It struck me reading through allot of the epistomology oriented threads, that most people define “knowledge” in such a way that, even if they had any, they wouldn’t know that they did… I think this betrays our theistic past in that we have defined a notion like knowledge into being without ever being able to experienced it first hand. Knowledge defined in humanly unknowable terms, servs no purpose other than to confuse us. But what do you think?
How do you define knowledge?
Is it knowable?
Do you think it ought to be?
NOTE: I mean “knowable” in actuality, not in principle. For example: the “justified, true belief” definition of knowledge would be unknowable in actuality, because of the truth component, but knowable in principle.
See the Problem of Epistemology thread in religion. You were involved in that one . . . actually, as memory serves, you started it. So you should know how I feel about “Justified true belief”. What a crock . .
Just read a quote today, by someone I forget who, who said, human life is has limits, knoweldge is unlimited. To use a limited thing, to pursue an unlimited thing, is foolish.
That only works if we agree to that definition of knowledge.
But tell me what YOU think. How should we define knowledge?
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[b]I hope you dont think i’m being difficult or trying to hinder futher exploration of the matter, but I dont know that definitions are what they are.
On the surface, knowledge seems like a shared agreement that constitutes reality.
I like to think of knowledge as the sum total of information in the universe, from DNA to the composition of stars, to wikipedia (haha) ect.
But again, I dont know what knowledge is, to the full extent.[/b]
Hello everyone. I just registered for this site yesterday and this is my first post. I just wanted to introduce myself briefly and say that I am really excited to have stumbled upon this site. I’m looking forward to learning a lot and hopefully enriching the debates from time to time.
I don’t have much to add right now, but I do think that knowledge, by definition, should be knowable. If by some chance we were able to reach a consensus on a precise definition, I hope that it would evoke some sense of humility about our place in the world.
What do you mean by “knowledge”? There are at least two kinds of knowledge. There is knowledge that does not depend upon our experience of what we take to be an external reality and there is knowledge that does depend upon our experience of what we take to be external reality.
I know that ~(p&~p) by understanding what the concept says. I don’t have to go out into the world to know that if the proposition “The sun is shining” is true then the proposition “The sun is not shining” is false.
I do have to experience the world, however, to know that the proposition “The sun is shining” (or the proposition “The sun is not shining”) is true and I can always know this in only a probable sense.
So again, which kind of knowledge are you talking about?
And how do you define this “knowledge” that you see as something always changing? What is the constant by which you identify it as “knowledge”? if there is no constant… then how do you identify it as knowledge?
To get the discussion started, maybe we can examine the classical definition of knowledge as “justified, true belief” and go from there. Gettier distinctions aside for the moment, does anyone have a problem with the proposition that knowledge is, at a minimum, a belief we hold for good relevant reasons that a proposition which accurately describes a state of affairs in the world is true?
By this definition then, the belief that the moon is largely a dusty rock about a 1/4 the size of earth would count as a case of knowledge (assuming one has good, relevant reasons for believing that the moon is largely a dusty rock about a 1/4 the size of earth) and the belief that the moon is made of green cheese is not a case of knowledge.
By relevant, I mean that the reasons a belief is held must relate to the belief that is held. They cannot be extraneous to that belief.
I might believe that the moon is a dusty rock because I have a rock in my back yard that looks kind of like the moon. That, however, is not justification for my saying that I know the moon is a dusty rock even though it is true that the moon IS a dusty rock.
If OTOH I read that there is a strong consensus in the scientific community that analysis of material brought back from the moon shows that the moon is largely a dusty rock, then that – in combination perhaps with other similar sorts of evidence – would be justification for my belief.
What else can ‘true’ mean in this context besides something like ‘a falsifiable proposition that has been thoroughly tested and that has passed every test to which it has been put’?
OTOH, if by ‘true’ you mean something like ‘a proposition that cannot be doubted’ then for you knowledge is impossible since any proposition that describes a state of affairs in the world can be doubted.
Classically, the devide has been between externalism and internalism. They both have their merits and flaws- Externalism is about how reality fits with our beliefs, and while that seems to be a key component of knowing, as Mad Man P pointed out, something seems wrong with the idea of us being unaware of some of the circumstances that lead to us having knowledge or not-if we don’t know that we know, do we know? On the other hand, internalism is appealing because it puts the criterion in our laps- if we believe like this for these reasons, then we have knowledge. Of course the problem there is with coherentism- as we get is a set of beliefs that make sense in themselves, and not that necessarily tie in any way to the world.
Also, there’s a psychological factor to be considered. Can a person know without having the mental experience of certainty? That’s something I haven’t seen explored very well in what I’ve read at least, but I think it needs a lot more thought.
Justified True Belief I think is probably not sufficient for knowledge, because of Gettier problems. They can be overcome with a few widgets that are uncomfortably complex for some, but that’s why I like reliabilism.
For my own part, I’m quite taken with virtue epistemology, I believe that justified belief comes from believing virtuously. I think that may or may not be internal- a person doesn’t have to realize that they are doing so in order to believe in the right way and for the right reasons. Add to that the external qualification that a person is forming their beliefs in a truth-friendly environment, and I think you get very close to what knowledge is.
Cool… but that falls under “justification” of a belief. We’ve basically managed to agree that knowledge is, if nothing else, a justified belief.
We might explore justification later on… but for now let’s deal with this bit:
That understanding of the world “true” falls under the justification bit…
“True” in this context means “objectivly correct”… it means to conforms perfectly to objective reality.
But since we can never justify a belief that we have the perfect image of reality, we can never know that what we believe is actually true or not… Leaving us with only “justification”…
