Recently in my History of Philosophy class, we discussed the works of Berkeley. Now, of course he is best known for his immaterialism…which is mostly a crock as we know. However, I’ve been thinking. Is there any difference between sensory perceptions and hallucinations for Berkeley?
For example:
According to the coherence theory of truth, a proposition consists in its being a member some suitably defined body of other propositions. Well let’s think about something. I know, when I’m sitting here, that my computer is in my dorm room. When I leave, I don’t necessarily know that it’s still in my room. The losers that I unfortunately live with on this floor could have came in and destroyed it for all I know. When I return to my room, my computer is still here. The conclusion could be made the coherence theory of truth is used to understand that my computer is still sitting on my desk in my room. Perhaps the coherent nature of my observations leads me to believe my computer is still in my room.
Now, what about hallucinations. Let’s say I hallucinate that a snake is in my room on the floor. When I leave, I do not know that its there. However, when I return its still on the floor. Suppose I come to my conclusion the same way I conclude my computer is in my room.
‘Esse est percipi’ - Berkeley’s “To be is to be perceived.” Does that ring true in this situation? Are things “to be” just because they are perceived?
The question is…Is there any difference then between my empirical perceptions and my hallucinations? If so, how do I know?
There isnt just things percieved according to Berkeley, there are also percievers. So when no-one is percieving something it can still exist because god is percieving it (of course this rests on an argument for the existence of god which i dont think Berkeley convincingly provides). However the point about hallucinations is interesting since all we percieve are ideas. The point about hallucinations is difficult since is i had an idea of a pink elephant then it would still be an idea. I think that Berkeley would say it is a hallucination because the majority of people do not have these ideas. However this leaves him open to the problem that the vast majority of people could be hallucinating.
However, i would be more interested to hear why u think idealism is “a bunch of crock”, since i thought that it was still quite a respectable idea :S (in the sense that i dont think it has been refuted).
this problem is encountered by all early empiricists, and they all explain it the same way, even berkeley. the answer is yes, you can tell the difference. hallucinations aren’t as ‘lively’ as the immediate perception of a real thing. that is, they lack intensity and the same feelings that immediate perceptions carry.
open call to anyone wanting to write a 12-15 page paper on berekely and his view on abstract ideas versus the notion of god is now being accepted by me. anyone wishing to write this can submit it to me over pm. for extra incentive, i’ll tell metavoid to give the author of the best paper a blowjob.
The difference between a perception and a hallucination is that something external causes the perception, nothing external causes the hallucination.
It may, however, be by coherence that we can determine whether it is a perception or a hallucination.