Is knowledge also a belief?

Interesting, so relevant to what?

Very good then - so there is no real basis you claim other than a subjective definition?

I contend my framework is superior in that it notes a difference that leads to a more coherent state of mind for all.

No. And I was not talking about a “subjective definition”. Your Interpretation is false. Read my posts again. Perhaps you can come to the right interpretation. Good luck!

Ok, so then I ask what are these definitions of belief and knowledge that they must begin with?

No, things like empiricism, rationalism and so on seek to flesh out the details of what the ‘J’ in JTB+ stands for. They aren’t in any sort of opposition to it. Empiricism and Rationalism are types of justification, they don’t disagree that JTB or JTB+ = knowledge.

Only if there is something inherently flawed with JTB+, which I don’t think you’ve shown.

As far as I recall, Gettier would say that all knowledge is JTB, but not all JTB is knowledge- there is an additional something which must be added to JTB to qualify it as knowledge.

A belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true, in the same way that ‘animal’ is a component to ‘being a fish’, because animals are the things that have spines, breathe with gills, and etc.

The state of thinking a proposition is true is always a belief. That is a simple definition of the term. That’s why knowledge is also a belief- because knowledge is a particular sort of ‘thinking a proposition is true’. I still haven’t seen a non-semantic disagreement with this from you.

Which is why JTB is broad and doesn’t specify the details of the ‘J’, and doesn’t have to in order for it to be true.

Eh, I don’t really care. It’s looking more and more like you’re making a semantic point and not a philosophical one. Pick the dictionary definition you like best and promote it I guess.

Again with this? Being true isn’t from any source of what the definition of knowledge is? What about the “Justified TRUE belief” definition we’ve been discussing for two days? Jesus Christ.

That’s your argument? You don’t see why it couldn’t be so? You’re right because you don’t see why you’re wrong? I’ve already given you an explicit argument for why you’re wrong twice, and again you’ve ignored it. Let me do it…again. Even simpler this time.

Propostions are the only things that can be true or false.
A belief is ‘a state of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of a proposition’.
Knowledge is also a state of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of proposition.
That’s why knowledge is a type of belief.

So far all you’ve given me is “Yeah but knowledge and belief feel different in my head”. Yeah, no shit. But so what? Nobody defines ‘belief’ according to a specific way it feels in your head. Thinking dogs have four legs, thinking the sun is shining, and thinking you have cancer all feel very different from each other too, and yet nobody tries to argue that some of these things aren’t belief on the basis of that.

There’s nothing subjective about it. They are both states of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of propositions.

Knowing that you are on fire is not a calm state of mind. Look, why would you even WANT to define ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ according to how you imagine they feel in other people’s heads? You already conceded to Arminius that how knowledge feels to you might be completely different from how it feels to him, so doesn’t that render it useless as a definition when we already have a perfectly good one?

It is not so difficult to say. So just make some suggestions.

To really narrow this discussion down to the crux of the matter, I’m going to only respond to this:

“A belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true, in the same way that ‘animal’ is a component to ‘being a fish’, because animals are the things that have spines, breathe with gills, and etc.”

Now you state a belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true"…

Please note you state belief can be justified and true. Of course, we don’t agree there. But you are stating also that “Belief is a component in knowledge” - note that you didn’t state “the component in knowledge” which would carry more weight.

Belief’s can become justified as knowledge, as I stated in my OP. However, my contention here is that belief is not needed for knowledge, rather a state of knowing is all that is needed and that state is state is different from belief. i state it is possible to bypass belief altogether to obtain knowledge.

So your response isn’t really a direct answer to the question I pose.

Do you understand this?

Relevant to the scope of topic concerns. For example, I define all existence in terms of affect because without it affecting anything, it is not relevant to my ontological concerns and if it does affect anything, I need to include it in the scope of an ontology. Or to say that you “know how to repair a short-block chevy”, whatever you are referring to as “knowing” needs to include the actual issue of repairing and specifically all of the details a chevy short-block within the scope of your intent - “relevant to your intent”.

You don’t think beliefs can be justified?

Or true?

Do you know that, or just believe it?

Oh wait, you DO think beliefs can become justified. You just prefer not to call them beliefs anymore when they are justified. Your preference is not an argument for anything. It certainly doesn’t change the fact that when a belief becomes ‘justified as knowledge’ it remains a person’s cognizance as to whether or not a proposition is true, and thus remains a type of belief, according to how epistemology defines ‘belief’.

I understand that you decided to ignore 95% of what I wrote to you, including all the detailed arguments against your positions and the information you asked for.

Correct, beliefs can become justified to become knowledge , just as easy as they can be destroyed to not be even considered anymore.

Its not a belief when its knowledge, so somewhat correct. I just laid out why this “preference” as you so nicely put it (as is the epistemic classification that knowledge is a belief is also a preference), is an argument for noting the difference between knowledge and belief in a more coherent manner that includes the state of mind we know as knowing, that provides a different attitude than just merely thinking something is true without justification. There is a difference and it ought to be recognized for good reason, to downplay belief due to its problematic nature. I contend belief is less intelligent. Knowledge is a different state of mind that is not a state of belief, it is a state of understanding. To consider belief and understanding as a similar category as you would with other epistemologists is not correct. So what is the reason for this assertion? Sure both a state of mindful understanding leads one to think their understanding is true, but so does a mere belief.

Good we agree. But I contend that belief isn’t required for knowledge; rather belief can be bypassed through understanding. In fact I would make the claim that belief should be bypassed until understanding occurs. Doubt, doubt, doubt, until comprehension and clarity are present. Certainly this leads one to a more logical method of gaining knowledge; to think something is true without the requirements of knowledge isn’t logical; that being there is no logical necessitate that it is true, but the mind thinks it anyway. With a state of knowing, belief is irrelevant.

The field of epistemology has come to an agreement of knowledge being a type of belief because philosophy often does build on itself in academia. This began with Plato and went on from there. But the field is problematic on knowledge and belief. Gettier already disproved JTB It seems as if you are attempting to appeal to authority as if why knowledge must remain a type of belief based on a very trivial matter that both contain one aspect in a greater state of mind that doesn’t just include that aspect. It’s also very subjective as its categorizations. Remember this is philosophy after all, this is not science. To thumb your nose at anything that flies against the past 2000 years of epistemology might seem the reasonable thing to do but it is reeks of elitism and a rather mindful appeal to authority, regardless of it being hidden from discussion.

We as humans attempt to categorize things just to try to make sense of them, but they are usually approximations - just as math i can be an approximation physically, but conceptually it is not. I have yet to see one justifiable necessity why knowledge must be classified as belief, other than what you state, that’s what epistemology states. I have yet to see a reason why knowledge must be considered a belief other than it shares one trait - thinking something is true. But lots of things share one trait in this world, we don’t categorize them in a group because they share one subjective trait that may or may not have any bearing on the nature of our mind due to its complexities.

I did not ignore, I decided to narrow the conversation for clarity on the crux of the matter. Once that is resolved (if you choose to), or at least for the sake of argument, then I think it would be best to get into other issues as a result of considering knowledge as not a category of belief.

What does it mean, when someone says “they know” or they “fail to know”? Is there a limit to one’s capacity to know? Or are there some things that are actually unknowable?

If we are honest with ourselves, we have to admit we are all sometimes mistaken in our beliefs, which means some of them are true, whilst others are false. There are times where we construct beliefs to create a positive state of mind or conversely to hoodwink ourselves and what becomes apparent from this is that some of these beliefs do not relay the way things actually are.

Is there an unerring way of arriving at beliefs?

Is all knowledge built on instinctive beliefs?

Plato believed in the pre-existence of the soul, which tied in with his innatism. He thought that we are born with knowledge from a previous life that is subdued at birth and must be relearned. He saw all attainment of knowledge not as acquiring new information, but as remembering previously known information. Before we were born, we existed in a perfect world where we knew everything.

I don’t know why there’s still so much issue with this!!!

A belief is something thought to be true.

Knowledge is something thought to be true.

However, belief is used as a form of probability, whereas knowledge is that actual doing of.

“I believe it’s 10th street”

“I know it’s 10th street!!”

Both people can be wrong when giving directions, the believer could be right and the knower could be confused.

It may seem like I’m overthinking this, but actually, I think you have been the over thinkers …

They are mostly synonyms. People who “know” can be mistaken… When they are mistaken, we get angrier, because knowledge is implied as zero error, whilst believing is considered probabilistic …

But, and this is important, for every knowledge, it is also believed …

Everybody notes the difference between knowledge and belief. If they weren’t different, there wouldn’t be two different words for them. Knowledge is a special type of belief, it differs in multiple criteria, including perhaps the attitude through which it is apprehended. That doesn’t mean it isn’t a belief. According to any common philosophical definition of ‘belief’, it absolutely is one.

All this shit has been pointed out to you when you made the exact same argument on reddit, and it was downvoted to oblivion there. You should have listened. “Belief” means something in philosophy, and if you undersatnd that meaning, it’s obvious that “knowledge” is a sort of belief. If you dispute that, especially as you have done without any argument or any demonstrable knowledge of the relevant field of philosophy, you are simply talking about concepts other than what the rest of us mean when we say ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’.

The question isn’t so much whether this fucked up thing (which includes neither belief, nor truth) that you are calling ‘knowledge’ for some reason should be understood to be ‘knowledge’ by anybody else. It seems the more reasonable angle is for us to simply conclude that WW III Angry is a strange man who uses words in strange ways that don’t make sense.

“Thinking something is true without justification” is not what a belief is. Beliefs can be justified- at least to every other epistemologist on earth. You’ve merely declared, for no reason, that once something has justification it doesn’t get to be called ‘belief’ anymore.

It is recognized. That’s why we have the word ‘knowledge’ and don’t just call everything ‘beliefs’. Just because lakes and oceans are very different, doesn’t mean we have to stop calling one of them a ‘body of water’ in order for the difference to be recognized.

There is nothing ‘problematic’ about belief. A belief is simply thinking a proposition is true or false. It’s only problematic because YOU DEFINED IT IN A PROBLEMATIC WAY. If this troubles you, then obviously you should stop it, and define belief the way the rest of the field does.

Of course it is, for you, because YOU chose for no reason to declare that beliefs with justification don’t count as beliefs anymore. The only thing you allow to be called a ‘belief’ by your asinine definition are things that aren’t very rational. So no fucking wonder you find them not to be rational.

Why ask? I explained it to you three times already and you fucking ignored me. Well, here it is again:

A belief is no more or less than thinking a proposition is true or false. Knowledge is also the state of thinking a proposition is true or false, plus some added criteria. By basic logic then, knowledge is a belief, and not all beliefs are knowledge. That’s the reason for the assertion. Feel free to ignore me again and go on pretending as if this is mysterious.

Well then you don’t fully comprehend what those words mean, or else you’re using them in a magical way that nobody but you uses them.

This is literally nonsense to anybody with a basic understanding of epistemology.

Doubting something is a belief of the form “I believe X is unlikely”. You really need to understand some basic epistemology. If you think belief and doubt are opposed to each other, then you’re probably mistaking New Atheist propaganda for epistemology. I understand that there are YouTube videos that use ‘belief’ to mean a bad thing that mature people don’t have, but they are making you look stupid when you bring that sentiment and attempt to work serious philosophy with it.

This is very important; I’m on to you, just as any epistemologist would be on to you. You have non-philosophical reasons for wanting to co-opt the term ‘belief’ as a term of denigration to apply to people who have convictions and opinions for what you consider to be the wrong reasons. I’m sure that’s how you’re used to using it, and how you’re used to seeing it used in the circles you run in. The fact that you think knowledge and doubt aren’t types of beliefs makes it obvious.

But you aren’t right, and you don’t have an argument, and as long as you keep pushing this bad idea without an actual understanding of epistemology to back it, you’re going to continue getting the bad reception you’ve gotten, and it doesn’t matter how many communities you peddle it to. Well, you can probably get some 14 year olds in the comment section of a Richard Dawkins youtube video to agree with you.

This is plainly false with standard definitions of terms, though God only knows how you define the ‘requirements of knowledge’. Or ‘logical’ for that matter. When you make up the meanings of words as you go, anything you say quickly becomes irrelevant.

Not in the way you think. I’ve already explained this to you 3 fucking times. Stop telling me what Gettier did and didn’t do, when it is obvious to both of us that you’ve never read him.
Gettier showed that something IN ADDITION to JTB are required for knowledge, not that JTB are not criteria for knowledge. How many times must I say it?

Yes, semantics is that way, and that’s all you have- a desire to use words in a way most people aren’t using them. You aren’t making any arguments, you’re just stubbornly insisting that everybody should change the way they use basic philosophical vocabulary.

You haven’t actually said anything at all about the nature of knowledge.

I don’t care if pointing out basic facts seems elitist to you.

OK, this is crucial, engage your brain here: ‘thinking something is true’ is not ‘one trait’ of a belief. It is the only trait. It is the sum total definition of what a belief is. Anything that is ‘a state of thinking something is true [or false]’ is a belief. Anything that is a belief is 'a state of thinking something is true [or false]. There are not dozens of traits of beliefs, of which I am singling out but one. Knowledge is a belief in the same way that a spoon is a utensil.

We do if it’s the only trait definitive of one of the two things we’re comparing. Water is H2O. Is ice water? Why yes it is. We don’t say “Clearly Ice isn’t water just because it shares one arbitrary trait (being H2O) with water!”

That’s exactly what you’re doing here.

You ignored me just like you ignored all those poor people on Reddit that tried to explain these same basic things to you.

We could have some fun here Uccisore !!!

If a belief cannot be knowledge, then you cannot know a belief can’t be knowledge!


Uccisore is wise and knowledgeable and his arguments very logical

One of the words for the definitions of “belief” and “knowledge” that they must begin with as one original phenomenon is the word “information” in a very primitive sense which means, for example, without lie, fraud, corruption, cynism … and so on.

Information is useless without understanding though. All of us are inundated with so much information every day we can’t possibly process it all. We process what is reasonable to process. Even an amoeba receives information, but does that mean it knows anything?

Not all information conveys meaning however. So information which does is a sub set of all information
It is important not to confuse it with knowledge which does convey meaning. The two are not the same

As is defined in epistemic framework that seems to be taken for granted since Plato. You did already state that “we’ve known since Gettier at least that Knowledge is not justified true belief” and that an additional jump is needed, however, why not just throw away the whole idea? Centuries of academic philosophy elitism building on itself, JTB being proven wrong and academic philosophy elitists seem to want to rationalize it anyway. I guess it would be a shame to throw out the concurrence of the likes of Hume on the matter, but Hume didn’t really focus on this so much. Not many have strictly focused on this matter, that I’m aware of.

I agree, my point is that the common philosophical definition is based on that continued usage of knowledge and belief that rooted in Plato and not much else. Why? Because academia embraced Plato? I agree it wasn’t really unreasonable - but I am offering a different framework. So why can’t we have a different framework? Can we not? Any logical reason why the current framework must be?

Are you appealing to argumentum ad populum here? I did listen to them, and the naysayers were provided responses that essentially went unanswered. I also had plenty of reasonable discussions with some on reddit, some offered help and did not provide a reason why I couldn’t lay out an epistemological framework in this way. Downvoting in reddit doesn’t mean what it should mean - The graduates and philosophy students there may not even challenge what their professors taught them. The point is, this philosophy is not a science. “Belief” means something in philosophy due to what reason? Tell me why it means that and why it has to remain that? Why can we not provide a better definition that includes all aspects of what belief and knowledge entail, and not base it on some oversimplification that knowledge is thinking something is true and so is belief therefore knowledge is belief. Both belief and knowledge are much more than thinking something is true and epistemology realizes that, so what benefit is it that this categorization persist?

I would agree that it would be very difficult to understand something such as this in a new light - but an attempt can be made and in turn can be understood. Again, I have no logical reason why knowledge must be a category of belief because it must be that they share certainty. Truth must be a category of belief as well because they share certainty. But that attitude of certainty isn’t really the same, that state of certainty as the field of epistemology has already recognized is different. So to me, it makes sense and there is reason to schism them both - because acceptance of something as true in belief and acceptance of something as true in knowledge is different. Yet the field just things its ok to call acceptance of something true to be all that matters for knowledge to be a “belief”. Either knowledge is a belief or knowledge isn’t a belief. I state it isn’t, you state it is. I think you have less reason to consider it to be one than myself. You have argumentum ad populum and an appeal to authority on your side. I have reason. Yes, definitions can be defined as such what we want and how we use it, but philosophy is often about finding the truth in those definitions, parsing them apart to make sense, not over generalizing and not over simplifying in the ways that I have mentioned previously.

I would say not every other epistemologist on earth. Perhaps those in bed with elitist academia, but justification is very arbitrary. So depending on the justification and reason, I contest that a theory of how beliefs can never be justified can be laid out. I have yet to see a logical reason on why that is impossible. I have seen reasons that include the field says so, or reddit agrees, or people use it that way. But again, linguistically I see a lack of depth on the matter. I see problems with JTB as Gettier has, as well as the reasons I have brought about. You seem to think academia must rationalize this problem with JBT? That we can’t throw it away and all those academic great philosophers that have touched on it, because why?

Yes its recognized but I contest it isn’t recognized in as concise a manner as I propose philosophically. I contest also that beliefs aren’t justified based on that philosophical framework and that knowledge is. That believing something true should not occur, but understanding something to be true should occur. So because epistemology currently defines knowledge as a type of thinking something to be true it parses out this state of mind that is a belief as well as other things - but I contend that any part of that “state of mind” isn’t the same as they already noted. The attitude is different as the field notes - but they arbitrarily call it belief regardless because belief isn’t defined as well in epistemology as what it actually is - its more than just accepting something to be true. Its accepting something to true without merit, essentially. The field of epistemology fails to recognize that in this sense, but not elsewhere I agree. The attitudes that arise are different. Belief isn’t needed for knowledge as I already explained why and contested based on the proposition of belief being unjustified and knowledge being justifiable. So instead of grouping it all as just thinking something is true, I propose a better way.
I need reason why a different way isn’t possible. I do not need reason why you think my way isn’t better however, at this point. That we discuss down the road. Do you think that the field of epistemology can change its framework on knowledge and belief or is it set in stone?

Disagreed, its problematic for reasons I have already stated. I didn’t define it in a problematic way, I defined it as the field of epistemology does aside from it as also being acceptance of truth through knowledge. That is it, and I don’t see why that is a problem. Because I offered many reasons already why it shouldn’t be defined that way.

I would say I have reason I agree that I haven’t laid out that justification as well as I can or should have in the OP, but alot of that has to do with the epistemic framework you and academia take for granted - so a daunting task lay ahead of me, possibly a 700 page Kantian nightmare. But I am looking for valid reason why my task is impossible and I have yet to find it, here on reddit, or anywhere.

No, doubting is not a belief, it is a state of uncertainty. I make no claim that x is likely or unlikely when I doubt. Do you? I do not need any conception of probability to have doubt. Where in epistemology does anyone even think such a thing? I would like to know.

I would say I do have non epistemological reasons for wanting to co-opt the term belief - but my reasons are philosophical. I also contend that I have epistemological reasons for not wanting to co-opt the term belief. So ultimately I don’t really have the wrong reasons based on the entirety of my stance. You can say “i’m not right” but as mentioned earlier - need to know the logical reason why what I am contending to do is impossible, or wrong. But your response here is mostly noise, lets get to reason and logic yes? Not noise…

Yeah I’m not just making up meanings of words as I go. I’m using reason why the meanings aren’t sufficient or realistic in epistemology. You aren’t negating those reasons though, you’re just alluding to epistemology says so, or everyone else says so. I do understand that its hard for an outsider who has studied epistemology to come across something that goes against everything they understood. That seems to be the issue of many so far. That’s how elitism of course, thrives.

Ok you’re not providing me a logical negation of why it isn’t the way I think, you’ve made an assertion about Gettier that I didn’t disagree with, but you haven’t ruled out my assertion with reason… Both my assertion and yours are compatible as I understand it, until you explain why. My understanding is based on a synopsis of the Gettier problem here -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

I thought I said at least a little bit about the nature of knowledge and making arguments. I would hope you can see past our lack of understanding to at least admit to that. Sheesh. I do agree as stated earlier a more comprehensive explanation is needed on everything I mentioned.

Well “I don’t care if it seems elitist” isn’t a reason why epistemology must recognize knowledge as a type of belief, due to the subjective definition, that I contest is problematic and I contend that you haven’t logically ruled out.

Yes, and thinking something is true isn’t the trait of knowledge that I am stating exists in the state of knowledge, it is more. I am contending that it is an oversimplification here. Knowledge is understanding something that is true, and by that it is much more coherent. The attitude between understanding and “thinking” or “believing” isn’t the same, thus a schism is warranted. Sorry I didn’t necessarily word that out correctly in my prior response, but I had already many times - I would hope you would understand that aspect by now of my position. I shall remain more adamant and thus explain things again, everytime I make a claim like that, I suppose. Even the definition I provided of knowledge doesn’t include thinking something is true, anyway. But I do understand the epistemic sense of thinking it is true being relevent to knowledge in the field of epistemology - but I contest it is problematic and can and ought to be turned on its head and ultimately incorrect due to the nature of the mind in processing belief and knowledge.

I contend that the analogically equivalent of what epistemolgoy is stating here is that Nitrous oxide is water because it has O. I am stating along that lines that Nitrous oxide is not water because it has O, Nitrous Oxide has NOS essentially, and even the O is fundamentally different in Nitrous Oxide than it is water. Pay very close attention to that.
I think the analogy though isn’t exactly correct due to the nature of O (the element) not changing in science. But it does in the nature of attitude in knowledge :slight_smile:

I answered every one of them and I did not ignore you. Thank you for your constructive criticism - I have more things to look into and other arguments to contend against on this matter to polish up my OP and take into account the harshness of what I am presenting, to someone who is invested in epistemology in its current state.

That is not true. You do not understand what I mean, what “information” in a very primitive sense means, or/and you do not want to understand and have a ready-made opinion in your head which you do not want to let it out of it.

Q.E.D.: You do not understand what I mean, what “information” in a very primitive sense means. Try to evolutionarily go backwards - far away from now. Otherwise you will never understand what the word “information” in a very primitive sense means.

Again: You do not understand what I mean, what “information” means … An amoeba does not need to believe (sic!) and [i]not need to know /i its information.

Have you forgotten the topic of your thread?