Gib; i answered Your inquiery above about thed
representation of experience, and further made a comparison of Fix’s comments on the paraphrase You quoted. If these are still,of relevance to the seeming unresolve of the basis of mathematics, we may
continue in this vein. Further, mathematics, since the positivists have gone through a successive development of displacing the logical basis of
mathematics, including that of the logical basis of
language.
Did they displace it? I thought they were trying to furnish a logical basis for mathematics and language.
There is a paper on this i could produce in kind, however it’s lengthy. Numbers are symbols which are irreducible because of set theory having no
concrete relationships to objects, either out there,
(material) or in here, (subjective)
You could say that, but that’s a different question from that of what numbers refer to.
Wouldn’t it be fair at this pont to settle to an interpretation which describes what is going on as variable and
probabilistic, in regard to whether
materiality/immateriality has ceased to become based on logical principles of the excluded middle, namely either it is material or immaterial?
I’m not a huge fan of violating the laws of logic, but it seems true that the term “material” tends to be confused given today’s science. Matter is said to be mostly empty space and even the space that’s filled is filled with things which can hardly be said to be “solid”–more like a wave that has no determinate position or momentum–it’s not even “there” in a sense. This does raise the question what is meant by “material”. The materialists still have a point though if they want to say that the clunky, hard, rigid, dense stuff the layman calls “matter” is still there–I mean, we see it every day, we reach out and touch it, feeling its real existence. I don’t think this is an illusion. If this is the stuff that’s continuous with the spatious, illusive, wave-like substance we catch a glimpse of at the subatomic level, then I think we have to grant the materialist that the naive view of matter (what the layman and the ancients must have understood matter to be) is still real, but I think modern science is forcing upon us a widening of the scope to which the definition of “matter” applies.
And such
is not fixed in meaning theory of language, nor in the
brain/mind distinction, as such distinctions led Russell into a regress.
The meaning of “material” is certainly not fixed in any language, especially when there is so much confusion between speakers, nor is it fixed in the privacy of one speaker’s head (although I think if it’s going to achieve clarity anywhere, it would be here). However, a lack of clarity is not the same as a contradiction of meanings, nor are contradictory meanings the same as a single meaning with internal contradiction. Many words in the English language have more than one meaning, and usually confusions over the meaning of a term can be resolved by suggesting that more than one meaning is being used.
To be specific, we can have a material concept, the object it’s self, the
representation, and the immaterial sans the abstracted one. (Your words) To use math, as somehow different qua abstraction is to make artificial distinctions between the old Lockian
categories of primary and secondary characteristics.
I’m not sure I follow. Are you saying that math as applied to concrete examples should not be thought of as occuring in a realm different than math as applied to abstract examples?
With the logical basis of math suspect and irresolute, this argument becomes prone to revert to the very
positivism which was the genesis of the digression.
How so?
I just read St. James in another forum stating the quantum mechanics, based on uncertainty is a myth. Well put, but it puts uncertainty on the topical level,
while the structure of math below it, becomes eqally suspect. Just a thought, and again , if this is beyond the intent of the forum please disregard.