Humans have five senses. Let’s suppose that we meet an extraterrestrial race that is, for all intents and purposes (take heed, dreamscaper - not “intensive purposes”), identical to us, but who possess six senses.
Okay - our sense of smell and sense of taste are similar - they often give us similar information. Often, we smell something before we can taste it. Which is often a very good thing. So I will call taste a more “local” sense than smell. And I’ll pretend that this is the only important difference.
So, what’s the analogy with sight? Well, we can’t see “around corners”, or through most substances. We don’t have “X-ray vision”. And we often wish we had more “resolution” at distances.
So let’s say that our new friends had these abilities - and even more. Let’s say that they have every type of sight that we can have only with technological aids. Night vision, “telescopic” vision, X-ray, even that which we can accomplish only with mirrors (around corners). The point is that we can readily imagine such a sense.
Now, we can go on and on about this. We can imagine more senses that we do not have. But even with sight, we can go further. We could imagine that we can “see” all sides of an object at once, and that we can adjust our vision to focus down to the molecular level. That we can have “analytical” sight-perception, the way a gourmand can tell us every ingredient of a sauce, or the way a musician can tell us every note in every chord in a piece of music, despite that we hear the notes of each chord all at once (this is often quite easy to do).
But let’s stick with the gourmand for a bit. We have a very complex sauce. And let’s say we know a very talented chef, who can tell us with great accuracy what the ingredients are, and when they were added, and how high the heat was applied in each step (“The garlic is slightly burnt!”) and the ratios of each ingredient. And even if the sauce was made that day, or was made yesterday and allowed to cool, and was then reheated.
None of this is all that far-fetched, by the way. Maybe Phaedrus can back me up, here.
So let’s say that there could be such a thing as a sense that not only gives “current” information, but which gives us a history of the object sensed.
Admittedly, the chef of which I speak is relying on experience - information and knowledge that he has received over time, through a process of education - but a keen sense of smell and taste is still required. And when we hear a train whistle change pitch as it moves, we are hearing a “history” of that sound.
What I am trying to do here - and I’d probably do well to edit this, but I’m just jotting it down as I go - is to show how we might be missing a whole lot of information about the world, due to our biological limitations. Which is not controversial.
The question I have is this - do the limits of our ability to collect information necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the information that we do have is wrong? Or is it rather just incomplete?
Is the nature of what we do not know necessarily very different from that which we do know? Or is there perhaps just more to know, but not of a different “nature” altogether?
If I can’t sit down at a piano and play “by ear”, does that mean that I know nothing about music?
If there was a thing-in-itself, what evidence do I have that I know nothing of it?
Why should I suppose that I know nothing of reality, just because I don’t know most of it?
Why should an epistemology direct me away from what I do know?
Why should I suppose that reality does not include that which my senses suggest?
Yet, epistemology, in the main, attempts to lead us to just this conceptual place - and I see it here all the time. That we must not trust our senses, that we “could” be all manner of monsters, that all “could” be an illusion (which doesn’t make sense on its face - for if everything is an illusion, then nothing is), and that we cannot “know” anything.
Is there some context to this that’s not readily apparent? Is it written as a response to someone? I’m just wondering, because it’s a bit mysterious to me. The references to “nature” for instance seem heavily dependent on context - the answers to some of your questions could be yes, no, maybe, etc. depending on what has specifically been asserted by someone, somewhere. In other words, this sounds like a refutation of something, but I can’t tell what exactly you’re refuting.
nice post Faust. i would tend to agree that there seems to be a consistent undercurrent of, not to say nihilism precisely, but maybe “dissatisfaction” or “distrust” with sense perception, or epistemology in general, on this thread. as to your questions, i will attempt to address them logically and without bias or superficial acceptance or rejection of ideas, as this is the approach that epistemology demands of us.
any limits which our senses have in gathering accurate information would not necessarily invalidate the information that IS gained. logically, the fact that we do not see the “other side” of, say a car, doesnt mean that the side we DO see is inaccurate or wrong. in this sense, limitations on the completeness of information gained via sense perception would entail just that-- incompleteness.
as to the nature of what we do not know, im not sure logically how we could calculate or form any information about that which we “do not know”; at least some minimal level of knowledge would need to be available for us to make an approximation as to how qualitatively similar/different that knowledge is from what we “do know”… even if this minimal amount of knowledge of the unknown were strict probabilities, this could be sufficient-- but in this case, therefore, our ability to extract information or compare that knowledge to current known information would just be equatable to that initial probability itself; and since that initial probability (as our only ‘knowledge’ of the unknown) would only be as accurate as our knowledge of that ‘unknown’, it seems sort of redundant. most likely, it seems we cannot know anything about that which we do not know; this seems a tautology, and im not sure i see a way around that.
by definition, if we can have no information about the “thing in itself” (because our senses only give us information of the “thing” and not its essential nature), then we could not know what we “do not know” about it. at the very most, logically we could infer some sort of relation between our sense data and the “thing in itself”, but even this is tricky and doesnt seem definitive, as its clearly possible that our senses are giving us COMPLETELY false information about the thing in itself. this goes back to the previous question-- it seems that we can only have knowledge of that which we can know; to the extent that something is literally unknown or unknowable, it seems useless to speculate as to its nature or qualities.
as to “Why should I suppose that I know nothing of reality, just because I don’t know most of it?”, you shouldnt suppose this; logically, as was stated in my first response, the limitations of knowledge do in no way reflect on the quality or accuracy of what we DO know, and even if they do, there is no way for us to KNOW that they do (since what is beyond the limits of knowledge is unknowable), therefore, while it may be possible that our current knowledge might be re-evaulated in light of new (presently unknown) information, our speculation as to this fact would be unjustified, since this possibility is by no means a necessity.
perhaps we could speculate as the likelihood that future unknown knowledge would leads to re-evaluation of current knowledge, but once again, this seems to presuppose at least SOME information about this unknown knowledge, which seems to be a contradiction.
the task of epistemology is NOT to direct us to what we do not know, nor is it to direct us AWAY from what we do or can know; the task of epistemology is to direct us to what we CAN and DO know. it is only after we have this information that we might be able to speculate as to any likelihoods of qualities or natures of unknown information, but as i said, this in essence does seem to present with a problem of contradiciton.
as to “Why should I suppose that reality does not include that which my senses suggest”, this is a very good question, and not easily answered. this doesnt really get at the heart of epistemology so much as psychology and biology. if we find reasons to assume that our senses do have severe limitations (such as perhaps our inability to see in infared or at the molecular level), then this could be seen as justification for the inference that our sense data in general presents with severe limitations; however, as i stated before, this does not NECESSARILY invalidate what we DO know, it only forces us to conclude that there may be other information which we do not grasp.
in that sense, there is no reason to suppose that reality does not include that which your senses suggest; because logically there is no reason to suppose this, therefore it seems at least LIKELY, if not PROBABLY that there ARE aspects of reality that our senses DO suggest. however, in the case of the limitations of our natural sense organs, the role of technology in expanding our senses could be considered, and perhaps used to formulate some sort of probability or likelihood that the ratio of the data that one sense (say sight) gives us to the data that the sense does NOT give us would carry over to sensation in general. however, im not a mathematician and i have no idea how we could go about calculating this probability; i just dont think that we can rule it out logically.
so of course the view that “That we must not trust our senses, that we “could” be all manner of monsters, that all “could” be an illusion (which doesn’t make sense on its face - for if everything is an illusion, then nothing is), and that we cannot “know” anything.” seems unjustified in the sense that it represents an extreme; although not a NECESSARILY FALSE extreme, it is a fundamentally untestable extreme, and at least appears unlikely given the vast amount of empirical evidence that our senses DO give us accurate information about reality (this is of course assuming a rejection of nihilistic skepticism, which we can properly reject as nihilistic, and therefore not only self-contradicting, but also unable to provide any sort of basis, standard or reference as to its own possibility for validity).
so in the end, it would seem that logically we are led to conclude that there is no reason to assume that our senses give us ALL possible information (in fact there is good reason to assume that this is NOT the case), nor is there any reason to assume that the information we do get from our senses is inaccurate, even IF our senses present with limitations… so we would seem to be justified in trusting the information we gain from our senses, up to the point that we 1) do not assume its infallability, and 2) that such information is either logically or empirically “backed-up” by verifying additional information (thus, even if ALL sense information is suspect, lessening the possibility that the sense data in question is suspect, since there is coherence provided between one data and another-- this does not disprove the claim that this sense data could be faulty, but it DOES, in all possible worlds, decrease the LIKELIHOOD of it being the case that the sense data is faulty).
Agreed. I am speculating. Since what we know comes to us from our senses, however aided by technology, I can only extrapolate from sensory information. Since an analogy exists between taste and smell, I am using a similar comparison. But it’s just an illustration.
Yes, which is why the concept has no use. My point is merely that we have no reason to suppose that knowledge we don’t have, but wish we did, should be of a different kind than that which we do have.
I will admit this, but my point is, as I am sure you know, that we have no reason whatever to assume this.
I can see no way around this.
Tell that to the epistemologists.
This is a keen observation. Which is why I have a Nietzschean “epistemology”, which is to say “none at all”.
I don;t think we can, but
I could not have said it better. Or as well, probably.
Well-said.
Perhaps anon sees why i posted this. It is a reaction to all the Ontology/Epistemology 101 posts I see here. But also a reaction to much professional philosophy.
Thank you for your comments. They have surely made mine much more accessible, and have also certainly filled in some blanks.
exactly why i have always rejected the idea of “true reality” vs “apparent reality”, or “being” vs “true being”-- even IF this were the structure of our reality (some kantian noumenal/phenomenal ontological split) there would be no way for us to gain this knowledge, so we are NEVER justified in making the claim that there is anything but ONE reality, the one that we experience directly-- this is of course making no claim as to the reliability or infallibility of our senses…
there could be only one reality, our senses could be limited/not infallible, and we could STILL have direct access to and knowledge of this reality-- no contradiction entails from this situation.
Brilliantly put. This is the basis for a philosophy that reflects our lives, rather than one that doesn’t. It seems to have always been the minority view, however. At least among philosophers.
It is precisely what I think Kant, far from being the greatest philosopher, was a boob.
I really don’t understand what you mean when you use the term “epistemology”, Faust. To me, it’s about how we know what we know, which sounds very much to me like what you mean when you talk about logic. What do you think the difference is?
I don’t have a problem with common-sense realism per se, but I do think it has just as much potential to lead to misapprehension and self-deception as metaphysics does. More importantly, though, I think that if we only ever thought in terms of what was self-evident we’d lose a lot of our capacity for innovation. Sometimes, we need to take a few risks. And why not? It can be immensely enjoyable.
Are you referring to things like that fact that all matter is 99% empty space despite the fact that our senses tell us it’s smooth continuous substance?
Well, it’s difficult to reconcile things like this in an exclusively scientific context, but I’m one to say that anything we sense - anything we experience in any way - is, by definition, real. That is to say, the root meaning of the word ‘real’ comes from the Berkelerian motto ‘esse es percepi’. The problem is that sometimes our experiences seem to give us what seems to be, on a cognitive/interpretive level, conflicting information (like the smooth continuous appearance of matter versus the scientifically verified fact that 99% of it is empty space).
As you probably know, my views are, to say the least, unorthodox (even for your typical idealist), but my method fo resolving these conflicts is to speak of the two models (i.e. the two ways of thinking of seemingly conflicting concepts like the essence of matter) as equivalent but not identical. That is to say, whether you think of matter as smooth and continuous or mostly empty space, those two concepts, although obviously not identical, are equivalent to each other in that they both entail similar pragmatic consequences.
This is true even when one concept makes specific predictions that can be tested in the laboratory that the other doesn’t. For example, the theory that sodium and calcium are made of atoms with specific properties predicts, based on those properties, that they will react together and make salt. This is not predicted from the assumption that they are simply smooth and continuous substances. Nevertheless, if you find, in the laboratory, that the predicted salt sure enough comes about, you need not dispense with the “smooth-continuous-substance” model, for even with that model, you learn something new about sodium and calcium - not so much that they are made of atoms that react together in that way, but that sodium and calcium just do that sort of thing. You would argue something similar about the properties of smoothness and continuousness themselves (for all matter). You would say of their being smooth and continuous, not so much that it indicates their being made of atoms with properties that manifest as smoothness and continuousness, but simply that matter just is that way.
So I don’t think we have to interpret our sensations and the more abstract concepts we gather from scientific data as inherently contradictory. If we can understand them as equivalent (although not identical) in the sense that they are two alternate models of our world manifesting/predicting the same outcomes, then we don’t have to choose between one or the other. They are both equally valid, both equally real. Some may have trouble with this since many would want to choose one over the other - one must be right and the other wrong, they would say - but to me, this seems similar to the urge to choose one frame of reference over another as the right one in Einsteinian relativity.
matty - Logic is a technique by which we expose the implications of sets of statements when taken together. It allows us to expand the meaning of those statements beyond what might be readily apparent.
Logic produces analytic knowledge only.
Epistemology is concerned with synthetic knowledge. What we can know, how we can know it, and how we can know that we know it.
gib - if we know that matter is 99% empty space, it is our senses that tell us this - even if indirectly. Empirical science is, well, empirical.
I don’t think that is a problem of our “operating theories” but of execution. We can always be better at perceiving the world, and we try to be.
But I am not arguing against empirical science, but against metaphysics. In have argued recently that science progresses without epistemology. Don’t want to do that again here, if I don’t have to.
Was it necessary for the post to correct my usage of that cliche, or were you just taking a barb at me?
Here is my take on epistemology:
We know what we know. We don’t know what we don’t know. Truth of the knowledge we possess is relative. Until we know everything then we don’t know anything for certain. So we must go on believing whatever is more certain at the moment.
However, I think you are wrong when you say that there is no good reason to assume that our physical senses are inaccurate. I think there is a very good reason. Our senses are just interpretations of what is happening, not what is really happening. It’s kind of like if I look at pictures of things existent every day but never actually see anything existent then I may come to the conclusion that the universe is two dimensional. What we see when we look around is not actually the light waves, but the neural signals resulting from the patterns that the light waves make inside our retinas. Our brains then decode those patterns and create something out of them. But how do we know that re-creation any what resembles that which is actually there? We don’t. But it is the best information we have so we have to assume it is somewhat accurate since if it is not then there is nothing we can do about it. There is no choice other then to deny the reality of everything which is not much of a choice. But I think the real answer is probably somewhere in between. The re-creations of things existent are probably somewhat like the real things themselves, but not entirely. As such I only trust my senses to an extent. Senses can be fooled anyway. Magicians are masters of fooling the senses.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
therefore
Socrates is mortal.
The conclusion is contained within the premises taken together. That is, it’s not contained within either premise by itself.
To make the claims of the premises is to also claim the conclusion. And in practise, we know the conclusion before we formulate the argument as often as the other way 'round. We may have an observable phenomenon that we think is always true, and “prove” that to be the case by using premises that also make claims that we believe are always true. So, this may be a formal proof for something we already know.
Either procedure is okay, because the conclusion is always “forgone”, given the premises. The conclusion (at least in an elegant argument - one without extraneous or irrelevant premises) is always the premises restated.
Yes, but my point is our senses sometimes tell us conflicting things. If our senses tell us something that conflicts with empirical data, it doesn’t negate the fact that the empirical data was experienced. The empirical data indeed tells us that matter is 99% empty space, but our senses also tell us, in a more day-to-day context, that matter is smooth and continuous, that it completely fills the space it occupies.
dreamy - I didn’t think you really meant “intensive purposes”. The phrase is “intents and purposes”. Was I wrong?
How do you know this? How would you know this? How could you know this?
Just as you don’t know that they are not.
Or say about it.
But this is a case where you claim to know you are fooled. Because evidence to that effect can be had. There is no such evidence that our senses are regularly fooled.
Wouldn’t it be easier to examine a being with less sensory information rather than a hypothetical one with more perception?
imagine a self propelling robot which is aware of itsel’f, and has a lazer sight for measuring distances.
this robot would cataloge correlations between certain distances and certain positions and begin to create a navigable understanding of reality.
This robots understanding might not be as dight is to us. Imagine if all the robot was able to percieve is a radar like image, a 2 d flat land. Let’s say the robot would not aim it’s measuring tool upwards…
or let’s say it could aim upwards, but what it percieved was changing 1’s and 0’s in a complex matrix.
The reality of this robot is fairly straight forward, so what does this mean epistomologically or existentially?
Let’s say this robot as a similar robot friend which can verify the accuracy of its measurements within a certain margin of error. So this robot knows that it is measuring something, and how accurate those measurements are.
When these robots successfully navigate a group of obstacles, you could say that they have a working understanding of their environment, much like we do.
So does this robot percieve of the true nature of the world? Sure it does! it’s measurements make sense if you understand the context in which they were made. There are accurate from certain positions and certain angles.
Though we know there is much more the robot is oblivious to, the robot does indeed have somethings at least nearly right (not wrong about distances). So i guess our conceptions of reality are simply incomplete. And we do create mechanisms to compensate for this. Sonar is an interesting adaptation, and even a compass is a mechanism we use to sense “more”.
Some birds have built in compasses, perhaps they see different directions as a different color.
Tell the robot that there is a ball on a stump and it will disagree and say there is just a circular barrier(where the stump exists) our understanding of reality differ entirely in form and function, but they do correlate on some levels.
If the being with more than 5 senses tells us something about the reality of a ball on a stump, but we might not comprehend.
The problem I have with this is that it’s all a bit, well, dull… It’s rather like this line from a once-celebrated French historian, Fustel de Coulanges:
Now maybe that makes me presumptive or arrogant to think I can jump the queue in some way, but I do rather wonder what synthetic thinking is for otherwise…
