Morality deals with human behavior, mathematics does not. IOW, mathematics is independent of humans, morality is not.
It’s true, I misunderstand a lot of things. But are you sure that you understand it?
Hilarious. 
Seriously?
Certainly you agree that moral behavior is only relevant to living beings? Thus there must be something about being alive that makes moral behavior relevant. And I would add that morality is actually only relevant to a special case of the living, specifically the sentient with capability of conscience. Insects are alive and one could stretch the notion of morality to fit their case, but what would be the point. Morality involves rules to play by and only a specific class of living creature can do that, homosapian barely fitting into that category.
The defining characteristics of a living being distinguishes it from the non-living by requiring a type of behavior, specifically the effort to survive (which happens to also include joy, but that is another subject). The idea of morality merely gives social foundation to that inherent function. If you are living, then you already are trying to survive. And to be moral merely means that you are doing it “properly” (assuming “proper” to mean “in the best way”).
The inanimate, non-living, or dead have no morality issues because they can not strive toward a purpose (even if they happen to serve one). Morality is about how one strives, struggles, or attempts to survive such as to be one of the living. Thus morality and being one of the living are eternally and objectively bound as each serves the other.
Phyllo: Morality, at least what I mean when I say morality, deals with not only human beings but all potential persons. Perhaps this disagreement arises from us meaning different things when we use the word “morality”. What exactly do you mean by “morality”? What I mean is “The way in which persons ought to be or act where ought is understood in a universal, categorical way”.
Phyllo second comment: Yes I am a real laugh-riot. Are you suggesting that the precise definition of life is particularly important to morality? Must be nail down whether viruses ought to be considered alive before we deal with any moral questions? That strikes me as rather an odd position to take.
James: I don’t know. Depends what we mean by living. I could conceive of an artificial intelligence that I would call a moral agent, but do we want to call that “living”? More importantly, and I think we are in agreement on this, it is not all living beings that are morally relevant. The case of an insect you discuss is a good one, it is certainly alive, but it is not a moral agent and it would be silly to talk of it acting rightly or wrongly. Morality applies to persons. That is; to conscious, rational and free entities.
However, I would say that being alive does not require trying to survive. There are many things, both persons and not, which are alive right now that are most certainly not trying to survive and are actively trying to end their life. From the seriously ill seeking to hasten the end through assisted suicide protocols to spiders that hop in the mouth of the female to be eaten once they are done mating or the antechinus literally shagging itself to death. Living beings do not all try to survive for the duration of the time they ought to be classified as living. What you are saying about living beings is factually inaccurate.
On a different note, what do you mean humans “barely” fit into the category of moral agents? Are you suggesting that we have only just made it over the moral bar? It is certainly possible that we are the only animal to do this, though I suspect that some of the great apes may require more investigation before we can rule them out as at least persons in the same way that a child is a person.
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Everything that isn’t living is dying … or dead.
If we can’t settle on what being alive means, we can’t settle on whether being alive is relevant to morality.
Defining morality as “how one ought to behave” is tautological. The term “ought to” conveys no more meaning than “moral” and both presume a standard. My question to you is whether you believe that;
A) There is an objective moral standard,
B) Moral standards are rationally founded,
C) Moral standards are aberrantly emergent,
D) Moral standards are passed down from “above”.
I support the notion that morality is rationally founded and that foundation can be discovered via the definition of “being alive”, thus morality is actually objective but not necessarily anything like what morality has always been taught to be. Perhaps the highest moral code allows or disallows different things than normally expected.
One thing that I can tell for certain is that without clear, unambiguous definitions of the terms, nothing can be resolved in discussion (e.g. “rational”, “moral”, “living”, “ought”…).
My understanding of the highest moral code reveals that homosapian cannot actually maintain it, although he senses something close to it. This trait appears to be a function of the limit of homosapian intelligence. By “barely fitting into the category [of being a moral agent]”, I am referring to the apparent fact that homosapian has a very difficult time comprehending true morality (and in fact, has never shown a precisely accurate understanding of it).
That is why I am higher than the homo.
The homo sapien.
If reality, realism =objective, and meaning=subjective, (drawn with grossly wide brush), the mechanism that’s in play here is of meaning and reality have been confounded, so as to avail to the question of ‘the meaning of reality’.As if, meaning had some kind of a goal or project to become real. Ultimately, the question becomes meaningless, as meaning strives to completely overlap reality, with the projection of a being in the world with no difference(s).
But why such a goal, or project? Because of the signification of that need.
For that reason, different consciousnesses will have to reduce to imperceptibility, by virtue of, and in spite of it’s self. That exclusion is not a conscious mechanism, is the further progression of this, and therefore, there may be very little, if any, excersize of will in the matter.
The representations , or the recognition falters, remotely, not because the horizon is shrinking, but because it looses significance.
I know you are not asking why, or how, but stating the thesis, representing the the mechanism of what is, because it is, but the absolute subjective as the objective needs existence as value.
And this is not a lie, it is an inherent need.
But then it’s said , sad, that it may just be a parley -
Making simple things complicated is not a sign of intelligence. It’s a sign you’ve been distracted.
Objectivity means you are on top of your impulses (aerial view, being in control of impulses) rather than beneath them (tunnel vision, being controlled by impulses.)
It means you are processing your impulses rather than deflecting them (by banning them from entering your consciousness or by prematurely converting them to action.)
It means you are adjusting your map (= expectations) to fit territory (= reality) rather than adjusting territory (= reality) to fit your map (= expectations.)
It means you are seeing reality as it is (= the best way you can see it) rather than the way you want to see it (= the way it is easier for you to see it.)
Google definition that James provided isn’t in contradiction to my definition.
No need for God and no need for evolution.
You just have to hold your ground and not be distracted by noise.
-it to those simpletons who need it. Tell it to those new cynics, who demand evidence. They are too sophisticated to need more then simply , and admittedly, catchy , however true, leading suggestions.
It may be the end of history or not, however, if those very simpletons and cynics would realize what’s at stake, how quickly would they need to willingly drop their thin allusions.
You are in the same unenviable position of trying to excavate that, which has been so casually dismissed as worthy of exclusion, not your fault, even though, you are trying to be fully objective about it.
Phyllo has a problem with a morality derived through internal senses, through exploration and utilization of one’s impulses, but he has no problem with a morality that has an evolutionary basis, apparently because the second involves external senses, in the form of reading books and studying others, perhaps even dissecting them in order to extract moral code from their bodies. That’s objective, he says, but the former, the more natural approach, isn’t. Talk about the hatred of the body.
…
When you act, your body re-acts. It gives you feedback. Positive or negative. It says “this is good” or it says “this is bad”. You then either accept this feedback and adjust accordingly or you deny it and shut yourself from reality.
You do not create the feedback you receive. It’s something external to your mind. It’s out of your control. You can deny it, forget it, ignore it, distort it and deform it; but you can’t choose it or change it.
Often it is said that feedback is sent in the form of pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Pleasure indicating good and pain indicating bad. That’s how we’re told. But it’s not like that. It has more to do with feelings of balance and imbalance. In this sense, both pain and pleasure are bad as both are extremes – none is the middle way. This glorification of pleasure is no doubt plebeian in nature. People who suffer a lot are prone to such a thing.
The fact that feedback is external, rather than internal, means that our actions – moral actions including – have a standard against which they can be measured.
This means that the worth of our actions is not simply a matter of belief, of faith, of unconditional appraisal. It is not subjective – not by necessity.
Only when feedback is ignored, instead of accepted, does one step into the murky waters of subjectivism.
Nihilism can be diagnosed by lack of awareness of one’s internal feedback and subsequent dependence on external feedback.
God used to be the judge. Now that he’s dead, he’s replaced by Reason. Or Facebook.
James: I agree that “ought to”, at least as it is used here as differentiated from hypothetical oughts, such as one ought to go to the fridge if one wants the milk, conveys no more meaning than moral because I think they mean the same thing… that’s what a definition is. Much like saying that frozen water conveys no more meaning than ice, I agree, because I think that is the same thing.
To answer your questions.
A) Yes I think I would agree with that statement though I might render it standard(s) or better yet say that there is an objective way which persons ought to act regardless of their desires.
B) Depends what you mean by that. I would say that morality only applies if there is something rational (and free, and conscious) as all moral agents are rational beings. I would also say that we determine moral truth through rational, philosophical investigation. I think this is something like what you mean, but I would say that “being alive” is not the relevant thing to consider because not everything that is alive is a moral agent. Instead, we should consider what it means to be a moral agent, what it means to be a person, which is exactly the strategy I use in the chapter I have linked here.
C) I am not sure what you mean by this in this context? Do you mean in a social sense? An evolutionary one? A metaphysical one?
D) No I don’t think that for a moment, I don’t even think the idea makes sense.
Ultimate: Did you just claim to be something other than human or were you making a bad gay pun?
I think that you are confusing “being objectively unbiased” as a rational behavior with the property of a fact being “objectively true” independent of perspective or prejudice. The first means that a person is weighing all of the details, as you suggest (e.g “Should I go to college and leave my friends behind or should I …”. The second means that an assertion is true regardless of what anyone might see or believe (e.g. the Moon having a far side despite no one ever seeing it).
Every internal impulse has to be considered in terms of the external world, otherwise thoughts and actions are purely self-referential and subjective.
Hatred of the body?
I have been saying all along that morality is based on human needs and desires. The majority of those are physiological - just look at the base of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_ … y_of_needs
If I “hated the body”, then I would be claiming or promoting a morality detached from physical needs.
I used to see reality as I wanted to but now see it as it is and so I am now as free as it is possible to be while still alive [ death is ultimate freedom ]
Basically, in a world sans God, it comes down to who is saying what is a good thing regarding any particular context. If you argue that your own existence is a good thing and you are aborted then would that not be a bad thing?
Isn’t that what the anti-abortion folks are arguing regarding the unborn? They merely connect the dots between “a good thing” and “morality”. And then between that and “God”. Or, absent God, “Reason” or “Nature”
Having or not having more kids is always situated out in a particular world historically, culturally and experientially. Value here is always calculated from a particular point of view, involving a complex existential interaction between “I” and “we”.
And [sometimes] in being perceived as either “one of us” or “one of them”.
It is the objectivists who, with respect to “personhood” and abortion, reduce this all down to their own particular political prejudices.
No, my point is to suggest that “correct” and “incorrect” arguments here are rooted by and large in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. And that in order to acquire some semblance of psychological equilibrium/equanimity, it is the objectivists who will insist that only their own moral/political narrative/agenda is the correct one.
Basically, aren’t you arguing that own your subjective account of “personhood” and abortion is the most rational? Just as all the objectivists who embrace a conflicting frame of mind insist that, on the contrary, it is their account that is the correct one.
What I do is to note that which all objectivists minds share in common: the belief that objective morality can in fact be ascertained. And, since they in fact already embody it, this proves it.
Thus you can well imagine how someone like me might be perceived as a threat to their peace of mind. In other words, to their self-righteous certainty regarding how the world is and how it ought to be instead.
Well, that’s the part that revolves around “might makes right”, “right makes might” and “democracy”. You can be convinced that human interactions basically revolve around survival of the fittest. If something furthers your own perceived interests, it becomes the right thing to do. Then you either have the power to make it so or you don’t. Or you can be convinced there is an objective morality and, as either a theocrat or a political ideologue, you can set about creating “out in the world” that which you believe “in your head”. And again you either can or you can’t. Or you can be convinced that, in a world where “moral goods” ever come into conflict, it is best to construct a legal process in which these conflicts are “settled” politically through elections. And through the courts.
And then there are the hybrids like the Nietzscheans. They divide the world into the masters and the slaves. But the masters are thought to be ubermen. They attain power not bluntly through “might makes right” but as the embodiment of “right makes might”. They are in sync with how the world is to be understood “naturally” and thus earn the right to exercise power over the herd.
But, [b]again[/b], they can either accomplish this “out in the world” [and not just “in their head”] or they can’t.
This is basically the argument I get from all objectivists. Unless I can demonstrate to them that I understand the analysis that they are making then there isn’t anything useful I can contribute regarding the premises. But [invariably] the only time someone is really able to demonstrate that to them is to agree with both their premises and their conclusions. And until you do you are the problem.
And I always make that crucial distinction here between that which we believe to be true “in our head” and that which we can demontrate that all rational human beings are obligated to believe in turn.
This however I construe as you making me the argument. But all I can do is to note how, personally, I am entangled in this…
If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.
…and then to ask the objectivists to note how they are not when their own value judgments come into conflict with others.
Unlike God, mere mortals are not omniscient. Unlike God, mere mortals are not omnipotent. And, in that context, I always come back to this: In the absence of God all things – all human behaviors – can be rationalized. Up to and including genocide.
And, with respect to a moral conflagration like abortion, what does it really mean [for all practical purposes] to make a distinction between being “misguided” in your behavior and being “wrong”?
In the end, it always comes down to who either does or does not have the power to enforce a particular agenda. And the only way mere mortals can avoid this is to separate themselves entirely from others.
Then it comes down to being able to survive or not. Morality is only relevant here if you do believe in God. Sans God, you either choose [in conjunction with nature] behaviors that allow you to survive or you don’t.
What you are implying is twofold, and either way the argument fails to reach the level of a normative theory, because both views, objective and subjective has to present a thesis, before proceeding. The normative implies just that, a normal interpretation of the problem at hand.
What normal is, here, depends on definitions of normalcy, for both: the mother and the new born. What constitutes a human being, what is the normal level of pain and suffering, even if, by an admission the mother can initially be considered normal?
Lastly, can normalcy in both regards, be better be constituted by a paradigm shift, from a more ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ criteria.
I think I can safely say that for various reasons, the foremost on my mind is your critique of non down to earth speculation.
Then on the level of typology the requirement of defining objectivity versus subjectivity places a n appearent barrier to further insight into the real meaning of abortion.
It is very well to leave them -the concepts where they are, and have a discussion about abortion based on reified concepts, but are not such ideas basically fluid and changing?
This is why there is a tendency for those seeking deep seated psychological places, to set the thesis of argument, (in this case-objective & subjective) and try to fathom the depth: as in case of the Freud/Jung approach innanalysis.
The point relevant here, is that Jung had the courage to get into the depths of the psyche by adopting the vernacular of that region of consciousness. Freud could not, he was much too conventional.
I bring this, with the idea, that hopefully no one on these boards is compelled to reject, or exclude various regions, by virtue of the quality of the vernacular. The culprit is modern communication, where absolute notions such as subjectivity and objectivity are still used within conventional rhetoric.
As a consequence, modern stream of consciousness, may still hold together, and metaphor needs to excavate meaning, from the outside, from extrinsic sources. These may very well have some connections to the reactions one’s own body exhibits to them
The measurement of the divide is impossible at any rate, and that is meant to imply no negation of the divide, but only that the divide is hidden.
The Dasein, really, is hidden, and practical applications do not recover it’s meaning, in specifics.
It is a general, universally constant, which involves and contains all possible pertinant action.
Covered here are all values, good and bad, where moral choice is made at the time of specific application.