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[Faust]

Mo -

Yes, this is basic Socratic stuff. Being an excellent cobbler doesn't make you an excellent person. And being an excellent football player doesn't make you an excellent person. That's just fucking obvious, isn't it?

It's obvious when you say what you mean. But you still haven't told us what makes an excellent person. You seem to be claiming that a morally excellent person is an excellent person, and when we ask you about actual moral cases, you claim that you don't know, that morality is "difficult". Just what good is your claim, then? You tell us it's easy to see a tree, but impossible to see right and wrong in the examples that have been given you. Moral theory is useful when it tells us which acts are right and which are wrong. You give extreme examples that most would agree with, on pain of being called insane, but you expect us to be insane enough to accept your claim that morality is just as easily seen - except that it's not, for when it's an example that's not settled by your claim, you simply shrug your shoulders and say - "Well, tough luck. I don't know the answer".

Again, with all this verbiage, all you have done is to make a single claim, that morality is "objective", and then use extreme examples that most would agree with, and when someone disputes not the moral choice itself, but the basis for that choice, you scream "Reductio! Reductio!" It's an insult.

The biggest problem with all this is that newbies might think that this is all actual philosophy, which it is not.

[von Rivers]

1) Science is very good at measuring and defining things, however hard it may be. Consequentialists generally wave their hands and talk about indefinable quantities like pleasure and well-being and back down when asked for specific objective measurables.

What? Why wouldn't a consequentialist just use the scientist to measure things like pain? Why reinvent the wheel? Is that what you want?

2) So where do you start? How do you objectively come to a conclusion that it's fifteen, or thirty-five, or whatever, such that anyone who disagrees is ignoring the tree in the yard?

Talk to a scientist. I am not a scientist.

I think you misunderstand me. I'm not saying one is better than the other, here, or that you're missing anything from your explanation of consequentialism. I'm saying that they are different, and will reach different conclusions on what is moral in specific cases, for different reasons. And I've given you examples of such things, as you asked me to.

Begging the question again. You have not explained how they are different, and if they are, you cannot point to the difference by saying that "they fight the good fight"----because that's obviously begging the question about what 'good' means here.

I've just said. Within the frameworks, we discover new trees and planets. If a thousand years ago in Europe we'd discovered trees, and no-one believed in them any more, we'd have a situation like that of morality.

I've just said. Within the frameworks, we discover new actions and principles, because new problems arise---like abortion. There are clearly people here who are prepared not to believe in trees, if only they were prepared to be consistent.

That's not a moral ought though; no-one is to blame. No normative power.

This is nothing but begging the question again. I'm tired of responding to it. Just look backwards if you need to.

[von Rivers]

It's obvious when you say what you mean. But you still haven't told us what makes an excellent person.

Plato beat me to it.

You tell us it's easy to see a tree, but impossible to see right and wrong in the examples that have been given you. Moral theory is useful when it tells us which acts are right and which are wrong.

I gave you an easy case. You're free to give me a hard case. You can do that to a scientist too. Just ask them if quarks exist. There's no difference, and neither hard case is a problem for a scientist, nor an objectivist about morality.

Again, with all this verbiage, all you have done is to make a single claim, that morality is "objective", and then use extreme examples that most would agree with, and when someone disputes not the moral choice itself, but the basis for that choice, you scream "Reductio! Reductio!" It's an insult.

This is the insult.

The biggest problem with all this is that newbies might think that this is all actual philosophy, which it is not.

I really hope they do. Because philosophy is practical---at least it can be, and was for the people who knew how to do it best.


And this brings up a more general point about ILP. There are, right now, any number of topics that I think are more interesting than this. But it's like talking to your neighbour and knowing in advance that he has a dead body in his closet. Some things need to be cleared up first...

Awhile ago, I wanted to figure out what makes something beautiful. And a bunch of ...people started going off about how beauty doesn't exist! it's all just made up shit! blah blah blah! So I was like, whoa...

You want to know what's not philosophy? That's NOT philosophy. If your answer to any of the deepest most interesting questions is: "It doesn't exist! You just make it up for yourselves! Every man for himself!" ...that's the style of answer people here give, including you... and it's not philosophy. I hope the newbs recognize that.

[Only_Humean]

1) Science is very good at measuring and defining things, however hard it may be. Consequentialists generally wave their hands and talk about indefinable quantities like pleasure and well-being and back down when asked for specific objective measurables.

What? Why wouldn't a consequentialist just use the scientist to measure things like pain? Why reinvent the wheel? Is that what you want?

Because pain is not suffering, as I've explained. And scientists don't measure pleasure. And no moralist has yet told a scientist how to measure well-being.

2) So where do you start? How do you objectively come to a conclusion that it's fifteen, or thirty-five, or whatever, such that anyone who disagrees is ignoring the tree in the yard?

Talk to a scientist. I am not a scientist.

What a disappointing cop-out. You haven't a clue what to measure, yet you insist it's there?

I think you misunderstand me. I'm not saying one is better than the other, here, or that you're missing anything from your explanation of consequentialism. I'm saying that they are different, and will reach different conclusions on what is moral in specific cases, for different reasons. And I've given you examples of such things, as you asked me to.

Begging the question again. You have not explained how they are different, and if they are, you cannot point to the difference by saying that "they fight the good fight"----because that's obviously begging the question about what 'good' means here.

Yes I did, back up the thread. Twice, I believe. Deontologists see the rational rule as good regardless of contexts, because the rule-keeping itself is what leads to the aggregate best world. Act consequentialists ignore a rule that brings a suboptimal result. I'm not going to keep repeating myself.

That's not a moral ought though; no-one is to blame. No normative power.

This is nothing but begging the question again. I'm tired of responding to it. Just look backwards if you need to.

[/quote]

I'm not sure that "begging the question" means what you think it means. Or if it does, how pointing out that not all oughts (nor this particular one) are moral statements does so.

I don't think that you're wrong that the baby ought have had a better life, nor that it doesn't matter. But it's simply not normative, no-one has the slightest capacity to change things. Unless you have a God you wish to blame. Ought can refer to many things besides moral injunction: you ought to try balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream, it's delicious - I'm not attempting to bring you in line, just offering a suggestion. Of course, if it is moral in that case, then "delicious" is an objective description, by your views.

[von Rivers]

Because pain is not suffering, as I've explained. And scientists don't measure pleasure. And no moralist has yet told a scientist how to measure well-being.

Then measure pain, not suffering. And measure pleasure. And reduce well-being to pain and pleasure.

Yes I did, back up the thread. Twice, I believe. Deontologists see the rational rule as good regardless of contexts, because the rule-keeping itself is what leads to the aggregate best world.

Oh for godssakes. You see how this is begging the question, right? To say that "Good is good regardless of context" doesn't tell you a freaking thing about what "good" is. And I seriously doubt you want to put the phrase "Aggregate best world" into the mouth of a deontologist. I seriously doubt that...

I'm not sure that "begging the question" means what you think it means.

Everytime you say something that implies a distinction between a prudential ought, and a moral ought, you are begging the question... because I asked you pages ago to explain the difference that I don't seem to see.

Ought can refer to many things besides moral injunction: you ought to try balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream, it's delicious - I'm not attempting to bring you in line, just offering a suggestion. Of course, if it is moral in that case, then "delicious" is an objective description, by your views.

Unless the ought just refers to "trying new things" or "seeing if you like what I like"---or is just plainly false in this example! In any case, I see no difference.

[Only_Humean]

Because pain is not suffering, as I've explained. And scientists don't measure pleasure. And no moralist has yet told a scientist how to measure well-being.

Then measure pain, not suffering. And measure pleasure. And reduce well-being to pain and pleasure.

Get as many people on an opium drip as society can sustain, then. Good luck with selling that as the definitive answer to human morality.

"Good is good regardless of context" doesn't tell you a freaking thing about what "good" is.

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

I'm not sure that "begging the question" means what you think it means.

Everytime you say something that implies a distinction between a prudential ought, and a moral ought, you are begging the question... because I asked you pages ago to explain the difference that I don't seem to see.

"That baby ought not have been born so" isn't a prudential ought. How can one be prudent about such things?

Ought can refer to many things besides moral injunction: you ought to try balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream, it's delicious - I'm not attempting to bring you in line, just offering a suggestion. Of course, if it is moral in that case, then "delicious" is an objective description, by your views.

Unless the ought just refers to "trying new things" or "seeing if you like what I like"---or is just plainly false in this example! In any case, I see no difference.

I don't believe you do. Ah well.

Though seriously, minor quibbles like morality aside, good balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream is good.

[iambiguous]

But if the reason she gives is, "it's immoral to bring more life into this wicked world", is that a fact about the world?

If the reason is a good one, then there will be a fact about the world that makes it true.

But she already thinks that, in fact, it is wicked; and for any number of reasons.

So, sure, that she has reasons is an objective fact. That they are good reasons is a matter of opinion. She may be a socialist convinced that capitalism has turned the world into a moral cesspool.

That's a reason. Is it a fact about the world? Some say yes and others say no. And they can all give you reasons. Lots of them. How then does science or philosophy determine if they are good reasons. At best you can go down the escape hatch: "someday we will know this for sure but it's hard to be certain now because these things are complex."

All I'm looking for is an argument able to convince me that "capitalism = a wicked world" or "capitalism = a virtuous world" is an argument that might possibly be made objectively. I am not suggesting that it can't be, only that you have not convinced me that it can. This is my escape hatch: that, in a world sans God, these things [i.e. value judgments] can't be known. Not wholly. Not objectively.

But, as an ironist, I accept that my own point of view here is just that: a personal prejudice.

Like yours is.

[von Rivers]

Get as many people on an opium drip as society can sustain, then. Good luck with selling that as the definitive answer to human morality.

Yes, so again, maybe something's left out---I'd be glad to hear what you think it is.

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

That's wonderful for a deontologist.

"That baby ought not have been born so" isn't a prudential ought. How can one be prudent about such things?

Begging the question again. I haven't made the distinction, so to say it's prudent but not moral, or moral but not prudent, is to beg the question of what you mean by the distinction.

[von Rivers]

But she already thinks that, in fact, it is wicked; and for any number of reasons.

What are her reasons? Why are those her reasons? What are her reasons?

You do that, you do philosophy. Period.

How then does science or philosophy determine if they are good reasons.

Logic and empirical fact.

[PavlovianModel146]

Try to digest the following: Some things are not subjective. Math, scientific facts are not subjective. Reasons, likewise, are not subjective.

It's quite simple. So, why do you think a human has a right to life? I.e., why is your opinion correct? Because as you know, your opinion here could be wrong. Why do you think the Golden Rule is a good rule? Are you saying that the negative emotional impact on the family who's member you killed is just a matter of your opinion, or do you think they actually feel that way?

I've already explained why Math is subjective, because it is language, but how it refers to the objective, often. That Math exists or is used is an objective fact, mathematical equations can be Empirically experienced. I've also determined that the goal of scientific inquiry is to determine what is objectively true, so you're just repeating what I said there.

The subjectivity, or lack thereof, of Math and Science have nothing to do with reasons.

I'm not going to answer all of those questions in the second paragraph as they should really be reserved for different threads. Besides, I would just be answering with reasons which would lead to more questions. I agree that my reasons are certainly refutable, but I'm not sure that a morally based reason can strictly be, "Wrong," certainly some are more unusual than others...

I will answer to the negative emotional impact. It is a matter of my opinion, unless I know that an individual has a decent enough relationship with his family. He may have no family alive. His family may hate him. Unless I know him, then I don't really know.

[phyllo]

beg the question - to use an argument that assumes as proved the very thing one is trying to prove

[von Rivers]

beg the question - to use an argument that assumes as proved the very thing one is trying to prove

Thank you. If Only_Humean was wondering, that should show him.

[von Rivers]

I think this thread is pretty much done. I wouldn't say I'm totally dusting off my hands, after a job well-done... but something close to that. A few honorable mentions are worth making. Dan~, for one, was a beacon of reasonableness when reasonableness came at a premium, and the dark mist of obscurantism overhung ILP. JSSaint made some nice comments. Ambigui asked the right questions---it's just a matter now of how badly he wants to be the King. I have confidence, regardless. If there was a "most improved" award, it'd go to phyllo. Big progress there... asking the tough questions. Pav and Faust were like Bert and Ernie... siding with the contract business, citing each other's refuted posts as refutation of other's. Everybody knows how the contract business ended up. You can draw up the most ridiculous contract imaginable, and the contract will still be ridiculous... it doesn't justify or underwrite anything to do with morality, but is only worthy if it captures what has to do with morality itself. Most people here are consequentialists now, I think, broadly speaking. Ambigui gets it now. And that's pretty much it. Good night and good luck.

[PavlovianModel146]

I think this thread is pretty much done.

I knew we were bound to agree on something.

[iambiguous]

But she already thinks that, in fact, it is wicked; and for any number of reasons.

What are her reasons? Why are those her reasons? What are her reasons?

You do that, you do philosophy. Period.

Yes, but, again, Socrates and the philosophic "method" you employ here has a transcending Truth that one can rely on outside the cave. Or however this is understood philosophically by realists. You ask enough questions and eventually you reach a mythical formal morality and the merely existential points of view rooted in dasein become...inadequate?

But all I propose here are particular worlds understood by particular daseins. And particular daseins have reasons to embrace capitalism and reasons to eschew it. And, with no equivalent of the Platonic entity able to parcel out more Formal truths down here "on earth", we are forced to rely on the extent to which we have come to believe our own existential prejudices reflect a "greater" good.

You have no God though. So, instead, you must reconstruct objectivity out of Reason. But the variables here are so complex [think "mind" alone!] there are any number of ways to define the words used in the analysis to make this "true".

And then around and around we go speculating as to whether the meaning you have ascribed to them [producing, tautologically, a particular sequence of ideas deemed "logical"] is the meaning everyone should assign them---commensurable, of course, with how we each then relate this to "universality".

Then we have to reconfigure these words so that somehow they are -- theoretically? -- in alignment with what we construe to be true empirically about the world around us. And "I" in it.

Then one day we are all dead and gone and the next generation takes up this seemingly Sisyphusian task.

[iambiguous]

I think this thread is pretty much done. I wouldn't say I'm totally dusting off my hands, after a job well-done... but something close to that. A few honorable mentions are worth making. Dan~, for one, was a beacon of reasonableness when reasonableness came at a premium, and the dark mist of obscurantism overhung ILP. JSSaint made some nice comments. Ambigui asked the right questions---it's just a matter now of how badly he wants to be the King. I have confidence, regardless. If there was a "most improved" award, it'd go to phyllo. Big progress there... asking the tough questions. Pav and Faust were like Bert and Ernie... siding with the contract business, citing each other's refuted posts as refutation of other's. Everybody knows how the contract business ended up. You can draw up the most ridiculous contract imaginable, and the contract will still be ridiculous... it doesn't justify or underwrite anything to do with morality, but is only worthy if it captures what has to do with morality itself. Most people here are consequentialists now, I think, broadly speaking. Ambigui gets it now. And that's pretty much it. Good night and good luck.

Are we dismissed, your majesty?

[Only_Humean]

Get as many people on an opium drip as society can sustain, then. Good luck with selling that as the definitive answer to human morality.

Yes, so again, maybe something's left out---I'd be glad to hear what you think it is. .

You're proposing scientific measures of morality in terms of neurological activity, not me. I think the project's far wide of the mark.

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

That's wonderful for a deontologist.

So you're giving up on this line? As you wish.

"That baby ought not have been born so" isn't a prudential ought. How can one be prudent about such things?

Begging the question again. I haven't made the distinction, so to say it's prudent but not moral, or moral but not prudent, is to beg the question of what you mean by the distinction.

I'm not begging any question. I said the statement is not a moral one, you bring in prudence, I say it's not prudential either. Whether they're the same or not.

It seems you're not interested in following the arguments, or maybe that there are too many going on in the thread and you're confusing my points with others'. In any case, it's a good time to let it rest.

[von Rivers]

Yes, so again, maybe something's left out---I'd be glad to hear what you think it is. .

You're proposing scientific measures of morality in terms of neurological activity, not me. I think the project's far wide of the mark.

Give me a single reason to think it's off the mark. That's what I've been asking you for, and you haven't given a single one. Let's be honest, whatever points you brought up earlier have been dealth with in such a way that you are now making yourself look to me like the Black Knight blocking the path forward without your arms and legs.

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

That's wonderful for a deontologist.

So you're giving up on this line? As you wish.

What line? Clearly morality is not context independent, as we both have agreed. Do you now want to give me a reason to think I should have to defend some deontological point?

I'm not begging any question. I said the statement is not a moral one, you bring in prudence, I say it's not prudential either. Whether they're the same or not.

Then explain what kind of 'ought' it is. Why should I have to help you explain yourself when I haven't an idea what you're referring to...?

[iambiguous]

Many years ago I read a book by [I believe] Michael Parenti. He [or whoever it was] bifurcated the world intellectually into two kinds of thinkers---those who practice "the politics of conviction" and those who practice "the politics of convenience".

The conviction folks construed the world of human interaction as reflecting either good or bad behavior. You did the right thing or you did the wrong thing. Sometimes this was predicated on theological renditions of one or another God, sometimes on secular and philosophical renditions of one or another Reason. Either way they were driven by a doctrinaire commitment to The Objective Truth.

More often than not, their own.

But, even more often than that, they rationalized a vast assortment of means in order to achieve the particular "kingdom of ends" they fancied.

The convenience folks, on the other hand, eschewed these dogmatic, catechismic cinder blocks and, instead, embraced pragmatism [or one or another rendering of Bismark's "realpolitik"].

Indeed, sometimes with the best of intentions as enlightened Humanists.

Others, however, represented themselves as purveyors of moral or political or philosophical conviction but actually strove to mold and manipulate those around them in an endless pursuit of what they construed to be their own selfish, Machiaveillian interests.

These Bilderberg types [exemplified by, say, Henry Kissinger or the government in China] are the most powerful people in the world. They own and they operate the global ecxonomy.

And that is the way the world works today.

Or so it seems to me.

[iambiguous]

Give me a single reason to think it's off the mark. That's what I've been asking you for, and you haven't given a single one. Let's be honest, whatever points you brought up earlier have been dealth with in such a way that you are now making yourself look to me like the Black Knight blocking the path forward without your arms and legs.

In my own estimation -- and that is all it is, my own opinion -- this translates as:

"Give me a single reason that I will agree with to think it's off the mark. That's what I've been asking you for, and you haven't given me a single one that I agreed with. Let's be honest, whatever points you brought up earlier I have already dealth with objectively such that you are now making yourself look to me like the Black Knight blocking the path forward without your arms and legs."

Clearly morality is not context independent, as we both have agreed. Do you now want to give me a reason to think I should have to defend some deontological point?

So then every single context has its own objective reality? And it is just that, regarding some contexts, it is harder to figure out what this is because they are more complex?

Is that your argument?

[von Rivers]

So then every single context has its own objective reality?

Is that your argument?

Sure.

[iambiguous]

So then every single context has its own objective reality?

Is that your argument?

Sure.

And I have to agree with this or I am wrong?

[von Rivers]

So then every single context has its own objective reality?

Is that your argument?

Sure.

And I have to agree with this or I am wrong?

It is possible to deny reality. If you disagree with that statement, then you disagree with me. Not just in the science case, but in the normative case as well.

Look at the dog, for instance. Ought that culture to invite animal abuse? The answer is discovered by investigating the actual world. You can get your reasons just by looking at the actual dog... from the world itself.

Someone might disagree... and claim to be a dasein and other bullshit. He is denying reality just as if he claimed he was the King of France, or that God made the world in 7 literal days.

[Only_Humean]

Yes, so again, maybe something's left out---I'd be glad to hear what you think it is. .

You're proposing scientific measures of morality in terms of neurological activity, not me. I think the project's far wide of the mark.

Give me a single reason to think it's off the mark.

Wait, so you can't think of a way to scientifically measure morality yet claim that it can be done, and the burden of proof is then on me to show you that it's not possible at all? That's not how it works. You're making the claim for objective existence, it's your burden. Just like the burden of proof is on the theist to prove the existence of God, or on the physicist to prove the existence of new particles.

So, my single reason, as requested, would be that the best criteria you could come up with so far barely took any effort to contradict. What more reason would you like not to believe in the existence of something?

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

That's wonderful for a deontologist.

So you're giving up on this line? As you wish.

What line? Clearly morality is not context independent, as we both have agreed. Do you now want to give me a reason to think I should have to defend some deontological point?[/quote]

You're... not following this discussion at all, are you? Let's drop it, then.

I'm not begging any question. I said the statement is not a moral one, you bring in prudence, I say it's not prudential either. Whether they're the same or not.

Then explain what kind of 'ought' it is. Why should I have to help you explain yourself when I haven't an idea what you're referring to...?

It's a purely emotive expression. It may be sympathy with the family of the baby, for instance. Now your turn: in what way is it possibly normative? What prudential/moral lessons can we learn from something completely out of our control?

[von Rivers]

Wait, so you can't think of a way to scientifically measure morality yet claim that it can be done, and the burden of proof is then on me to show you that it's not possible at all? That's not how it works.[i]

I don't know where this comment comes from. Gauging the consequences of actions is often easy. It's often obvious. We use second order concepts to characterize it. There's no complex mathmatical or scientific technique needed. It's a way of approaching moral problems. I'm not doing a scientific investigation, I'm doing a conceptual one. And if you are denying that sometimes people fare worse, and sometimes people fare better, then you're insane. If you have a problem with characterizing 'faring better' and 'faring worse' with pleasure and pain, then propose something it leaves out. That's the question I asked you. Get it straight.

So, my single reason, as requested, would be that the best criteria you could come up with so far barely took any effort to contradict. What more reason would you like not to believe in the existence of something?

What are you denying the existence of? Suffering? Pain? What?

It's a purely emotive expression. It may be sympathy with the family of the baby, for instance. Now your turn: in what way is it possibly normative? What prudential/moral lessons can we learn from something completely out of our control?

It would be better for the baby not to be horribly deformed. It ought not have been that way. No one is to blame. But obviously some 'oughts' have nothing to do with blame. And no one is to be praised, but obviously some 'oughts' have nothing to do with praise. This is clear.