ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, WTP)

[size=85](March-June 1888)

( A )

I observe with astonishment that science has today resigned itself to the apparent world; a real world–whatever it may be like–we certainly have no organ for knowing it.

At this point we may ask: by means of what organ of knowledge can we posit even this antithesis?–

That a world accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, that we understand a world as being subjectively conditioned, is not to say that an objective world is at all possible. Who compels us to think that subjectivity is real, essential?

The “in-itself” is even an absurd conception; a “constitutioning-itself” is nonsense; we possess the concept “being,” “thing,” only as a relational concept–

The worst thing is that with the old antithesis “apparent” and “true” the correlative value judgment “lacking in value” and “absolutely valuable” has developed.

The apparent world is not counted as a “valuable” world; appearance is supposed to constitute an objection to supreme value. Only a “true” world can be valuable in itself–

Prejudice of prejudices! Firstly, it would be possible that the true constitution of things was so hostile to the presuppositions of life, so opposed to them, that we needed appearance in order to be able to live–After all, this is the case in so many situations; e. g., in marriage.

Our empirical world would be determined by the instincts of self-preservation even as regards the limits of its knowledge: we would regard as true, good, valuable that which serves the preservation of the species–

a. We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world. (There might only be an apparent world, but not our apparent world.)

b. Assuming the true world, it could still be a world less valuable for us; precisely the quantum of illusion might be of a higher rank on account of its value for our preservation. (Unless appearance as such were grounds for condemnation?)

c. That a correlation exists between degrees of value and degrees of reality (so that the supreme values also possess the supreme reality) is a metaphysical postulate proceeding from the presupposition that we know the order of rank of values; namely, that this order of rank is a moral order–Only with this presupposition is truth necessarily part of the definition of all the highest values.

( B )

It is of cardinal importance that one should abolish the true world. It is the great inspirer of doubt and devaluator in respect of the world we are: it has been our most dangerous attempt yet to assassinate life.

War on all presuppositions on the basis of which one has invented a true world. Among these is the presupposition that moral values are the supreme values.

The supremacy of moral valuation would be refuted if it could be shown to be the consequence of an immoral valuation --as a special case of actual immorality–it would thus reduce itself to an appearance, and as appearance it would cease to have any right as such to condemn appearance.

( C )

The “will to truth” would then have to be investigated psychologically: it is not a moral force, but a form of the will to power. This would have to be proved by showing that it employs every immoral means: metaphysicians above all.

We are today faced with testing the assertion that moral values are the supreme values. Method in investigation is attained only when all moral prejudices have been overcome:–it represents a victory over morality-- [/size]
It is a beautiful passage, in which we can distinguish what held Nietzsche back from a comprehensive clarity. He still believed in, at least worked from, the duality of truth and appearance. In this way it could not become apparent to him that the value is not what derives from the truth/appearance of the world/a thing, he was not (morally) strong enough to reverse this conception, as I have done – to arrive at the far more useful idea that value (more precisely the act of valuing) gives rise to both appearance and truth.

This is not “the truth” – it is far more than that, it is the ground at the root of all true/false evaluation. It defines “false” as inconsistent with self-value, and commands that we take it as such! Not many of you will see the consequences of this last bit yet, but it gives a direction to the human intellect, where up until now this strange faculty on top of our ape-ness has merely been accidental, drifting, and only maturing in spite of itself.

I renamed this thread (again) – I realize that I had not yet posted an OP explaning value ontology. It has come up as parts of other threads.

ILP is a forum where ideas are born, not where they can be developed to maturity… the traffic is too fast, there is too much superficial talk going on. But I would like there to be an ILP thread dedicated to this idea, especially as it has been created here, though now development of it is largely taking place elsewhere.

To ILP and its crowded halls!

Valuation as a viable answer to Nietzsche’s call to move from the truth/appearance duality…

Yes, maybe.

I will read this a few times more.

I think what held Nietzsche back was not his belief in appearance/truth. He was obviously quite ready to move on from that…

It was morality that held him back! Victory in the battle against it was -just- beyond his reach, and only because of his positioning in history. That’s why he is more a prophet than a protagonist. He sensed all this, which is why he waited for the philosopher of the future.

I would suggest never to ignore the will to power though, and to be very careful to interpret it as it was meant.

Fuck me, you’re on to something…

Do you mean that the passage is in truth full of beauty, or that it appears to be full of beauty?

Uh-uh. He was just knocking Platonic/Cartesian/Kantian dualism. The true world he wants to abolish is in the imaginations of philosophers such as these, and of course those of Christians.

I have come to the same conclusions. He was not morally independent, simply not strong enough – the Christian weakness and pessimism toward the world was still in his roots.

It is interesting to read his notebooks. At one point he admits that he is not strong enough to will the eternal recurrence of the same. But he had Zarathustra will it anyway.

For a long time I have tried to explain everything in terms of will to power. It doesn’t add up if we take it to be the root of all activity. After all, what would will to power? There is no explanation of the emerging of a perspective here. Nietzsche seems to have been content to leave this unexplained. Perhaps he was not, but he made a show of being very happy with it.

We may now admit to ourselves that the passages in which he describes the will to power and the eternal return as ultimate realities, are clearly written by an intoxicated man.

As an extension of value-ontology, the will to power will serve well. Before, it has not been of any use as it remained God-like, ungraspable, “just there”. I’ve never been content with such ‘explanations’.

It is something yes. And it is very applicable, understanding it makes a man more powerful. Understanding only the will to power without this makes him weaker, as the concept of power is fundamentally rooted in the other / otherness, as hard as N tried to bend it into the fabric of the identity of entities.

Neither contain the necessary context for “truth” or “appearing” to make sense in terms of stern logic, so both fail to clarify.

“It is appears to me (Fixed Cross) to be true that the passage appears to me (Fixed Cross) as beautiful” would work a bit better, contains less imperfections.

That was not just what he was doing, this knocking over of the ideas of old philosophers was only one of the consequences of his thinking, which was aimed at a comprehensive clarity.

Nietzsche knew that his thinking was ‘only’ a prelude. It should come as no surprise that there is now a continuation of his work, a definitive commencement of a philosophy of the future.

Does neither in truth contain the necessary context for “truth” or “appearing” to make sense in terms of stern logic, or does neither appear to contain that context… Don’t bother answering, this is already getting boring.

It appears to me that your posts in this thread are just a load of self-flattering—nonsense. Very disappointing.

The valuation is mutual.

You have apparently no idea what you are responding to.

All cleverness and Ernst aside, perhaps you may understand why truth is conditional to valuing, and why the activity valuing is not conditional to the term “truth”.

Truth is not conditional to valuing. If there is valuing, then that is the truth, so valuing and truth are coeval; neither precedes the other.

I’m not getting it. The only truth is psychological truth. I think N has your idea covered.

The crux of it is – why should I yield to your language games? Here you have entered a ground where the use of grammar as exact logic can simply not apply. The axiom “self-valuing / valuing other in terms of self-value” dictates your tenacity, but at the same time prevents it to be effective, due to its particular premises being antithetical to value-ontology.

Value predicates all truth/falseness/ appearance/appearing, because all these terms require a standard to which they (are)(do).

Such a standard is called a value.
How is such a value established?
By self-valuing
of a subject.

The subject is thereby defined.
This subject wills to power. Thereby is the world defined.

The world is will to power, but the subjects, of which the world is composed, are self-valuing and valuing the other/world in terms of this self-value.

The will to power as primary assumes a subjectivity which is not given by our understanding of science.
Self-valuing, the activity of an entity (force / form) to relate to other entities while still remaining a structural integrity, explains this subjectivity. It explains it as well as is possible to a consciousness – it explains it in terms of itself.

As all good definitions, this one is circular if we understand the term well. But its application is not circular, on the contrary, it forms an arrow where there was only chaos. The application of ‘merely’ the will to power as if this is the ground of all givens, leads to a circularity of action and reaction, push, counterpush. It is predictable, and only by the ‘magical’ quality of dialectic does it acquire meaning, substance. This quality is rooted in the existence of the subjects and his inherent will to advance over decay and to manipulate appearances to this end.

The entire given of relating, whether electrical, chemical, physical, psychological or logical, may or may not appear as will to power, but always appears as value-interaction.

Regarding truth, he had it covered.

What is new about my idea is that it establishes the ground of appearance.
Like truth, appearance is conditional to a reference frame, in the human case the senses and the brain.
Unlike truth, appearance has no requirement of a system of conscious definitions.

The difference between ‘appearing’ and ‘self-valuing / valuing (otherness) in terms of the established self-value’ is that the former is only half a definition ( to whom / what does it appear? What is “it”? ) whereas the latter includes subject, object and a verb including both. It also explains why, how things appear as they do. Nietzsche did not do this. My definition is more technical.

It is an idea including the missing benevolence in Nietzsches thinking. He was the final critic. I am a critical constructor.
My definitions will hold.

Thought is construction, good thought is critical construction. Criticism without construction is entropy. N. arrived at the consequence of his deepest assumptions – disintegration.

I’ve been there, done that, climbed out of it and dived back in… now I know what kind of value I expected to find in that mad sea, why I got there in the first place. I too, believed. I believed that there was still going to be something, if I attempted to judge objectively. Apparently I was strong - or lucky! - enough to attain to what N. could not – the real-life realization that I exist as an entity only to the measure that I am actively discriminating ‘unfairly’!

Well what is the fairest way to judge unfairly? To at least understand the terms of your judgment.
Nietzsche did not arrive there. Not because he was not capable of it perhaps, perhaps he was superior to me intellectually, but because he did not have the real-world context that I have, the means to create and consume value, the reduction of society to an appraisal affair of common denominators – Perhaps he, in his ethical superiority to us (me), still took valuing for granted.

I think that I have been very nihilistic without knowing it, before I was led to this idea by without-music.

No, that can’t be the crux, as I’ve played no language games in this thread.

All this is just nonsense which may fool some into thinking that it’s deep, but not me.

Ridiculous. You are a clown.