Hi,
It seems that you are missing the point. The argument posits God because he is defined as an omnipotent and eternal being, and the argument attempts to show that an omnipotent and eternal being is necessary to provide men with perfect and lasting happiness.
The reasoning runs as follows:
X is necessary
X is God (by definition)
Therefore God is necessary.
No fallacy here.
No drug can do it without utterly overthrowing the laws of nature. But that would not be surprising if God were involved, because he is the very creator of nature.
The instinct to independence is a false volition, a volition with an impossible object, brought about by a lack of reasonableness. However, through this illusory volition, we can glimpse a basic tendency: the tendency to happiness. Happiness is always the ultimate value, only the means thereto vary and are sometimes flimsy.
It is what I would reply if I wanted to defend the argument. I am not even sure I support this argument.
yet perfect and lasting happiness eludes us.
unless you believe in heaven.
in which case you have assumed God’s existence (implicit in assuming the existence of heaven).
and therefore pre-assumed your conclusion: that God exists.
no?
Hi,
The argument purports to show that perfect and lasting happiness is possible (it is not said when). But, it is a fact that "perfect and lasting happiness eludes us [in this life]". In that case, to remain consistent, we must hold that there is another life in which happiness can be attained. Again, no question-begging.
Sâmkhya wrote:
We can’t conclude that another life exists because we fail to achieve perfect and lasting happiness in this one. Your argument works under the assumption that perfect and lasting happiness must exist, for otherwise we would have no tendency towards such an object. Now, consider the following comments:
Sâmkhya wrote:
Here is the flaw: but forever. You can argue that human beings have a tendency towards happiness, but notice that happiness – as it exists, as object, in this world – is not everlasting, but brief, and evanescent. Since nobody has an experience, or, let’s say, since me and you have not experienced everlasting happiness, how then can we postulate that it exists as an object? You reply, “Because we have the tendency.” This is not sufficient; and it is not sufficient because I reject your response to the mirage objection, and thereby shall offer a similar one (and attempt to elaborate on the flaw):
We must distinguish between tendencies which are directed toward real objects, and tendencies directed toward imagined objects. For example, an individual has a tendency to find the lost city of Atlantis; they go out on a quest in search of this lost city, but how can they know that this city is not merely legend; how can they know that it exists in actuality? Now, notice that the tendency exists, but the object to which it is directed towards is still in question – does the object exist externally of one’s mind, or not? The only way for one to obtain definitive knowledge of whether or not Atlantis exists, is to find the city of Atlantis itself. Unless the individual finds the city, they cannot determine whether or not the object exists. Now, in the example, which slightly differs from the mirage one, to what is the individual’s real tendency directed toward, if it is a question of volition?–The volition is to find the city, in hopes of satisfying the tendency (let’s propose, the tendency is to bring the individual joy); now, consider what has happened: The tendency is to bring the individual joy, which can only be brought about by finding the city of Atlantis; the volition is that the individual has determined that only Atlantis can bring them the joy that they seek; but have we determined that Atlantis must exist, simply because they have postulated that only it can bring them this type of joy? No, not at all; for the tendency was directed not towards the object of Atlantis, but as we have determined, towards the feeling of Joy which the individual in search of has determined only Atlantis can provide.
Therefore, the tendency is towards everlasting happiness, but it is in-itself the object which it seeks; heaven/god is not the object that it is directed towards, even though that is what would provide them with what they seek (everlasting happiness). Does that make sense to you?
Sâmkhya
I would think that for an individual who thinks, or feels, him or herself – or even a loved one, perhaps even a stranger – to be the victum of injustice, cannot find happiness. I would therefore assume that the tendency towards justice underlies the tendency towards happiness.
TUM,
Your criticism is interesting. Let us restate the argument in a more refined way.
What is sought is not an external object but a state of consciousness: a stable state of happiness.
The existence of a tendency toward this state shows that, by the very definition of a tendency, this state is not impossible.
But since this state is possible, things that permit this state must be real, but often, man deceives himself into thinking that finite and perishable things can bring such a state. Actually, what exists is a very powerful and eternal deity (or many?) which can produce and maintain happiness forever.
All the objections amount to pointing to false objects mistaken for a way to attain a state of happiness.
Sâmkhya,
You wrote,
Nor does it imply that it is possible; and that is precisely what we are looking to definitively prove with the argument – however, it remains unproved. Again, let’s go back to Atlantis: because we have the tendency towards joy, we may assume that the joy may be possible to attain, but we are not certain of this, for the joy depends on us finding the city. If there is no city to be found, then we are forced to conclude that the object of our tendency (the joy) was an illusion – a grand mirage. But you reply, why then did we develop the tendency; how could we have developed a tendency without a real object to which it corresponds? And that I shall answer with the following: The problem in the argument is that one puts the cart in front of the horse; and that is because the tendency toward attaining the joy, which will be brought about by finding the city, only develops after the individual comes across the idea of the city. That is to say, until the individual can postulate that the city of Atlantis exists, they cannot have the tendency towards the joy which finding Atlantis would bring (you are right to say that the existence of the tendency necessarily implies the existence of the city – but not the actual external existence: merely postulating is enough to bring about the existence of the tendency); hence, the tendency develops as a direct result of postulating the existence of the city.
Therefore, once the individual has the idea of God/heaven, the idea creates in them the notion of eternal happiness, thereby creating the tendency toward such an object. The seemingly irresolvable question, of where this tendency originated from, that is, if there is no corresponding object (a stable state of happiness), is that it developed as a consequence of postulating the existence of such a place/being/state, which thereby produced the tendency toward the, never experienced ideal, of a perfect state of eternal happiness.
If someone objects, by bringing up, say…a guy like Karl Marx; I would say, in similar fashion, that the tendency towards eternal happiness developed only after the notion of a utopia developed. But if one asks: why was he in search of a utopia?–I shall respond: because he was motivated by the desire to end the suffering experienced under capitalism. The tendency towards developing a theory of perfect happiness in a utopian state, is a direct result of having such a state to postulate.
Sâmkhya,
ok cool.
but what i don’t get now is how do we know that a perfect and lasting hapiness is possible if:
a) it eludes us in this life… and
b) we cannot prove the existence of another/after-life.
why should we come to the conclusion that it is a possibility if, to make that conclusion we must make an assumption of an after-life for which we have no proof.
why would it be more reasonable to say that:
than…
or…
We should test this idea by checking what happens to a guy brought up without having heard of heaven: does he seek nonetheless a stable state of happiness?
Prove-it
The argument states that we have a tendency to happiness, and a tendency involves in its definition the existence of its object.
There is also an inductive argument: we see that real objects fit basic tendencies in the world: there is a tendency to food, and there is food. There is a tendency to water, and there is water. There is a tendency to sex, and there is mates, etc. So we can make a generalization and take as a law that a tendency CAN be satisfied.
Sâmkhya,
hello.
yes. we have a tendency to food and that hunger is satisfied.
yes. we have a tendency to sex and that lust is satisfied.
and yes we have a tendency to happiness and that happiness is satifsied.
i think you will agree that all these happen in this life.
what i am objcting to (or perhaps what i don’t fully understand the reasoning behind…) is why from his we can assume that any of these things are eternally staisfied.
i believe in happiness but i do not believe in eternal happiness any more than i believe that i could ever be eternally sexually satisfied.
these are all cravings that are satisfied and then return. like Plato’s leaky pitcher.
Hi,
Why am I speaking of eternal happiness? Because when we are happy, we would like to remain forever in that state, and when we are not, we try to attain that state. To me, it seems to show that the happiness which is sought must be stable for the tendency to be fully satisfied.
Sâmkhya,
No, he seeks an end to suffering. Buddha.
Samkhya,
Sorry, to be jumping in late, but I find your basic premise questionable. It is true that all organisms have a tendency toward physical stability, but it’s a huge leap to suggest that humans tend toward permanent happiness.
For your premise to be reliable, you would have to show an example of something, anything in the universe representing stasis, for only in a static universe can something be forever. I would argue that any ‘tendency’ toward permanent pleasure flies in the face of of everything we’ve discovered about the natural universe. It is processual and in constant flux. Nothing is forever, but perhaps the process of coming into being and returning.
That said, it is entirely possible for the mind to create an illusion of the possibility of permanent happiness, but it is illusion nonetheless. I do understand the concept, since many (most) are in constant pursuit of ‘happiness’, but the goal of constant and unending anything is still illusion.
JT