Nietzsche encourages us to embrace reality for what it is, but do we know what reality is? I mean, we know what reality looks like, we know what reality makes manifest to our experience - but the question we want to ask is an ontological one: what is reality?
It’s been a while since I read Nietzsche, and I haven’t yet read all of Nietzsche, but from what I recall, he spoke vehemently against metaphysics and ontology particularly as a form of metaphysics. So how are supposed to heed to his ethic of embracing reality?
Well, here’s where I call upon the expertise of the Nietzsche scholars - tell me if this is true: when Nietzsche speaks against the religious, the metaphysicists, the idealists, the nihilists, etc., he is not speaking against the philosophies themselves, but the motives we have for upholding them.
After all, how can we know which of these philosophies is the truth about reality when we have no way of answering the question conclusively: what is reality? What if reality just turns out to be metaphysical in essence? What if it all turns out to be an illusion, a dream, just products from a mind living in a solipsistic universe? If that were the case, we would not be escaping reality to believe in these things but embracing it.
Of course, Nietzsche never embrace such ideas, but I don’t think he would say it was because he knew them to be wrong. Rather, I think he would say because he has no motive to embrace these ideas - or at least that if he did have a motive, we recognized that motive as one geared towards self-gratification rather than affirming reality as it presents itself to him. Reality simply doesn’t present itself to him as metaphysical, religious, ideal, etc. - and I get the impression he didn’t believe it did for anyone. So the only realistic way he understood others to embrace these ideas was as an escape from the way reality presents itself.
Just to get a better idea of what I’m getting at, imagine two men: the first man clings tenaciously to Christianity because it was the religion he was brought up with, it brings him comfort to think he’ll live an afterlife of eternal bliss in heaven, it makes him feel righteous to believe he knows and follows the right moral codes, and so on. The second man believes because he had a personal revelation, a vivid spiritual experience. A manifestation of Christ himself appeared to him and enlightened him about the truth of the Christian religion. Just to be sure he wasn’t hallucinating, he immediately goes to a doctor and has a whole battery of tests done on him. They take his blood, scan his brain, administer standardized oral and written psychological tests, and a number of other tests. When the results come in, the doctor says he, and a whole panel of other experts, unanimously agree that there is nothing wrong with him. No drugs were found in his system, no abnormalities, no telling signs of schizophrenia or any other psychosis, nothing at all to indicate that what he saw wasn’t real. At this point, the man finds it irresistible to dismiss the conclusion that what he saw was real and that Christianity must be the one true religion. That’s not to say he doesn’t try to resist it, telling himself that maybe a few more experts and a few more tests would have revealed something abnormal about his system, or that maybe he ought to simply settle on being agnostic about the whole thing, but keeping that thought in the back of his mind at all times, the fore of his mind is flooded with a strong conviction that Christianity must be true.
Now which man would Nietzsche say is rejecting reality, and which embracing it? I think he’d say the first man is rejecting it and the second embracing it. The difference is the motive: the first man’s motive is that he wishes Christianity were true rather than what’s presented to him by reality, and so adopts it because it makes him feel better. The second man shows his desire to keep in touch with reality (getting tests done, keeping in mind that he still can’t know anything for certain) and only yields to Christianity because it seems to have been presented to him by reality quite convincingly.
I could also offer this hypothetical case: an atheist and secularist rejects religion and metaphysics because without them, there is no basis on which morality can be imposed on him. That is to say, he is not an atheist/secularist because he wishes to face reality as it is presented to him, but because he finds the idea of doing whatever he wants and getting away with it very appealing. I think Nietzsche would classify him in the same category as the first man in the previous scenario - even though Nietzsche himself was an atheist/secularist. This example shows that it’s not about whether or not you are “in touch” with reality, but your motives for being so.
The larger point, of course, is that in promoting a life-affirming ethic, Nietzsche wasn’t taking a stance on what reality ultimately is, and therefore whether one is a life-affirmer or a life-denier is somewhat independent of what one’s particular philosophy is (scientist, metaphysicist, atheist, idealist, etc.). It is one’s reasons for adopting said philosophy. Nietzsche’s critique against the life-denier is a psychoanalytic one - not a metaphysical one, not an epistemic one, not an ontological one. He’s not getting at what’s real; he’s getting at why we believe.