Any Western Philosopher Greater than Kant?

[James_S_Saint]

@Uccisore

Not that your purpose here is to advance Eastern religion at the expense of western civilization.

Programmed drones know nothing of purpose.

[zinnat]

Actually, philosophers should not be compared unless they deal strictly with the same issue, which does not happen generally. Philosophy is very broad and loose term, just like science. One cannot compare a physicist with a biologist.

Having said that, the main objective of the philosophy is put a complete ontology of the existence forth, in as far as deductive detail as possible, and Kant tried that. Hume also did that.

In my opinion, which is certainly just the opposite of the general perception, Kant would certainly be the greatest philosophers of all times if he would have not written anything after his self imposed exile. His first half is truly innovative and in the right direction. But, not being able to complete the ontology for the various reasons, he also compromised later.

To me, Kant is the height of both of intellectuality and effort. Not many western philosophers made efforts which can match Kant. I would have certainly rated him the greatest of all times, had he left the ontology incomplete.

I rate Socrates as all time great of western philosophy. Kant and Aristotle are 2nd and 3rd place. I am not sure who was better. Kant made more inroads but Aristotle was certainly the wiser and more knowledgeable between the two.

But, I would rate Hume very below. There are many other who deserve the place before him. Skepticism is not a bad thing but he put everything in the doubt, which does not serve any purpose either.

Given my knowledge of the western philosophy, I am not competent enough to make claims about it, but it seems to me that Hume is one of the main culprits of the mitigation of the philosophy and science superseding it. Intellectual populace, who considered Hume as an authority on philosophy at the time, taking clue from him, put all the philosophy in the doubt and started looking at science for more concrete and demonstrable answers and ontologies.

Philosophy was never the same for the people. Fertile minds started migrating from the philosophy to the science. That is why we were not able to produce any such philosopher since Kant, which would be remembered after 2-3 centuries, in the same way we today remember Kant, Descartes, Socrates, Aristotle etc. Kant was the last in that league. Perhaps, Wittgenstein is the only exception.

It is not the case that there was a scarcity of the intelligence. There were people like Newton and Einstein, which were not less capable than any past philosopher, but philosophy lost the capacity to attract the best, which was the default phenomenon before Kant.

To summarize the issue, Kant was perhaps the best only in the terms of efforts, not the findings.

with love,
sanjay

[Wandering_Lands]

@Prismatic567

To infer the Absolute is not that easy but it is not difficult either.
The Vedantist infer that there must be a permanent self within the changing selves [over child, youth, adult ages] over time. This permanent self must be a part of an overall absolute self like a drop of water [the individual self] to the ocean [higher absolute SELF].
The point here is the Absolute Self is a mere speculation and cannot be proven.

You only gave me his theories and did not really go into explanation for how it’s so.

@Prismatic567

My basic philosophy is based on Eastern philosophy so I am very familiar with the above. I had explained how the Vedantist infer the Absolute above.
The Mahayanas do consider the ‘higher’ Dharmakaya, the Buddha Nature, Alaya Consciousness, etc. but these are not absolutely Absolute like those of the Vedantist pantheism or the theistic God.

The core principles of Buddhism has no room for the absolutely ABSOLUTE. Kant’s philosophy is parallel and almost exactly the same as Buddhism core principles on the intellectual aspects. Buddhism has a lot of practical and practices whilst Kant is restricted to merely theories and principles.

You go from saying that they don’t talk about the Absolute to contradicting yourself, as seen by talking about the Vedantist and Buddhist conception of self and higher consciousness (which was actually what people like Hegel were also proposing). Next, you then start back-tracking that they don’t talk about the Absolute absolutely, and that they infer it - which is actually another lie; as a I recall, they are affirmed in talking about the Absolute (again, look at Advaita Vedanta, for example).

[Prismatic567]

@zinnat13

Actually, philosophers should not be compared unless they deal strictly with the same issue, which does not happen generally. Philosophy is very broad and loose term, just like science. One cannot compare a physicist with a biologist.

Having said that, the main objective of the philosophy is put a complete ontology of the existence forth, in as far as deductive detail as possible, and Kant tried that. Hume also did that.

Philosophy in general is a very loose term. It is said that there are as many definitions as the number of people who attempt to define it. However, I noted there is a core and essence [substance] of ‘what is philosophy’ within the varied form of its definitions.

The essence of philosophy permeates every knowledge.
Science at one time was a form and a subject of philosophy but separated once it specialized as an independent body of knowledge, but the essence of philosophy still remains within it. It is possible logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics could go their own separate independent ways in the future and what is left is philosophy-proper, i.e. its essence.

Whilst philosophy-proper and its current form is difficult to nail down, there is always a way to compare philosophers based on an agreed set of criteria. Note how ratings are done in sports that are very subjective, e.g. gymnastics, diving, ice skating, in beauty contests and other contests that has subjective variables.
Perhaps you missed this post re why the need for a set of TO BE AGREED criteria viewtopic.php?p=2517890#p2517890
Therefore we can compare philosophers.

In my opinion, which is certainly just the opposite of the general perception, Kant would certainly be the greatest philosophers of all times if he would have not written anything after his self imposed exile. His first half is truly innovative and in the right direction. But, not being able to complete the ontology for the various reasons, he also compromised later.

To me, Kant is the height of both of intellectuality and effort. Not many western philosophers made efforts which can match Kant. I would have certainly rated him the greatest of all times, had he left the ontology incomplete.

I rate Socrates as all time great of western philosophy. Kant and Aristotle are 2nd and 3rd place. I am not sure who was better. Kant made more inroads but Aristotle was certainly the wiser and more knowledgeable between the two.

You seem to be trying to hold back the drive of progress within humanity with the wish that Kant should not have awoken from his DOGMATIC state and dreams.

Within the spirit and essence of philosophy, the ongoing drive is to exhaust all claims of ‘knowledge’ to its roots.
Kant did that and found ontology to be groundless, i.e. ontology is floating on an illusion. Btw, Kant did not propose the elimination of ontology/metaphysics which he stated is as necessary as breathing. However, one must be aware of its limitations of illusoriness and use it within its limits if need to.

Btw, attributing the ‘greatest’ or the top 10 is not an ego trip. Rather for philosophical sake, it direct one to prioritize one’s allocation of limited time and mental resources to areas that are critical for humanity.

[Prismatic567]

@Wandering_Lands

You only gave me his theories and did not really go into explanation for how it’s so.

At certain phase of philosophical discussions, the optimal is to discuss tips of iceberg rather than diving deep into the other 9/10th. To go deeper will require a lot of time and tedious volleys of postings. We will try our best to go deeper but why should it be obligatory in a forum like this?

@Prismatic567

My basic philosophy is based on Eastern philosophy so I am very familiar with the above. I had explained how the Vedantist infer the Absolute above.
The Mahayanas do consider the ‘higher’ Dharmakaya, the Buddha Nature, Alaya Consciousness, etc. but these are not absolutely Absolute like those of the Vedantist pantheism or the theistic God.

The core principles of Buddhism has no room for the absolutely ABSOLUTE. Kant’s philosophy is parallel and almost exactly the same as Buddhism core principles on the intellectual aspects. Buddhism has a lot of practical and practices whilst Kant is restricted to merely theories and principles.

You go from saying that they don’t talk about the Absolute to contradicting yourself, as seen by talking about the Vedantist and Buddhist conception of self and higher consciousness (which was actually what people like Hegel were also proposing).
Next, you then start back-tracking that they don’t talk about the Absolute absolutely, and that they infer it - which is actually another lie; as a I recall, they are affirmed in talking about the Absolute (again, look at Advaita Vedanta, for example).

You seemed to have missed the point quite completely. It is a serious issue to jump in to accuse another of lying if you do not have the fact or misunderstood the fact.

I’ll present it in another way.
There are multiple perspectives to the term ‘absolute’ which could be

1. in conventional usage like absolute temperature, monarchy, and the likes
2. in term of GOD, the ABSOLUTE, the Ultimate that is without any conditions.

Advaita Vedanta, Hegel, and other theists and pantheists refer to the Absolute as in 2.
I had stated their claim to knowledge of such an Absolute is based on transcendental logical inference. How else, by empirical observations?
In addition to inference, they would claim they have personal experience of it, but I have discussed such experiences are dubious and are based on an illusion.

As for Buddhism and Buddhists, there is no recognition of the Absolute as in 2 above.
Note what I said is, the Buddhists do consider higher states of consciousness and higher self but they DO NOT accept the ABSOLUTE. That is because they understand the idea of the reality of the Absolute or God as claimed by Advaita Vedanta [Brahman], Hegel or theists is an illusion.

Hope you get the point.

[Prismatic567]

@James S Saint

@James S Saint

How did Kant “prove that monads are not realistic”?

Can’t answer that one either??
Is there anything about Kant’s thesis that you actually understand?

I have the answers but I don’t have the appetite to discuss it with you especially when you are full of vomits all over yourself.

[James_S_Saint]

@Prismatic567

@James S Saint

@James S Saint

How did Kant “prove that monads are not realistic”?

Can’t answer that one either??
Is there anything about Kant’s thesis that you actually understand?

I have the answers but I don’t have the appetite to discuss it with you especially when you are full of vomits all over yourself.

In short, like the other subjects that you discuss (logic and religion), you don’t actually know anything about it. You are merely preaching what you want people to believe - proselytizing. In this case, I suspect your support for Kant stems merely from your hatred for Hume’s religious stance.

[zinnat]

@Prismatic567

there is always a way to compare philosophers based on an agreed set of criteria.

May be. But, in that case, who will decide what that criteria should be?

@Prismatic567

You seem to be trying to hold back the drive of progress within humanity with the wish that Kant should not have awoken from his DOGMATIC state and dreams.

Within the spirit and essence of philosophy, the ongoing drive is to exhaust all claims of ‘knowledge’ to its roots.
Kant did that and found ontology to be groundless, i.e. ontology is floating on an illusion. Btw, Kant did not propose the elimination of ontology/metaphysics which he stated is as necessary as breathing. However, one must be aware of its limitations of illusoriness and use it within its limits if need to.

I am not holding back anything. Making compromise and putting anything incomplete or wrong and saying or assuming that it is done, is not the progress by any mean.

Kant certainly realized that there is something beyond the physical limit but he was unable to reach the experiencing stage.
He tried honestly but could not able to cross that threshold which is required for the actual answers. That is fine. I am okay with that. But, in that case, he should not come up saying that there are no answers whatsoever. He was guilty of that.

@Prismatic567

Btw, attributing the ‘greatest’ or the top 10 is not an ego trip

I am not sure in which context you said this.

@Prismatic567

Rather for philosophical sake, it direct one to prioritize one’s allocation of limited time and mental resources to areas that are critical for humanity.

Philosophy, in its strict sense, has nothing to do with humanity or mankind. Yes, its findings can be used to help mankind but both are not the same things. It is a tool which can used for any purpose.

with love,
sanjay

[zinnat]

@Prismatic567

@Wandering_Lands

You only gave me his theories and did not really go into explanation for how it’s so.

At certain phase of philosophical discussions, the optimal is to discuss tips of iceberg rather than diving deep into the other 9/10th. To go deeper will require a lot of time and tedious volleys of postings. We will try our best to go deeper but why should it be obligatory in a forum like this?

@Prismatic567

My basic philosophy is based on Eastern philosophy so I am very familiar with the above. I had explained how the Vedantist infer the Absolute above.
The Mahayanas do consider the ‘higher’ Dharmakaya, the Buddha Nature, Alaya Consciousness, etc. but these are not absolutely Absolute like those of the Vedantist pantheism or the theistic God.

The core principles of Buddhism has no room for the absolutely ABSOLUTE. Kant’s philosophy is parallel and almost exactly the same as Buddhism core principles on the intellectual aspects. Buddhism has a lot of practical and practices whilst Kant is restricted to merely theories and principles.

You go from saying that they don’t talk about the Absolute to contradicting yourself, as seen by talking about the Vedantist and Buddhist conception of self and higher consciousness (which was actually what people like Hegel were also proposing).
Next, you then start back-tracking that they don’t talk about the Absolute absolutely, and that they infer it - which is actually another lie; as a I recall, they are affirmed in talking about the Absolute (again, look at Advaita Vedanta, for example).

You seemed to have missed the point quite completely. It is a serious issue to jump in to accuse another of lying if you do not have the fact or misunderstood the fact.

I’ll present it in another way.
There are multiple perspectives to the term ‘absolute’ which could be

1. in conventional usage like absolute temperature, monarchy, and the likes
2. in term of GOD, the ABSOLUTE, the Ultimate that is without any conditions.

Advaita Vedanta, Hegel, and other theists and pantheists refer to the Absolute as in 2.
I had stated their claim to knowledge of such an Absolute is based on transcendental logical inference. How else, by empirical observations?
In addition to inference, they would claim they have personal experience of it, but I have discussed such experiences are dubious and are based on an illusion.

As for Buddhism and Buddhists, there is no recognition of the Absolute as in 2 above.
Note what I said is, the Buddhists do consider higher states of consciousness and higher self but they DO NOT accept the ABSOLUTE. That is because they understand the idea of the reality of the Absolute or God as claimed by Advaita Vedanta [Brahman], Hegel or theists is an illusion.

Hope you get the point.

Prism,

I think that you are missing something here.

There is general misperception among the western intellectualls that Buddhism does not propose an absolute. Or perhaps, they like to interpret it that way in order to suit their atheistic mindset.

The Rinzai Zen Buddhist master, Soyen Shaku, speaking to Americans at the beginning of the 20th century, discusses how in essence the idea of God is not absent from Buddhism, when understood as ultimate, true Reality:[52]

At the outset, let me state that Buddhism is not atheistic as the term is ordinarily understood. It has certainly a God, the highest reality and truth, through which and in which this universe exists. However, the followers of Buddhism usually avoid the term God, for it savors so much of Christianity, whose spirit is not always exactly in accord with the Buddhist interpretation of religious experience … To define more exactly the Buddhist notion of the highest being, it may be convenient to borrow the term very happily coined by a modern German scholar, ‘panentheism’, according to which God is … all and one and more than the totality of existence … As I mentioned before, Buddhists do not make use of the term God, which characteristically belongs to Christian terminology

Buddhism and Jainism are Process ontologies while Vedanta and Abrahamic religions are Destination ontologies. But, that does not mean that Buddhism does not believe in the absolute state. The only difference is that it says that being there or here does not make any difference if one has attained Bodhisattva. On the other hand, in destination ontologies like Vedanta, it is necessary to be there at the highest point to be librated completely.

with love,
sanjay

[Prismatic567]

@zinnat13

@Prismatic567

there is always a way to compare philosophers based on an agreed set of criteria.

May be. But, in that case, who will decide what that criteria should be?

It is on a negotiated basis between two person, a small group, large community or the majority.

What is done is,

1. Both of us present our set of criteria and seek agreement on criteria that are acceptable to both.
2. Assume we accept 20 criteria and the respective weightings.
3. Then each will do the ratings based on the accepted criteria.
4. The rating is given to 10, 20, 100, 500 or more philosophers, those interested in philosophy, general public or any groups.
5. The results are averaged out.
6. From the above we will arrive at an ‘objective’ result.

The results will be qualified to the above and cannot be absolute. However, the objectivity is greater if we rely on the ratings of philosophers than if were from the general public.

You can also establish your own unilateral preferred set of criteria and do your rating by yourself or from your own selected samplings.

From the above exercises, the critical point is to understand the objectivity obtained must be qualified to the criteria set.
The results are not absolute but they are definitely more rational than unmoderated subjective opinions that are off the cuffs.

Philosophy, in its strict sense, has nothing to do with humanity or mankind. Yes, its findings can be used to help mankind but both are not the same things. It is a tool which can used for any purpose.

Philosophy is a very loose term.
To make sense, as with the objectivity exercise above, we need to set out our criteria and definitions for consensus before we discuss.
Otherwise one it talking apples while the other oranges.

At present, it is a matter of individual’s opinion on ‘what is philosophy’.
However, personally and for my own credible sake, since I am interested in philosophy and delve into it, I have done very extensive research on ‘what is philosophy.’
I have reviewed between 300-500 definitions of ‘what is philosophy’ from all over the world and extract an essence out of them.
What have you done to reinforce your own credibility on what you think is ‘philosophy’?

[Prismatic567]

@zinnat13

Prism,

I think that you are missing something here.

There is general misperception among the western intellectualls that Buddhism does not propose an absolute. Or perhaps, they like to interpret it that way in order to suit their atheistic mindset.

Buddhism and Jainism are Process ontologies while Vedanta and Abrahamic religions are Destination ontologies. But, that does not mean that Buddhism does not believe in the absolute state. The only difference is that it says that being there or here does not make any difference if one has attained Bodhisattva. On the other hand, in destination ontologies like Vedanta, it is necessary to be there at the highest point to be librated completely.

with love,
sanjay

I have spent MANY years hanging on to the idea of the ABSOLUTE [never God though].
My transition to the letting go of the ‘Absolute’ is nothing personal [emotional, biasness and the likes] but only after long reflection, understanding and experience [just experience, not experiencing something].

There are Buddhists who delve into the idea of the ‘absolute’ or in very rare cases, they term it ‘God’, ( in fact it is higher states of consciousness or self), but they will and can never equate that to the theistic Absolute of the Abrahamic religions, the pantheists or deists.
This is because the core principles of Buddhism do not entertain the absolutely absolute.
The vedantist path is the Atman, therefore → Brahman.

When the core principles of Buddhism do not accept ‘atman’ per se in the first place, how can it cannot follow to Brahman [Absolute].

There are sects in Buddhism, e.g. Pure Land, who adopt the approach where believers merely ‘believe’ in Buddha and they will go to ‘heaven’.
There are talks of rebirth in various forms and for some there is literal rebirth.
These are to attract and cater-to the very laypeople but they can be explained. On a deeper analysis with the core principles of Buddhism proper, the principles are not in the theistic sense of the Abrahamic religion, the Absolute [with capital ‘A’] or God per se.

I dare say [that’s imo] you have only dive into the 8/10th of the iceberg of spirituality. You need to dive into the 9/10th toward the 9.99/10th of the iceberg.

[zinnat]

@Prismatic567

I have reviewed between 300-500 definitions of ‘what is philosophy’ from all over the world and extract an essence out of them.

That may be true. I can believe you.

@Prismatic567

What have you done to reinforce your own credibility on what you think is ‘philosophy’?

Conventionally not much but actually a lot.

I am involved in this since more than last twenty years without realizing what i was doing is actually a philosophical investigation. That realization came only when i came to philosophy boards and started understanding philosophy.

The one and only purpose of the philosophy is put the ontology of the existence forth. And, for that, one must know the tool of knowing. That is why Greeks rightly defined philosophy as Know thyself.

That definition is sufficient enough. If one can know thyself completely, the whole of philosophy would be over. Nothing would be left behind. All Eastern philosophies also say the same.

with love,
sanjay

[Only_Humean]

quantum warned for his post.

[quantum]

Board warning issued
Sent: Mon Jan 12, 2015 8:29 am
From: Only_Humean
To: quantum

The following is a warning which has been issued to you by an administrator or moderator of this site.
This is a warning regarding the following post made by you: viewtopic.php?f=1&p=2518639#p2518639 . Not acceptable for the Philosophy board.

---

Re: Board warning issued
Sent: Fri Jan 16, 2015 6:32 am
From: quantum
To: Only_Humean

your warning my ass.
I know there exist no members.
you guys really need looses users
no matter what I do you never reject me
i write what ever i want

assole

[Only_Humean]

Another warning issued to quantum, post against Philosophy forum rules. Second warning, one-day ban.

Additionally, his thesis seems to be flawed.

[quantum]

My dick to the ass of the admin of this site
no matter what I do you will never ban me.
I truly know how many users exist on this site.
fake usernames.
pay me daily 20 dollars.
I’m ready to create enough users and topic mails and can keep this site look busy.
from reality of ethics and morality of being concept to ethics and morality of kant.

[Only_Humean]

Third warning, four-day ban. The next warning will be a permanent ban.

[quantum]

pay me daily 20 dollars.
I’m ready to create enough users and topic mails and can keep this site look busy.
from reality of ethics and morality of being concept to ethics and morality of kant.

[Arminius]

Kant believed in indeterminate free-will.

No. Kant referred to both indeterminism and determinism, because he taught (1) an empirical (thus: close to nature) person and (2) an ethical (thus: close to culture) person. So according to Kant humans are citizens of two “worlds”: (1) a “visible world” and (2) an “intelligible world”. The humans as (1) empirical (natural) persons or citizens of the “visible world” do not have an “absolute free will” becaue they are subordinated by nature and its “law” of causality; but the humans as (2) ethical (cultural) persons or as citizens of the “intelligible world” have an “absolute free will”. The “moral law” is based only on the existence of the “intelligible freedom” (=> 2).

@"Ted Honderich (in: [url=http://www.ucl.ac.uk

UCL.ac.uk[/url])"]One summary of the great Kant’s view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too – but takes this situation to have nothing to do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness – at bottom, being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge, quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists – origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as Incompatibilists certainly do.

Kant’s main idea, whatever sense can finally be made of it, depends on his fundamental two-worlds doctrine. He locates determinism in the empirical world or world of appearances, and freedom in the world of things-in-themselves, the world of reason. It is important that the latter world is not in time.

So he is a determinist of a kind, opposed to the tradition of Compatibilism, not really in the Incompatibilist tradition, but tries to make his determinism and freedom-as-origination consistent by his own private means. You may well wonder if he can succeed in all this – and suspect too, at the beginning of the 21st Century, that something so radical as his view is actually needed.

Who ist Ted Honderich?

@"[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Honderich

Wikipedia[/url]"]Ted Honderich (born 30 January 1933) is a Canadian-born British philosopher, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London[1] and Visiting Professor, University of Bath. His work has been mainly about five things: determinism’s truth and its consequences for our lives; the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain; right and wrong in the contemporary world, in particular with respect to terrorism; the supposed justifications of punishment by the state; and the political tradition of conservatism.

[Arminius]

Excerpt from The Critique of Pure Reason:

@Immanuel Kant

… Every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing other than a certain causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects in appearance this reason exhibits a rule, in accordance with which one could derive the rational grounds and the actions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the subjective principles of his power of choice. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically

But if we consider the very same actions in relation to reason, not, to be sure, in relation to speculative reason, in order to explain them as regards their origin, but insofar as reason is the cause of producing them by themselves — in a word, if we compare them with reason in a practical respect — then we find a rule and order that is entirely other than the natural order. For perhaps everything that has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds inevitably had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least believe we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to the actions of human beings as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred not through empirical causes, no, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.

Suppose now that one could say reason has causality in regard to appearance; could reason’s action then be called free even though in its empirical character (in the mode of sense) it is all precisely determined and necessary? The empirical character is once again determined in the intelligible character (in the mode of thought). We are not acquainted with the latter, but it is indicated through appearances, which really give only the mode of sense (the empirical character) for immediate cognition. Now the action, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it in accord with empirical laws, i.e. in such a way that it is preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the appearance of inner sense precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to the conditions of the temporal sequence. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise or start working at a certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom.

Thus we could say that if reason can have causality in regard to appearances, then it is a faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the condition of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensible condition or to any determination of time through any passing cause.

Nevertheless, this very same cause in another relation also belongs to the series of appearances. The human being himself is an appearance. His power of choice has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is not one of these conditions determining human beings according to this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and does not obey the laws of nature according to which no empirically unconditioned causality is present among the things that happen in time. Hence no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely from itself. But of reason one cannot say that before the state in which it determines the power of choice, another state precedes in which this state itself is determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it.

Reason is thus the persisting condition of all voluntary actions under which the human being appears. Even before it happens, every one of these actions is determined beforehand in the empirical character of the human being. In regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical one is only the sensible schema, no before or after applies, and every action, irrespective of the temporal relation in which it stands to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason; reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically by external or internal grounds temporally preceding it in the chain of natural causes, and this freedom of reason can not only be regarded negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for then the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of appearances), but also indicated positively by a faculty of beginning a series of occurrences from itself, in such a way that in reason itself nothing begins, but as the unconditioned condition of every voluntary action, it allows of no condition prior to it in time, whereas its effect begins in the series of appearances, but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning in this series.

In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use — not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions) — one may take a voluntary action, e.g. a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person. WIth this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect.

Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of consequences entirely from himself.

This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is. And indeed one regards the causality of reason not as a mere concurrence with other causes, e but as complete in itself, even if sensuous incentives were not for it but were indeed entirely against it; the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character: now, in the moment when he lies, it is entirely his fault; hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, is fully free, and this deed is to be attributed entirely to its failure to act.

Excerpt from The Critique of Practical Reason:

@Immanuel Kant

The concept of causality as natural necessity, as distinguished from the concept of causality as freedom, concerns only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time and hence as appearances, as opposed to their causality as things in themselves. Now, if one takes the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things-in-themselves (which is the most usual way of representing them), then the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as contradictory. For, from the first it follows that every event, and consequently every action that takes place at a point of time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time. Now, since time past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act.

Indeed, even if I assume that my whole existence is independent from any alien cause (such as God), so that the determining grounds ot my causality and even of my whole existence are not outside me, this would not in the least transform that natural necessity into freedom. For, at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to action by that which is not within my control, and the series of events infinite a parte priori which I can only continue in accordance with a predetermined order would never begin of itself: it would be a continuous natural chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.

If, then, one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, one cannot, so far at least, except this being from the law of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and consequently as to its actions as well; for, that would be tantamount to handing it over to blind chance. But since this law unavoidably concerns all causality of things so far as their existence in time is determinable, if this were the way in which one had to represent also the existence of these things-in-themselves then freedom would have to be rejected as a null and impossible concept.

Consequently, if one still wants to save it, no other path remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and so too its causality in accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing-in-itself. This is certainly unavoidable if one wants to maintain both these mutually repellent concepts together; but in application, when one wants to explain them as united in one and the same action, and so to explain this union itself, great difficulties come forward, which seem to make such a unification unfeasible.

If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could have been left undone; how, then, can appraisal in accordance with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been omitted because the law says that it ought to have been omitted? That is, how can that man be called quite free at the same point of time and in regard to the same action in which and in regard to which he is nevertheless subject to an unavoidable natural necessity?

It is a wretched subterfuge to seek to evade this by saying that the kind of determining grounds of his causality in accordance with natural law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom, according to which that is sometimes called a free effect, the determining natural ground of which lies within the acting being, e.g., that which a projectile accomplishes when it is in free motion, in which case one uses the word “freedom” because while it is in flight it is not impelled from without; or as we also call the motion of a clock a free motion because it moves the hands itself, which therefore do not need to be pushed externally; in the same way the actions of the human being, although they are necessary by their determining grounds which preceded them in time, are yet called free because the actions are caused from within, by representations produced by our own powers, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances and hence actions are produced at our own discretion.

Some still let themselves be put off by this subterfuge and so think they have solved, with a little quibbling about words, that difficult problem on the solution of which millennia have worked in vain and which can therefore hardly be found so completely on the surface, That is to say, in the question about that freedom which must be put at the basis of all moral laws and the imputation appropriate to them, it does not matter whether the causality determined in accordance with a natural law is necessary through determining grounds lying within the subject or outside him, or in the first case whether these determining grounds are instinctive or thought by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these determining representations have the ground of their existence in time and indeed in the antecedent state; and this in turn in a preceding state, and so forth.

These determinations may be internal and they may have psychological instead of mechanical causality, that is, produce actions by means of representations and not by bodily movements; [still] they are always determinining grounds of the causality of a being insofar as its existence is determinable in time and therefore under the necessitating conditions of past time, which are thus, when the subject is to act, no longer within his control and which may therefore bring with them psychological freedom (if one wants to use this term for a merely internal chain of representations in the soul) but nevertheless natural necessity; and they therefore leave no transcendental freedom, which must be thought as independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally, whether it is regarded as an object of inner sense in time only or also of outer sense in both space and time; without this freedom (in the latter and proper sense), which alone is practical a priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it.

Just for this reason, all necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature, although it is not meant in this that the things which are subject to it must be really material machines. Here one looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or with Leibniz spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were none other than the latter (say, psychological and comparative but not also transcendental, i.e., absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself.

Now, in order, in the case at hand, to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action, one must recall what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason or follows from it: that the natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting subject as appearance, and that, accordingly, the determining grounds of every action of the subject so far lie in what belongs to past time and is no longer within his control (in which must be counted his past deeds and the character as a phenomenon thereby determinable for him in his own eyes).

But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing-in-itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action — and in general every determination of his existence changing conformably with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being — is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.

So considered, a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he could have omitted it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and, so far, is inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which determines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of his character, which he gives to himself and in accordance with which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all sensibility, the causality of those appearances.

The judicial sentences of that wonderful capacity in us which we call conscience are in perfect agreement with this. A human being may use what art he will to paint some unlawful conduct he remembers as an unintentional fault — as a mere oversight which one can never avoid altogether, and so as something in which he was carried away by the stream of natural necessity — and to declare himself innocent of it. He nevertheless finds that the advocate who speaks in his favor can by no means reduce to silence the prosecutor within him, if only he is aware that at the time he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, had the use of his freedom; and while he explains his misconduct by certain bad habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow in him to such a degree that he can regard his misconduct as their natural consequence, yet this cannot protect him from the reproach and censure he casts upon himself.

This is also the ground of repentance for a deed long past at every recollection of it, a painful feeling aroused by the moral disposition, which is empty in a practical way to the extent that it cannot serve to undo what has been done and would even be absurd. (Priestley, a genuine fatalist proceeding consistently, declares it absurd; and for this candor he deserves more applause than those who, while maintaining the mechanism of the will in deeds but its freedom in words, yet want it to be thought that they include it in their syncretistic system, though without making the possibility of such imputation comprehensible.) But repentance, as pain, is still quite legitimate because reason, when it is a question of the law of our intelligible existence (the moral law), recognizes no distinction of time and asks only whether the event belongs to me as a deed and, if it does, then always connects the same feeling with it morally, whether it was done just now or long ago. For, the sensible ljfe has, with respect to the intelligible consciousness of its existence (consciousness of freedom), the absolute unity of a phenomenon, which, so far as it contains merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with (appearances of the character), must be appraised not in accordance with the natural necessity that belongs to it as appearance but in accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom.

One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind, as shown by inner as well as outer actions, that we would know every incentive to action, even the smallest, as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain that the human being’s conduct is free. If, that is to say, we were capable of another view, namely an intellectual intuition of the same subject (which is certainly not given to us and in place of which we have only the rational concept), then we would become aware that this whole chain of appearances, with respect to all that the moral law is concerned with, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing-in-itself, for the determination of which no physical explanation can be given.

In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this difference between the relation of our actions as appearances to the sensible being of our subject and relation by which this sensible being is itself referred to the intelligible substratum in us. From this perspective, which is natural to our reason though inexplicable, appraisals can be justified which, though made in all conscientiousness, yet seem at first glance quite contrary to all equity. There are cases in which human beings, even with the same education that was profitable to others, yet show from childhood such early wickedness and progress in it so continuously into their adulthood that they are taken to be born villains and quite incapable of improvement as far as their cast of mind is concerned; and nevertheless they are so judged for what they do or leave undone that they are censured as guilty of their crimes; indeed, they themselves (the children) find these censures as well founded as if, despite the hopeless natural constitution of minds ascribed to the, they remained as accountable as any other human being.

This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever arises from one’s choice (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its basis a free causality which from early youth expresses its character in its appearances (actions); these actions, on account of the uniformity of conduct, make knowable a natural connection that does not, however, make the vicious constitution of the will necessary but is instead the consequence of the evil and unchangeable principles freely adopted, which make it only more culpable and deserving of punishment.