That’s definitely worth keeping in mind, Blutgi, however, this discussion is trying to determine the credibility of the war-for-oil thesis.
You mentioned that trade in oil can take place outside the OPEC structure. Quotas have not been set for Iraq since the first Gulf War, however, they have remained a member, and Opec plan to reintroduce quotas to Iraq following the war and any subsequent regime-change, assuming the new government favours renewing its membership of Opec.
One suggestion I have heard in Westminster, is that the US government’s post-conflict commitment to Iraq will constitute taking the reins at the start, under the guise of a UN protectorate. With the US government leading the effort to ensure Iraq’s new political system is secure, any new government, elected or otherwise, will need an American seal of approval. And here comes the bombshell I have heard, from a prominent Labour backbencher whose anonymity I have promised to maintain (sorry about that).
That the US government, whilst drawing attention to the success of their war, the liberation of the Iraqi people, and to ensuring that all information channels necessary for a active democracy are kept open and free (I suspect this will be forced by the international community), will actually be planning not to take over Iraqi oilfields, but planning bilateral trade agreements with the Iraqi federal government, so as to ensure a steady flow of oil for a ‘new American century’.
They will guarantee this, by supplying Iraq with financial and technical aid to revive the failing oil infrastructure - the refineries, wells and pipelines to the Red Sea, and also through Kuwait. This will actually give Iraq a competitive advantage over other Opec members, providing an incentive for Iraq to not renew its membership to Opec, and set its own quotas. This will, without doubt, cut the costs of many American (and European) businesses, large and small, freeing micro-economic resources to kickstart a world economy in need profit innovation and, ultimately, more consumption. Sweeping my generalisations may be, when those buyers on the world oil market know how to ensure oil prices do not waver too wildly, one has to question whether the desperate short-term need for oil is a major direct reason for seizing Iraqi reserves, or even whether the ‘greed’ and ‘profit-mongering’ of American oil companies is directly responsible for the Bush administration’s plans.
Were Iraq to undercut Opec prices, the ‘knocking-off’ of Middle-Eastern autarkies would become easier, as ground movement against these governments would seem likelier, so the logic goes. What cards do these regimes hold on the international stage, without significant profit’s from oil? [Few, if any, other than weapons, hence the many signs of armament from Iran and others]. What “guarantees the stability and harmony of the world oil market by adjusting their oil output to ensure a balance between supply and demandâ€? [Opec]. Reliant on oil revenues for the economic development of these nations, distorting the very foundations Opec relies upon, with a local founding member (Iraq) substantially undercutting their prices, would (as is planned) see the calculated ‘flood of Iraq’ drown the Middle-East with democracy and social movement?
True, you may point out that OPEC’s eleven members collectively supply about 40% of the world’s oil output, so the short-term economic craving from the West, can be satisfied by the rest. However, the volume of investment required to adapt industry and transport (and all else reliant on oil) to new sources of power, whilst staying efficient and above the operation line, is currently beyond the reach of most western planners - in government and in the private sector. Opec members possess more than three-quarters of the world’s proven crude oil reserves. Weaken Opec, and the Project for new American Century (outlined next) has some breathing space.
This war is a key part of ‘The Project for a New American Century’ (PNAC), a strategic paper with recommendations for defence spending and political approach, devised by the American Enterprise Institute and the Hudson Institute. The PNAC was founded by Dick Cheney, Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby (Cheney’s chief of staff), William J Bennett, (the Reagan administration’s education secretary), and Zalmay Khalilzad, the Bush administration’s ambassador to Afghanistan. Under the cloak of freedom democracy and peace, it is designed to assert American influence around the world - economic and political. This in itself, I think comes from a sincere belief held by the named characters (plus possibly some others in the current Washington consensus) in the United States as capable of delivering an economic and political system which can be of benefit to any People, and which demands and instils a work ethic which will favour humanities’ prospect of survival and progress. Institutions such as the United Nations and Opec only slow down the process towards achieving the desired position on the world stage. Their use of the UN now, seems to serve the political interests of their ally Tony Blair. Plus, that a UN mandate for war, will help minimise the short-term political damage caused by operating outside any UN ‘process’.
There is, after all my deliberations, a strategic case (albeit weak, given the quality of security in the US and UK at least) that the present-day Iraqi regime will make his weapons available to terrorists, and that since they will be used against western interests, ‘doing something’ (as considered outside of the tablet of the PNAC) is an option. However, the doctrine of pre-emption establishes a precedent which is difficult to swallow in the new economy/new world disorder, only defendable within a multilateralist framework.
Regardless of how questionable the plans for war are - and the damage it will do world government, to international relations, and to the root causes of the terrorism – if the anti-war side were to succeed in stopping the drive to war, but fail to achieve a consensus between the two sides, and some sort of regime change in Iraq, a clear message would be sent out to all that the PNAC has its eyes on – that the US are a paper tiger, pliant even. A message even the Chinese and Russian leadership would never have realistically aimed for.
Russia’s involvement in the Iraq crisis is, for me, understated by a media under the illusion that the American-Russian alliance is still fresh and strong. Igor Ivanov (the Russian foreign minister) and his secret meetings with Saddam Hussein, imply enough. The last-minute Russian oil contracts, in addition to the Russian-Iraqi trade agreement made late last year, are all designed for a scenario where the current Iraqi regime are not toppled, or are replaced by a Russia-phile which is prepared to agitate US interests in the region by not co-operating in trade negotiations as was planned. The Iraq issue truly becomes a crisis, when the new regime is installed, and the US and/or UN build the foundations of a new political and economic order in Iraq. At this point, the conflict of interests between Russia and the US will come to the fore, especially if there still persists an angry division between ‘old’ Europe and America, and the climate of international politics provides enough leeway for Russia to compete for Iraqi hearts, government and oil.
There is a great temptation to speak of the Cold War having ended, and there being a new world order up for grabs, of the context of American foreign policy having changed considerably. Whilst it is certainly true that the war has a strong element of power politics to it, with there being more diplomatic room for manoeuvre (hence the current division in the international community), I am inclined towards a thesis that reveals, if not states the extent to which this conflict is implicitly between the USA and Russia. Whilst there are many prisms within prisms and a complex fragile cobweb of alliances to be fully considered when observing the international political scene, the fact that American and Russian interests in and around Iraq overlap as they do, is endemic, standing out like a wart on the eyelid of the international community. It is not a Cold war, and it is not based on ideology. Russia’s late entrance to the Franco-German opposition was based on an ambivalence as to whether opposing the US stance was in their interests, whether it was politically feasible. Circumstance (given the domestic politics of France and Germany) had played Russia a sweet card - a final window of opportunity for Russia to defy the United States on a matter of international importance. To defend their interests at the expense of American interests, even if these interests do not concern the sweep of humanity’s history (as with the ideological war), but merely (without understating its importance) the access to a key resource – oil - which at some point within the middle to long-term, may be in short supply.