cla.calpoly.edu/~fotoole/321.1/popper.html
Karl Popper denounced psychological and sociological models as unscientific, as said the theory of evolution didn’t rank as a valid scientific theory as it doesn’t make testable, verifiable, falsifiable predictions
And he was a Jew, not a Christian
Popper recanted his claim that evolution was unfalsifiable and a tautology, in “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”, Dialectica 32(1978), pp. 339-355
As I remember he said natural selection was falsifiable, not evolution/ism
Natural selection can work on information that is already there, the question is ‘where did that information come from?’
"The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true. "
What you are doing here is equivocating on the term evolution. My understanding of the word evolutionism isn that it is a system of beliefs that presuppose a naturalistic explanation.
Evolution is a theory of explination of descent with modification. It relies upon mutation and natural selection. One can remain skeptical towards naturalism and still believe the theory of evolution.
Evolution isn’t only an explanation of adaptation - it’s an explanation of how life came to be so complex. Lifeforms are irreducibly complex.
Like Popper said, the theory of evolution which states that life evolved at random out of simpler biological systems is untestable, unverifiable, unfalsifiable and so doesn’t even satisfy the basic criteria of a scientific theory.
I’m equivocating nothing - I’m talking about the whole kit and kaboodle. Your understanding is very limited, hence you are the one equivocating
Here is a section from a paper I am currently writing:
ID is argument from ignorance:
This claim is very similar to the above one, but is just subtlety different enough, that it warrants its own point. Let’s analyze a slightly different claim: “Because there is no naturalistic explanation for irreducibly complex structures, then they must have been created by an intelligence.â€
Made explicit and generalized, our example looks like this:
Let p= is no naturalistic cause for proposition X
Let q= proposition X warrants a supernatural explanation
Symbolically:
This, however, is a valid form (modus ponens) so if the premises are true, then we are forced to believe the conclusion. So, we have to look at the argument’s premises this time. Without considering whether or not premise 2 is correct, on what grounds would we be able to claim that there is NO naturalistic explanation for a given proposition?
To answer this question, lets focus on a similar, more straightforward example. On what grounds do we know that the number 11 is prime? First of all, for 11 to be prime, it can only be divisible, without remainder, by any integer except 1 and itself. So, if 11 is a prime number, there are NO other integers besides 11 and 1 that divide it, without remainder. The most simplistic way to test this, is to divide 11 by every integer 2-10 and see if any of them work, if they do, then 11 isn’t prime, if they don’t then 11 is prime. We know, that there are no such integers in existence now, and there are no such integers that will ever exist that will divide 11 without remainder except for 1 and itself.
11 is an easy example, because it’s clear that there won’t be any new integers discovered between 1 and 11 ever. However, to claim that there is no naturalistic explanation for a given proposition we will have to assume that we have a completed theory of physics, biology etc. This is not the case now, (and some might argue that it might never be the case) we can’t even see the metaphorical light at the end of the tunnel. Yet ID claims that there are no other possible explanations for irreducible complexity then divine interaction with the world. To me, there are two possible explanations for this 1) they have a crystal ball which tells them the future (if so, it’s no small wonder why most of them don’t win the lottery more often) or 2) they don’t know what they are talking about.
Ever read Ken Miller’s book “Finding Darwin’s God,” well if you haven’t you should.
A group of scientists in 1997 tested Behe’s conclusions by evolving a new interface between two sets of proteins.
“They did this with an important signaling hormone, human growth hormone. This molecule, itself a protein, binds to cells by means of receptors, precisely shaped molecules on cell surfaces that fit the three-dimensional shape of this hormone. The fit between hormone and receptor is almost like the fit between a key and a lock-break off even a tiny part of the key, and it may no longer turn the lock…
They deleted a tryptophan, a large amino acid found at the exact point where the hormone and the receptor binds. Having lost that amino acid, the receptor’s shape changed and it could no longer bind the hormone.â€
This group of researchers then randomly mutated the region of 5 amino acids in the growth hormone and generated roughly about 10 million different mutations. From these random mutations they selected for ones that could bind with the hormone. The new version fit even more perfectly then the previous one did, about 100 times tighter than the original protein. Ironically this randomly mutated hormone appeared to be better designed then the original found in nature.
This is just one example of evolution happening in a lab type setting where a so called “ireducibly complex” (Behe has actually used this hormone interaction as one of his examples of an irreducibly complex system) structure evolved… I’ve got even more.
Okay, first of all, a lack of knowledge doesn’t prevent people from equivocating on terms. I’ve seen some incredible philosophers do it… to err is human.
Second, you don’t know anything about me, you have no idea what my educational background is. You have no idea what subjects I study etc. For you to make a value judgement as to my level of understanding of this issue is totally unwarrented. You have quickly jumped to an unjustified conclusion, just as you have jumped to an unjustified conclusion that structures are irreducibly complex.
Third, there is a definite line between evolutionism and evolution. The first is a metaphysical claim, the second is an emperical claim. I realize that equivocating the two helps your cause, but it denys the common usage of the term.
Fourth, what do you mean by “whole kit and kaboodle,” you have slipped into an abiguous metaphor here. I’m not entirely sure what you are talking about, I can guess… and I can make arguments for you, but that wouldn’t be fair to you or me. Be sure to be more precise with your terms next time.
The problem with Popper’s falsification theory imho is that…well its stupid.
When Kuhn published his book of the scientific revolutions in 1962 we hoped that this would be the end of the scholastics…but some dinousaurs does not seem to realize that they are dead, one of these is Sir Karl Popper.
Popper never really understood what science was; he thought that science was a logical construction and therefor should be treated as such. It is not.
Even though he did understand that science was tested deductivly, he still strangely enought believed that science was inductive in its essence: one single factor that did not completly logically agreed with the theory, was enough to immediately and fully discard it. Critics, such as Imre Lakatos pointed out that if that was the case, we would have to put down the whole science, except maybe for pure formal sciences such as logic and most areas of mathematics…and that is totally insane.
Scientific theories is not judged as logical constructions,
but after its ability to navigate the scientific ground.
If Popper didn’t understand science, then I guess Einstein didn’t, either. After all, Einstein completely agreed with Popper’s approach to scientific discovery. As Einstein said, no amount of data could have led to his theory of General Relativity, unless one already had the theory of relativity within which the data could be interpreted.
While Popper may not have provided a full analysis of scientific methods and progress, his key insight is still quite valid. Scientific rationality does not rely on induction. Deduction, on the other hand, is both necessary and sufficient.
The extreme and naive view expressed here–
–does not seem to be a fair representation of Popper’s ideas. Rather, it is a straw man: easily knocked down, but unfairly dismissive.
Pragmatist, this is my interpretation of Popper as well, and I pretty much get my reading of him from Godfrey-Smith. I believe this is the biggest weakness in Popper’s philosophy.
There have been some good reactionary authors to Kuhn and Popper that have pointed out flaws in both of those authors (although none seem to interpret Kuhn quite right, perhaps rightfully so, because Kuhn is pretty nebulous), including Paul Feyerabend, Lakotos, and Laudan… The best of which, IMO, is Laudan.
Try, “Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult”, by D.C Stove. It is the best of them, although I preferred its former title, “Anything Goes”. Kuhn never understood the difference between the sociology of science and the philosophy and logic of science.
I’ll put that on my still growing list of reading…
Kuhn was a moving target, he changed his views so many times. There are about three readings of just what exactly a “paradigm” depending on the mood he was in at the time he wrote it.
This is why I believe people rightfully misinterpret him. He even tried to correct the postmodernists’ spin on his work, but they gave him the finger. They pretty much said, “if this wasn’t what you meant, then too bad.”
His ideas were so damn interesting, no one could help but write about them…
First, let’s be clear on what I said. I didn’t say the interpretation was unfounded. I said it was unfairly dismissive. I acknowledge that Popper can, at times, be interpreted as making such an extreme and naive assertion. I just don’t think an analysis of Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of science should be limited to a discussion of that assertion. Rather, I think attacking that assertion misses the point.
Popper’s insight into the nature of scientific discovery has received some very interesting and important criticisms. I’m particularly fond of the Quine-Duhem thesis. But even that, perhaps the most pragmatic point of view, does not invalidate Popper’s view–that is, that there is no “problem of induction” with which scientists need to be concerned, and that empirical deduction (i.e., testing and falsification) is the logical framework which defines scientific theories as such.
So, while we may not always have clear-cut cases of falsification, and while we may not always be sure if our theory is falsifiable at all, we can at least orient scientific pursuits towards the logic of empirical deduction.
You might not understand how fundemental this criticism is. We rarely (if ever) reject good theories, rather we expand upon them. When Einstein came along and put forth his theory of relativity it didn’t throw out Newton’s theory. In fact, Einstein’s theory can explain why objects behave the way they do in the Newtonian framework. Most theories are subsumed, not replaced.
Its hard to imagine that falsification is what we should use to measure what is and what is not science when there is no clear line as to when we are actually falsifying a theory and when we are relying on false assumptions about the way we are testing that theory.
No doubt that Popper is an important figure in the philosophy of science, he moved science in an important direction… but as my philosophy prof used to say “you don’t get famous by being right, only controversial.”
I don’t know why you would question my understanding. In any case, we seem to disagree on some things here.
Well, if the theory is “good,” then there is little reason to reject it. The question, of course, is what makes it “good.”
Technically, Einstein did throw out Newton’s theory. The fact that a Newtonian framework can still be used in certain circumstances doesn’t change that.
Sure, one can still use Newton’s physics in everyday circumstances. When we do so, we should be aware that we are using a theory that does not offer the most accurate results. That doesn’t mean that Einstein only subsumed Newtonian mechanics. Einstein didn’t subsume them. He replaced them.
All you’ve offered is one instance in which the theory was actually replaced, and not subsumed. So, I see no justification for this assertion. Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the universe did not subsume the geocentric model favorable in his day.
There are some instances in which theories are subsumed by others. For example, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetic forces was combined with the theory of weak forces, and now we have a theory of electroweak forces. However, such unifications are rare.
Anyway, sure, we can use theories that are outdated. They still offer some predictive value. That’s why it took so much for them to be replaced.
And, to be fair, it wouldn’t be that hard to find an instance of a theory that was maintained even when contradictory evidence was found. While falsification is the general means by which a theory is replaced, replacement is only an option when a better theory is available. Thus, while Newton’s theories did not make perfect predictions across the board, it wasn’t until Relativity and Quantum Mechanics that we had better alternatives.
I cannot follow your reasoning.
Perhaps it would be best to talk about things that aren’t scientific. That way, we can see the criterion in action. Religious claims–to take an obvious example–aren’t scientific because they define certain elements to be untestable by empirical means. The very notion of the “supernatural” means that it cannot be falsified. So, religious beliefs are decidedly unscientific, if we adopt Popper’s criterion. They cannot be falsified, because they are defined that way. The same goes for metaphysics in general, including mathematics and logic. You cannot use an empirical test to falsify math and logic, because they are defined without any reference to empirical measurements.
So, while we can argue for days on end about the merits of a particular scientific theory, and whether or not there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that it is false, the general point remains: if we can talk about the theory in terms of falsifying evidence, such that the value of the theory can be measured and discussed in terms of predictions and experimentation, then the theory is scientific. If the theory cannot be tested against experiment, and cannot be discussed in terms of falsifying evidence, then it is not. The fact that we cannot be sure that such discussions are without error is irrelevant.
I’m not questioning your understanding of Popper, but Popper’s understanding of scientific progress.
You’re right to point this out… there was a little of intentional hand waving here.
It seems to be the case that when a theory has predictive success it is more often then not incorperated into larger theories rather than being replaced.
This is how I believe theories should be evaluated, on their predictive capability and potential for progress rather then their ability to be falsified.
Within the frameworks that Newton was working the theory of relativity reduces to Newtonian equations.
That was a good example, because the geocentric model also had predictive success. Note that such an example would also be considered “scientific” under Popper’s view also, because it is also falsifiable.
If theories are in fact subsumed and used after they are falsified, then it seems rational to speculate that falsification isn’t enough to reject a certain theory.
You’re exactly right. This phenomena is called “Scientific Conservatism.”
For example, lets say I make the general claim that iron expands when heated. I have to make certain assumptions about my instruments, about the composition of the sample of iron I have… etc.
If I find that my sample of iron actualy shrinks when heated, do I reject the hypothesis or do I search for other explinations?
Scientists tend to blame themselves for bad results much more then they blame their operating theories.
I would argue that such theories are not pursued because they do not offer any rate of progress, not necessarily because they aren’t falsifiable. Although it can be argued that such theories do not offer a rate of progress because they are not empirically testable and therefore not falsifiable (so you can see that we really don’t disagree about much).
The problem lies when we start getting into things like string theory which doesn’t make falsifiable claims
I still prefer Laudan’s view over Popper’s. I think its the best description of how science progresses to date primarily because it is much more plastic then Popper’s was.
Troy,
First, this is a big “if.” If a theory has predictive success, it is only because it was falsifiable. So, whether the theory was replaced or subsumed seems to be a tangential issue. As it happens, I am not convinced that the majority of scientific theories are merely incorporated, and not replaced. It seems to me that an incredible number of scientific theories have been abandoned through the ages. But unless we’re going to tally up every scientific theory in all of history (an impossible task, no doubt), I see little point arguing about it.
Predictive capability is the other side of the coin of falsifiability. Predictive value is there if and only if the theory is falsifiable.
Newton defined his framework as the entire universe. Furthermore, while Einstein’s equations may approximate Newton’s in certain conditions, there are fundamental differences. There is not a complete reduction. Most importantly, Einstein’s theories involves qualitative differences which lead to significantly different descriptions of basic notions, like time and gravity. It seems to me that, on a fundamental level, Einstein replaced Newtonian physics. When you take quantum mechanics into the picture, Newtonian physics is replaced in even more ways.
But, again, this all seems to be a tangential point.
Of course. The geocentric model was scientific, just as Newtonian mechanics was scientific.
You haven’t shown any indisputable evidence of a theory being both falsified and subsumed. 20th century physicists have shown that certain of Newton’s assumptions were just plain wrong. Newton’s framework has been replaced. While his equations still have some predictive value, they are no longer upheld as scientific “truth.” They are scientific, no doubt. Subsumed . . . I don’t think so.
You can and should consider other explanations. If those other explanations support your original theory (or, at least, don’t contradict your original theory), then you should continue to test the original theory as well as the new explanation. If you cannot find any other explanations, however, you should be willing to abandon the theory.
Popper realized as much, which is why he eventually advocated the use of auxiliary hypotheses. He just stressed that they shouldn’t be ad hoc.
That is probably true, which only goes to show that many theories are hard to falsify, and that obvious alternatives are rarely available. For, if there were obvious alternatives with better predictive value, there wouldn’t be much of a need to test new theories.
Indeed. I don’t see how your notion of a “rate of progress” is any different than falsificationism.
To be more accurate, the only problem lies when people on the fringes want money or power in the name of Science. String theorists don’t seem to be on the fringe. While tests for string theory are still a matter of hope and dreams, the work is clearly being made towards testability. Furthermore, the data and equations being studied and manipulated are either rooted in, or mathematically connected to, scientific theories and observations. So, string theory seems to have at least one foot squarely in the realm of science. It just hasn’t made it all the way yet.
Earlier I noted that Popper didn’t offer a complete or thorough analysis of scientific methods and practice. I never suggested that he represents the final word in the philosophy of science. And, while I’m not familiar enough with Laudan to criticize or praise his efforts, I know that others have made significant contributions to the field. My interest here has only been to defend Popper against an unfair dismissal, and to uphold his basic insight, that empirical deduction is the logical ground for scientific discovery.