Yes exactly.
what about this… could that last point not be precisely the why?
Isnt it all an attempt to create a non-taxing, “free morality”?
all strong and wholesome and generous beings tap thankfully from their roots. But a fungus has no roots…
Yes I think this must be so. Freedom is simply another word for consciousness, and this implies great responsibility. Determinism and freedom are the same thing once you realize that determination mounts through itself up and toward the universal, which is what we call “life”.
The psychopathological and wholly entropic compulsion to avoid responsibility, in this case responsibility in thinking and valuing, is probably at root of why philosophy continues to flounder in these bad ideas.
What if a thing itself is composed of what can enable it to be free in the sense we have described? e.g. consciousness
Do the temporal representations we ascribe to any thing’s reasons for being (its history) necessitate the state of freedom?
Just because a thing has reasons, which are necessary, the interpretations of these reasons are contingent throughout time. The nature of those reasons do not persist over time, only the existence of reasons. Just as the thing also exists, but may change its nature or interpretation. Because we have the ability to ascribe meaning, we can consciously change the interpretations of the reasons of a beings existence along with the representation of the thing that is caused by those reasons. ‘Predetermination’ disregards that we have the ability to change the meaning(s)/interpretation(s) (influenced by the faculties language, consciousness, state of mind, health etc.) of a thing and its history simply because a thing and its history exist; a deterministic fallacy. I will elaborate on this more in-depth in later reply.
It is true that beings have access to certain ranges of their own (pre)determination. This is integral to what consciousness is and means. But even this kind of access and self-notification of being is, itself, just a more derivative form of predetermination anyway.
Just because a being has the ability to reinterpret its own causality doesn’t mean this being is free from causality; just because there is a state of predetermination from which arises certain powers and freedoms to act counter to something in that state, doesn’t mean that those very powers and freedoms are not also predetermined. It is a categorical error here: the error is in viewing predeterminacy as an either/or choice, either a being is predetermined OR it is not predetermined. If you look at things from this vantage, then certainly it makes sense to conclude that because being is able to self-modify and to some degree reinterpret and change/reject certain of its predeterminations then it must consequently “not be predetermined”.
But again, that is the conclusion only because the issue is being viewed in a linear, black and white manner. It isn’t an issue of mutual exclusivity between predetermination and freedom, these are connected, since freedom is in fact a kind of predetermination that is able to act upon other predeterminations directly; you have different scopes, ranges of predeterminations affecting and influencing each other. This is what beings are: very complex and massive collections of many different kinds and ranges and scopes and intensities of predetermining causal-flows, all coming together in very intricate and subtle ways to inform a “total being”.
After all, what do you think is doing the “changing” of predetermined states, when for example a conscious being reaches inside itself somehow and forces a change upon its predetermining causes (as for example by ascribing meaning to things, as you mentioned)? It isn’t some magical non-predetermination that is causing that change, it is simply another kind of predetermination, something external and somewhat different from the one that is being interceded upon.
You can’t logically argue against predetermination just because you can point to an instance where a predetermination is being influenced to be “different” than otherwise. This only demonstrates more derivative, complex and self-reflexive predetermination, which is a hallmark of what we call living things.
wyld - what is a “reason for being”?
In what context?
You still need to define what you mean by free will. So far you’ve described what determines freedom and so, is it really so “free”?
There would be too many indeterminate entries that would add ambiguity to any computer results. You could abstract the person (heart rate, brain activity, whatever else you deem as predictor) and the input they are exposed to. What the input invokes in the subject is indeterminate. You can ask the subject about what they are thinking and thus link it to the other objective data you are acquiring at the moment, such as heart rate and brain activity, but the fallibility of the reporter, the person, compromises the data. You cannot read and quantify their minds. But maybe you can do your own mind? Sure, but the generalization of the data to all minds as a norm requires, again, asking people to see if they had a similar experience as yours, which engages the possibility of error. Maybe a subject wants to get your approval, wants to belong and is persuaded that they indeed felt as their object of admiration. Not saying that this happens all of the time or that it cannot be worked into the observations themselves, but that when you factor this in then the reliability and confidence has to be express as a percentage rather than as a “1”.
In order to predict ‘everything’, you would need to track all the subatomic particles in the universe. You would need to know the location (x,y,z) and velocity (vx,vy,vz) of each particle at the very least. So you need to know and remember at least 6 numbers and you would need computer memory to store those numbers. Computer memory works by changing the state of one or more atoms to represent some numeric value. It would require more than one atom to represent 6 numbers in memory. More atoms would be required to build the processor and the input/output units of the computer.
IOW, a computer which predicts ‘everything’ would be larger than the universe itself.
There was little elaboration as to how exactly freedom is just another word for consciousness, so this statement to me seems absurd. I believe freedom is not a subject but a characteristic or state which a subject holds. We could say such and such is free or there will be freedom or there is not freedom, but we can say a thing is freedom, as you have by connecting freedom and consciousness so blatantly. There’s no disagreement or insult here, I just want a better explanation as to how consciousness and freedom represent a tautology of the same concept in your system of determinism.
If I can juxtapose your statement with something congruent to my developing system presented here; will is another word for the action of consciousness. The will is the ongoing development of consciousness to freely determine the meaning it seeks to identify in order to comprehend any thing as it appears in that moment in time - but not in-itself. I agree on the basis of everything having a necessary determination in regards to the necessary will of ascribing meaning, but when I use predetermination or absolute predetermination, I mean to say that hypothetical state where every thing have stagnant reasons which serve as the objective being to its existence which we can comprehend objectively. Because we have the ability to ascribe meaning, we can consciously change the interpretations of the reasons of a beings existence along with the representation of the thing that is caused by those reasons. ‘Predetermination’ disregards that we have the ability to change the meaning(s)/interpretation(s) (influenced by the faculties language, consciousness, state of mind, health etc.) of a thing and its history simply because a thing and its history exist; a deterministic fallacy. The fallacy which tries to say “it depends how much we consider or how far back in time we consider” in order to reveal a sense of absolute determination which can be objectively interpreted by the will.
Predetermination implies an eternal and objective determination of all things. Determination implies only the current appearance of a represented thing within our consciousness. These two distinctions are not based on some sort of semantic acrobatics like you suggest. I have a feeling that many people could agree that predetermination and determination hold a different meaning when referring to the current and future states of any thing as it is interpreted. When we say a person, place, thing or event is determined by such and such, it has upheld a representation for how it exists in the current moment. When we say a person, place, thing or event is predetermined by such and such, we imply that it will eventually uphold a representation for how it exists in a future moment. When I add absolute before predetermination, the thing that was predetermined will have to uphold to both an objective and stagnant existence but also to an objective history which could not possibly change. These distinctions are definitely not semantic acrobatics like you suggest; especially when we want to consider concepts as the will, consciousness and freedom.
Freedom and determination are not set in tiers of appearing before our phenomenology as a secondary or primary term. They are both term which can simultaneously coincide within the process of contingency and transformation which consciousness demonstrates nicely (if we are to explore it in-depth as such). Because subjects may not possibly know or predict outcomes or how things will change in advance, which negates absolutely (pre)determination, we can will the meaning of a thing to hange not only the thing’s history and current state, but to what extent we understand our own will to do this.
Thanks for your reply. I too want to get more into what I meant by equating the ideas of freedom and consciousness. But I need to address a few things first.
-I sincerely and truly do not understand why you keep associating the idea of ontological predetermination with the idea of epistemological representation (subjective knowing, prediction, etc.) This distinction between ontology and epistemology is very important because it goes to the heart of the difference between how we talk about reality versus how we talk about how we talk about reality. To be very clear, there is nothing about the idea of causal predetermination that requires it to be “representative” to those beings which are predetermined, in fact I will argue that the sheer complexity, depth, and chaotic-emergent nature of deterministic systems is such that it actually implies a lack of representation. Beings, even conscious ones, simply cannot develop enough representative powers and faculties of thought and ideation to actually model real pre-deterministic machinery to their understanding, we can only know the intricacies of this machinery to a certain point, which means that all beings including all conscious beings have only a finite capacity for knowledge, self-knowledge and prediction. This is implied by the very idea of predetermination itself given how utterly complex and unfathomable deep and subtle such causal deterministic systems are in reality, and this also adheres to our experiences of beings and of the ability to know, self-know and predict: no one had perfect ability to do these, no knowledge is absolute or totally exhaustive.
It is necessarily the case that beings only know up to a certain point, and while beings can push further and expand the sphere of their knowledge they cannot do so absolutely; I think you would agree with this, but I don’t think you realize that this is a direct consequence of the idea of predetermination. I’ve outlined already the chaotic and emergent, sheer unfathomable complex and nuanced nature of these systems we call living beings or consciousness… How is it that you have such a simple picture of these systems that you conclude their being predetermined means they would be “stagnant”?
A being’s ability to influence and change itself is built right into the predetermination machinery of being itself, there is no contradiction here at all. Being is not linear or lateral, not merely horizontal, but vertical, noetic, derivative, continuum-like and “Russian doll-like”, and is profoundly massively complex and self-affective. Being moderates being itself; beings are tasked to modify and change themselves all the time, both consciously and unconsciously.
This is the central point where I think you are mistaken: that you think an ontological predetermination somehow implies an epistemological certainty about beings being able to know themselves and predict absolutely in advance. This is not the case. Predetermination had nothing inherently to do with epistemology, predetermination is at basic just a statement of ontology, the logical extension of the idea of PSR. Predetermination is a fact of how beings or things are put together, it is simply the case that they ARE predetermined but this absolutely does not mean that said beings or things will know this predetermination to any given extent, certainly not absolutely. Therefore a space for potential “freedom” appears in a being’s inability to totally know or predict its own predeterminations but also its ability to somewhat know and predict these.
- I like how you equate will and consciousness, will as totalized conscious acts especially with respect to meaning-making (even if you were being a little facetious about that, not sure if you were or not). We’re definitely nearing the same page here and a shared understanding is not impossible.
In fact Wyld correctly interpreted your quite valid model of changing, or choosing ground (history and past) - as consciousness.
It would be up to you to show how the state of freedom to auto-determine ones constituting factors, to become what one chooses that you have described is not synonymous with consciousness.
The larger question is: what has determined this capacity to not be fixed in a single determinative stream?
My answer is not for here - but it has to do with the nature of that which determines as being logic, rather than substance.
From the other topic I just made,
I’m wondering the reason for the almost instinctive dislike of the idea of predeterminism among philosophers. Personally I think the religious notion of (very naive) free will is carried over still into philosophy, so much that we have this deep-seated need to defend the notion that “I can do what I want”. Nietzsche pointed out this has a basis in being able to ascribe moral culpability to people who do what are deemed bad things, so we can judge them as personally deficient since after all they were “choosing” always to do those things and thus are responsible.
Never do we ask if their “freedom of choice” was itself somehow faulty and in such a way that undermines the notion of moral culpability and blame.
I think predetermination is a logically necessary conclusion of the basic rational idea that everything has causes, and that nothing “just happens for no reason”. If you carry this idea out logically to its conclusion you arrive at predetermination, the idea that everything that happened “must have” happened that way and that everything that will happen “must happen” that way.
The important piece to remember is that beings themselves do not usually know their or others predeterminations, because fate is a higher order of causality than conscious (finite) beings have access to. We understand that we can produce causes from ourselves and we seem to have some control over what we do, we feel free and feel ownership over ourselves, but we also recognize that our range of options is always limited and we also understand that our own understanding of causality and determination is limited. We often do and say things we didn’t intend to do or say, a clear example that our “freedom” exists within strange and somewhat unknown boundaries and at times we are animated by things we didn’t sit around and “choose”.
In the space of unknowing, our relative ignorance over our own causality and our predictions about the future, comes the possibility to “freely” insert “new” causes than formerly had been the case. This is the real basis of what we call freedom, that we can set one cause deliberately against another in a way that seems to counteract the original causality of things… In this way we can exert influence.
But even this ability to limit one thing with another and to set causes against each other, even with our feeling of freedom, there is always a higher order of determination that would explain exactly why we did what we did, even it we ourselves don’t know this. As Nietzsche said, even the false belief that we are free, even the naive feeling of freedom, becomes a causal participant in our overall (deterministic) causality.
I argue that it is because of determinism that morality can even mean anything at all: we know that certain beings have necessarily certain needs and desires, and we know and can predict how our actions will impact ourselves and others… Upon this deterministic basis of (relative) knowledge and prediction emerges the possibility to establish values and to use values as causalities for what we do, say, think, and for what we are snd aspire to be. Because everything is causal and impacts other things in determinate ways we are therefore morally responsible for how we affect others, for the causes we introduce into the world; the understanding of this transformed human beings into moral agents, fundamntally changing and elevating the kind of determinism we care capable of possessing.
A more responsible and edified determinism, one that includes more of its own responsibility within itself as a causal factor for its own actions, is a more truly free determinism, for two reasons: it is larger/more comprehensive, and it is more itself (begins to understand and respond more to the fact of its own actual nature and reality, in this case to its causal power and therefore also causal responsibility). Freedom is basically a facet of a kind of determinant causality, such as we possess and we call sentient or self-conscious. It doesn’t mean we aren’t determined anymore and it doesn’t mean we aren’t still predetermined according to some higher more comprehensive level of fated causalities and situations which we have no real access to knowing about. But it does mean that our determinism is more edified, expansive, self-feeling, self-directed, honest, moral and capable of responsibility.
…And for even greater philosophical precision:
"^ This above post (Iambiguous’ post in my other topic, on predetermination) reflects the nihilist defeatist view on predetermination, which is a false view. It goes something like “well if I knew everything was determined already then why do anything?” That’s like saying there’s no point eating dinner because you know in advance that you’re going to eat anyway, so what’s the point? A categorical error, because the meaning and value of eating has nothing to do with whether or not you know you’re going to eat in advance.
The other problem with nihilism-defeatism is its assumption that “well if I knew everything in advance then doing anything would be meaningless anyway”, when in fact it is the exact opposite: once you understand a cause before it occurs you don’t become powerless over that cause, you actually gain power over it and expand your freedom in terms of that cause. The more you know and understand the more free you become because the more power you have over those things which you can now act differently than.
In other words it is our knowledge and foresight that empowers us into greater freedom by expanding the scope of our determinations “upward” (more comprehensively). You subsume lesser causes within greater causes, this is really what “meaning” means, the progressive rank-ordering of causes against each other or what we call “values”.
If you hypothetically gained absolute foreknowledge over all of your own causality (which wouldn’t be possible anyway), you wouldn’t lose your power and freedom, you would immediately be thrust upward into an even greater order of power and freedom – a new climb upon the continuum of being and thus subject to a new scope and logic of predeterminacy. Beings (meaning us too) are always onto-epistemologically situated between that range of predeterminations below us which we have already overcome, and that other range of predeterminations above us which we have yet to know or encounter. Our freedom and indeed the meaning of our conscious sentience lies in the ability to negotiate between these two ranges, to in fact be literally this “middle space” itself. But this is purely structural; we don’t go around thinking this is how we are, because we simply find it more expedient to operate on the assumption that we have limitless freedom, which assumption empowers us to extend ourselves maximally across that middle-space.
A philosopher has a responsibility beyond simply self-maximization in that way, however; the philosopher must understand and compel truth as much as possible, his “maximization” (his maxim) is not simply to unconsciously drive subjectivity to fill out the middle space between onto-epistemically categorically distinct kinds of predetermination but to actually make this situation conscious before itself: in this way the philosopher pushes being as high as it can go, recreating the original condition of “medial subjectivity as comprehensivity-maximization”, I.e. being itself is changed fundamntally by becoming more aligned to the universal which simply moves being (self-valuing) closer to what it already was anyway.
If you feel de-empowered thinking that you are totally predetermined you can overcome that feeling easily by adding the realization that YOU actually lack anything like a “complete understanding”, so even if you’re totally predetermined that thought itself (the thought of being predetermined) can only expand the range of your being anyway (unless you give in to nihilistic defeatism, which is just a misunderstanding of the situation of being predetermined, a misunderstanding more precisely of conflating the mere fact of predetermination with your own actual subjectivity-range (the sub-spaces, within larger predetermination, wherein causes become self-limited and further integrated within the expanding sphere of conscious knowing))."
Freedom is actually the self-overcoming of (always-already determinate) being, through that being becoming more and more able to act on causes that originate closer and more truly to that nature, structure, law and “reality” which it in fact is. Being becoming more itself is what freedom means; so the question of freedom isn’t “are we (pre)determined?” but rather, “what is it in our more true nature to be, what/how/why are we really?” (And in the opposite, What are the errors that we still hold to, and how/why?)
I think the rejection of determinism is 90 percent due to one ominous, almost omnipotent mistake, that the thinking human bug tends to make - to not actually count himself in the equation… not even the equation of what he wants, and is.
Because if he would, if he would think of his own actual body when he says “I”, then he would be glad to be able to say that “he” is determined. Determined by his past, and by his parents and his ancestors, which a real human feels in his gut.
All real entities feel their history. Or are connected to it in a way that becomes consciousness in man.
Now, this brings me to the early point we discussed years back; about the relative existence of humans. I used to claim that most people do not fully exist. I think that that has been corroborated in this way.
People who refuse determinism, do not actually exist. They self-value in terms of a modern notion of entity, which has as a property the intangible and unverifiable aspect ‘free will’.
Because none of it is tangible, it is easily interpreted universal.
The next step in this logical argument, which is easy for you but which I draw out for lesser but still sensible minds to catch a glimpse - is to observe that whatever is universal and intangible is indeed fundamentally different from anything particular, anything natural, anything with roots.
We can thus say that the love of free will that is at once the rejection of being determined, is the pathos of a quasi-entity. This is not an insult, as it is the default state man inherited from his words, which made him out of ape.
We have to get, and are getting to an affirmation of the ‘baser’ (or just as well, holier) aspect, the ground, before we can actually use consciousness to shape consciousness so as to apply.
Wyld - After reading Heraclitus’ eternal flux and a substantial amount of Schopenhauer, I have more firmly grasped your perspective on this subject. Space, time and causality are all necessary and must exist for each other. My opposition to determinism still lies with predetermination in so far as it enforces predictability and limits the relations and contingencies of object and subject; especially the latter. I now want to present more recent developments to our discussion for which I think you could find more interest.
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To what extent is consciousness self-caused, if at all?
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Does our faculty of knowledge expand to know more about the truth of all objects or in random directions of subjective representations in all objects?
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Is there a knowable world outside our current knowing (in relation to the prior question)?
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Time without space is impossible, space without time is stagnant and unknowable, space and/or time without causality is unperceivable, but do these things presuppose consciousness or does consciousness presuppose these things?
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Does the a prior of time, space and causality limit (or perhaps emancipate) these things as actual things-in-themselves or are they mere concepts?
I hope to discuss one, or perhaps all, of these possible inquiries for which serious discussion could prove helpful for this withering thread. The death of this “Opposing Determinism” is my responsibility. After reconsideration, I would sincerely appreciate the development of new grounds.
Seems like some odd assertions.
It is self-caused to the extent that it is consistent, continuous; this continuity, consistency is itself the very ‘self’ that both cases and is caused.
The ultimate cause of any existent item of cognition, any ‘thing out there’ that we ‘know of’, can only be approached linguistically; we can not really use words and grammar to fully exhaust the origin of everything including words and grammar; we can use grammar to exhaust logical possibilities; in this way, we can arrive at the idea the things exist because their non-existence isnt included in their properties, and such -
comes down to the Parmenidean logic of positives.
The final causes of things must always include all the circumstances from which they originated, synthetic and analytic ones; in this way we can come up with a notion of origin.
We can obviously never truly recede back into the origin of being, and continue on as solid beings so as to reflect on it.
We are already reflections of pure possibility; (same as impossibility of non-existence), we can not really see beyond the reflecting surface; ‘possibility’ is the first and final cause, and possibility quickly translates/filters into necessity, by virtue of all particular possibilities, forms of possibility, are competing against each other. “The most logical outcome” follows; but the logic here is a matter of what Nietzsche calls will to power; there is no neutral existence. It is very much a hierarchy of staying powers.
There is no truth to know besides that which is already reflected in our subjectivity. So these options aren’t different.
Accumulation of experience and knowledge is “random” in as far as it isnt intended; but it is still the result of necessities, thus of an ordering principle.
Necessity “fixes” possibilities into concrete forms.
Absolutely, we’re only just deciphering our own knowing-apparatus.
Once we get some control over it, we’ll be able to meaningfully integrate (consciously experience) unimaginably more data.
Consciousness is always a reflection of circumstance.
So first of all consciousness is formed in terms of what, as it is formed, it starts to recognize as time, space and causality; however, these notions are already a function of that formation;
and that brings us close to explaining the necessity of value-ontology or value-philosophy, which takes such fundamental notions as, basically, beings that mediate between what they represent and whom they represent it to.
“Value”, with all its permutations represents such a hub between nature and mind; a word in which conceptuality itself is enclosed.
In as far as the concepts are scientific, they represent necessities. They do not however explain these necessities in any way, nor do they necessarily give a good indication of their full consequences.
The way we “map” consequences of “laws” is still far too primitive and one-sided. We have not yet integrated the semantics and the syntax of ontology, we have no epistemic ‘ethos’ yet - or actually I do, but Ive developed it in 2011 and no one has any experience in thinking in this way.
At this point I quite expect you to be capable of integrating most of what Ive said here into your questioning. Philosophical answering is a way of refining the questioning; each philosophical model is basically a very precise question; far too precise to be phrased as a question. Statements of fact are always in themselves of questionable value; this is how Nietzsche opens his attack on epistemology; inquiring after the value of truth; we may also ask after the context in which this or that truth is valuable. A truth about some random thing does not necessarily represent working knowledge, or clarity about that thing; clarity is a contextual matter, and context is just another way of saying reality.
There is no “whole of reality” that we can deduce or induce; there are only instances of it. These instances are what we truly refer to as reality. Reality is epistemically fragmented. This is what Relativity shows, and what Einstein really didnt like about it.
The first step is truly to become aware that whatever concept the human mind has formed, is a mediation between the nature of that mind and the nature of what the mind receives some influence from; pure representation is very clearly out of the question. We are mirrors to reality, which is made up off slightly skewed and delayed reflections that accumulate into gigantic fractal like patterns of reflection and representation; a human consists of an immesurably great set of skewed reflections, that in time function as a coherent being, as the reflections form a spiraling pattern. Nothing is ever truly circular, there is never a same point to return to, but all moves in cycles; arguments of logic equally as planetary orbits.
Thank you for the reply.
I find it extremely interesting to contemplate the consistency of consciousness. There has never been one definite cause or time we attribute to the existence (the beginning and end) of human consciousness. I do not believe we will ever be able to trace a seemingly infinite regression backwards or forwards to find these exact origins of consciousness (the why and how to the origins of consciousness and being). You are right in mentioning the origin of a thing or a collection of things must include their origins within their current circumstance(s), but I am skeptical as to how this principle could be applied to perception. With a brief aside to the perception of properties, is existence included as a property of a thing? To what extent or what form can existence be taken as a predicate? I am also not sure how the only truth to really be gotten at is reflection and subjectivity; is that not a truth or at least a form of truth?
I also have serious doubts about the competition of all possibilities. If absolute predictability is impossible, are not the slightest possible/hypothetical future states only negated once the logic of outcomes occurs? The hypothetical possibility of a multi-verse is a good example. If we ever develop the intelligence and/or technology to affirm or deny this hypothesis, it remains only hypothetical but nonetheless possible. I want to research more about how logic really dictates consistency within the bounds of perceivable reality. I also want to research more of what you call the semantics and syntax of Ontology. Either I am confused, there is a contradiction or there is still a undiscovered explanation still to be understood. You propose experience and knowledge is random so long as it is not intended, but if we are currently inquiring empirically and theoretically into the human knowing-apparatus (psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, etc.), are we not discreetly expanding our faculty of knowledge to effectively integrate all these new ideas you propose (unimaginably more data, value-ontology, value-philosophy, semantic-syntax ontology, epistemic ethos etc.)? This hypothetical fascinates me and I would greatly appreciate any recommendations into that latter idea as I will be venturing into academia for these exact professions/studies/interests. I apologize for phrasing my reply mainly as questions. My ideas are not strong enough to precisely succeed the bounds of direct questioning. I am new to philosophy and show that questioning immaturity towards it.
But my skepticism will never die. There is a contradiction in stating that all human knowledge are representations; fragmented. We hope to exceedingly expand the capabilities of consciousness through these inquiries, to understand the syntax of ontology, to penetrate the universe with the mapping out of laws and physics, but what will we achieve? I cannot propose that this expansion is truly an expansion. These developments may not be, after all, better or worse for mankind…only different. But that only aligns with my wandering mind; this sincerely extends that attack on the value of these developments. Will these new philosophical developments truly represent a new body of working knowledge? Or just a different state, which Nihilism may grow, for human consciousness?
Consciousness is a reflexive (reflex based) system for producing actions in response to stimuli. The first conscious systems were simple coordinations of muscle reflex in order to provide a means of evading a predator or moving toward something that proves edible. Muscle movements are always a kind of unconscious spasming, one that just happens to end up achieving some kind of result for the organism. Or in the case of early invertebrate life in the oceans you maybe have a tail-like protrusion that gets waved around to propel the organism here or there, then later in fish you have fins and body muscles that can wiggle, simple stuff like that.
Sense organs are receptive cellular structures, receptive to a certain range of stimuli, most often wavelengths and frequencies in EM spectrum or physical air or water. Vibrations are captured by these sense organ systems and converted into electronic signals. Those signals route to the central nervous system where they produce cascading changes in neurological structures; those structures are also simultaneously connected into those reflex musculature systems, so that over time and thanks to evolution a correspondence is produced between certain kinds of incoming electrical sense data and certain kinds of muscle movements (e.g. certain kinds of electronic signals from the mouth will cause the jaw muscles to spasm).
There’s nothing really that special about the brain and neurology, it’s mostly a huge mass of emergent simultaneous transistor-like calculation power capable of coordinating inputs and outputs to each other. Those organisms that did this better were more likely to perpetuate their genome to the next generation, so over time organisms got very good at coordinating their bodies and senses to do what the organism needs to do-- put edible things in its mouth, avoid things that would harm it, and reproduce (ejaculate in the presence of a potential mate).