"Right Over the Physicalist's Head"

cypressmoon · December 29, 2008, 3:59am

Well, this is may be a bit long for some, but I think it may be worthwhile to consider if you think physical explanations can account for everything. If you do read it, pay particularly close attention to C7.

I’m saying that brain states (namely a collection of synapsis) may be the last thing that happens in the physical-non-physical-process of the properties of imagination. Take, for instance, the thought of imagining a row of houses, the architecture of which are all vastly different. Now, the first house is thirteenth century Gothic architecture. The second house is seventeenth century colonial architecture, and the third house is post-modern architecture. Further, the fourth house is a collection of all three of these houses.

Let's say that architecture is like music frozen in time (Goethe).  In this case, the physical stuff is interacting with the mental processes of the architect (e.g. imagination / logical faculties etc.), or musician.  These physical things, like "brain states", or complex organic matter(s) (considering time), and the architecture, are a result of a colonial architects' interpretation of the whole history of architecure from sketches in a book of Roman collumns, the Gothic arch etc. and symbols (language) re-sembling concepts "in" the mind,  The Colonial house he designed was not an entirely physical process.  Here's why:

1.  There is the physical world.

3.  There is the brain.

4.  The colonial house was merely an evolutionary result of the interaction of the brain and its world.

Physically, I have no problem here.  But it seems to settle pretty much any argument fairly easily, without any critical analysis that would lead to a more thorough understanding of language, and human relations.  Here's the way I look at the process:

A.  There is the physical world.

B.  There is the brain.

C.  The colonial house was merely an evolutionary result of the interaction of the brain and its world.

C1,  The evolution of the brain and its world is a cuturally and historically contingent process of rule-bound revision.

C2.  The rules of architecture are "built" through historically and culturally contingent descriptions of physics, through epistemic limits and properties.

C3.  From one architectural movement to another (Gothic to Colonial), both physical descriptions, and the interpretation (for architectural purposes) are revised.

How is architectural revision possible?  the physicalist might say something like:

1A.  The architecture from a colonial book on the history of architecture is just some light.

2B.  The light enters the eye and is recieved thereafter by the brain.

3C.  The light is transformed into synapses in the brain.

4D.  These synapses work with other properties of the brain (chemicals neurotransmitters etc) that make new synapses.

5E.  These new synapses create new neural networks that tranform the history of architecture into a new Colonial Architecture.

The problem with this is: how are new nueral networks formed without accounting for a non-brain state imagination?  This is the way I see it:

C4.  Non-physical "stuff", like rules (e.g. epistemic limits, Physical limits (objects can't float), are accounted for by the mind (the elsewhere).  There are no rules in the brain.  They are outside the brain.

C5.  Rules are a historically and culturally contingent process that continually revises the rules.

C6.  The rules themselves are a product of communal, triangulated language justification.  Without non-physical explanations, the work of Davidson, and its pervasive power to explain phenomena within human communities of language, history, and affectionate triangulation wouldn't have come to fruition. 

[b]C7.[/b]  Triangulated language justification is what holds communities together through an intersubjectively shared world.  This world - the world that is shared within communities and micro-communities - is not physical.  If it were, there would be no such thing as cultural (communal) evolution, because there would be no need to communicate.  The objective world would be in our brain.  In the case of the intersubjectively shared world, it allows for revisions of non-physical rules that make the human wheel of communal evolution turn.  Physicalism alone, cannot offer the explanation of communal evolution.

C5.  Only with this non-physical stuff, like rules, revisions of non-physical and physical stuff are possible.  Only with non-physical stuff is the transformative power of human civilization explained.


The problem I see with physicalism, is that it's descriptions are limited, so much so, that it cannot account for why communities change.  It cannot account for the why's of history.  In order to account for the Why's of communal change, we must take into account the non-physical, intersubjectively justified rules of a community.  Rules are not a synapse, a chemical emmision or any combiation under the umbrella of neurology, or brain stuff.  They are "in" the non-physical in-bewtweens of communities.  This approach has much more explanatory power, and is more valid considering that rules are not in the brain - They're elsewhere.

Apologies for the poor grammar and spelling,

CM

Liteninbolt · December 29, 2008, 4:33am

I must fall into the physicalist category. That went right over my head.

Xunzian · December 29, 2008, 4:35am

Good post.

I think C7 is a false distinction. We usually don’t talk about the cells in our body having a flawed semiotic conception of reality, yet those cells have to communicate with each other quite extensively.

I talked about some of the concepts you discussed in some threads, like these:

Truth or Enlightenment

Solipsism and representative realism

Basically, my stance is that ‘the mind’ and ‘the world’ are coextensive (as opposed to ‘the mind’ and ‘the brain’) and that reality is constantly changing, though the manner in which change occurs is related through causality (so the change occurring at one moment is restricted insofar as it changes from the previous state).

Let’s use the Goethe line and take it a step back. Let’s talk about music first, since it is a little easier to see how spontaneous things can be. We are, at all times, exposed to a myriad of sounds. Some are pleasant to the ear, others aren’t. Likewise, we are exposed to a wide variety of different musical styles and arrangements. For example, Mozart is famous for his appropriation of Turkish music and blending it with European sensibilities and Elvis is famous for his appropriation of African-American music and blending it with White-American sensibilities. The degree of the appropriation is, of course, terribly important. No one would call Mozart a Turkish composer, but Elvis is often described as being ‘blues’ as well as ‘rock-and-roll/rockabilly’. So where the ‘borrowing from’ and the ‘borrowing to’ take place is often murky. To say nothing of the materials available. Hip-hop music would not have been possible if turntables had not been made inexpensive by the invention of the 8-track (and later cassettes). Not to mention the role of communal poverty in the development of sound systems.

I have to imagine that the switch to colonial from gothic was along similar lines. A change in the availability of building materials which demands certain changes as well as a variety of influences resulting in a new synthesis. So, different elements that were already there were simply connected as opposed to something arising sui generis. “There is nothing new under the sun,” but old things can be re-arranged in very interesting new patterns. Which I believe offers the bridge between 4D and 5E.

cypressmoon · December 29, 2008, 5:20am

Likewise.

I think you have an ontology in mind here when you say that “… the cells in our body [have] a flawed semiotic conception of reality.” This is, basically an ontological claim, I think. You’re welcome to hold any ontological belief you wish, but I don’t think ontology is within the confines of rationality. This is the epistemology I hold. It is, at root, derived from the first few pages of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations, and later expounded into the subjects object triangulation by Donald Davidson. This intersubjectivity, from a perpetually occuring communal justification of the “objective” world, makes transcending these cultural confines into some objective view of the world impossible. To value life itself is to transcend life and value the invaluable… long story.

Sure. I understand, and agree… but I don’t understand this ontology you hold, if that’s what you mean when you say “reality”.

Let’s use the Goethe line and take it a step back. Let’s talk about music first, since it is a little easier to see how spontaneous things can be. We are, at all times, exposed to a myriad of sounds. Some are pleasant to the ear, others aren’t. Likewise, we are exposed to a wide variety of different musical styles and arrangements. For example, Mozart is famous for his appropriation of Turkish music and blending it with European sensibilities and Elvis is famous for his appropriation of African-American music and blending it with White-American sensibilities. The degree of the appropriation is, of course, terribly important. No one would call Mozart a Turkish composer, but Elvis is often described as being ‘blues’ as well as ‘rock-and-roll/rockabilly’. So where the ‘borrowing from’ and the ‘borrowing to’ take place is often murky. To say nothing of the materials available. Hip-hop music would not have been possible if turntables had not been made inexpensive by the invention of the 8-track (and later cassettes). Not to mention the role of communal poverty in the development of sound systems.

Yeah. I can see that. I think we are more or less agreeing with how to analyse history from an epistemic, quasi-rational perspective. Practically, though (not rationally) I use Freud’s triad to develop some sort of map of the development of civilization to act as a moral agent, and attempt to make predictions of the future of the psyche.

I think where we disagree is on the play of non-physical “stuff” (like rule-bounded rationality) and physical stuff (like the world and the brain) - how these things interact, or if they even do at all.

Thanks for the detailed, thought provoking response.

BTW, the only ontological hypothesis that I really have hope for is Max Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis… but that is fairly irrelevant.

Faust · December 29, 2008, 1:44pm

Could you explain C4 a bit?

How are physical limits not physical?

That we know or do not know the loadbearing qualities of a 2x4 doesn’t change those qualities, correct?

cypressmoon · December 29, 2008, 4:19pm

Hi, Faust.

In all likelyhood, I think that physical limits are indeed physical.

For instance, though, take the speed-limit on light in general relativity. Relativity is only an account of the macro-scale of the universe. The important thing here, I think, is that general relativity is not accounting for the micro-scale(s) as well (quantum and “beneath”), making its claims about the physical world not an ontology, but (an unbelievably huge crescendo for human thought) just a revision of Newtonian mechanics - this, I think is further evidence of the non-physical epistemic, historically and culturally contingent rule-boundedness of thinking. Einstein was (as Deleuze would say) “overhuman”, insofar as that the physics community was knocked over with a profound revision of the rules that the community abided by, to practice with. Luckily for einstein, the scientific community is open to revision and encourages the scepticism that democracies allow for…

Xunzian · December 29, 2008, 4:43pm

I think one of the first things we should tackle is the whole notion of ‘objectivity’. I’ve written about it before, so I may as well just post my position:

The objective/subjective distinction is a post-Christian hangover that modern philosophy is dealing with. Objectivity demands a God’s eye view of the situation and since there is no God, a God’s eye view is impossible (or, to broaden the argument slightly, humans have no access to the God’s eye view). This does make the distinction between subjective and objective a little blurry, but I don’t think the line is abolished. I’d generally say ‘objective’ is that which we can’t control through substitution of symbols. If I swap “red” with “rot”, the apple does not change. Indeed, if I were able to undergo some operation that would eliminate my color-blindness, the apple wouldn’t change either merely my perception/symbol for it. The apple creates the phenomenon, I’m merely interpreting it.

With respect to how the physical and non-physical interact, I’d admittedly coming into this discussion from another angle with another set of foundational assumptions, so it should come as no surprise that we would have some degree of difficulty establishing common ground, at least initially. So as to avoid the nasty situation of us ‘talking past’ each other, let me provide some background. For the sake of intellectual integrity, I should note that the following is autoplagarized, but due to the already abundant use of quotes I’m presenting it as though it were originally written for this post as opposed to quoted:

If I could contrast a few of the philosophers that I find relevant:

–start autoplagarization–

Xiong Shili:

The word principle (li) originally has the meaning of order or pattern. But we should not say, as Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianists said, that it is order within material force (qi). Many of them considered material force to be a real thing and consequently considered principle to be merely order within material force. According to this, principle itself is an empty form and material force alone is real. […] Here I do not want to criticize them [the Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianists] too much. I merely want to explain my idea of principle and material force. I believe they cannot be sharply divided into two pieces. The word “principle” is a general term for both substance and function, whereas “material force” refers only to function. When the meaning of the word “material force” was explained above, it was already made quite clear that material force is the function.

[…]

Substance also means the source of all transformations, the foundation of all things and the converging point of all principles. It should be called true principle or concrete principle. It can also be called ultimate principle. Spoken from the point of view of function, in the wonderful functioning of opening and closing, all characters and phenomena seem functioning of closing and opening, all characters and phenomena seem to be manifest. Here phenomena follow a certain order, easily pervasive without any obstruction. It is also called principle, for phenomena and principle are identical, that is, phenomena are principle. Principle in the first instance refers to substance. It is the one source, which actually involves all manifestations. Principle in the second instance derives its name from function. It is the many manifestations which returns to the one source. Although principle may be said to be two, essentially, it is neither one nor two. As meanings as substance and function differ it is not one. But since it is at the same time substance and function it is not two.

Feng Youlan:

Chu Hsi regards principle as that by which actual things necessarily are what they are and the specific principle according to which they should be. Our idea of principle is the same. As square thing must follow the principle of the square before it can be square, and it must completely follow the principle of the square before it can be perfectly square. Whether a square thing is perfectly square depends on whether or not it follows the principle of the square completely. According to this reasoning, the principle of the square is the standard of all square things; it is the specific principle according to which they should be.

[…]

In our system we can still say that “the principle is one but its manifestations are many.” But when we say so, the principle we are talking about is still the principle when we discuss it as such. Let us first take the example of things in a certain class. The things in this class all follow one principle. However, although they all follow the same principle, they each have their own individuality. From the point of view of things of this class being related within the class, we can say that their principle is one but its manifestations are many. As we said before, the principle of a class implies the principle of a general class, all specific classes within the general class can also be stated in terms that the principle is one but its manifestations are many . . .

Both philosophers from their respective sections in Wing-Tsit Chan’s “A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.”
Next, I think that a bit from Tu Weiming is necessary:

Tu Weiming:

We have already suggested that man’s structure of being and man’s process of becoming are two complimentary points of view. Indeed, if I interpret Yangming’s perception correctly, they actually represent two inseparable dimensions of human reality. Therefore, we must recognize that man is both a given structure and an indeterminate process. To say that I am a given structure is not to deny the freedom of choice, for I alone can make the inner decision to become what I ought to be. And such a decision necessarily transforms the restrictive ties of my given structure into a set of instrumentaria for self-realization. To say that I am an indeterminate process is not to undermine my inner identity. No matter how I choose to act, I do so in the context of being a meaningful entity. Therefore, a measure of freedom is an integral part of the given structure, and a sense of identity is an integral part of the indeterminate process. Although the structure is given for the sake of self-realization, it must undergo a process of transformation. By the same token, the indeterminate process constantly assumes a temporal structure because of self-identity. Consequently, man’s being what he is must be sought in his becoming what he ought to be, and vice versa.

–Subjective and Ontological Reality – An Interpretation of Wang Yang-ming’s Mode of Thinking.

So the task here is how to synthesize these separate concepts. When Tu talks about a “given structure” we can say that it is the function of the thing a la Xiong Shili; whereas the indeterminate process of transformation is the “substance” Xiong Shili spoke of. We can see that these things are linked and, to a certain degree, inseparable. But the principle that serves as the source for the thing in question is poorly defined in this case, which is why Feng Youlan’s more developed concept of how the principle can be one but its manifestations are many is in order.

So, at this point we have substance and function giving rise to each other which would be circular if time weren’t taken into account: any given function is the result of its substance and substance is the result of its function. However, if this process is not viewed as a static process but rather a temporal one, a helix is formed stretching across time. This entire process is what I think of as “principle”.

—end autoplagarization—

Granted, that largely stems from an ontology that you are more than free to reject, but I think that given those elements, the ‘helix’ I described allows for meaningful interaction between that which makes a thing and the pattern a thing takes. But you’ll note there is nothing in that framework that can really be called ‘non-physical’, since the two elements are the same thing just engaged in a process with each other.

As for the notion of a mathematical universe, I’m not entirely opposed to many of the conclusions he reached, but I think he reaches them through a reification of mathematics, which strikes me as rather fishy. At least insofar as I understand it, which is just through the wiki article I just skimmed. I can agree that physical reality is indexical but it is precisely because it is indexical that things like mathematics can be developed within it. So I’d say that all structures that exist physically also exist mathematically. Though the mathematics in play may be different in each case.

cypressmoon · December 29, 2008, 6:58pm

Xunzian:

I think one of the first things we should tackle is the whole notion of ‘objectivity’. I’ve written about it before, so I may as well just post my position:

The objective/subjective distinction is a post-Christian hangover that modern philosophy is dealing with. Objectivity demands a God’s eye view of the situation and since there is no God, a God’s eye view is impossible (or, to broaden the argument slightly, humans have no access to the God’s eye view). This does make the distinction between subjective and objective a little blurry, but I don’t think the line is abolished. I’d generally say ‘objective’ is that which we can’t control through substitution of symbols. If I swap “red” with “rot”, the apple does not change. Indeed, if I were able to undergo some operation that would eliminate my color-blindness, the apple wouldn’t change either merely my perception/symbol for it. The apple creates the phenomenon, I’m merely interpreting it.

I hope you don’t mind my emboldenment, but I hold the same idea Philosophically, or rationally. Transcendence (JC incarnate God) of life itself, is inexplicable because of epistemological confines. Under this reasoning alone, I agree that valuations of the rationally invaluable are irrational, and only a practical necessity. These, I think are the conditions of western, pre-suppositional (or axiomatic) reasoning. And for that matter objectivity is obliterated, as well as subjectivity. Everything becomes intersubjectively verified. The totality of things are a property of sentences (truth is). Triangulated justification of the “objective” world is achieved thorugh, what Wittgenstein calls Grammar. Object and subjects (thing and human beings) is the triangle of the justification of the objective world. This is Davidson’s view, more or less.

I’m sorry. I have to cut this short. I have a plane to catch, but I’ll be back (in the meantime, if you’re board, feel free to talk about anything).
I could very well be wrong, but I think we’re just having trouble communicating using different terms that hold similar ideas. “principle” for you is similar to the way I see this “rule-bounded epistemic to physical relationship”.

Anyway, gotta run. Talk later.

Faust · December 30, 2008, 3:53am

What does this mean? Do you mean “a brain and the world external to that brain”?

cypressmoon · December 30, 2008, 1:36pm

Yeah. Or, the self, and “the totality of things”. However, I think that if we look at it as the self, and the totality of all things, the explanatory power, and validity of philosophy becomes more potent…

Your brain doesn’t think of rules. The rules you are thinking of are an emergence from your community, not your brain but a collection of brains - through triangulation.

Object / subjects … or … things and community. You have your object in front of you and some friends, and you say to your micro-community, “that apple is blood-red”. Your friends reply, “Word. It’s totally blood-red.”

In that act, through inter-subjective (“inter-people”) verification, you have verified a “fact” about the “objective” world: “The apple is blood-red”. This was not an entirely physical process, in that this “fact” about the apple is contingent upon cultural-historical layered language metaphors (which I have already explained in this thread). The language you are employing, in other words, to verify a shared world, is only physical during the initial Acoustic metaphor that resonates in the air. The meaning of these words, are beyond this dead, meaningles, undulating sound wave through some air. They are a non-physical “product” of a cultural-historical continuity.

… This, in general, is Davidson’s sketch for intersubjective triangulation.

Faust · December 30, 2008, 2:01pm

Ah, so that we remember things, collectively, transforms the physical into the non-physical.

That’s just some metaphysical sleight-of-hand, and simply untrue.

uglypeoplefucking · December 30, 2008, 2:22pm

What exactly is the fear of simply acknowledging thoughts (communal, intersubjective, or whathaveyou) as physical entities? What is it about rules and revisions that requires non-physical or non-brain states as explanation? I’m not clear.

If we don’t presume a strict or absolute dichotomy between individual and community, then there’s no reason to presume a strict or absolute distinction between an individual brain state and a communally conceded “rule”, and thus no need to posit a non-physical intersubjective realm . . . it can just as well be physical - compendiums of brain states - the creative/imaginative process of the architect does not begin solely as she views the picture of the roman column in the text book - she’s got an entire lifetime of physical experience behind her (including physical, communal experience of other people’s brain states). The stylistic evolution (and the rule revision) can just be a novel recombination of preexisting physical properties . . . i don’t see where the non-physical needs to come into the picture . . .

maybe the question is really about the semantics of the word “physical” - to me, simply displaying physically causal properties is enough to qualify . . .

Faust · December 30, 2008, 2:35pm

Excellent analysis, ugly. You’re correct - the “nonphysical” is simply posited here - sort of “snuck in”.

Typical metaphysical ruse.

Xunzian · December 30, 2008, 2:49pm

+1 on ugly’s response. It’s why I opt to use funny words. Not just because I’m trying to make my philo all exotic but because occasionally it helps to use a lexicon with a different set of baggage. For example, no one familiar with qi would argue that thoughts aren’t qi. Contrast that with the physical/psychic divide we’ve inherited from the Greek tradition. Thoughts aren’t physical because they are the measure whereby something isn’t considered physical. Which is fine in 500BCE, but we’ve come a long way since then and it just so happens that such a definition causes more problems than it solves. That doesn’t mean some of the terms I’ll use don’t have problematic baggage (ohhhh boy do they ever!) but the nice thing is that the baggage is crazy enough to be discarded pretty easily.

cypressmoon · December 30, 2008, 3:13pm

It allows for a more thorough, explanatory account of relations. (human → non-human / non-human → human / physical → non-physical / non-physical → physical … and any combination therein)

If we don’t presume a strict or absolute dichotomy between individual and community, then there’s no reason to presume a strict or absolute distinction between an individual brain state and a communally conceded “rule”, and thus no need to posit a non-physical intersubjective realm . . . it can just as well be physical - compendiums of brain states - the creative/imaginative process of the architect does not begin solely as she views the picture of the roman column in the text book - she’s got an entire lifetime of physical experience behind her (including physical, communal experience of other people’s brain states). The stylistic evolution (and the rule revision) can just be a novel recombination of preexisting physical properties . . . i don’t see where the non-physical needs to come into the picture . . .

I think the non-physical does need to come into the picture. Without this “sneaky non-physical, metaphysical ruse”, as you’ve displayed, physicalist explanations of historically continul relations are nothing but, “communal experience of other peoples brain states.” The communal experience of other people’s brain states are because of non-physical “stuff”. The rules are nowhere in the brain. They are in the “in-bewteens” of communities. Take IQ tests as an example:

What are IQ test? The measurement of one’s ability to follow rules. The rules, are “up-to-date” revisions of continually revised rules throughout history.
IQ tests were developed by a early 20th century German Psychologists. Psychology back in the early 20th century, if I remember, had nothing to do with neurology, but inferences from behavior, and “meta-models” made from these inferences. So, this physical thing, (the arrangement of particles that make up an IQ test) was, in fact only possible because of non-physical descriptions of physical behaviors. This is a blatant example of how non-physical stuff, is part of the relations between historically and culturally contingent human and non-human stuff… yet further evidence that physicalism isn’t cutting it when it comes to historically continual relations.

What else need be said about philosophy? “Everything is physical!” It sure is a good way to get yourself out of any critical thinking.

I suppose neither of you believe that the transcendental musings of pre-historical humans, like myth-making, had absolutely nothing to do with the development of the Communal “Super-ego”, and therefore the development of language. It was just a healthy diet, and opposable thumbs that made us human - not this non-physical myth-making that allowed communities to bind through language. That’s just superfluous semantics, huh?

My point exactly. Why bring up more problems, when everything is already solved? Or, not sarcastically: We need to bring up more problems because not everything is solved.

Faust · December 30, 2008, 11:51pm

Just not true.

Also just plain false. To predetermine the results of critical analysis is mere dogma - which is the true way to avoid critical thinking.

Does capitalising “Communal Super-ego” somehow impart literal meaning to this metaphor?

If only it were so easy.

But we don’t need to invent them. We already have enough.

uglypeoplefucking · December 31, 2008, 1:48am

Cypressmoon:

What are the qualities or properties that distinguish the “non-physical” from the physical, in your view?

And

What particular problems does positing a “non-physical stuff” allow you to resolve that couldn’t otherwise be resolved by granting thought physical status?

cypressmoon · December 31, 2008, 2:41am

No. It’s true.

No. We don’t.

Here’s something worth considering:

I suggest that you sufficiently demonstrate why I should think otherwise. We’re not discussing statisticall facts about the Yankees here. And you’re abusing your power, by relying on the credentials your name carries with it. Only, I don’t believe in credit-cards.

The way I see the physical, is that denoting a topography of a landscape is of epistemic value when composing sentences, whereas denoting a topography (surveying where) non-physical “stuff” is of no use.
As for specific properties, The Hard sciences consider the properties of the physical, and categorize them in thier explanations.
The non-physical “stuff” (e.g. rule bounded epistemology) is described through language, and the properties are as varied as the physical properties that Scientists account for. For instance, axioms (or pre-suppositional “foundations”) are floating (i.e. ungrounded), fallible, open for revision, historically and culturally contingent, etc.

I already explained a few… but here’s another:

Freud’s triad, for instance, (a non-physical substance) evidently changed society, the non-substantial human psyche, and the physical brain forever. His triadic apparatus’ are nowhere to be found in the physical stuff of this world. Also, it was the myth-making (non-physical substance) that gave humanity a communal “super-ego”, which binded a community through it’s service as a common language producing machine. There is no doubt (in my mind at least) that these two substances interact.

I think the problem we’re having here is that of dualism, or absurdism. This is the way I see it:

Rational consistency in this mess of post-modernist philosophy can only take us so far into all relations (physical —> physical [ontology] / non-physical <—> physical). The monism pervading through this adhereance to rationally consistent metaphysical doctrines (e.g. physicalism / Idealism etc.), is the occultish dogma of philosophy. Dualism - the rationally absdurd to monists - is a necessary “inconsistency” in order to offer explanations that encompass, and detail a vastly broader range of relations. The western tradition of pre-suppositional “foundations” of philosophical doctrines is a rule-bounded dogma that, I think, needs to be revised. The logical confines that give rise to numerous metaphysical explanations, and epistemic beliefs, needs to be exorcised from the Western mind. The rule-boundedness of monistic metaphysics needs to “open up” to other rule-bounded monistic doctrines. When they spill into each other, the mess is left up to us to sort through. It is, by the current rationallity, irrational “dualism”, or “absurdism”. The project of this new metaphysics is to sort through the inconsistent mess of incompatible propositions, and transform the whole idea of rationality into something else. I think this new idea of rationality will consist in its ability to explain (both precisely and broadly) all relations. If this is the case, then monism is merely a cultural and historically contingent bias (dogma) that is perpetuated by the valuation of the importance of consistency over explanatory power. These monistic attitudes are also pre-supposing a monistic ontology. It is the bewitchment of the epistemic notion of mirrors. The immensely powerful desire to ontologize, and know all through a monistic rationality has, I think, only “suppressed” ideas, doctrines, claims, propositions, etc., in a way that all Dogmas do. We’ve had this monistic notion for centuries, and nothing has come of it, but some poor explanations and untenable bickering between these agents of short-sighted monistic metaphysics.

This dualistic “absurdist” doctrine is not nurtured in modern civilization. People dismiss thoughts out of hand because of dualistic tendencies that they “intuit”.

“Let the man speak.” absurdists say. While the ontologically confident say, “shutup. Your premises are dualistic.”

Epistemic humility leads to a more pervasive explanation of relations, and thereafter, moral agency becomes a much more effective practice.

I think the problem is developing a language to describe the interactions between these two monistic philosophical doctrines. The notion of truth, I think, is a provisional property of sentences.

If we can never achieve a linkage between the physical and non-physical explanations, would that necessarily entail that dualism is true? Two essentially different explanations would be needed to explain relations. All relations will never be explained though (namely the physical to non-physical relations).

We just might have to settle with two incompatable explanations of the world…

Faust · December 31, 2008, 3:48am

What are you talking about?

If my replies are not sufficient, I would suggest that you simply don’t understand them. I am certainly not going to try to match you for long, convoluted arguments. You have simply invented some stuff here. I have pointed this out to you. There is no need to counter an argument containing fictional premises.

uglypeoplefucking · December 31, 2008, 2:51pm

Fallibility, openess to revision, historal and cultural contingency, etc, are all properties that apply to physical substance as well. A rule-bounded epistemology can be located in the thinking organs of a given human pondering the subject - it doesn’t exist until and unless somebody thinks it (that’s what it MEANS to say that it is historically or culturally contingent). I still don’t see why we need to posit a non-physical stuff to explain rules . . .

Freud’s triad exists as an analogy desribing some of the varied functions of the thinking organ - as long as we think, read or talk about these things, they exist in the physical world - but they are only physical descriptions of physical phenomena, there’s no compelling reason to presume they exist independent of human thought in some seperate, non-physical realm of their own. These are things created by humans, for humans. They explain physical phenomena (brain functions) in physical ways (words, images, symbols, etc…)

What about myth making is non-physical? What about the community as a language producing machine is non-physical? Language has its being in physical sensation (sound, symbol, thought, patterns traced on Helen Keller’s palm, etc …). The community has its being, its myths, and its figurative super-ego, in the physical relations between its members as instantiated through physical language and symbols. Just because something isn’t comprised of particles doesn’t mean its not physical - Heat, for instance, is a physical phenomenon, but it is only the result of the ACTIVITY of matter, and not of matter itself.

I think the problem we’re having here is that of dualism, or absurdism. This is the way I see it:

Rational consistency in this mess of post-modernist philosophy can only take us so far into all relations (physical —> physical [ontology] / non-physical <—> physical). The monism pervading through this adhereance to rationally consistent metaphysical doctrines (e.g. physicalism / Idealism etc.), is the occultish dogma of philosophy. Dualism - the rationally absdurd to monists - is a necessary “inconsistency” in order to offer explanations that encompass, and detail a vastly broader range of relations. The western tradition of pre-suppositional “foundations” of philosophical doctrines is a rule-bounded dogma that, I think, needs to be revised. The logical confines that give rise to numerous metaphysical explanations, and epistemic beliefs, needs to be exorcised from the Western mind. The rule-boundedness of monistic metaphysics needs to “open up” to other rule-bounded monistic doctrines. When they spill into each other, the mess is left up to us to sort through. It is, by the current rationallity, irrational “dualism”, or “absurdism”. The project of this new metaphysics is to sort through the inconsistent mess of incompatible propositions, and transform the whole idea of rationality into something else. I think this new idea of rationality will consist in its ability to explain (both precisely and broadly) all relations. If this is the case, then monism is merely a cultural and historically contingent bias (dogma) that is perpetuated by the valuation of the importance of consistency over explanatory power. These monistic attitudes are also pre-supposing a monistic ontology. It is the bewitchment of the epistemic notion of mirrors. The immensely powerful desire to ontologize, and know all through a monistic rationality has, I think, only “suppressed” ideas, doctrines, claims, propositions, etc., in a way that all Dogmas do. We’ve had this monistic notion for centuries, and nothing has come of it, but some poor explanations and untenable bickering between these agents of short-sighted monistic metaphysics.

This dualistic “absurdist” doctrine is not nurtured in modern civilization. People dismiss thoughts out of hand because of dualistic tendencies that they “intuit”.

“Let the man speak.” absurdists say. While the ontologically confident say, “shutup. Your premises are dualistic.”

Epistemic humility leads to a more pervasive explanation of relations, and thereafter, moral agency becomes a much more effective practice.

I think the problem is developing a language to describe the interactions between these two monistic philosophical doctrines. The notion of truth, I think, is a provisional property of sentences.

If we can never achieve a linkage between the physical and non-physical explanations, would that necessarily entail that dualism is true? Two essentially different explanations would be needed to explain relations. All relations will never be explained though (namely the physical to non-physical relations).

We just might have to settle with two incompatable explanations of the world…

I understand that you wish to rebel against the philisophical status quo which you perceive as being dogmatically monist (i would say, if anything, that’s a scientific status quo - and ideally science is self-correcting and therefore not dogmatic - you simply would need to come up with some more compelling evidence for the existence of a non-physical substance in order to change the prevailing view), but to do so by positing substances that serve no compelling explanatory purpose seems like a step backward. I have no problem with dualism, it is by dualism that we have arrived at what you’re (somewhat quaintly) calling monism, dualism is just another explanatory step in that direction. It’s not intrinsically flawed, and it is indispensibly useful in certain contexts, while not in others - but, frankly, i fail to see how it is useful in the context of explaining what you are almost arbitrarily insisting are non-physical phenomena. The physical explanations seem to work just as well.

I think you harbor prejudices against “monism” that are qualitatively similar to the prejudices against dualism which you invoke in making your argument.