Silhouette! Experientialism!

[Silhouette]

@Magnus Anderson

I am saying that the statement “There is a tiger that is separate from its environment” is true. I am not saying the other statement is false because I do not even know what it means.

You said that it’s “more true”. That to me indicates that you think it’s false. Of course, that may not be the case; but when someone says that a statement is “more true” instead of simply saying that it is “true”, I assume it’s because they don’t think it’s true. And if a statement isn’t true, it is false.

So we’re in agreement that “more true” or “less true” are valid with respect to reality, but you also say “more true” indicates false?
And since “more true” is truer than “less true”, then presumably “less true” is also false by the same logic?
So is any relative degree of truth “false”, except absolutely true?

Surely “more true” is simply “less false”, and “less true” is “more false”?
That doesn’t mean both are flat-out “false”.
Perhaps you’re saying they’re degrees of false? But “absolutely true” is “more true” than any other degree of truth, yet “absolutely true” being “more true” here doesn’t mean “false”.

I’m not using “more true” as “false”. I literally mean there are degrees of truth (and falsity), and “more true” can mean anything up to and including absolutely true. My claim is that Continuous Experience is how “absolutely true” is experienced. Since it’s “absolutely true”, it’s also “more true” than discrete experiences - and also, some ways of interpretting discrete experiences are more or less true than others: they are all true/false relative to Continuous Experience.

I acknowledge that you’ve been attempting to argue against my points, but are you experiencing any degree of understanding of the arguments that I’m making whatsoever?

@Magnus Anderson

The noumenal existence you speak of – putting aside the Kantian misuse of the word “noumenon” to refer to something that exists outside of mind – refers to “potential experience” or “that which can be experienced under specific circumstances”.

You’ve experienced how annoyed I get when people when people mistakenly tell me I’m saying something other than what I’m saying as fact. I’d rather avoid being annoyed, so if you’d help me out with that, I’d appreciate it. I don’t like being annoying, nor the effect it has on others, but most importantly how little it helps the discussion of facts. Moving swiftly on.

Noumena are already defined as beyond phenomena, which are the only means by which we have access to reality and the only means by which we can derive knowledge. It’s only logical that if something is inaccessible and beyond our means to derive knowledge of it, that it’s unknowable. Sure, by virtue of being unknowable, noumena are “outside of the mind” as a consequence, but I’m well aware that that’s not the definition. We’re supposed to “otherwise know” of noumena at least “indirectly” - as though they can conceptually exist “within our minds” without being directly knowable, but this doesn’t work for the reasons I already explained. Any conception whatsoever that we attempt of noumena will be in terms of experience - it’s impossible to conceive of noumena without any reference whatsoever to experience: conception itself is an experience. As such, even “indirect” knowledge of noumena has to be knowledge of phenomena.

@Magnus Anderson

To say that a tree exists at a certain point in time is to say that it is possible to experience it at that point in time (provided you do what is necessary to do in order to experience it.)

That’s why we can say that a tree exists even if we’re not looking at it (because it is possible to experience it during that period of time.)

Actual experience (that which is normally called “experience”) and potential experience (things-in-themselves) are two different things. Physical objects belong to the second category.

Okay, so the problem with “potential experience” is that it’s always “beyond experience” until it’s being actually experienced.

The reason we think that non-actual experience is “potential” is because we’re actually experiencing either a memory of it having been actually experienced “before” (though the memory occurs in the present), or we’re actually experiencing the belief in someone else’s actual experience of it - and/or we experience a belief in the reliability of the conceptual model of causation for such an experience to happen again. These are all “actual” experiences - that’s the direct verification required of the absolutely true - anything else is unfalsifiable. To conceive of actual experiences as some other kind of potential experience twists this truth into a useful conceptual model, but it’s not as true.

@Magnus Anderson

Sure, it might be difficult for people to define their terms and their attempts to develop complete definitions may be counter-productive; but what exactly does that prove?

By definition, the tiger’s environment is that which surrounds – environs – the tiger. It refers to that which occupies portions of space that are NOT occupied by the tiger. So by definition alone, any given tiger and its environment occupy two different non-intersecting portions of physical space, which means they are two separate, non-overlapping, things. That people cannot determine whether certain portions of space are those occupied by the tiger or not does not change that fact. Whichever way they settle it, the environment would be that which is separate from the tiger.

It proves that precision over what “portions of space” are “NOT occupied by the tiger” is a counter-productive pursuit, the more you attempt to refine it.
We can be a lot more sure that the centre of the tiger least environs the tiger compared to the tip of its whisker, and the further away from the tiger that the environment is, the more sure we can be that it’s unoccupied by the tiger - both subject to what we attempt to precisely define as tiger and not environment (and vice versa), which we’ve established gets increasingly grey the more black and white we try and make it. Or is that “centre of the tiger” more heart than tiger, or less tiger than jungle etc. depending on how macro/micro we’re defining things?
Again you’re distinguishing the ability of people to determine something from “the fact”, which I showed to be logically inconsistent: existence purported to be pre-knowledge is a statement of knowledge, and knowledge is something that requires existence. So it matters “which way we settle it” - the environment cannot be separate from the tiger “as a fact” if determining this as knowledge is problematic. If there’s an epistemic problem, there’s an ontological one.

@Magnus Anderson

The gap is a conceptual one.

There’s no need for a physical line between the tiger and its environment, and another physical line between that first physical line and the tiger, and yet another physical line between that second physical line and the tiger, and so on.

“The tiger is separate from its environment” merely means that the two portions of physical space are non-intersecting. It says nothing about there being a physical line (or gap) separating the two portions. That’s how I interpret that statement and I believe that’s also how others interpret it.

If you want to use the word “separate” to mean something else, that’s fine by me, but then you can’t use that to reject the above statement.

A “conceptual” gap is an experience. No physical lines are needed - even the existence at all of physical lines in nature is a highly dubious proclamation.

I’ve already explained that non-intersection of two bodies means mutual intersection with a gap, and as I explained, the precise bounds between the bodies and the gap are also highly dubious. Forget lines - the harder you look, the more indistinct it is whether one bit of what could be tiger is environment and vice versa, and the less clear it is if you’re talking about tiger, part of tiger, or what tiger is part of. Just like you might not be able to see the tiger for the jungle, you might not be able to see the tiger for carbon atoms. You have to be general and imprecise to interpret your statements about separating two portions in the way others interpret it, which as you say is how you’re interpretting it. I’m well aware how people normally conceive of distinctions - I’m just saying that upon examination, these ways are significantly flawed in the ways I’m arguing, and can easily be resolved through Experientialism.

I believe it would help the discussion if you were able to confirm if you have any understanding at all of my points, so I can better gauge if I need to be explaining some bits differently than how I already am - because I’m becoming conscious that I’m starting to repeat the best ways I can think of to explain these points and I really can’t see how you could be failing to see their sense. You don’t have to agree on an emotional level, I’m just interested if you see my points at all on an intellectual level.

[Magnus_Anderson]

This is first part of my response.

@Silhouette

So we’re in agreement that “more true” or “less true” are valid with respect to reality, but you also say “more true” indicates false?

Not necessarily.

“Trump’s face is orange” is both 1) true, and 2) more true than “Trump’s face is white”. So the two, “true” and “more true”, are not mutually exclusive.

I merely assumed that you used “more true” instead of “true” because you thought the statement is actually false.

And since “more true” is truer than “less true”, then presumably “less true” is also false by the same logic?

“Less true” necessarily means false. (Note that in everyday use the word “false” does not mean “completely false”. It merely means “not completely true”.)

“[M]ore true” can mean anything up to and including absolutely true.

I agree with that.

My claim is that Continuous Experience is how “absolutely true” is experienced. Since it’s “absolutely true”, it’s also “more true” than discrete experiences - and also, some ways of interpretting discrete experiences are more or less true than others: they are all true/false relative to Continuous Experience.

Noted. That means my assumption was wrong.

Noumena are already defined as beyond phenomena, which are the only means by which we have access to reality and the only means by which we can derive knowledge. It’s only logical that if something is inaccessible and beyond our means to derive knowledge of it, that it’s unknowable.

I am not sure what the underlined means. The way I see it, it simply means “potential experience” or “experience that can occur under certain circumstances”.

Sure, by virtue of being unknowable, noumena are “outside of the mind” as a consequence, but I’m well aware that that’s not the definition.

Kantian noumenon is defined as “a posited object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception”. That means “outside of the mind”.

I merely hinted at the (irrelevant) fact that the word “noumenon” comes from the Greek word “nous” which means “mind”. “Noumenon” originally referred to that which is thought as opposed to that which appears. It had nothing to do with what’s outside of mind. But Kant or whoever misread Kant misused the word and it became the norm.

We’re supposed to “otherwise know” of noumena at least “indirectly” - as though they can conceptually exist “within our minds” without being directly knowable, but this doesn’t work for the reasons I already explained.

I am not following you.

Any conception whatsoever that we attempt of noumena will be in terms of experience - it’s impossible to conceive of noumena without any reference whatsoever to experience: conception itself is an experience. As such, even “indirect” knowledge of noumena has to be knowledge of phenomena.

I insist that Kantian noumenon means no more than “potential experience”.

I also insist that potential experience is not the same as actual experience. Potential experience means “experience that can occur under certain circumstances” whereas actual experience means “experience that occurs at present time”. Every actual experience is an instance of potential experience (if someone has an experience, it means that such an experience can be had) but the opposite is not the case (if an experience can occur, it does not mean someone is having such an experience.)

I think one of your points is that there’s only actual experience. Correct me if I’m wrong.

[Magnus_Anderson]

The second part of my response.

@Silhouette

It proves that precision over what “portions of space” are “NOT occupied by the tiger” is a counter-productive pursuit, the more you attempt to refine it.

It is my belief that you made a claim that the statement “The tiger is separate from its environment” is false (but useful.)

Can you confirm that?

What I’ve been asking you to do is to explain what that statement means. (I need to understand what you believe before I can ask for an argument in support of what you believe.)

The way I interpret that statement, and I am sure the way most people would interpret it, is that it is saying that the portion of reality represented by the term “tiger” and the portion of reality represented by the term “tiger’s environment” occupy two different non-intersecting portions of physical space.

Is this what you mean by that statement?

So far, I haven’t seen a clear “Yes” or “No” from you.

If this is what you mean, then the statement is true by definition because the term “tiger’s environment” is defined in such a way that it refers to that which occupies those (but not necessarily all) portions of physical space that are NOT occupied by the tiger. This is regardless of how the term “tiger” is defined. Even if the term “tiger” is not completely defined (which I can accept to be the case) and even if it is impossible for people to complete the definition (which I don’t agree to be the case though I can agree that some, perhaps many, people find that task to be rather difficult), the term “tiger’s environment” still refers to something that is separate from the tiger.

We can be a lot more sure that the centre of the tiger least environs the tiger compared to the tip of its whisker, and the further away from the tiger that the environment is, the more sure we can be that it’s unoccupied by the tiger - both subject to what we attempt to precisely define as tiger and not environment (and vice versa), which we’ve established gets increasingly grey the more black and white we try and make it. Or is that “centre of the tiger” more heart than tiger, or less tiger than jungle etc. depending on how macro/micro we’re defining things?

The heart of the tiger belongs to the tiger – it’s part of the tiger. His internal organs, his eyes, his paws, his tail, etc all belong to him.

And if that tiger happens to be in your room, then you are not part of the tiger but part of its environment. And not only you but also your table, your TV, your kitchen counter, your shoes, your bed and so on. Plenty of things we know with certainty to belong to the tiger’s environment (and not to the tiger.)

For most but not all portions of reality, the definition of the word “tiger” allows us to determine whether they belong to a tiger or not. For some, however, the word is insufficiently defined – that’s the so-called “grey area”. The grey area problem is resolved by filling the gaps in the definition.

Again you’re distinguishing the ability of people to determine something from “the fact”, which I showed to be logically inconsistent: existence purported to be pre-knowledge is a statement of knowledge, and knowledge is something that requires existence. So it matters “which way we settle it” - the environment cannot be separate from the tiger “as a fact” if determining this as knowledge is problematic. If there’s an epistemic problem, there’s an ontological one.

I am not sure what you’re saying here but that the tiger is separate from its environment is a definitional truth – something that you can deduce from definitions alone. There’s absolutely nothing problematic about it. It’s as problematic as the problem of “What’s the result of 2 + 2?”

A “conceptual” gap is an experience.

How is that an experience?

I’ve already explained that non-intersection of two bodies means mutual intersection with a gap

What does “mutual intersection with a gap” mean?

the harder you look, the more indistinct it is whether one bit of what could be tiger is environment and vice versa

The harder you look, the more you run into those portions of reality that you cannot classify as either belonging to the tiger or belonging to the tiger’s environment. The fact that you cannot classify them does not mean you can classify them both ways (which is what the word “indistinct” suggests to me.)