Moderator: Only_Humean
so whatever we choose to do is caused, but that in no way infers that we are not able to freely choose between caused options
volchok wrote:so whatever we choose to do is caused, but that in no way infers that we are not able to freely choose between caused options
If whatever we choose to do is caused then choosing between caused options is also caused and therefor not free.
Giant hole in your logic. There goes your argument.
Btw, let's keep this civil ok?
Chester wrote:
If what we choose is caused by knowledge
Chester wrote:Working towards our ends in the correct way is what we want, I'm sure you agree.
incorrect wrote:just some thoughts
i think freedom and knowledge are intimately tied.. but i don't think one is necessarily based on the other
some people smoke cause its cool
some people smoke cause its cool, but they know its bad for your health
some people smoke cause they are addicted, and they know its bad for your health
its important to point out that given some knowledge, the 'correct' action isn't necessarily taken based on that knowledge.. this is in some ways freedom
however, ones awareness of options increases with knowledge
so given some set of circumstances.. lets say you're a 13 and trying a cigarette for the first time.. and you're given an ultimatum...
smoke and be cool, or not smoke and be laughed at...
and lets say me, being the smarter person, knows there's three options.. smoke and be cool, not smoke and be laughed at, or punch my friend in the face
does that make me more free? perhaps not
but lets say government imposes on us that 'to not smoke and be laughed at' is illegal
now i only have 2 options, and my friend has only 1 option
does that make me more free?
well i am aware of an option... and the other guy is not
in some ways i have a choice he doesn't have.. in some way i am more free
to enumerate the available options is perhaps impossible.. the fact that the law does it, is definitely arrogant
but the alternative.... lets say me punching someone in the face (the more realistically illegal option).. is perhaps also arrogant

volchok wrote:If whatever we choose to do is caused then choosing between caused options is also caused and therefor not free.
Chester wrote:Rather than build up to my point, thereby allowing some moron to intercede and destroy the thread, I thought that I'd just explain my opinion about freewill, then others can comment on it if they wish.
Firstly , what do we mean by "freedom" . I think this is where most people trip up. Freedom of the will doesn't mean freedom to do anything (we all know that, don't we?), it means freedom to do what we want to do within the confines of reality.Now, reality is a cause and effect environment from which we can not escape, so whatever we choose to do is caused, but that in no way infers that we are not able to freely choose between caused options. The sort of freedom we want is freedom to do what we think is best given the confines of reality.
People may argue that we are unable to control our impulses, this is clearly incorrect because if we have knowledge of what a mistaken impulse will cost us we are able to check our actions by weighing them up against the costs.Knowledge frees us to make the right choice for ourselves.
Some people are doing this, but other who are interested in the issue are not.James S Saint wrote:The entire issue of "Free-Will" is merely another semantic equivocation mind game with intent to associate determinism with oppression.
This is how you are defining it. Other people have other definitions. Your version of free will could be compatible with determinism, the other versions cannot be. Not everyone in the free will vs. determinism debate only thinks there is an issue because of a failure to understand the phrase free will."Free-Will" means the Freedom to exercise Will without Oppression; "Unopposed Will".
It does NOT mean freedom from Cause; "Acausal Will"
Causes do not resist oppression. Apart from the fact that oppression is a value, causes do not resist. They cause something. If what they would have caused to happen is interfered with, they do not cause it to happen. So then they are either causes of something else - friction and kinetic energy perhaps, where there might have been flight - or do not cause in any of the senses whoever is watching is interested.Determinancy refers to the fact that all things have cause. But determinancy also refers to the fact that causes resist oppression ("being determined").
If it is only a potential, then how is it a guarantee of balance. Are we only talking about causes in human contexts? the context of will? Or of all causes? If we are speaking of all causes this is very strange, unless this is a panconsciousness position.For every cause there is a potential counter cause and thus there is a balance of forces wherein a decision if afforded.
Though in determinism, the outcome was determined back in the Big Bang or before. We just get to watch it unfold. I think it would be better however to refer to counter forces and obstacles. Because calling things causes, when the willpower might keep them from causing whatever it is - the countering - is confusings and rather teleological.The person's will-power is a measure of his determination in the face of counter causes.
Moreno wrote:Causes do not resist oppression. Apart from the fact that oppression is a value, causes do not resist. They cause something. If what they would have caused to happen is interfered with, they do not cause it to happen.Determinancy refers to the fact that all things have cause. But determinancy also refers to the fact that causes resist oppression ("being determined").
Moreno wrote:If it is only a potential, then how is it a guarantee of balance.For every cause there is a potential counter cause and thus there is a balance of forces wherein a decision if afforded.
Moreno wrote:Are we only talking about causes in human contexts? the context of will? Or of all causes? If we are speaking of all causes this is very strange, unless this is a panconsciousness position.
Moreno wrote:Though in determinism, the outcome was determined back in the Big Bang or before. We just get to watch it unfold.The person's will-power is a measure of his determination in the face of counter causes.
Moreno wrote:I think it would be better however to refer to counter forces and obstacles. Because calling things causes, when the willpower might keep them from causing whatever it is - the countering - is confusings and rather teleological.
without-music wrote:Perhaps you mean definitively caused, for my eating a bar of chocolate might be caused by my desire for chocolate, but not caused entirely, perfectly, definitively -- for I've turned down the chocolate many times before, and I could have done so this time as well.
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volchok wrote:Chester wrote:
If what we choose is caused by knowledge
That's an oversimplification. What we choose is caused by many things.Chester wrote:Working towards our ends in the correct way is what we want, I'm sure you agree.
Sure, but that's not free will. That's the ability to pursue your will. Free will would be the ability to will your will.
incorrect wrote:just some thoughts
i think freedom and knowledge are intimately tied.. but i don't think one is necessarily based on the other
some people smoke cause its cool
some people smoke cause its cool, but they know its bad for your health
some people smoke cause they are addicted, and they know its bad for your health
its important to point out that given some knowledge, the 'correct' action isn't necessarily taken based on that knowledge.. this is in some ways freedom
however, ones awareness of options increases with knowledge
so given some set of circumstances.. lets say you're a 13 and trying a cigarette for the first time.. and you're given an ultimatum...
smoke and be cool, or not smoke and be laughed at...
and lets say me, being the smarter person, knows there's three options.. smoke and be cool, not smoke and be laughed at, or punch my friend in the face
does that make me more free? perhaps not
but lets say government imposes on us that 'to not smoke and be laughed at' is illegal
now i only have 2 options, and my friend has only 1 option
does that make me more free?
well i am aware of an option... and the other guy is not
in some ways i have a choice he doesn't have.. in some way i am more free
to enumerate the available options is perhaps impossible.. the fact that the law does it, is definitely arrogant
but the alternative.... lets say me punching someone in the face (the more realistically illegal option).. is perhaps also arrogant
at the end of the day i think freedom is the ability of an entity to make its own decisions and reap the benefits/suffer the consequences, regardless of how informed it is
a lack of freedom is perhaps the awareness of some option, and the inability to perform that option, perhaps due to physical restrictions (jailed) or expected consequences (laws)
James S Saint wrote:Chester wrote:Rather than build up to my point, thereby allowing some moron to intercede and destroy the thread, I thought that I'd just explain my opinion about freewill, then others can comment on it if they wish.
Firstly , what do we mean by "freedom" . I think this is where most people trip up. Freedom of the will doesn't mean freedom to do anything (we all know that, don't we?), it means freedom to do what we want to do within the confines of reality.Now, reality is a cause and effect environment from which we can not escape, so whatever we choose to do is caused, but that in no way infers that we are not able to freely choose between caused options. The sort of freedom we want is freedom to do what we think is best given the confines of reality.
People may argue that we are unable to control our impulses, this is clearly incorrect because if we have knowledge of what a mistaken impulse will cost us we are able to check our actions by weighing them up against the costs.Knowledge frees us to make the right choice for ourselves.
All quite correct, although not entirely complete.
The entire issue of "Free-Will" is merely another semantic equivocation mind game with intent to associate determinism with oppression.
"Free-Will" means the Freedom to exercise Will without Oppression; "Unopposed Will".
It does NOT mean freedom from Cause; "Acausal Will"
Determinancy refers to the fact that all things have cause. But determinancy also refers to the fact that causes resist oppression ("being determined"). For every cause there is a potential counter cause and thus there is a balance of forces wherein a decision if afforded. The person's will-power is a measure of his determination in the face of counter causes.
Chester wrote:
It may be an oversimplification but only acts based on knowledge, or at least sound reasoning, are free from such internal drives as impulse.
Chester wrote:Knowledge means we are free to make the right choice
Chester wrote:Nobody really wants to make choices based on wrong information, being free from knowledge/truth is not a cool form of freedom.
Chester wrote:Knowledge is the only thing that allows us to will our will. If you wanted to rape a woman but knew you would be caught and hung, you would will your will not to rape her...unless you had a death wish.
"Free-Will" means the Freedom to exercise Will without Oppression; "Unopposed Will".
It does NOT mean freedom from Cause; "Acausal Will"
Wiki wrote:Free will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long been debated in philosophy. Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been the metaphysical constraint of determinism. Two prominent opposing positions within that debate are metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus that free will exists (or is at least possible); and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus that free will does not exist.
Both of these positions, which agree that causal determination is the relevant factor in the question of free will, are classed as incompatibilists. Those who deny that determinism is relevant are classified as compatibilists, and offer various alternative explanations of what constraints are relevant, such as physical constraints (e.g. chains or imprisonment), social constraints (e.g. threat of punishment or censure), or psychological constraints (e.g. compulsions or phobias).
The principle of free will has religious, ethical, and scientific implications. For example, in the religious realm, free will implies that individual will and choices can coexist with an omnipotent divinity. In ethics, it may hold implications for whether individuals can be held morally accountable for their actions. In science, neuroscientific findings regarding free will may suggest different ways of predicting human behavior.
volchok wrote:I never said that the cause for eating a bar of chocolate would be simply the desire to eat chocolate. Certainly there's more to it then that. There's probably an incalculable number of variables coming into play.
without-music wrote:In essence, I want to know what kind of picture of determinism you can paint when you concede the incalculability of the causes that determine action.
Small differences in initial conditions (such as those due to rounding errors in numerical computation) yield widely diverging outcomes for chaotic systems, rendering long-term prediction impossible in general. This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved
without-music wrote:
I'm interested in this statement of yours. If the causes that determine my choices and actions are incalculable, then what impact does the charge of determinism claim for itself? Is it merely a way of doing away with moral responsibility?
without-music wrote:If the causes that determine my choices are incalculable, then why suppose they're definitive and complete? This is certainly a weary thought. Rather, why not suppose that there exists some ambiguity within which to exercise one's will? This is certainly the more powerful thought.
without-music wrote:In essence, I want to know what kind of picture of determinism you can paint when you concede the incalculability of the causes that determine action. On such a picture, determinism cannot be empirically verified, and so it seems to relegate itself to the warm but irrelevant womb of analytic philosophical academia. That is: it has no force.
finishedman wrote:It may be that there is no such thing as cause and effect outside the subjective mental construct that’s been systematically put together in your mind.
All we have are theories and ideas about life. Asking what is the meaning of life is the beginning of nothing but the question/answer ritual. There is no freedom to even ask a question from an area where there are no answers there already. You are restricted to the endurance of your thinking which is governed by the limitations of your knowledge and intelligence.
Why is it not that every event is a separate and independent event? We link certain events together only to make up stories about living. If you don’t link up events, it’s impossible to maintain the set of characteristics recognized as belonging to you and constituting your individual personality/philosophy. Once those conditioning factors are acquired, actions and events take on a more deterministic quality.
volchok wrote:You don't know what is the point of having a theoretical model of how the world works?!?!
volchok wrote:Moral responsibility can't possibly exist. Even if determinism is false. So why pretend it exists?
volchok wrote:If by powerful, you mean pleasing then yeah, sure. Thinking that we got free will is certainly pleasing but is it true?
volchok wrote:Plus why would the fact that your actions are caused by a multitude of factors render those same factors "indefinite" and "incomplete" ? Makes no sense to me.
volchok wrote:Is the incapability of the causes that determine actions news to you?
without-music wrote:FJ: My question is, to be more specific: of what use is it to us to define the will and human action in terms of chaos theory? It doesn't really yield much of anything outside of the impossibility of moral responsibility. But of course, it's simply ludicrous to suppose we can do away with responsibility while at the same time conceding the incalculability of the causes that determine action. Such is tantamount to proclaiming that we have no idea how it was that John murdered Anthony, but we know it was determined, so we can't hold John responsible.
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