ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, WTP)

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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Cezar » Thu Nov 17, 2011 5:32 am

That is so shallow, almost American. If not stupidly English.

I am making a list of secondary drives. If you want to know what will is then work on it and you will see the drives and the perspective (value) are different.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 5:37 am

Cezar wrote:That is so shallow, almost American. If not stupidly English.

I am making a list of secondary drives. If you want to know what will is then work on it and you will see the drives and the perspective (value) are different.


The thing with you, Cezar, is that you play in a depth that you are not deep enough for. The result is statements that sound deep, but the percieved depth is only an echo of the place you are in. Get out of there! You do not belong.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Cezar » Thu Nov 17, 2011 5:50 am

The trick is in not speaking before you are sure what you are saying.

If you have that, then you don't need to hear the sound of the room, you can look into the dark of the depth.

One day there will maybe be no chance to speak at all. People will kill each other for a wrong word.

Therefore you can see this as a training for more serious undertakings.

Train yourself for war.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 7:41 am

Pezer wrote:So, Nietzsche did propose a... kind of ontology. But inasmuch as it still requires a sort of metaphysical "will", the will to power doctrine differs from value ontology. The latter attempts at an objective description, while Nietzsche's is ultimately subjective.

Instead of "subjective" and "objective", I propose that we use the words "perspectival" and "non-perspectival", respectively---so as not to reify subjects and objects all too explicitly (though the word "per-spective" still implies a subject and an object).

Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism is perspectival and non-perspectival at the same time:

"Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any 'categories'." (Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil".)
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:02 am

Sauwelios wrote:
Pezer wrote:So, Nietzsche did propose a... kind of ontology. But inasmuch as it still requires a sort of metaphysical "will", the will to power doctrine differs from value ontology. The latter attempts at an objective description, while Nietzsche's is ultimately subjective.

Instead of "subjective" and "objective", I propose that we use the words "perspectival" and "non-perspectival", respectively---so as not to reify subjects and objects all too explicitly (though the word "per-spective" still implies a subject and an object).

Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism is perspectival and non-perspectival at the same time . . .


They seem to work well, and are agreeable to me. But they do lack a certain action that implicit in "subjective"/"objective". The object is seen, is arrived at. The subject sees, arrives. I think the grammatical structure fits the circumstance quite nicely. Either way, I don't think the difference is important enough. If you think "subjective"/"objective" muddy things up too much, I'll stop using them.

Sauwelios wrote:"Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any 'categories'." (Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil".)


I think this captures very well a thing we already seem to agree on: That the will to power both describes and incorporates human perspective.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:05 am

Cezar wrote:The trick is in not speaking before you are sure what you are saying.

If you have that, then you don't need to hear the sound of the room, you can look into the dark of the depth.

One day there will maybe be no chance to speak at all. People will kill each other for a wrong word.

Therefore you can see this as a training for more serious undertakings.

Train yourself for war.


Now this depth, this depth you fill very well.

I will.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Fixed Cross » Thu Nov 17, 2011 10:17 am

Sauwelios -- The idea that value-ontology rests the idea of self-valuing erupting from nothingess is an error. It rests only on the observation that this is in fact that a self-valuing must exist, if there is any valuing going on at all.

Regarding origin, I have simply observed, facing the notion of no-thingness, is that this grants its possibility, by virtue of chaos' incapacity of enforcing its impossibility.

I have let myself be foolishly drawn into discussing nothing, whereas I clearly posited chaos / no-thingness. i.e., theoretic potential for somethingness, as the limit. So discussing with you has not only been doing the job of clarifying for me, but also of misleading, when we began treating the notion of chaos (being different from flux, as I made logically clear), which stands at the limit of my theory, as nothing.

The idea that value-ontology is essentially the same as the will to power is wrong. The will to power treats the subjects capability to engage otherness as a given. This has been the main problem I have had with the theory. On which terms does it do so? Nietzsche has explained nothing in this respect. He simply observes that the subject of will to power has this ability.

Where N. treats this capacity as a given, I ask: how can anything value? The answer: by being/holding a standard-value. And how can it be a standard? I have posited as the answer: its full being must be engaged in positing itself as a standard. Its being can be nothing besides positing itself as a standard, as this is the only certainty we have of what it is.

This is the root on which the entire theory rests - that being a standard is the activity granting the possibility of the secondary modus of this activity of valuing otherness in order to dominate/incorporate/reject. What has been misunderstood/miscommunicated, and this happens at the same level as trying to implant a crude causality-temporality thinking to this theory, is that this positing itself as a stands happens logically prior to valuing otherness, but can only be physically observable when it values another thing, when it starts to accumulate, when it begins willing to power.

So here we are back again, thankfully, at the real theory.
The notion of nothing must be entirely dismissed as nonsensical, and the notion of chaos, which means flat time-space, as the ground/limit.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Fixed Cross » Thu Nov 17, 2011 10:35 am

The mentioned passage from BGE:

If we assume that nothing is “given” as real other than our world of desires and passions and that we cannot access from above or below any “reality” other than the direct reality of our drives—for thinking is only a relationship of these drives to each other—: are we not allowed to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this given is not a sufficient basis also for understanding the so-called mechanical (or “material”) world on the basis of things like this given. I don’t mean to understand it as an illusion, an “appearance,” an “idea” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer*), but as having the same degree of reality as our affects themselves have—as a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything is still combined in a powerful unity, something which then branches off and develops in the organic process (also, as is reasonable, gets softer and weaker—), as a form of instinctual life in which the collective organic functions, along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism, are still synthetically bound up with one another—as an early form of life? In the end making this attempt is not only permitted but is also demanded by the conscience of the method. Not to assume various forms of causality as long as the attempt to manage with a single one has been pushed to its furthest limit (—all the way to nonsense, if I may say so): that is one moral of the method which people nowadays may not evade; —as a mathematician would say, it is a consequence “of its definition.” In the end the question is whether we acknowledge the will as something really efficient, whether we believe in the causal properties of the will. If we do—and basically our faith in this is simply our faith in causality itself—then we must make the attempt to set up hypothetically the causality of the will as the single causality. Of course, “will” can work only on “will”—and not on “stuff” (not, for example, on “nerves”—). Briefly put, we must venture the hypothesis whether in general, wherever we recognize “effects,” will is not working on will—and whether every mechanical event, to the extent that a force is active in it, is not force of will, an effect of the will.—Suppose finally that we were to succeed in explaining our entire instinctual life as a development and branching off of a single fundamental form of the will—that is, of the will to power, as my principle asserts—and suppose we could trace back all organic functions to this will to power and also locate in it the solution to the problem of reproduction and nourishment—that is one problem—then in so doing we would have earned the right to designate all efficient force unambiguously as will to power. Seen from inside, the world defined and described according to its “intelligible character” would be simply “will to power” and nothing else.—

The problem here is that in terms of defining this working, "will" is an entirely empty term.
How could will work on will? On which terms ? I.e. what is this will?

Will must be somethingness engaging somethingness. What is somethingness? A standard. Waht is a standard? A value. How can a value be a subject? By it being a valuing in terms of itself. How can it do this (not just be this) Only by positing itself as a value.

I.e. self-valuing.

As I said before, value theory is a specification, a refining of the will to power theory. Why is it superior? Because it is more powerful, more useful. It explains further the terms by which an entity may be maximize its the capacity to will to power.

Will to power focusses on otherness, on the "to --->", i.e. not on the subjects activity itself. The 'will' is secondary, because unexplained, mystical.

Unrefined, that is to say up until now, it could only lead to entropy. Now that I have demystified the will to power, philosophy/philosophers may actually begin acquire power.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Fixed Cross » Thu Nov 17, 2011 10:50 am

Do I sound arrogant?

With people with only modest ability, modesty is mere honesty; but with those who possess great talent it is hypocrisy. - Schopenhauer

If I would not present this theory as a victory, a great advance, I would be misleading, lying. Value-ontology should be judged and analyzed according to its use, what it makes possible, which is an entirely new power-architecture.

Trying to logically reduce it to that from which it sprang forth, as you are, Sauwelios, is as trying to reduce man to ape, as some schools of behavioralist psychiatry are doing, instead of trying to elevate him, to overcome man, to forge out of him a higher species.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Cezar » Thu Nov 17, 2011 10:58 am

Where I break from Nietzsche is where I say that unit-ness is not given, that only chaos, no-thingness (other than nothing-ness), is given. There is no "chaos of sensations" or "chaos of wills" - these are self-contradicting phrases.


Unit is the center of energy. Each unit has it's own will and perspective. They all together form a chaos.
You claim that it is not possible and also units are chaos?

But that which has a center is a unit.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Fixed Cross » Thu Nov 17, 2011 11:12 am

Concluding:
How can anything will to power?
By positing itself to itself as a ground value.

And you, Nietzscheans, are excellent examples of this. Nothing will be incorporated by you unless you have defined it in your own terms -- in the terms made possibly by your self-positing.

This is a prologue to the next phase of the theories development. The question: can one posit oneself in different ways? Self-valuing is the primary activity, absolute to being-subject, but the particular self-value that is posited may very well be more arbitrary, especially as larger entities are concerned, more resource is involved, different contexts are available.

"What matters is the quantum of power that one is" means: what matters is the scope/size/amount of context in which one is able to posit oneself as primary.

As power is context-bound, and a context is a value-system, the essence of power is the capacity to posit oneself as a ground-value. "Fundamental am I to myself, and to what/who else?" This is the question that we self-conscious entities face. We are driven to find the context in which we, as ground-value, determine the greatest good, the highest value.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Cezar » Thu Nov 17, 2011 3:00 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Concluding:
How can anything will to power?


How can anything want power? How can anything not want power?

Even you with your "thing in itself" want Nothing and can simply not stop wanting.

And even your nothing is a will to power, because every decadent is losing power against his own will and the Nothingness means wanting to stop the loss of power! Nothing = 0 loss of power. - It is still a will to power.

And knowledge is power.
And decadent is hedonist.
And hedonists are forgetful.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 3:04 pm

How can Value Ontology apply itself? Where is it better than science?

I will probably make a case for science as soon as you answer, be ready.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 6:21 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Sauwelios -- The idea that value-ontology rests the idea of self-valuing erupting from nothingess is an error.

If the attempt to understand "self-valuing" necessarily leads to its genealogy, then it rests on that.


It rests only on the observation that this is in fact that a self-valuing must exist, if there is any valuing going on at all.

So Pezer is wrong, and self-valuing is not subordinate to valuing, but the other way 'round?


I have let myself be foolishly drawn into discussing nothing, whereas I clearly posited chaos / no-thingness. i.e., theoretic potential for somethingness, as the limit. So discussing with you has not only been doing the job of clarifying for me, but also of misleading, when we began treating the notion of chaos (being different from flux, as I made logically clear), which stands at the limit of my theory, as nothing.

But it amounts to nothing. Nothing is literally no thing, so nothingness---the reification of nothing---is literally no-thingness.

As I said, pure flux would be nothing. But your flux is no pure flux, it's only relatively fluxious.


The idea that value-ontology is essentially the same as the will to power is wrong. The will to power treats the subjects capability to engage otherness as a given.

Where is there "otherness" in will acting on will?


This has been the main problem I have had with the theory. On which terms does it do so? Nietzsche has explained nothing in this respect. He simply observes that the subject of will to power has this ability.

There is no subject of will to power. The will to power is encroaching subjects, or force moving outward from centers. The phrase "encroaching units" is not an answer to the question "who wants power?" or "who feels pleasure?"


Where N. treats this capacity as a given, I ask: how can anything value? The answer: by being/holding a standard-value. And how can it be a standard? I have posited as the answer: its full being must be engaged in positing itself as a standard.

And how can anything posit itself? I've asked this question, in different forms, multiple times already, but this suggestion of absurdity has been conveniently ignored.


Its being can be nothing besides positing itself as a standard, as this is the only certainty we have of what it is.

"Itself" already refers to its being, so this is circular, absurd.


This is the root on which the entire theory rests - that being a standard is the activity granting the possibility of the secondary modus of this activity of valuing otherness in order to dominate/incorporate/reject. What has been misunderstood/miscommunicated, and this happens at the same level as trying to implant a crude causality-temporality thinking to this theory, is that this positing itself as a stands happens logically prior to valuing otherness, but can only be physically observable when it values another thing, when it starts to accumulate, when it begins willing to power.

Well, I don't care whether it's logically prior or only logically more fundamental; all I care about is whether it's logical.

I would agree if you said that valuing presupposes a value-standard. What I disagree with is the notion of "positing itself as a value-standard", or "self-valuing"---as that is circular, absurd.


So here we are back again, thankfully, at the real theory.
The notion of nothing must be entirely dismissed as nonsensical, and the notion of chaos, which means flat time-space, as the ground/limit.

And what is "flat time-space"?
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 6:27 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:The problem here is that in terms of defining this working, "will" is an entirely empty term.
How could will work on will? On which terms ? I.e. what is this will?

Will must be somethingness engaging somethingness. What is somethingness? A standard. Waht is a standard? A value. How can a value be a subject? By it being a valuing in terms of itself.

This last part is nonsense: "it, which is a valuing in terms of it, which is a valuing in terms of it, which is..."


How can it do this (not just be this) Only by positing itself as a value.

I.e. self-valuing.

More nonsense: see my previous post.


Will to power focusses on otherness, on the "to --->", i.e. not on the subjects activity itself.

Wrong: will to power cannot be further analysed (e.g., as "will" and "power").
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 6:35 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Do I sound arrogant?

Only a teeny weeny bit, e.g.: "Now that I have demystified the will to power, philosophy/philosophers may actually begin acquire power."...


Trying to logically reduce it to that from which it sprang forth, as you are, Sauwelios, is as trying to reduce man to ape, as some schools of behavioralist psychiatry are doing, instead of trying to elevate him, to overcome man, to forge out of him a higher species.

The latter is actually not Nietzschean.

The nature of man cannot be found in the "lower" species from which he originated (e.g., the ape, in the narrower sense), but just as little in the "higher" species that will supposedly originate from him.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 6:37 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Concluding:
How can anything will to power?
By positing itself to itself as a ground value.

And you, Nietzscheans, are excellent examples of this. Nothing will be incorporated by you unless you have defined it in your own terms -- in the terms made possibly by your self-positing.

This is a prologue to the next phase of the theories development. The question: can one posit oneself in different ways? Self-valuing is the primary activity, absolute to being-subject, but the particular self-value that is posited may very well be more arbitrary, especially as larger entities are concerned, more resource is involved, different contexts are available.

"What matters is the quantum of power that one is" means: what matters is the scope/size/amount of context in which one is able to posit oneself as primary.

As power is context-bound, and a context is a value-system, the essence of power is the capacity to posit oneself as a ground-value. "Fundamental am I to myself, and to what/who else?" This is the question that we self-conscious entities face. We are driven to find the context in which we, as ground-value, determine the greatest good, the highest value.

Nothing is fundamental to itself.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Fixed Cross » Thu Nov 17, 2011 7:16 pm

Sauwelios -- Flat time space is un-curved time space. That shouldn't be too difficult to understand.

"There is no subject of will to power. The will to power is encroaching subjects, or force moving outward from centers. The phrase "encroaching units" is not an answer to the question "who wants power?" or "who feels pleasure?""

Of course it is. Either that or you believe in a metaphysical bond between these units, i.e. in God.

""And how can anything posit itself? I've asked this question, in different forms, multiple times already, but this suggestion of absurdity has been conveniently ignored.""

How can anything exist if it does not posit itself? The notion "it is simply there" is what is absurd. There is no "simply is". There is only acting, positing. And I have answered the question, several times: by accident, enabled by the absence of its active impossibility.

This is logic, driven to its extreme. Which means not to rely on it faithfully, expecting it to give you the answers. Logic can only naturally flow forth in explanation to the extent that we expect that the universe is part of a duality, a yes and a no.

I have subjected logic to the term which' meaning is fundamental to it: value.

"Nothing is fundamental to itself."

Thank you. I will file this statement, along with "will to power cannot be further analysed." under "Sauwelian law", and may use this file in the future to explain why a certain type of thought cannot attain to value-ontology.

Cezar -- Was labert der Honk?

Pezer -- Better than science? No, furthering science, from a bringer of objectivism/nihilism to a handmaid of philosophy.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 7:53 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Sauwelios -- Flat time space is un-curved time space. That shouldn't be too difficult to understand.

It's as difficult to understand as curved time-space, of course. And I think that's impossible to understand, as the mathematical equations that formulate it cannot be imagined: http://xkcd.com/895/.


"There is no subject of will to power. The will to power is encroaching subjects, or force moving outward from centers. The phrase "encroaching units" is not an answer to the question "who wants power?" or "who feels pleasure?""

Of course it is. Either that or you believe in a metaphysical bond between these units, i.e. in God.

How so?


""And how can anything posit itself? I've asked this question, in different forms, multiple times already, but this suggestion of absurdity has been conveniently ignored.""

How can anything exist if it does not posit itself? The notion "it is simply there" is what is absurd.

What's absurd about it?


There is no "simply is".

There simply is no "simply is"?


There is only acting, positing. And I have answered the question, several times: by accident, enabled by the absence of its active impossibility.

What bullshit.


This is logic, driven to its extreme. Which means not to rely on it faithfully, expecting it to give you the answers. Logic can only naturally flow forth in explanation to the extent that we expect that the universe is part of a duality, a yes and a no.

Which we must do, as is implied in everything you say.


I have subjected logic to the term which' meaning is fundamental to it: value.

"Nothing is fundamental to itself."

Thank you. I will file this statement, along with "will to power cannot be further analysed." under "Sauwelian law", and may use this file in the future to explain why a certain type of thought cannot attain to value-ontology.

Which is because it does not leap into irrationality (mysticism), as you do.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 7:54 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:Sauwelios -- Flat time space is un-curved time space. That shouldn't be too difficult to understand.

"There is no subject of will to power. The will to power is encroaching subjects, or force moving outward from centers. The phrase "encroaching units" is not an answer to the question "who wants power?" or "who feels pleasure?""

Of course it is. Either that or you believe in a metaphysical bond between these units, i.e. in God.

""And how can anything posit itself? I've asked this question, in different forms, multiple times already, but this suggestion of absurdity has been conveniently ignored.""

How can anything exist if it does not posit itself? The notion "it is simply there" is what is absurd. There is no "simply is". There is only acting, positing. And I have answered the question, several times: by accident, enabled by the absence of its active impossibility.

This is logic, driven to its extreme. Which means not to rely on it faithfully, expecting it to give you the answers. Logic can only naturally flow forth in explanation to the extent that we expect that the universe is part of a duality, a yes and a no.

I have subjected logic to the term which' meaning is fundamental to it: value.

"Nothing is fundamental to itself."

Thank you. I will file this statement, along with "will to power cannot be further analysed." under "Sauwelian law", and may use this file in the future to explain why a certain type of thought cannot attain to value-ontology.

Cezar -- Was labert der Honk?

Pezer -- Better than science? No, furthering science, from a bringer of objectivism/nihilism to a handmaid of philosophy.


Your theory has emerged again in my mind as completely valid, and worthy of at least most of the importance you and yours give it.

I like the way science gets valued, it works. It remains to be seen to what detail what part of science adheres to value ontology, doesn't lose the ability to be its handmaiden.

I still don't connect with the importance of the "yes and the no", the truth of what you say about it seems to me not to be self evident, and not to be essential to the logical cohesion of the... theory?

What trully stands out is this: "How can anything exist if it does not posit itself? The notion "it is simply there" is what is absurd. There is no "simply is". There is only acting, positing. And I have answered the question, several times: by accident, enabled by the absence of its active impossibility."

But I value it only after slicing off the "only" and "enabled by the absence of its active impossibility." Why go beyond? Outside? Wherefore comes the idea that you can know such a thing? Or even infer it? If, like you sway(edit-say) (and I agree), logic is an expansion and not a discovery, an uncovering?

This, I think, makes up for the small part of your pride in this theory that I find unwarranted.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:04 pm

I think FC and I are back to our disagreement about the question "Why is there something, and not rather nothing?"---which may be called a fundamental disagreement in at least that Heidegger called that question "the fundamental question of philosophy". To me, the question is meaningless, as by definition something (Ger. Seiendes, "being" (nominalised present active participle)) can only be, not not be, and nothing cannot be.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:10 pm

Fixed Cross wrote:enabled by the absence of its active impossibility.


I'm starting to come around to this...
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:11 pm

Sauwelios wrote:I think FC and I are back to our disagreement about the question "Why is there something, and not rather nothing?"---which may be called a fundamental disagreement in at least that Heidegger called that question "the fundamental question of philosophy". To me, the question is meaningless, as by definition something (Ger. Seiendes, "being" (nominalised present active participle)) can only be, not not be, and nothing cannot be.


To me it is also meaningles, but for a different reason. And i think FC thinnks along these lines too:

It is meaningless because it presents no value, there is nothing useful in that question.
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Sauwelios » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:30 pm

Heidegger also called the question "What is Being [Sein, present active infinitive]?" "the fundamental question of metaphysics", and understood philosophy as metaphysics. In the past, however, FC has disagreed with me that the fundamental question of philosophy and that of metaphysics are essentially one and the same. But if I'm right, then FC can be understood as a true Heideggerian: for according to Heidegger, Nietzsche only answered "the guiding question of metaphysics", "What is being [Seiendes]?", and not the fundamental or grounding question (Grundfrage); FC however claims to have answered the latter question.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Re: ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, W

Postby Pezerocles » Thu Nov 17, 2011 8:34 pm

Sauwelios wrote:Heidegger also called the question "What is Being [Sein, present active infinitive]?" "the fundamental question of metaphysics", and understood philosophy as metaphysics. In the past, however, FC has disagreed with me that the fundamental question of philosophy and that of metaphysics are essentially one and the same. But if I'm right, then FC can be understood as a true Heideggerian: for according to Heidegger, Nietzsche only answered "the guiding question of metaphysics", "What is being [Seiendes]?", and not the fundamental or grounding question (Grundfrage); FC however claims to have answered the latter question.


I disagree. I think he claims to have perfected the former. And the latter just follows logically. Namely: Things exist. Why? Because we see them. Well, value them.
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