What makes anything valuable?

{First, I’ll phrase it in some technical language, but then I’ll simplify later on.}
To judge J, at time t, something is valuable if its properties are perceived as matching the property-names that comprise the meaning of the thing-being-evaluated.
We learn meanings associated with specific words or concepts when we first learn the language, our native tongue. For purposes of logical analysis, the meaning is here seen as a set. …a set of predicates (property names.) If this set matches {even partially} the properties in the item (or person) being judged, prized, valued, assessed, then the judge (the one doing the evaluating) will tend to describe the item as “valuable” or as “having some value.”

To put it in plain simple everyday language, when the actual matches the ideal, there is value. [ The actual never has to touch the ideal, just correspond to it, in the mind of the valuer. Value is a matter of degree: to the extent x matches the picture you have for x’s in your mind, you will tend to call it: a good x. ]

If it has everything (it is supposed to have in the picture of the ideal concept of things of that kind) then the valuer is likely to call the item “good” or “a good one.” So, goodness is: being all there - under its concept. Exemplifying fully its concept makes something “good.”

I trust this has been helpful and is responsive to everyone who had an inquiry about this topic.

To learn more about my approach to Ethics, see these papers which you can either search for on Google, or simply click on the links here and enjoy reading the selections free of charge. These are all PDF files, safe to open:

LIVING THE GOOD LIFE by M. C. Katz & Wade Harvey
http://tinyurl.com/28mtn56

A UNIFIED THEORY OF ETHICS - Marvin C. Katz, Ph.D.
http://tinyurl.com/27pzhbf

Ethical Adventures - http://tinyurl.com/38zfrh7

Ethical Explorations - http://tinyurl.com/22ohd2x

Aspects of Ethics: Views through a new lens.
http://tinyurl.com/36u6gpo

What are the property-names that comprise the meaning of a dog? Is this supposed to be on objective or a subjective standard?

I’m afraid that I would have to disagree with Katz.

Value is based fundamentally upon anticipated affect. The named properties might or might not be involved in an evaluation of that affect.

It seems kind of silly to think that perhaps a dog would taste something as bad only because of the names given to its properties.

From dictionary.com I got this:

dog
noun
1.
a domesticated canid, Canis familiaris, bred in many varieties.
2.
any carnivore of the dogfamily Canidae, having prominent canine teeth and, in the wild state, a long and slender muzzle, a deep-chested muscular body, a bushy tail, and large, erect ears. Compare canid.
3.
the male of such an animal.
4.
any of various animals resembling a dog.
5.
a despicable man or youth.

All the above words are the property names (attributes) of a dog …to the mind of most English speakers. Of course there are many, many more in the connotation the name “dog” (for the concept dog) may have for an individual.

The dictionary is objective about subjective states of a person; in the same way a physician can objectively write in a report that the patient had a pain in his abdomen. The pain was subjective. …but very real (to the patient.)

If you admit that “the named properties might be involved” as you do, then you are not disagreeing with Katz.

Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that the dog, being a conscious mammal, has a language that it speaks, and that you speak it also. Did the dog tell you that what it tasted was “bad.” Did the dog actually say “bad” in dog-tongue to you?? Or are you anthropomorphizing, reading into the dog’s behavior what you judge as “bad”? Can you definitely say for sure that the dog made a value judgment - in dog terms? In that case it is incumbent upon you to spell out the dog’s thinking proceses, and the neurology behind it.

What is your definition of (or scientific analysis)as to) how the dog “anticipates”?

Yes, thank you. I know what a dictionary is. I also could have looked up the word ‘dog’ in one myself.

OK. Lets say I believe that cats are largely useless, needy animals that shit in other people’s lawns and do the world very little good. So the attributes I attach to a cat are ‘lazy’, ‘disobedient’, ‘vicious’, ‘disloyal’ and ‘has a tendency to shit on other people’s lawns’. Anyway, lets say that we have two cats. One cat is the epitome of all these things, however the other cat goes against the grain. It is fiercely loyal to its owner, knows a few cool tricks like fetching the paper and has the added bonus as acting as a guard cat - often alerting its owner to some stranger’s presence (actually, I know of such a cat, and the aforementioned properties of a cat are truly how I conceive of the wretched things).

It seems like, by your standards, the first cat would have to be the more valuable because ‘its properties are perceived as matching the property-names that comprise the meaning of the thing-being-evaluated’. On the other hand, if someone asked me which cat I would save given the options, I would obviously go for the second, seeing it as being more valuable than the first.

So basically, I can’t see the necessary correlation between exemplifying attributes commonly associate with its name, and something being valuable. The two just don’t seem to be linked.

(I could apply a startlingly similar argument to human children, but we’ll leave it at cats for now)

You seem to be overlooking the obvious.

The dog’s behavior, whether a spoken language or not, reveals the dog’s preferences and the dog’s anticipation of value. There need not be any names of anything nor language involved at all, merely memory of experiences and affects.

This is the animal version of Charles L. Stevenson’s emotivism, and/or of a Positivism (such as Carnap’s) applied to values. Behavior reveals a lot to a behavioral psychologist, but this thread is about Ethics. Let’s not have a reductionism to psychology to explain the moral life. For it doesn’t work.

Your definition, James, of “value” is circular, it is true only by definition. You tell us that preferences accounts for value; Nick Rescher wrote an entire little book on the logic of preferences …and no one I know of ever found this satisfying, or wanted to adopt it to teach students about value. It turned them off. And - don’t get me wrong - I admire Nicholas Rescher as a sensitive man who really cares about people, and who really knows Logic.

The problem is that “to prefer” is a synonym for " to like" and liking is a psychological phenomenon. To say “I value x because I prefer x” is not informative. I value Dick Cheney as a conscious human being, but I certainly don’t prefer him. [size=85][I’m sure it’s mutual.][/size]

The critic failed to give us an analysis of how dogs “anticipate”, as was requested, and merely spoke of “the obvious” (and said I was overlooking it.) This is not doing philosophy. [size=85]p.s. Incidentally, I have fed many a pet, and some have characterized me as a “dog whisperer” in an analogy with a “horse whisperer.” But this is not too relevant to how human beings judge value, or prize, or rate things.[/size]

In contrast, the original post gives a coherent, logical theory in re the concept “value.” It is a synthetic a priori, in the sense that it is part formal, a construction of the mind, and part empirical, an observation of what people mean when they make value judgments. When the theory is applied to practice, it explains shades of valuation such as derived definitions of “fair”, “so-so”, “pretty good”, “mediocre”, “bad”, “lousy”, , “no good”, “terrible.” - all derived in terms of the arithmetic. {See for details what Mark says, in his presentation, early in the UNIFIED THEORY OF ETICS by M. C. Katz.}

G. E. Moore struggled with the issue, and for most of his life thought that “good” was indefinable …however, toward the end of his life, he changed his mind about this. He did not make the breakthrough - that was R. S. Hartman’s contribution - that good is not a primary property, but is a secondary property. What does this mean? Good is not like yellow, shapely, tanned, flat, solid, curvaceous, which are primary properties. Good though is a property OF properties :exclamation: (a second-level property).
Namely, good is an axiological quantifier: it is analogous to ALL in Logic. And value is analogous to SOME in Logic.
What do they quantify? Properties. (Properties are empirically sensed.)

Example: You go into a hardware store to buy a drill. The shopkeeper shows you a drill and outlines for you the features it has. If it has all those you were picturing (that a drill is supposed to have, by the meaning you have come to associate with the word “drill”) you will exclaim, “Good !” or “This is a valuable item” or something to that effect. If it has all, and then some, you may utter: “Excellent !” [size=85]Especially decisive (and what the shopkeeper wants to hear) is “I’ll take it. Wrap it up.”[/size] Features, or qualities, are general words meaning either attributes or properties.

Greetings, brevel_monkey

You have shifted the concept from “cat” to “cat-sub-1”, namely “lazy’, ‘disobedient’, ‘vicious’, 'disloyal, etc… cat.” And cat-sub-2, namely “fiercely loyal, fetching, guard cat.” Each one can be good as an exemplar of the name you put on it. “The name sets the norm,” Hartman liked to say. [size=85] {What particular animal you select to hang out with is not relevant to the specific topic under discussion, namely, the best definition of the concept “a good x.” }[/size]

We must be careful to stay on the same level of abstraction when making comparisons. The more features mentioned, the more concrete the concept is becoming, and the closer it gets to reality. For an actual cat - a living, conscious individual, is an Intrinsic Value (to me, anyway.) It has an infinity of properties, more than I could ever enumerate. Everyone of its properties has a long list of properties.

The category “cat” is an abstraction from reality. It pulls together the minimum number of properties that all cats have in common. That abstract word is what we find in dictionaries. Your were not in your post describing a generality, a universal, but were describing particulars.

“Jessica”, the late all-white Persian Angora I once had as a pet, and a companion, who had two different-colored eyes, was not just in a-class-by-herself, she was Unique; she was a singular, ontologically speaking. “Unique” is a value-judgment meaning intrinsically-valued. So is “rad”, “super”, “cool” “swell” “real” etc.

That cat is better, all things being equal, if on the same level of abstraction, cat-1 has more features (qualities) than cat-2 …under exactly the same concept.

I hope and trust this clears things up and responds to your questions.

You seem to have gotten off track from your own OP…

That is an explanation for words such as “perfect” or “acceptable”, but not for “value” or “good”.

Irrelevant.

Again, you are discussing only how well something matches a description, not whether the item has value or importance to the assessor.
One does not say, “oh this item exactly matches its description, I just MUST have one!!” unless the assessor already valued that particular description set.

The description is not what makes something valuable.

Hi, James

You raise a lot of points. I’ll take them up one at a time. I’ll speak to you as one philosopher to another.

When the Axiom of Value (the formal definition of “value” offered) is applied, one of the fields we get as a result is Ethics, so I wasn’t off the track. The whole reason I brought up the study of what “value” means in the system is because of its relevance to Ethics …which is what I’m really interested in, and which is what the world needs urgently now. There is such confusion about (moral) values prevailing that people do some pretty dumb things, I believe you would agree.

You are correct when you say “this explains 'perfect;.” With the aid of the three basic dimensions of value, we generate three definitions when S, E, and I are applied to the concept FULL VALUE. They are:
S: Perfection
E: Goodness
I: Uniqueness.

To illustrate:
When the holes in two punch-cards were seen to match, a guy was overheard to exclaim, "Perfect :exclamation: "
When two paper circles totally overlapped (were geometrically congruent) a little girl, who was playing with the paper shapes, said: “That’s perfect.”

The fact that “We learn meanings associated with specific words or concepts when we first learn the language, our native tongue” is highly relevant. Why? Because value, by the Axiom of Value, depends upon meaning. Meaning serves as the measure. Value is a function of meaning. For purposes of applying Set Theory and Logic, we understand meaning to be a SET of predicates (descriptors). [size=85]As you can tell from the End Notes in the UTE (Unified Theory of Ethics), I am quite aware that the concept is broader, and I recommend A. N. Whitehead’s prehension notion (in his PROCESS AND REALITY) as grasping more of the sense of meaning.[/size]

You protest: “you are discussing only how well something matches a description, not whether the item has value or importance to the assessor.
One does not say, “oh this item exactly matches its description, I just MUST have one!!” unless the assessor already valued that particular description set.”

This misses the point. When a formal frame of reference is applied (via bridge laws of interpretation) to a set of unordered data it is useful if it orders and explicates the data. You could charge Einstein for employing the Tensor Calculus (a matrix of matrices) to speak about Relativity, when it seems to have nothing to do with it. Yet he found it to be a useful tool, whose later deductions revealed something about the nature of the universe. In the same way, no matter how counter-intuitive at first, the structure of value, as explained in the Axiom, seems to you, it will be very helpful later in ordering and explaining the data of Ethics; it will reveal a lot about human nature - which, after all, is a part of nature too.

Of course I know that people don’t stop and count properties, or check descriptions !! I am not that naive. Give me a little credit… But when you speak of “whether the item has value or importance to the assessor” you are going in circles, since importance is one type of value. You can’t use that to define “value” As G. E. Moore pointed out: When you define value as importance, it’s like saying “Value is value” – which is a tautology.

I fully understand that issue. My point was that I am back on step one, the definition of value in non-ambiguous, but accurate terms. How that will then relate to Ethics comes next. If you don’t get the primary definitions straight, the later theory will usually be seriously flawed. Thus to me, it is critical to get the concept of value ironed out before we bother concerning ourselves with Ethics or any other potential use of value ontology. It appears to me that you have a circular/tautological or presumptuous definition.

It seems to me that you are confusing your statements with mine. I have not offered any definition of value.

You have indirectly implied that value is associated with usefulness. I would agree with a definition centered around that concept. But of course the issue immediately becomes “use for what purpose?” That question has relevant answers as well, but one step at a time.

There are 3 primary concerns to interpretation of thought (“meaning”);

  1. consistency
  2. comprehensiveness
  3. relevance

Note that (3), “relevance”, is an issue of usefulness and/or value.
A definition of a term must adhere to all 3 concerns of cohesive thought.

Something perfectly matching something seems to have very little to do with usefulness; "This pile of dung exactly matches what I thought a pile of dung would look like." But of what use is that perfect pile of dung?

I need to see a complete, consistent, and relevant definition before I go into the conceptual architecture of Ethics.

Value is what happens when we attach meaning to a proposition beyond what is analytically extrapolable from it. I know extrapolable isn’t a word. You still know what I’m saying.

Why is it ‘an Intrinsic Value’. I can hardly see how you got to this conclusion following your own definition of value.

Do tyres and rubbish tips have this same ‘intrinsic value’, (when they perfectly match the attributes ascribed to them?)

No, there are no circles involved here. James lumped ‘value’ and importance together and effectively equated them. He did not at any stage suggest one be defined as the other. Sorry, but you are clearly reading whatever you want to read into his statements.

Granted, but you have yet to demonstrate how, exactly, your ‘frame of reference’ is actually useful. Some frames of reference look counter intuitive but are useful - no shit. This doesn’t help us understand why yours is useful and not just a waste of 0.5kb worth of ILP board space.

Basically, so far you have simply stated a definition of value that you yourself admit is counter intuitive, and (as far as I can see) provided no motivation for this definition besides the vague promise that it will be a ‘useful tool’ somewhere, somehow.

What makes anything valuable?
That an entity values it.

You’re right, brevel monkey, it doesn’t follow from that definition. What I meant to say is that a cat (as well as anything else) can be Intrinsically valued, and that with my cat, Jessie, I did Intrinsically value her (much of the time.)

Yes, I did read things in to what he said. I apologize for that. You are correct.
However I do define “importance.” I define it as: “the Intrinsic-valuation of relevance.”
For a view of other definitions resulting from the application of the S, E, and I dimensions of value, see End Note 4, pp. 63ff. in A Unified Theory of Ethics - http://tinyurl.com/27pzhbf

[quote=“brevel_monkey”]
When a formal frame of reference is applied (via bridge laws of interpretation) to a set of unordered data it is useful if it orders and explicates the data."
Granted, but you have yet to demonstrate how, exactly, your ‘frame of reference’ is actually useful. … so far you have… provided no motivation for this definition

[quote]
In response, I refer all readers to the words of the inventor/discoverer of value science, himself, Dr. Robert S. Hartman. Study this paper and it shall answer many of your questions. In the future, superior models will be developed to extend the body of knowledge, and better methods of calculating formulas and symbols will no doubt be introduced. However the basic groundwork has been laid. Check it out: - http://hartmaninstitute.org/Portals/0/html-files/AxiologyAsAScience.html

Incidentally, I do believe that the system of ethics that is derived from the basic definition of “Value” will, when it is tried out, prove to be useful. I thought I already hinted at, and even argued for, some of the utility and benefits in my previous posts here at this Forum.

You’re right, brevel monkey, it doesn’t follow from that definition. What I meant to say is that a cat (as well as anything else) can be Intrinsically valued, and that with my cat, Jessie, I did Intrinsically value her (much of the time.)

Yes, I did read things in to what he said. I apologize for that. You are correct.
However I do define “importance.” I define it as: “the Intrinsic-valuation of relevance.”
For a view of other definitions resulting from the application of the S, E, and I dimensions of value, see End Note 4, pp. 63ff. in A Unified Theory of Ethics - http://tinyurl.com/27pzhbf

[quote=“brevel_monkey”]
When a formal frame of reference is applied (via bridge laws of interpretation) to a set of unordered data it is useful if it orders and explicates the data."
Granted, but you have yet to demonstrate how, exactly, your ‘frame of reference’ is actually useful. … so far you have… provided no motivation for this definition

[quote]
In response, I refer all readers to the words of the inventor/discoverer of value science, himself, Dr. Robert S. Hartman. Study this paper and it shall answer many of your questions. In the future, superior models will be developed to extend the body of knowledge, and better methods of calculating formulas and symbols will no doubt be introduced. However the basic groundwork has been laid. Check it out: - http://hartmaninstitute.org/Portals/0/html-files/AxiologyAsAScience.html

Incidentally, I do believe that the system of ethics that is derived from the basic definition of “Value” will, when it is tried out, prove to be useful. I thought I already hinted at, and even argued for, some of the utility and benefits in my previous posts here at this Forum. See the discussion here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=179140&p=2315146#p2315146
and here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=179277

So you judged her as valuable, but not because you judged that her properties were perceived as matching the property-names that comprised the meaning of the her.

So in a way, aren’t you contradicting yourself a little here? Or is this supposed to be a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, definition of value?

Hmmm thanks, but no thanks sorry. I have a whopping great prospective reading list, all philosophy books are somewhere near the bottom of it anyway. And so far, you’ve literally done nothing to convince us that the theory has an merits at all. All you’ve done is say ‘this is a definition of something that’s counter intuitive but really useful (honest!), read about this other guy to find out why’. Personally I’d like a little bit more than ‘your word’ that it won’t turn out to be another overly complex, analytical philosophical mess with no relevance to anyone (because right now that’s where my suspicions are resting), like most of the American philosophy from the last 30 years has tended to be.

Why start a thread about a definition that you are now unwilling to provide any motivation for believing?

No, there is no contradiction. The axiom, the AV, is both, descriptive and prescriptive, and fertile enough to generate an entire system …as it turned out.

Jessie, the cat, had properties way above and beyond what I expected her, or any cat, to have. {My wife, who is a cat connoisseur, would say the same.) She was a true one-of-a-kind, and special beyond all words, a singular. One must resort to metaphor, to poetry, to begin to describe her.

When someone or something has uncountably-infinite properties - which is the case with Intrinsic Value - has a continuum of properties, how do you ever know that? Like the decimal fractions and the transcendental numbers, it’s more than you could ever count :exclamation: So how do you know it :question:

Answer: By giving your total attention to it, by focusing on it. by becoming involved with it, :bulb: by starting to identify with it, by seeing it as a gestalt, as a myriad stream of possibilities and radiating properties, by forming a continuum with it, so that, so to speak, an observer can’t tell where you leave off and it - what is valued - begins. You have, in a sense, bonded with it.

Like the experience you may have if, say, you are in a in a museum, examining a detail of a masterwork of art, and being fascinated by it, you find “worlds within worlds” there. That is Intrinsic valuation: It is the same in whatever you Intrinsically value …you find worlds of possibilities, worlds within worlds.

We are I-valuing whatever we take a strong interest in; whatever hobby we spend a lot of time on, whatever we love, whatever ‘turns us on’, whatever we give ourselves to.

If you want motivation, see the thread STEPS TO VALUE CREATION. http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=179293 It shall give you practical applications. It was all inspired by the AV (combined with some findings in the science of Brain Neurology.)

Regardless of motivation issues and consequences, I am still back on the fundamental definition issue.

Can you justify why the definition of “value” should relate to the matching to a description?

It seems to me that you are actually intending something a little different, perhaps matching to a polar or extreme property.
But even that would seem distorted because something could be “the ultimate extreme of worthless trash” and still not be considered valuable.

Doesn’t the property or its description have to include something of value in order for such a property’s inclusion in the description indicate that the item must have value?

…btw, I once had a similar cat. :smiley: