A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

This is the main board for discussing philosophy - formal, informal and in between.

Moderator: Only_Humean

Forum rules
Forum Philosophy

A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:53 am

For my PhD thesis I am writing and defending a new normative theory. Part of this process is gathering objections from many different sources and then discussing the most interesting or common ones in an objections chapter.

So, I am looking for people to read a portion of my work and then tell me anything they think is wrong with it, anything I've missed and anything they think I am mistaken about. Anything you say that I use in my thesis will be referenced to you in the way that you prefer (real name or username).


Here is the link for a draft version of two early chapters which should outline what my theory is and give you a give you a good enough understanding to point out all the ways in which you think I'm wrong:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B00h0N ... sp=sharing

Thanks for reading this. I look forward to reading your comments.
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby surreptitious57 » Sun Nov 20, 2016 5:40 am

A MIND IS LIKE A PARACHUTE : IT DOES NOT WORK UNLESS IT IS OPEN
surreptitious57
Philosopher
 
Posts: 1931
Joined: Sun Oct 11, 2015 2:05 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Sun Nov 20, 2016 1:05 pm

Are you posting that to suggest that morality is inter-subjective? Because I strongly disagree and if that is what you mean by morality then we are discussing different things entirely.

Let me explain the difference with an example.

If I were to say that I think someone, lets call them Ann, is beautiful, I could be making three distinct kinds of claim (well, I could be making more, but for the purposes of this discussion three is plenty). I could be saying that I personally find Ann beautiful, a wholly subjective claim. I could be saying that Ann is such that most people would agree that she is beautiful, or that she is beautiful to most people in a position to make that judgment (perhaps those who are attracted to women), which would be an inter-subjective claim and the sort most people would make when discussing whether or not someone is attractive as it is by far the most useful way to do so. If I were making this kind of claim, then I could be wrong and we could have a productive discussion about it, but there isn't any objective beauty beyond what people think. However, I could also be making a third kind of claim. I could be claiming that Ann is beautiful, objectively. I could be claiming implicitly that there is such a thing as objective beauty and that Ann possesses it. If I were making that kind of claim I could be wrong, and indeed I think I would be wrong as I don't think there is any such thing as objective beauty. However, the fact that others disagree with me would be no evidence of my wrongness, as objective truth need not be accepted by others in order to be correct, any more than the tide of people claiming that the chances of winning the car in the Monty Hall problem are 50/50 whether you switch or not have any affect on the real probability of 66.66.../33.33...

The point I am making here, is that when I talk about morality, when I claim something is wrong, I am making the third kind of claim. I am claiming that something is objectively wrong, regardless of whether people agree with it or not. I could be wrong about this. I could be wrong that there is such a thing as objective wrongness. It could be the case that there is no such thing as objective wrongness and error theorists are right. However, crucially, I am not mistaken about what I am talking about. I am not discussing something inter-subjective, I am making an objective claim.

Any other sense of the word "morality", such as being what most people think of as right or what promotes the most flourishing, is not something I am interested in. I seek the answer to the question "how ought we to live?" if indeed it has an answer at all. Anything else calling itself morality is of no interest.
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Ecmandu » Sun Nov 20, 2016 7:24 pm



That was an awful essay surreptitious !!!

Objectivity is when all subjects agree as well!

For example "in order to walk down a sidewalk, you must actually walk down a sidewalk"

It's objectively true

I agree that subjectivity can be a rabbit hole for some; but not for me!
Ecmandu
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 6825
Joined: Thu Dec 11, 2014 1:22 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Sun Nov 20, 2016 8:44 pm

Agreed,because subjectivity has hidden objectives,yet to be uncovered.
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Only_Humean » Mon Nov 21, 2016 10:03 am

Hi Daniel,

I've not had time to read through the whole article, I'm afraid, but there are certainly enough points in the part I've read for a discussion.

However, because we are defining morality as simply the way that persons ought to be or act, and ought implies can, it would be a problem for any definition of morality if some persons could not live up to it. If morality consists of how persons ought to be or act, and ought implies can, then if some persons cannot be or act a certain way, then that way cannot be required of them by morality. So, any definition of morality that cannot, at least in theory, be lived up to by all persons, both real and imaginary, cannot be the way that persons ought to be or act, and therefore cannot be a (or the) correct theory of morality.


I don't see that being a problem at all. Saying that "a person ought to do X in circumstance Y" does not imply that every single human being has to be able to do X in situation Y, which is what you seem to be arguing. One surely ought to help a distraught child down from a tree that they're stuck in, but a quadruplegic can't do this, and nor can someone in a persistive vegetative state, and nor can some people whose mental faculties don't permit them to recognise this as a problem. Ought in the general sense does not imply can in the specific sense. And certainly if it must apply to all persons real and imaginary; you've a definition of morality that exempts any action from ever being judged as moral.

Using "some people can't live up to it" as an argument against virtue morality seems to assume an egalitarian shot at moral perfection that virtue ethics never aspires to. Some people simply are privileged at living virtuously by the circumstances of birth and upbringing, just as some are privileged at sports or study or social skills. The latter examples are all fairly undeniably true - why should living ethically be any different?
Image

The biology of purpose keeps my nose above the surface.
- Brian Eno
User avatar
Only_Humean
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 6193
Joined: Mon Jun 22, 2009 10:53 am
Location: Right here

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby surreptitious57 » Mon Nov 21, 2016 10:33 am

Daniel McKay wrote:
I am claiming that something is objectively wrong regardless of whether people agree with it or not. I could be wrong about this. I could be wrong that there is such a thing as objective wrongness. It could be the case that there is no such thing as objective wrongness and error theorists are right. However crucially I am not mistaken about what I am talking about. I am not discussing something inter subjective. I am making an objective claim

The fact that you are making a claim is objectively true even though the claim itself is not objectively true
A MIND IS LIKE A PARACHUTE : IT DOES NOT WORK UNLESS IT IS OPEN
surreptitious57
Philosopher
 
Posts: 1931
Joined: Sun Oct 11, 2015 2:05 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Mon Nov 21, 2016 11:36 am

Saying that a person ought to do X in circumstance Y does seem to imply that they can. It makes sense to say that people who can help children down from trees should but the paralyzed are under no such obligation. The point is that if we are trying to get at what is of moral value for all persons, then it must be something that all persons can in principle possess/do/participate in. Yes virtue ethics doesn't aspire to applying equally to all persons, which is a good reason to think it isn't a good theory of describing how all persons ought to be or act, which is the point I am making. Does that clear up that issue?

surreptitious57: Um... okay? Was there more to that point?
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Mon Nov 21, 2016 1:44 pm

it restates the issue.
Last edited by Meno_ on Mon Nov 21, 2016 1:52 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Only_Humean » Mon Nov 21, 2016 1:51 pm

I think it's perfectly coherent to say that everyone should aspire to be honest (but not blunt) or brave (but not foolhardy), as Aristotle does - and to believe that this objectively will lead to a better society - while at the same time recognising that some people suffer from compulsive lying, or have anxiety disorders, or whatever. There are people who can barely walk 5 metres without having to rest - does that mean no-one can have any moral obligation to do anything strenuous at all? If all persons includes people in a coma (to whom we have moral duties of care), the only universal moral stricture we can obtain is to lie very still at least some of the time. It seems that rather than your aim of defining morality as something all people can do, you've defined morality as only things that aren't worth doing! You're right that morality has to take account of the capacity of the agent, of course; but just as capacities vary, so do moral requirements. That doesn't rule them out from being objective.

It seems to me like you've picked an unworkable definition of morality, or at least that I can't follow the necessity of some of the strictures you've applied to what morality must be.

I think the ought/can causes some confusion in the argument: I ought to be at my job as a surgeon, but I can't because I'm in the pub, falling-down drunk. Clearly this "can't" doesn't cancel out my moral obligation, because I could have been otherwise. The paralysed person can't rescue the child, but that doesn't mean she oughtn't, just that circumstances prevent her from doing so. Ought and can are two completely different sorts of verbs, and language gets very tricksy when conditionals become involved.
Image

The biology of purpose keeps my nose above the surface.
- Brian Eno
User avatar
Only_Humean
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 6193
Joined: Mon Jun 22, 2009 10:53 am
Location: Right here

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Mon Nov 21, 2016 2:00 pm

In mind washing techniques, is it wrong to resist it, if it means the disintegration of the group, or is it right for individuals to overcome the fear of doing the right thing? Where the right or wrong thing can either be resistance or adherence to brain washing?


I think this is a good example of a search for a normative.

I think it is fair to say that in search of the normative, we should not be talking of obviously excluded classes, but of a broad range of people with those with the capacity to be included.
Last edited by Meno_ on Mon Nov 21, 2016 2:28 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby surreptitious57 » Mon Nov 21, 2016 2:16 pm

The closest one can get to an objective moral system with regard to ability is to say everyone should try their best to help others whenever possible
But while this is desirable it is not achievable because of free will which can prevent moral actions from being taken and for any reason whatsoever
A MIND IS LIKE A PARACHUTE : IT DOES NOT WORK UNLESS IT IS OPEN
surreptitious57
Philosopher
 
Posts: 1931
Joined: Sun Oct 11, 2015 2:05 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby phyllo » Mon Nov 21, 2016 7:38 pm

I could be claiming that Ann is beautiful, objectively. I could be claiming implicitly that there is such a thing as objective beauty and that Ann possesses it. If I were making that kind of claim I could be wrong, and indeed I think I would be wrong as I don't think there is any such thing as objective beauty. However, the fact that others disagree with me would be no evidence of my wrongness, as objective truth need not be accepted by others in order to be correct, any more than the tide of people claiming that the chances of winning the car in the Monty Hall problem are 50/50 whether you switch or not have any affect on the real probability of 66.66.../33.33..
But what would be the evidence that you are correct? What is the criteria of beauty which is separate from human desires and evaluations?

If you base the "objective beauty"on some objective external characteristic such as symmetry ... you could say that Ann is beautiful and a spider is also beautiful. Is that spider beautiful to another spider?
If a hypothetical conscious, rational spider said to you that Ann is beautiful but she would be more beautiful if her limbs were longer, then your only recourse would be to consult other humans who would judge whether the suggested proportions are appealing or not.

Morality seems to have the same problem ... it cannot be separated from the needs and desires of human beings. That doesn't mean that morality is not objective. After all, humans have evolved on this planet to a particular physical form. The archetypal human being has some objective functions, needs and desires - for starters : food, water, air, shelter and human beings feel pain and pleasure.
These will determine what humans consider to be moral behavior.

So I don't see how you will be able to take human "inclinations or desires" or "motivations" out of human morality :
I will begin, as is so often the case, with an assumption, and that assumption is this: if moral realism is

correct, that is, if objective, universal morality exists, then there is a way in which persons (and by

persons I mean free, rational agents) ought to be or act, regardless of their inclinations or desires. It is

important to note that when I say ‘ought’ here, I mean it in the categorical, unconditional sense. I make

this assumption because this is, as I understand it, what it means for morality to exist. Morality just is

the way in which persons ought to act or be, independent from their motivations. When we say that

what someone did was wrong, we are saying that they ought to have done otherwise, when we say

something is the right thing to do, we are asserting that someone ought to do it regardless of their

desires. If morality is to exist, then it seems that at least this much be true.

The 'evolved inclination' is the basis of morality. :-k
"Who loves not wine, woman and song, remains a fool his whole life long."

"Only the educated are free" - Epictetus
"Music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy" -Beethoven
"Everyday life is the way" -Wumen
"Do not permit the events of your daily life to bind you, but never withdraw yourself from them" - Wumen
phyllo
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 10110
Joined: Thu Dec 16, 2010 1:41 am
Location: ->.

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby iambiguous » Mon Nov 21, 2016 8:13 pm

I will begin, as is so often the case, with an assumption, and that assumption is this: if moral realism is correct, that is, if objective, universal morality exists, then there is a way in which persons (and by persons I mean free, rational agents) ought to be or act, regardless of their inclinations or desires. It is important to note that when I say ‘ought’ here, I mean it in the categorical, unconditional sense. I make this assumption because this is, as I understand it, what it means for morality to exist. Morality just is the way in which persons ought to act or be, independent from their motivations.


My reaction to arguments like this is always the same: How is this applicable to an actual context in which in folks on both sides of a moral issue agree that this is the case but then insist that their own actual moral narrative/agenda reflects the most rational and virtuous frame of mind.

Reflected by and large in the point that William Barrett raises here:

For the choice in...human [moral conflicts] is almost never between a good and an evil, where both are plainly marked as such and the choice therefore made in all the certitude of reason; rather it is between rival goods, where one is bound to do some evil either way, and where the ultimate outcome and even---or most of all---our own motives are unclear to us.


And then [of course] the extent to which "good" and "evil" become embodied more in the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein.

On the other hand, some insist this has nothing to do with "serious philosophy" at all. And, sad to say for the future of philosophy, they may be right.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

Start here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529
Then here: viewtopic.php?f=15&t=185296
User avatar
iambiguous
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 22655
Joined: Tue Nov 16, 2010 8:03 pm
Location: baltimore maryland

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Ecmandu » Mon Nov 21, 2016 11:04 pm

You know what my main problem is with you iambiguous???

Everything is a conflicting good; therefor, every side should see you as correct.

It's a scary world out there... And I know you don't want people to fuck with you, so you try to appease them all... That's who you are

But there is the real world, and it doesn't let you tip toe through it by agreeing with everyone
Ecmandu
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 6825
Joined: Thu Dec 11, 2014 1:22 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Tue Nov 22, 2016 2:03 am

Phyllo: I simply disagree that morality cannot be separated from the needs and desires of human beings. I think it can be and should be. However, if what you are saying is that what I am talking about here is, in a sense, not really morality, then that is an interesting point and one that has come up before. If that is what you are saying, I would like to reference you as one of the people who has said it as it is something I discuss in the objections section of my thesis. If you are okay with this, how would you like to be referenced?

Only Humean: I do not think it would be consistent to say that every person should be brave if some persons cannot experience fear, as one cannot be brave without fear. This doesn't mean that it is not the case that people should sometimes do brave things, it merely means that being brave cannot be the underlying moral value that provides the rightness of those actions. Whereas freedom, the ability to understand and make one's own choices, is common to all persons, as it is the quality which makes them persons. This commonality, I propose, makes it a better candidate for moral value. This does not mean that what is right is what you want to do, this means that the underlying moral value that ought to be protected is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, which might require honesty in some circumstances and bravery in others and self-sacrifice in many. Does that clear up my position somewhat?

I think we can safely say that the paralyzed person not being able to rescue the child and you not being at your job because you're getting drunk at the pub are very different situations. Saying the paralyzed person should rescue the child is meaningless as they cannot. However in the pub scenario, we can say that you ought not to have gone to the pub, that you ought not continue drinking there and you ought to call your job immediately to explain both that you will be unable to attend work on account of being too sloshed, and that they might want to consider getting a new surgeon as there one seems to have a problem with drinking too much rather than going to work (though this part can probably go unsaid as I suspect they will come to that conclusion on their own)

iambiguous: Depends what you mean by applicable. Are you saying that this talk of objective morality does not help convince another person of the rightness of your position? Or are you saying it does not resolve the conflict between two opposing positions regardless of whether that resolution actually convinces the holders of those positions?

surrepticious57: I don't agree that is the closest we can come to an objective moral system. I don't think that is even remotely close to an objective moral system. I think the closest we have come so far is the theory explained in the chapters I have linked here.
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Faust » Tue Nov 22, 2016 8:18 pm

I have looked through the first chapter and I have a question. Firstly, for context - and this is not meant as a criticism - I think that the term "objectively moral" or "objectively morally right" is literal nonsense. That said, while I am sympathetic to the notion that moral judgments should be about acts and not intents, there is a problem. While, as you say, we may not know what is morally right even if we suspect that something is, take for example homicide laws, which I will stipulate are influenced by morality. There is premeditated murder, murder that is more a crime of passion (murder 2) and even (by one name) involuntary manslaughter. All are homicides.

There are actually two problems here - one is common to all moral theory at some level of analysis - and that is determining just what the act is.

Legally, we have done that, however imperfectly. But to do that, we need to include intent. And that is the other problem within your discussion so far as i understand it. While all of the aforementioned acts are homicides, some homicides are legal and most people accept this as just. It's a tough thing to claim that self-defense homicide is immoral. So how do we parse up this general type of act called homicide and how do we view these more specific acts morally?

Are you going to object to the notion that intentions matter? I realize that you are not putting forth a theory that must be voted on by the populace. But how then to decide?

You may recall Russell's discussion of moral theory - about the level of specificity required. he made a good case, but so far as i know, few have taken it seriously.

Another question - you seem to say that will is free or not free. I am fairly Nietzschean on this issue, which makes the question, for me, superfluous at best and unintelligible at worst, but later, you say that there are limits even to a free will. So do i take you correctly that this freedom may lie along a spectrum?

I do agree that ought implies can. But would you propose that individuals are either moral agents or not - or - does this agency also lie along a spectrum - a legal example would be juveniles in some cases being tried as adults, but not in others, or that juveniles face different penalties than adults. Again, assuming a moral component to law.
User avatar
Faust
Unrequited Lover of Wisdom
 
Posts: 16726
Joined: Sat May 21, 2005 6:47 pm

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Wed Nov 23, 2016 1:37 am

Faust: First, do you mind if I reference you as you have brought up some points that others have as well? If so, how would you like to be referenced?

Laws involving intent are completely compatible with my theory, as the passing of a law is also an act that we can analyze the potential consequences of. If we have reason to believe that laws that treat different intentions differently, such as the difference between murder and manslaughter, will have good consequences, then passing those laws is a good idea and we should do it.

How to decide if my theory is right if not public vote? Through rational philosophical analysis.

I don't believe I said that there are limits on free will so much as the kind of freedom, which I defined as the ability to understand and make choices, which is morally relevant is limited to only freedom over that which belongs to the persons in question. In any event, I am not sure what free will lying on a spectrum would mean. Maybe it could be unintelligible in the case of some kind of robot that has free will but a few pre-programmed commands for certain circumstances? But I would need to think more on that.

I wouldn't say agency lies on a spectrum, but I would say that rationality, which is a component of personhood/moral agency, does lie along a spectrum. I have a whole chapter about children and non-human animals and what we should do in borderline cases where it isn't clear whether something is a person or not. I could post it here if you'd like to read it?


Everyone else: I wrote a reply post previously but it doesn't appear to be showing up at the moment. I will have a look at what happened to it before I rewrite it.
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby phyllo » Wed Nov 23, 2016 5:18 pm

I simply disagree that morality cannot be separated from the needs and desires of human beings. I think it can be and should be. However, if what you are saying is that what I am talking about here is, in a sense, not really morality, then that is an interesting point and one that has come up before.
Essentially, yes ... you are not really talking about morality. Human being have evolved to have many needs and desires which are contradictory and in conflict. Morality is an attempt to balance and prioritize these desires within one individual and among many individuals in a society. For example, the desire for justice is in conflict with the desire to gain by way of injustice. The desire for freedom is in conflict with the desire for stability, predictability and order.

So desires both create the need for morality and the contents of morality. Why are these so many desires? Because the world is complex. At different times, it is useful to have one desire fulfilled rather than another. It is analogous to physical attributes of an animal - in some situations it is an advantage to be strong, at others to be fast or flexible or small ...

But one cannot be all these things and therefore an animal has a balance of attributes which ensure its survival in a particular environment.

Balancing human desires, by way of morality, improves the chances of survival.
If you are okay with this, how would you like to be referenced?
Sure, you can reference me. There must a standard way to reference posts on the internet. You can use that. :-k
"Who loves not wine, woman and song, remains a fool his whole life long."

"Only the educated are free" - Epictetus
"Music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy" -Beethoven
"Everyday life is the way" -Wumen
"Do not permit the events of your daily life to bind you, but never withdraw yourself from them" - Wumen
phyllo
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 10110
Joined: Thu Dec 16, 2010 1:41 am
Location: ->.

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby iambiguous » Wed Nov 23, 2016 7:54 pm

Daniel McKay wrote:iambiguous: Depends what you mean by applicable. Are you saying that this talk of objective morality does not help convince another person of the rightness of your position?


No, my point revolves more around this: that I am not able to even convince myself that my position is anything other than a particular subjective/subjunctive fabrication/contraption rooted existentially in the actual life that I have lived.

Which, pertaining to abortion, for example, I encompass here:

1] I was raised in the belly of the working class beast. My family/community were very conservative. Abortion was deemed a sin.
2] I was drafted into the Army and while on my "tour of duty" in Vietnam I happened upon politically radical folks who reconfigured my thinking about abortion. And God and lots of other things.
3] after I left the Army, I enrolled in college and became further involved in left wing politics. It was all the rage back then. I became a feminist. I married a feminist. I wholeheartedly embraced a woman's right to choose.
4] then came the calamity with Mary and John. I loved them both but their engagement was foundering on the rocks that was Mary's choice to abort their unborn baby.
5] back and forth we all went. I supported Mary but I could understand the points that John was making. I could understand the arguments being made on both sides. John was right from his side and Mary was right from hers.
6] I read William Barrett's Irrational Man and came upon his conjectures regarding "rival goods".
7] Then, over time, I abandoned an objectivist frame of mind that revolved around Marxism/feminism. Instead, I became more and more embedded in existentialism. And then as more years passed I became an advocate for moral nihilism.


In other words, that "talk" of objective morality is not the same thing as being able to demonstrate that morality does in fact exists objectively/essentially/universally/ideally/naturally etc., "out in the world" of actual conflicting behaviors derived from conflicting value judgments.

Daniel McKay wrote:Or are you saying it does not resolve the conflict between two opposing positions regardless of whether that resolution actually convinces the holders of those positions?


My own moral compass is entangled in this:

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values "I" can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction...or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then "I" begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

Which many here mock. And it may well be entirely unreasonable. I just have not been convinced of that yet. It still seems perfectly reasonable to me when confronted "down on the ground" with actual conflicting goods that precipitate conflicting behaviors.

Though, sure, if, within any particular community a political consensus is embraced such that everyone agrees that behavior X is prescribed and behavior Y is proscribed, that encompasses [for all practical purposes] a fully functional morality.

But [in my view] that is not the same thing as establishing [rationally, logically, philosophically, scientifically etc.] that all rational and virtuous men and women are obligated to think like this.

That seems entirely beyond the reach of mere mortals in a Godless universe.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

Start here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529
Then here: viewtopic.php?f=15&t=185296
User avatar
iambiguous
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 22655
Joined: Tue Nov 16, 2010 8:03 pm
Location: baltimore maryland

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Ecmandu » Wed Nov 23, 2016 8:05 pm

Iamb!

I'm not mocking you when I state that in order to cross the street, you must cross the street !

I'm not mocking you when I say that you are so fearful that you decided at some point in your life to define yourself as "good" (conflicting GOODS!) for everyone because you are terrified .... And if everyone agrees that you're good, you have nothing to worry about!

I understand why you say all of this ...

Life is scary and you're scared shitless!

I get it man. But it's not philosophy.
Ecmandu
ILP Legend
 
Posts: 6825
Joined: Thu Dec 11, 2014 1:22 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Wed Nov 23, 2016 8:21 pm

I see a problem in a moral compass which separates the subjective from the objective absolute, because that separation, infers a moral distortion, the greater degree is. The spectrum is a good analogy, because the way the colors are interphase, creating broader
or narrower margins. Total absolute saturation create the black/white distortion, of having no color at all, whereas in both cases there is, at least by the effects
of reflection and an absorption.


These effects are consistent with no absolute determinations of either a reflective surface, or an
absorbing one, for it is a process of mutual interplay
of both.

Such is the effect of an objective-subjective
distinction, the Dasein is a conceptual absolute,
which has been logically permiated by a retro process of filling in the should have been with could have beens, if they were not pre-maturely excluded in the first place.
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Daniel McKay » Thu Nov 24, 2016 1:21 am

Phyllo: Yes there is a standard way. I was just asking if you would like to be referenced as "Phyllo" or by your real name. If the latter, message me with your name.

Iambigious: I agree that talk of objective morality is not the same thing as being able to demonstrate that it exists. I haven't even tried to demonstrate that it exists here, and have instead left that to the meta-ethicists and discussed what it could be, if indeed it does exist. Though I will say that a) I wouldn't assume that everyone is obligated to believe in objective moral truth, rather that objective morality places obligations upon them regardless of whether they believe it exists. And b) I don't agree that determining whether objective morality exists or not is beyond the reach of mortals, and I don't think that God could help if he existed.


jerkey: I am not sure what you mean by the separation of subjective and objective in morality implying (I assume you meant implying as it would be weird if a conceptual separation had the power of inference) a moral distortion. Could you explain why this is so? It seems to me a bit like saying "separating the subjective from the objective in mathematics implies a mathematical distortion. Would it be fair to say that you would agree that this second statement would be a silly one to make?
Daniel McKay
 
Posts: 58
Joined: Sun Nov 20, 2016 2:44 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Thu Nov 24, 2016 2:19 am

Daniel,

Of course the latter in math would be improper, since a separation in the sense of the above would be non-sensible. However this too can be argued, but it is not within scope here.

I see no problem in finding not only resemblances in the Wittgensteiniansense,but equivalence as well. The latter referring to the logic of identity-inclusion in math, the former to the logic relating to exclusion and subsequent efforts to fill those in by trying to find the stasis or equilibrium sought by the former.
Someone said, I think it was Nietzche, but I am not positive, that the haste to fill in excluded material suffers from a subtle change of meaning along the downward logical quest.

Mathematics does not yet suffer this kind of abbetation, but there were some who pointed to a functional derivations collapse at a certain value.(Hofstatter).

In any there is nothing wrong, in looking at normative, with an intention of psychological equilibrium, which a quantified qualifier could equivocate more then simply on basis of similarity.
I think the identification of conflated goods can be looked at in this way, but with an intentionality tied to it.

Reversely, if this normative equilibrium is sustained or in existential terms bracketed, no further regression of analysis must sever this supposed unity.

If not, then the functional collapse occurs in line with Quine's critique of Russell's reduction ad absurdum of sense-data.

I know I brought in a lot of supporting tie ins into tour quiery, but there is o way to credibly answer your comments.
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Re: A new normative theory and a PhD thesis

Postby Meno_ » Thu Nov 24, 2016 2:27 am

jerkey wrote:Daniel,

Of course the latter in math would be improper, since a separation in the sense of the above would be non-sensible. However this too can be argued, but it is n
ot within scope here.

I see no problem in finding not only resemblances in
the Wittgenstein sense,but equivalence as well. The
latter referring to the logic of identity-inclusion in math, the former to the logic relating to exclusion and subsequent efforts to fill those in by trying to find
the stasis or equilibrium sought by the former.
Someone said, I think it was Nietzche, but I am not positive, that the haste to fill in excluded material
suffers from a subtle change of meaning along the
downward logical quest.

Mathematics does not yet suffer this kind of
aberration, but there were some who pointed to a
functional derivations collapse at a certain value.(Hofstatter).


In any case,there is nothing wrong, in looking at normative functions,with an intention toward psychological equilibrium, where a quantified qualifier
could equivocate more then simply on basis of
similarity.
I think the identification of conflated goods can be looked at in this way, but with an intentionality tied
to it.


Reversely, if this normative equilibrium is sustained or in existential terms bracketed, no further
regression of analysis must sever this supposed
unity.

If not, then the functional collapse occurs in line with
Quine's critique of Russell's reduction ad absurdum of
sense-data.

I know I brought in a lot of supporting tie ins into tour
quiery, but there is o way to credibly answer your comments.



The philosophical regression ends with the Kantian Categorical Impetative, and it is for that reason alone that Russell was justified to holding to a neo-Kantian position.

I think only the future will spell out the necessity of holding-on to the limits of permitted regression..
Meno_
Philosopher
 
Posts: 2607
Joined: Tue Dec 08, 2015 2:39 am

Next

Return to Philosophy



Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Yahoo [Bot]