Delving into monetary economics is maybe pointless (and, anyway, I would not be really capable of that) with respect to your claim, which seems to be ‘reality is intersubjective consensus’.
I guess consensus is necessarily inter-subjective, in the sense that one does not normally use the word unless one is referring to some opinion/belief/idea shared by a plurality. Yet maybe consensus is not the exact word you mean, because you lay its foundation in the human DNA.
Now that ‘reality’, whatever that is, has to have the quality of being intersubjective is somehow easily conceded. The questions becomes if, assuming that intersubjective means only ‘something shared by people’, that is all it takes for that something to become ‘real’.
If we consider consensus as a widespread opinion only, that may be very helpful, but it is not what makes something real. Actually consensus is not even what would define Lyon as the capital of France. In order to make Lyon the capital, the legislative bodies de la République would need not only to agree on that, but also to act. Although a general consensus may be a most sought and somehow necessary precondition, Paris would remain the capital as long as a certain number of laws (and possibly a change of the Constitution) are passed. And once the laws are there, then it’s no longer a matter of consensus - laws are binding regardless what one thinks of them, at least as long as the state has the legal monopoly of violence. (Powers and acts of a similar kind are also what is at the basis of the ‘objective trading’ of the US dollar, though money is a more complex matter).
So, leaving consensus aside, what remains is ‘intersubjectivity’ - and I guess that the OP can be rephrased as ‘reality is intersubjectivity and nothing else’. I guess that you have slowly drifted to to kantian stance, which is to say ‘what comes to my mind because of my DNA is real - I know nothing of the thing-in-itself’. If that is so, this amounts to swapping the word ‘objective’ with ‘intersubjective’. Regardless, what about what comes to your mind and it is not firmly rooted in the DNA? Is intersubjectivity possible at all then?
Let’s take General Relativity. Regardless how much perception is the fabric of a-priori structures or not, I guess that GR cannot be said to depend on human DNA. GR, or many of its tenets, can be qualified as intersubjective? What makes this theory something like ‘knowledge of the real’?
It can’t be said that the theory relies on discovery or experience, e.g. it redefines gravity, but not on the basis of a changed perception of gravity. Surely it is not intersubjective because it’s popular (in fact not many can master it), nor because people agree with it (in fact not many would understand what they would be agreeing with). Its ‘intersubjectivity’ lies in the fact that it presents a character of necessity, it appears inescapable, alternative theories prove wrong or are incapable to yield the same predictions. It is by this necessity that this theory is about ‘reality’ and it is intersubjective. But that used to be true also of Newton’s universal gravitation, before Einstein…
What does that mean, after all?
Well, in utmost honesty… I have only some ideas, I do not feel thoroughly sure about that.
Cutting some corners, it can be seen as a logical necessity - but only for a part of it. It’s not about the ‘facts’, it’s about the frame where ‘facts’ are placed (yet ‘facts’ have to be crafted carefully). My take is that one can predicate intersubjectivity of knowledge when it is possible to representi it through a logical relationship - possibly only one: (if(A) then (B)) iff (if not(B) then not(A)).
Note that I am not implying that logic is the form by which intersubjectivity emerges, instead this is ex-post work, this is ‘justification’ (borrowing from Kant). Also, the tautology above overshadows a semantic component that it is equally important: B needs to be a logical consequence of A, B may be true only when A is true. (Please note that it is well possible that A is a long chain of propositions joined by any kind of functor). That said, what I do imply is that one cannot have the absolute truth of a single generic A or B, one can have the truth (as long as it works…) of both of them - simul stabunt vel simul cadent.
So the question becomes how come would one know when A and B are true (or false)? This is when it gets really difficult… I refer to Henri Poincaré and K.R. Popper - those who are interested may turn to the Value of Science and to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. However, this is where experience may become necessary (experience is not necessarily required, as it would be pointless to refer to experience for a Geometry theorem). Yet experience alone is not sufficient, but at the same time experience has to allow to consider at least that B is true (or false), that it is more the case that B than the case that not(B) (or the other way round).
This is more easily said than done. Nevertheless, as Poincaré noted, rigour in mathematics in a virtuous circle with science, notably physics, managed to single out a very specific perpective (‘regional ontology’, if one likes that better) for looking at facts, so that ascertaining facts, viz. assigning a ‘true’ or ‘false’ value, becomes very possible. Clearly this applies to science only (while Poincaré speaks of moral truths equally ascertainable, but totally independent form Science’s). Popper (maybe) acknowledges that the approach is founded, but he presents a more open and articulated view (which I like better), so that the way to ascertain facts remains more mysterious (and ‘mysterious’ is a kind word allowing me to oversimplify).
Either way, what is intersubjective is what can be represented through that tautology: the truth of the antecedent depends on the consequent and yet the consequent owes its truth to the antecedent. Outside this conundrum, I guess it’s difficult to speak about intersubjectivity.