Nothingness of Being - Absolute freedom - Sartre

[b]Freedom is our only being but we are not free to cease being free, said Sartre.

In oher words, the limit of our freedom is its neccesity and inevitability.[/b]

The problems i have with this are -

Is this really freedom, then?

This total all encompassing acknowledgement of freedom, the acceptance of a free will in regards to everything, would appear to be the opposite of a determinist theory…BUT by appreciating the inevitability of freedom does the idea not then involve a suggestion of determinism?

Furthermore, how can Sartres claim of ‘absolute freedom’ stand up against relatively simple criticisms of it, like hypnosis, psychotherapy or psychological tampering (ie. addiction)?

and finally,

when we acknowledge death as an inevitable is our freedom then not confined by such an inevitable pre-determined?

We may be free to choose our being from moment to moment but we do so aware that such modes are only temporary…thus invalidating their significance and as a consequence rendering our freedom irrelevant,

no?


Hope this can be a lively debate,

please join in,
thanks

of course he was free to cease being free…

he should have asked yorick

-Imp

I think he would have agreed with you there.

Freedom is our only being, but we are not free to cease being free, said Sartre.

In other words, the limit of our freedom is its necessity and inevitability.

This is deterministic. There is no free will. It sounds almost Hegelian, the truest freedom is the most complete servitude to the state. He means to go with the flow.

We are most free, when we follow our instincts, our hidden inner selves.

He was a pretty hardcore Marxist so I don’t think he was necessarily a fan of going with the French state… He, of course, also was a part of the resistance against the Nazis…

Yes I know, the point is there is no free will.
Marx is a neo-Hegelian; dialectical materialism.

Yes I know, the point is there is no free will.
Marx is a neo-Hegelian; dialectical materialism.
[/quote]
Are you arguing that there is no free will or that Sartre thought that there was no free will?

=D>

Are you arguing that there is no free will or that Sartre thought that there was no free will?

That’s an interpretation of the quote.
“we are not free to cease being free”
i.e. no free will, (freedom in servitude, and vice versa.)

Hello illiades:

— Freedom is our only being but we are not free to cease being free, said Sartre.
In oher words, the limit of our freedom is its neccesity and inevitability.
The problems i have with this are -
Is this really freedom, then?
This total all encompassing acknowledgement of freedom, the acceptance of a free will in regards to everything, would appear to be the opposite of a determinist theory…BUT by appreciating the inevitability of freedom does the idea not then involve a suggestion of determinism?
O- But a determinism in another manner, more in tune with subjective experience. We are, so to speak, determined to be free. This does not deny the belief in a deterministic universe, but goes beyond that to signal our first person experience, and it makes sense because the contents of the subjective are ill defined and so cannot form a firm part of a causal chain. If they do, if you insist to put the human will in a causal chain, then you must deal with it’s elusiveness…something you don’t have to deal with with billiard balls (and even this up-front causal-chain is questioned by Hume).

— Furthermore, how can Sartres claim of ‘absolute freedom’ stand up against relatively simple criticisms of it, like hypnosis, psychotherapy or psychological tampering (ie. addiction)?
O- Hypnosis is very hard to achieve if the participant does not want to be hypnotized. It is a game of suggestion and it depends, therefore, on the choice of the participant to let himself be open to suggestions. Psychoanalysm depends on freewill as well or else you’re talking about psychiatry, in which case we are dealing with altered states and not ordinary human consciousness.

— and finally, when we acknowledge death as an inevitable is our freedom then not confined by such an inevitable pre-determined?
O- You are again misunderstanding that Sartre was not denying all determinism, but that when it comes to humans, determinism or determinism theory hit a road block. He did not say that all is free, not even that we were free, but that we were condemned, determined, to be free, free in the sense that we, not planets, nor stardust, nor the beating of a butterfly’s wings, determine our choices, we, who stand not entirey detached from overpowering determinants but are the most overpowering of all determinant in the chain of a choice.

— We may be free to choose our being from moment to moment but we do so aware that such modes are only temporary…thus invalidating their significance and as a consequence rendering our freedom irrelevant, no?
O- Our freedom may be irrelevant, but this does not change our freedom. We cannot help ourselves but to continue choosing.

It’s important to remember with Sartre that his arguments and investigations are phenomenological, so it must take into account the lived first person experience of each particular consciousness. We are not dealing with freedom in the sense that our consciousness may be grounded in some sort of neurobiology that we have no control over, but hat from the first person perspective of consciousness we are never constrained in choosing one action over another.

marxists.org/reference/subje … kojeve.htm

iep.utm.edu/k/kojeve.htm#H2

I appreciate your replies

Omar, we haveto put the human will in a causal chain otherwise the will loses its significance. In other words, its significance is derived from its ability to cause. When you speak of its elusiveness what do you mean?
That the will is not there for us to comprehend or that the context within which the will operates is not ‘ultimate’?

The second point i made, to which you stated hypnosis is only effective on a willing participant, i guess was not stated succintly by me. Sartre alleges we have ‘total freedom’ and alludes that we are responsible for every choice we make, how does this have relevance, i am asking, when an individual can be ‘influenced’ by something beyond his 'control. For instance, a neurobiological implant, or even more simply prozac, furthermore, a placebo, which has ‘influenced’ his decision making therefore affecting his freedom.

Now, of course, in a sense everything affects our decision making, and so our freedom, thus in principle this should be no different but it is precisely because of its clarity. Any event will impact on future choices and thus have a bearing on ‘true’ freedom but they will always be open to perspective, ie. what is cold for some is warm for others - it will be relative.
But an implant, or prozac, for example, will only have a particular effect. Rather than be open to perspective it will form perspective. How can freedom be total when we are susceptible to such restraints?

To the next point, i appreciate your take on Sartres idea of freedom and compatibility and i must say it is largely how i see it too, namely, we alone as individuals are accountable for our choices. Exclusive of war, for instance, or weather or mood etc etc, we make our choices and are free to do so. This is our ‘condemned state’, to be free.
The suggestion i am making is that Sartre did not really account for death suitably. As the true powering determinant, inescapable regardless, our ‘freedom’ operates within its boundaries. We proceed from one choice to another, one ‘being to the next’ en route to death. Even the semi-permanence of our states, our ‘beings’, loses significance when considered in the light of death. There is no actual freedom, i think, just a semblance of it. A suggestion of it. As though it flirts with us without ever intending to ‘be’. We are free, damned to be free, but because we are free, we will never be free.
Am i lucid enough? Probably not, but i would appreciate if you tried to comprehend my point and offer your view.

Reading your final point, maybe you have a similar opinion.

So we are both free and not free, are you saying?


Radiohead, i take your point about first person perspective, that freedom of choice is ours in the sense that when we are making it we are making it, regardless of what may have influenced us, we will still be making it.
That although other factors may be the reason for the choice, ultimately, it is still us making the choice. Is that your point?
If so, i agree and consider it so, but, even from such a phenomenological stand, how does this freedom justify being called freedom when it is restrained by itself?

The idea that we have to choose a being, be it temporary or not, means we are not free. [i]We are forced to will. We are forced to become.

How can that be free?[/i]

thanks,

enjoying the debate so far,

hope more people join it
Being and Nothingess is appropriate after all.

Hello illiades:

— Omar, we haveto put the human will in a causal chain otherwise the will loses its significance. In other words, its significance is derived from its ability to cause.
O- It is a cause which we cannot predict or else it would not be a choice.

— When you speak of its elusiveness what do you mean?
O- That the causes of a choice stem in part from the imagination, which often completes the sensible information and makes us “confused”, as we hold that the choices we’ve made are based on “facts”, but these facts, unknown to us, might just be half-imagined as we use imagination in so many features of our reasoning including apprehension, comprehension and memory.
Because of this factor, which is very intractable, a true measurement of the causal chain cannot be made. Also remember that the “causal-chain” is not emprirical but imagined as well, so that we can have “links” in the chain, so to speak, which do not belong, in fact, but seem to belong there to us. As Hume put it, we don’t observe the moment of causation, only disparate events that uniformly followed each other. The causal chain, then, is a way we interpret the world around us based on our own version of experience (I say “version” because our perspective need not be universal or even mirror the world of facts= subjectively, the sky above us is blue) but it need not be absolute.

— That the will is not there for us to comprehend
O- Every comprehension is itself an interpretation. Need I say that that is how I see it?

— or that the context within which the will operates is not ‘ultimate’?
O- The “will”…so impersonal…as if it is an object-out-there. This obscures rather than reveal to us the character of experiences, and when we talk Sartre we must remember this is his perspective. But no. The will, or our experience of reality is never the final word on that which is, as Sartre would say, “in-itself”.

— The second point i made, to which you stated hypnosis is only effective on a willing participant, i guess was not stated succintly by me. Sartre alleges we have ‘total freedom’ and alludes that we are responsible for every choice we make
O- Normally this is so. But we are not normally hypnotized, are we?

— how does this have relevance, i am asking, when an individual can be ‘influenced’ by something beyond his 'control.
O- How do you what is “beyond” or “within” your control? And what is “control” in this scenario? Does rock music influence anyone to kill other people? Or are we really already killers just looking for a good rhyme? Who knows? Certainly christians have made rock music a threat to our civilization. Others accuse religion of influencing people into killing doctors etc. I believe that an influence is only as effective as we allow it to be. Rock music pleases us, or something in us. Religion pleases us as well. When anyone SAYS that they have killed in the name of one or the other, this is a way of escaping responsibility, or as Sartre would say “bad-faith”. Were they influenced or not? Maybe. Maybe not? Let’s go back to Hume. The causal chain is a matter of listing probable chain of events. But there is no absolute where choices are concerned. Not all christians kill doctors, nor all head bangers kill people or hip-hoppters. So how do we know then if rock or christianity are part of the causal link of a murder? We do not. We choose this interpretation over other alternatives.

— For instance, a neurobiological implant, or even more simply prozac, furthermore, a placebo, which has ‘influenced’ his decision making therefore affecting his freedom.
O- Drugs can influence a decision but do not make, as if by themselves, the decision. It narrows our freedom but do not eliminate it in all possible cases. We treat it (interpret) as if drugs did indeed curtail our freedom to choose completely, but only by suppressing certain exceptions. We could say for example that Christianity will cause someone impressionable enough to kill abortion doctors. Fair enough. But now we must explain the many months, perhaps years, in which this murderer was both a Christian and aware of the existence of these doctors. Why did he kill so-and-so on this morning and not in any other morning prior to this one? Premeditation is considered a choice.
Now, to conclude here, I am not denying that there are times when our ability to choose is diminished. Take for example a man that walks in on his wife and lover. he is now in the grip of a jealous rage. What will he do? Is he without a choice? Suppose he did kill her that time and we were able to turn back the time and re-start history. Can we know for sure he will kill her once again? Probably, would say Hume, but we cannot be sure until it happens again. Every prediction carries a level of uncertainty especially where a choice is concerned. Even when we are under the effects of rage, or of drugs we cannot say that we were beyond our own ability to choose because we are not robots, our mechanism is not easily defined, or even designed by us from beginning to end for us to know it’s true capabilities and limitations nor can we claim that we have reversed engineered the human animal to the point where we KNOW beyond a shadow of doubt where a choice is possible or impossible. Drugs and anger and other emotions play a part in our making a choice but this can expressed in likelyhood, probability, but not in certain or absolute terms and when we do claim that the murderer is guilty (chose to kill freely) or innocent (was determined by his strong emotion that robbed him of his ability to choose), we are making interpretations, linking the links of a possible chain of events which we never did witness or observe. And even our choice of a narration or interpretation, will reflect on our preferences, our perspective of the world and not by necessity on the in-itself.

— There is no actual freedom, i think, just a semblance of it. A suggestion of it. As though it flirts with us without ever intending to ‘be’. We are free, damned to be free, but because we are free, we will never be free.
Am i lucid enough? Probably not, but i would appreciate if you tried to comprehend my point and offer your view.
O- First of all, when talking existentialism one can never be lucid. This is why the best philosophical explanations of existentialism is made through narratives. remember Sartre’s “Nausea” or Camus’ “The Stranger” or even Kafka’s “The Trial”?
Death does not curtail our freedom. That is how I see it. I know that I am mortal but I still have to choose what I am going to study today or what I want to become tomorrow. Should I become a teacher? A mechanic? A doctor? Death cannot aleviate the anxiety over this and other choices because it cannot make these choices for us nor can we say, if we fail, that it was the “will of death” and act as if it was out of our hands from the start because we were going to die. There are people, I have heard, that become paralysed thinking about the many ways that they can die: What we eat can kills us, a short fall, walking by the street, at home by the weather itself…but these are very few cases and do not represent what most human beings have dealt with in their lives. Even in these cases, a person still makes minor choices here and there. Should I pee on myself or hold it in? Should I drink water and eat or starve myself to death? If a person eats and cooks for themselves then even more choices are inevitable.

— So we are both free and not free, are you saying?
O- And what I think that sartre is saying.

Freedom does not have to be complete - to be free we do not have to be able to anything. We just have to be able to choose between at least two distinct possibilities.

It is obvious that we are not free to do anything we want too - even to the most optimnistic philosopher. I do not have the option of adding two to two to make five, for example. In fact, I can’t even choose to run at 100mph or fly to the moon, despite these being possibilities.

Determinism, though, is the theory that we are not free to choose at all. If I had but one meaningful choice between eating an apple for lunch or a banana (I had a banana today, by the way), then determinism would be false.

Personally I think free will is somehing akin to time - our experience of freedom is a curious, unique trait of the human mind (just like the experience of time as a constant) that for some reason doesn’t accord with the way things are in physical universe. It’s all part of the apparent miracle of human experience (maybe someday science will have answers, maybe not). But to me the undoubtable ‘illusion’ of free will is sufficient proof for the existence of free will - whatever occurred when I felt I was selscting my banana earlier today is free will by definition. Some might object that this doesn’t answer the central question; “Could I have done otherwise” - but to be honest I don’t think this is necessary. It is still enough to claim that, say, moral decisions can be significant and that thus moral agents can be blameworthy.

I agree with you about the bold, and I think people who take Sartre’s argument to mean otherwise have either not read and studied him closely or are reading him quite uncharitably.