Towards a complete metaphysical theory

Wittgenstein wondered what are the most basic facts on which all other facts depend. That was what the Tractatus was about. I answer that question here. I have outlined here the 165 most basic facts on which all other facts depend. Naturally, since I’m such a rigorous philosopher I got kicked out of philosophyforums.com. This is a complete metaphysical theory in the sense that all 165 terms in here are defined, 15 I leave undefined and 20 are defined circularly.

NC stands for a pair of terms that must be defined circularly such as mind and belief. ND stands for a term that cannot be defined. EOR stands for eliminated by Ockham’s Razor, which means there are more than one term in the English language for the same thing. OB stands for too complicated too define. Fortunately, there are only two of those words: human and eye. I have developed a new logical notation since ultimately this system will be dumpled into a computer which will output certain signals that I can understand such as contradiction or redundancy. You can read about the logical notation and get a better organized format of my system here:

docs.google.com/file/d/0B9zzW6- … sp=sharing

Argument: some facts are basic.

1 x depends on y means if y does not exist then x must not exist.
2 A fact depends on words for its existence.
3 Words depend on other words for their meaning.
4 A word’s meaning is a type of fact.
5 If x has meaning then x has existence. The relation “have” is transitive.
6 Therefore words depend on other words for their existence. The relation “depend” is transitive. From 3 and 5
7 Therefore facts depend on other facts for their existence. From 4 and 6
8 x does not equal y means x has many z and y has few z.
9 Not all facts are depended on by an equal number of facts.
10 Therefore some facts are depended on by many facts. From 7 and 9
11 Basic is a property of a fact which is depended on by many facts.
12 Therefore some facts are basic. From 10 and 11

E.g. The meaning of logical is: Logical must be any knowledge which must not be obvious but some other obvious knowledge implies it.
A fact relates two relatees.  
The relation "implies" relates "obvious knowledge" and "non-obvious knowledge"
Therefore, the meaning of logical is a fact which depends on the meaning of: "knowledge" which is also a fact.  
Therefore, the fact that logical has meaning depends on the fact that knowledge has meaning.

Argument: There is a most basic fact.

21 A word x is more basic than a word y means x depends on y for its meaning and y does not depend on x for its meaning.
22 The quantity of words has a limit.
23 The quantity of words has a limit means not all words depend on other words for their meaning.
24 Therefore, at least one word does not depend on other words for its meaning. From 23
25 Therefore, at least one word is the most basic word. From 21 and 24
26 All facts relates two relatees.
27 Therefore, the relation the most basic word has to another word is a fact. From 25 and 26
28 Therefore, there is a most basic fact. From 26 and 27
The name I give to that relatee is “thing” and the name I give to its relatee is “existence” and the name for that relation is “have”. Note - if philosophers want to call that word “entity” or anything else then we disagree over terminology which is not important.

We start with the most general fact we can think of: “Things have existence.” Although there are types of things, the word “thing” does not belong to a more general category. “Universe”, “Quarks”, “Mind”, “Delusions” all seem to be members of the concept “thing”. The only property that all things share is that they exist. We then split the concept “thing” into less basic concepts. After we split the concept we define the criteria for membership to that concept. As we define these new concepts we introduce other words. We must now have a strict criteria for defining a word:

  1. State the relation it has to another word.
  2. State the concept it belongs to.
  3. If the word is undefinable then one must clearly mark that word as undefinable and one must only mark a word undefinable if its meaning is known to someone roughly 10 years of age.
  4. One must only resort to circular definitions, that is the meaning of x depends on a word y whose meaning depends on x, when those words are already known to someone roughly 15 years of age. These words must be clearly marked so that the reader is aware that a definition is circular. A definition is not circular if x depends on y and y depends on z and z depends on x. Sooner or later, all words are circular if you define circular in that manner.

And now for the basic facts:

1 All things must have existence. [NC - things/existence ND - have EOR - entity = thing]
2 x causes y means if x does not exist then y must not exist. ND - must/can
3 God must be a thing which can cause all natural beings and some facts to have existence and must not be caused by anything to have existence.
4 All natural beings must be things which are caused by God to exist and can cause some facts to exist.
5 Facts must be things which relate all things and must not cause other things to exist.
[Note - This ontology is remarkably similar to the 9th century philosopher John Scottus Eriugena who wrote: “Nature is divided into … that which creates and is not created, secondly into that which is created and also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create, while the fourth neither creates nor is created.” But he did not make the connection that those things that are created and do not create are facts.]
6 x is the opposite of y means x does not have a certain relation to y.
7 Nothing is a relatee which is the opposite of everything.

Language

8 All terms must be aspects of any fact.
9 All names must be aspects of beliefs which must be identified by some natural beings with some terms. ND - identify
10 All relatees must be terms which must be related by some relator to some other relatee. [NC - relator/relatee]
11 All relators must be terms which must relate some relatees to each other.
12 God x and natural being x allow natural being y to cause fact z means if x did not exist then y must not cause z.
13 x has an active relation to y means x causes y to be related to x or x allows y to be related to z. [Note - it is simply too difficult to define active relation in the property-bearer position.]
14 x has a passive relation to y means x is caused by or allowed by y to be related to y.
15 All property-bearers must be any relatee which must have an active relation to some other relatee. [EOR - subject, noun = property-bearer]
16 All properties must be relatees which must have a passive relation to some property-bearer. x is a property of y is the symmetric relation to y has x. [EOR - trait, characteristic, feature, attribute, description = property]
17 x loses y means x has y in the past and x does not have y in the present.
18 x becomes y means x loses its essential property.
19 All essential properties must be properties which must be related to some property-bearer or the property-bearer loses its name. Essence is the plural of essential property. [EOR - nature, requirement, defining characteristic = essential property]
Note - There is skepticism about essential properties but there is no skepticism about the word condition or defining characteristics which has the same meaning. E.g. The essential property of a triangle is “has three sides.” If it gains a side then it becomes a quadrilateral. The essential property of carbon is “has six protons”. If it gains a proton then it becomes nitrogen. The essential properties of a mother are: has offspring, is female.]
20 All accidental properties must be properties which can be lost by some property-bearer and the property-bearer does not lost its name.
21 All proper names must be names which must not be lost by some property-bearer if it loses its essential property which means if a property-bearer loses its essential property then it must not lose its proper name.
22 All states must be property-bearers which must have an essential property and must also be the accidental property of some other property-bearer. In other words, states are essential properties of accidental properties. EOR - condition = state
E.g. The sun is in the condition of being cloudy. Being cloudy is a name and it must have certain essential properties in order to get its name. Or I am in the condition of being sick. Being sick is one of my accidental properties. If I am healthy I still have my essential property which is philosopher but to be sick, sickness itself must have an essential property such as causes someone to feel bad.
23 Depend is defined as the symmetric relation to cause which means x depends on y is the same as y causes x. [EOR - y is due to x, y is affected by x, y is an effect of x = x causes y]
24 All personal properties must be properties which must depend on you. The opposite of personal property is impersonal property. [E.g. That the Grand Canyon is valuable is a subjective fact. That I do not value the Grand Canyon is a personal fact. Note - we can’t use the letter y to symbolize you since y is a variable so the German “du” is used.]
25 All objective properties must be impersonal properties which must be properties of any property-bearer, the having of which does not depend on any human which means no humans cause any property-bearer to have objective properties.
[OB - human Note - a common mistake is that people protest that objective is a type of fact not a type of property but properties are also types of relatees which are types of terms which are aspects of facts and if a is a type of b which is a type of c which as an aspect of e then a is also e.]
26 The opposite of objective is subjective which means subjective must be caused by some human to be a property of some property-bearer. [E.g. The most common subjective property is value.]
Note - The difference between a subjective property and a personal property is of the utmost importance. You can be wrong about a subjective property, you can’t be wrong about a personal property. This is of especial importance in ethics where you can be wrong about a subjective fact.
27 All modifiers must be terms which must modify some fact and all modifiers must depend on some fact or other terms for their meaning. ND - modify [Note - it is reasonable to believe that facts can exist without modifiers but that is not the case, certain modifiers are simply assumed so they are not mentioned.]
28 All operators must be modifiers which must modify some relator.
[Note: can/must and the passive operator are the only operators we use here. All of them are indefinable. It is not the purpose of this essay to provide an exhaustive list of all the operators in English, only the operators that are necessary for understanding the atomic facts. For example, question and command are also operators but they are not needed here.]
29 All quantifiers must be modifiers which must quantify the property-bearer’s having a property with a probability. ND - quantify. [The quantifiers we have used here are all/some/none, many/few, more/less which are not definable.]
30 All probability must be quantifiers which quantify how often property-bearers have properties. ND - quantify how often
31 All Numbers must be quantifiers which must quantify aspects, members or parts.
32 Both truth values are properties of belief which must refer a belief to a fact (truth) or must not refer a belief to a fact (false).
33 All negation must be any modifier which must cause the truth value of some belief to have the opposite truth value.
34 All lists must be groups composed of some facts of which it is possible that they do not share an essential property.
35 All situations must be wholes composed of some facts which must share an essential property. [EOR - state of affairs, condition, circumstance = situation]
36 All connectors must be aspects of any situation which must relate some fact to the truth value of the situation.
37 All conjunctions must be connectors which must equate the truth value of two or more beliefs to the truth value of the situation. Logically speaking: A situation has truth value x and belief x and y have truth value x and a conjunction equates the two beliefs with the truth value of situation.
38 All disjunctions must be connectors which must relate two or more beliefs of different truth value to the truth value of the situation.
39 All material implications must be connectors which equate all symbols x with some symbols y. The logical sign for material implication is →
40 All Equivalence must be a connector which must equate symbol x with symbol y. [Note - equivalence does not equate facts because every fact is different. Quite often however different symbols refer to the same fact.]
41 Mind infers x from y means a fact x allows mind to know a different fact y.
42 Fact x implies fact y means fact x allows mind to infer fact y from fact x.
43 All implication must be any connector which must imply a fact x from at least two facts y and z. The sign for this is not → but 7 [EOR - entailment, conclusion = implication]
44 All meaning must be an aspect of all facts x which allows some mind to infer fact y from fact x. Fact is the object of meaning: [xHAmn = xMNfa]
45 All wholes must be relatees which must be composed of other relatees and they must depend on most of these for their essential property. The object of the whole dependence is part.
46 All aspects must be parts, all of which are depended on by the whole for its essential property which means a whole depends on all its aspects for its essential property. To be even more clear: if one aspect does not exist, then the whole does not exist. [E.g. The standard example of an aspect is a triangle has three aspects or a coin has two aspects: heads and tails.]
47 Simple must be a property of any property-bearer which must not have parts. Complex is the opposite of simple. [EOR - unit, basic, fundamental, elementary and as if we didn’t already have enough synonyms philosophers invented another: primitive = simple EOR - composite = complex]
48 All substances must be parts which must compose each part of the whole.
E.g. Imagine a house made only of wood. The houses parts would be: door, roof, wall, pillar, but wood would compose each of those part. The substance that composes the floor is marble. The floor is composed of parts which are tiles but marble is in each of the tiles. A thing can also be made of several substances. A house can be made of three substances: pine, oak and glass and its parts are walls, door, roof and window. One of the three substances composes each of those four parts. It does not matter that the wood is also composed of more fine-grained substances such as molecules, atoms and quarks. It only matters that the substance is in every part of the whole. So wood can be made of the substance of atoms, since atoms are in every part of the wood.
49 x and y share a property means x and y have the same property.
50 All groups must be any relatee which must be identified by mind with many other relatees for a purpose and it is possible that the relatees not share an essential property. Members are the object of group dependence. [EOR - set, class = group]
51 All concepts must be any property-bearer which identifies things which all share an essential property and which all have abstract existence. [EOR - notion = concept
Note - the word general is synonymous with concept in the sense that we say “what is true in general of cars” means the same thing as “what is the essential property of the concept car.”]
52 All instances must be property-bearers which must identify a thing which must belong to some concept and the instance has some accidental property. ND - belong
53 Concrete must be a property of any instance which must have more physical existence than mental existence. [Note - actual and real are sometimes synonymous with concrete but here actual and real are given another meaning.]
54 All types must be concepts which identify at least two property-bearers x and y which share the essential property of a concept z but x has an essential property which y does not have. [In other words, types are concepts within concepts. Logically speaking: types identify property-bearer x and property-bearer y which belong to a concept which has essential property z and property-bearer x has essential property x and essential property z and property-bearer y does not have essential property x but has the essential property y and z.
Note - In English the word particular is synonymous with both type and instance. One can say that woman is a particular type of mammal and that Princess Diana is a particular instance of woman.]
55 Basic must be a property of any fact on which many facts depend.
56 All information must be an aspect of any matter which must allow mind to infer some fact.
57 All data must be any information which allows some mind to infer some actions.
[Note - This definition might seem rather bizarre given the fact that “a rock exists at point p” hardly seems like an action and yet it must be data. In this ontology, however, anything that exists in spacetime is the result of some action.]
58 Mind x tells mind y about their belief means mind x allows mind y to know their belief.
59 A natural being makes x means a natural being causes x to become y.
Note - the only reason why we use “make” instead of “actualize” is that we actualize beliefs but when we simply tell our beliefs we do not actualize them and for this reason we need the word “make”.
60 Mind x embodies a belief y in a symbol means mind x makes a symbol and tells another mind z that the symbol means belief y. Symbol is the indirect object of embody and belief is the direct object.
61 All statements must be information which embody some beliefs. EOR - sentence = statement
62 A symbol refers to a term means mind infers a term from a symbol.
63 Data points to a fact means a mind infers a fact from data. [EOR - indicate = point to]
64 All Symbols must be aspects of any statement which must embody some names.
[Note - Music, painting, sculpture, dance, literature appear to be different types of symbols and philosophers would like to learn about them but I’m going to delay analysis of them for another day.]

Matter, Spacetime and God

65 All matter must be an aspect of all natural beings which exists in spacetime and each type of matter must not have the same limit and it is impossible to know what type of substance matter is composed of. [Note - English makes a distinction between count nouns and mass noun. The count noun of matter is body and body is complex matter and particle is simple matter. EOR - object = body]
66 x limits mind means mind cannot move matter to any point of space in an instant of time which also means mind moves matter within limits.
67 All Limits must be probabilities which quantify how often mind causes the motion of matter to a point in an instant. [Note - What most people think of as a law of nature is really a limit.]
68 x changes y means x causes y to lose an accidental property. [Note - Change and make in popular English are often used interchangeably but not here.]
69 x can actualize y and x does not actualize y means x chooses not to actualize y [Note - the only reason why we have this word is that if I were to say “x does not actualize y” then the reader is likely to think “it is false that x can actualize y”]
70 God can limit all minds, can cause mind to experience all sensations, can allow mind to move matter, can move matter but chooses to not move matter, can change His properties but chooses to not change His properties, does not cause mind to get abilities and has consciousness of everything located in the present and the past. ND - choose
71 All mass/energy must be any limit which must quantify the probability of some mind moving some matter from one point in an instant to another point in an instant. [Note - My definition of mass/energy is certainly subject to change since my knowledge of quantum mechanics is not what I would like it to be.]
72 x enters y means x did not exist in y in the past and x does exist in y in the present.
73 x absorbs y means y enters x then x and y change to z.
74 All fermions must be any matter which can absorb bosons and this absorption must cause sensations and must change its energy and fermions must not exist in the same space as other fermions.
75 All Bosons must be any matter which can be absorbed by fermions, can exist in the same point of space and can allow fermions to get information. [Note: Of course there are other properties of fermions and bosons but only these properties are relevant to the atomic facts.]
76 x is located in y means x exists in y. Contain is the active relation of “located in” which means x is located in y is the same as y contains x. ND - in
77 Location must be a property of all things which must point to where things exist. [EOR - dimension = location ND - where]
78 The universe must be a location which must not be located in anything which means everything must be located in the universe.
79 x moves from point y to point z means x exists at point y in the past and x exists at point z in the present. Motion is the object of move. xMOy = xCAmo + yHAmo [NC - move/spacetime]
80 All sequences must be any whole which must be composed of parts which must follow each other. [ND - follow]
81 All orders of magnitude x must be any whole and any sequence which must have ten of the same parts and must be followed by an order of magnitude y which must be composed of ten parts of x.
82 Identical must be a property of any two symbols which must refer to one term which means anything that is not a symbol must not be identical. [NC - same/two EOR - sameness = identity
Note - Sameness seems to be the one time where we define it with a word which means “not same”, that is, two. Nevertheless, it is useful to spell this word out since we make the point that only names have sameness.]
83 Numerical identity must be a property of any body which must have all of the same properties at an order of magnitude of space except time. NC - numerical identity/time
84 Qualitative identity must be a property of any body which must have all the same properties except space at an order of magnitude of space. NC - qualitative identity/space/matter
85 Similar must be a property of any two instances which must share many properties of another instance. ND - many
86 Dissimilar is the opposite of similar which means dissimilar must be a property of any two instances which share few properties with each other.
87 All spacetime must be any location which must allow any mind to cause motion.
88 All space must be any location which must allow any two qualitatively identical bodies to exist.
89 All points must be simple parts of space. [Note - I have not broken my rule for defining terms since if x composes y and y is a type of z then x is a type of z]
90 All time must be any location which must allow any numerically identical body to have a different relation to some other body. Logically speaking: time allows thing x to have relation x to thing z and thing x to have relation y to thing z.
91 All instants must be simple parts of time. [Note - do not confuse instant (time) with instance (concept).]
92 The present must be any time which must allow any mind to actualize some beliefs.
93 Mind remembers some belief means mind believes x and x existed in the past. [NC - remember/past]
94 The past must be any time which must allow any mind to remember some beliefs. [Note - It might seem like my definition of the past is superfluous but since many philosophers believe the past exists now, I decided to define it.]
95 Mind plans x means mind believes it will actualize x in the future. [NC - plan/future]
96 The future must be any time which must allow any mind to plan something. [Note - the future and the past allows for many things but I decided to only name one of them.]

Existence and Reality

97 The external world must be any world which must contain everything outside of your imagination. ND - outside
Note - It is very important to keep in mind that the external world is relative to you. If something exists in someone else’s imagination, such as a false belief, then it exists in the external world.
98 x takes y into account means x desires z and x must be conscious of y to get z. Ignore is the opposite of take into account.
99 Real must be a type of existence which must be a property of anything except what you cause to exist in the imagination and if it does exist in the imagination it must not refer to the external world and if it exists in someone else’s imagination it must not refer to their desires and mind should take the real into account and mind should ignore the imaginary. NC - real/imaginary
100 Appearance must be a property of any natural being x which must allow another natural being y to believe x has y. [V - ap#HAx = xAP.xHAy EOR - seem = appear]
101 Fake must be a property of any natural being x which desires that x or something else y appears to have a property to another natural being z to have a property but x or y must not have the property in reality. The opposite of fake is genuine. [EOR - phony = fake EOR - authentic, real, actual = genuine]
102 Abstract must be a type of real existence which must be a property of anything that must not cause some other thing to exist.
103 Purpose must be a property of any action which must be desired by mind in the future but is impossible to actualize if another action is not actualized.
104 x attempts y means x desires y become an action and y does not become an action. [Note - It is not necessary in spoken English that whatever one attempts never comes to pass but here it must have that meaning to distinguish it from actualize.]
105 All pretense must be any belief which must be known to be false but mind tells or attempts to actualize for a good purpose. The object of pretense is fiction which means mind pretends x is the same as mind pretends fiction. [Note - Pretense in spoken English can be either good or bad. Here, so as to distinguish it from lies, it is only good]
106 All lies must be any belief which mind must know is false but tells or actualizes for a bad purpose.
107 Real must be a property of any fiction if mind knows another mind’s pretense is fictional.
108 Imaginary must be a property of any belief which refers to anything which does not exist in reality.
109 Actual must be a property of anything that must exist in the present and must be real. [Note - It is correct in English to say: “Actual dinosaurs lived in America” in this sense actual is synonymous with genuine.]
110 Hypothetical must be a type of abstract existence which must or can exist if some situation is actualized. [EOR - ideal, inevitable = hypothetical]
111 Historic must be a type of abstract existence which must be a property of anything that must have existed in the past.
112 x does not exist in spacetime means x transcends spacetime.
113 Mental existence must be a type of real existence which must be a property of anything which must be located in the imagination, must not refer to the external world and transcends spacetime. [Note - It is grammatically correct to say in English my beliefs exist in my mind which would make mind synonymous with imagination but here the two are not the same.]
114 Physical existence must be a type of real existence which must be a property of anything which must have an aspect that is located in some spacetime. EOR - material = physical
115 Natural existence must be a type of real existence which must be a property of anything which must have a mental and physical aspect.
116 All worlds must be locations which contain anything that has the same type of existence. E.g. The physical world contains all physical things. The natural world contains all natural things. The abstract world contains all abstract things.
In my experience, reality is the most difficult concept to understand. First, we have to be honest with the reader that there does not seem to be any escaping the circularity of reality: the real is not imaginary and the imaginary is not real. Second, “real” has a broad sense and a narrow sense. The narrow sense is synonymous with “genuine” which has been clearly defined. However, some fake things have an aspect that is real. For example, a fake flower, although the flower does not exist in reality, whatever the fake thing is composed of, it nonetheless exists in reality. The broad sense of reality is much more difficult to define. Let’s first understand why we make this distinction. We make this distinction because it helps us decide what we must pay attention to and what we can ignore. We can ignore the imaginary but we must take the real into account. Reality is usually contrasted with imaginary but in this ontology imaginary is not completely synonymous with the imagination since there are things in the imagination which are real and not imaginary, such as feelings. All feelings are interdependent with some beliefs and if those beliefs should refer to the external world then they may be false and hence refer to imaginary things. For example, say I feel a sharp depression which is interdependent with the belief that I am a failure and it just so happens that that I make a million dollars a year and am highly successful.
The feeling is real but the belief that it’s interdependent with is false and does not refer to reality. If, on the other had, I should feel a sharp depression and the belief refers to that sharp depression and not the external world, then that belief must be true. Reality is also relative in the sense that what is imaginary to you, is real to someone else. So Don Quixote imagines himself to be a knight. He’s not a knight in reality. However, he does have a plan to attack a windmill which he thinks is a giant. To Sancho Panzo, Don Quixote’s plan to attack the windmill is real and Sancho has to take this fact of reality into account. To Don Quixote however he does not have to take the windmill into account because in reality it is not a giant. So we have to take the desires of others into account and treat them as real even though the desires might be inspired by imaginary things. If, on the other hand, the product of someone else’s mind is a mere statement about reality, that is their external world and not a desire and it turns out that the statement is the result of something imaginary then we do not take this into account, the statement does not refer to reality.

The feeling is real but the belief that it’s interdependent with is false and does not refer to reality. If, on the other had, I should feel a sharp depression and the belief refers to that sharp depression and not the external world, then that belief must be true. Reality is also relative in the sense that what is imaginary to you, is real to someone else. So Don Quixote imagines himself to be a knight. He’s not a knight in reality. However, he does have a plan to attack a windmill which he thinks is a giant. To Sancho Panzo, Don Quixote’s plan to attack the windmill is real and Sancho has to take this fact of reality into account. To Don Quixote however he does not have to take the windmill into account because in reality it is not a giant. So we have to take the desires of others into account and treat them as real even though the desires might be inspired by imaginary things. If, on the other hand, the product of someone else’s mind is a mere statement about reality, that is their external world and not a desire and it turns out that the statement is the result of something imaginary then we do not take this into account, the statement does not refer to reality.

The feeling is real but the belief that it’s interdependent with is false and does not refer to reality. If, on the other had, I should feel a sharp depression and the belief refers to that sharp depression and not the external world, then that belief must be true. Reality is also relative in the sense that what is imaginary to you, is real to someone else. So Don Quixote imagines himself to be a knight. He’s not a knight in reality. However, he does have a plan to attack a windmill which he thinks is a giant. To Sancho Panzo, Don Quixote’s plan to attack the windmill is real and Sancho has to take this fact of reality into account. To Don Quixote however he does not have to take the windmill into account because in reality it is not a giant. So we have to take the desires of others into account and treat them as real even though the desires might be inspired by imaginary things. If, on the other hand, the product of someone else’s mind is a mere statement about reality, that is their external world and not a desire and it turns out that the statement is the result of something imaginary then we do not take this into account, the statement does not refer to reality.

For example, MacBeth thinks he sees a knife in front of him but there is no knife in front of him in reality.  So long as MacBeth is not making a plan then we need not take the following statement into account: "There is a knife in front of me."  Now, if there was a plan in MacBeth's mind: "I'm going to attack these people with this knife," that desire to attack is a real desire and MacBeth could really actualize it, knife or no knife.  We have to take this into account and therefore this plan of MacBeth's is real, although the knife is not.  Finally, there is a disagreement among philosophers as to whether things without causal powers are real.  I do not believe with Samuel Alexander that "to be real is to have causal powers," for the reason that if that were true then we would have to admit that the obviously correct English sentence: "Global Warming is a real fact," is false.  Moreover, given this criteria for real it turns out that "truth" is not real since truth has no causal powers.  I simply cannot accept the fact that truth is not real.  Further, our guide for determining what is real is: "Anything that in some situation we have to take into account is real."  Using this guide there are situations where we have to take things without causal powers into account.  The past, the future, facts and the hypothetical all have to be taken into account at some time or another and for this reason they are real. 

Mind

117 All minds can cause beliefs to exist, can move some matter, can actualize some beliefs, must have some consciousness, must experience some sensations. NC - mind/belief/sensation/imagination [EOR - person, agent - mind]
118 All beliefs must be mental effects which must be caused by some mind and can refer to some fact in reality and must be true if the belief refers to your feelings. All propositions are the objects of belief which means mind has a belief is the same as mind believes a proposition. EOR - idea, thought = belief [Note - I was skeptical of propositions after I saw seven philosophers fail to distinguish it from statement but Soames pointed out that the same proposition can be symbolized differently.]
119 All imagination must be the location of any mind, any belief and any sensation.
120 x enters y from z means x exists outside y and exists in z in the past and x exists inside y in the present.
121 x is interdependent with y means if x does not exist then y must not exist and if y does not exist then x must not exist.
122 All sensations must be any mental effect which must be caused by God to be experienced by some mind, must be interdependent with some beliefs and must enter the imagination from the external world. [V - miEPss = miHAep ND - experience. Note - if you’re uncomfortable with the word God, most atheists say sensations are caused by psychological laws without much change in the meaning]
E.g. When I open my eyes and look around I see things. I personally do not cause that, something else causes that. I can’t cause a brown image to become red and I cannot cause a bright image to become dim. Moreover, there seems to be something lawlike about this in that I always see the same thing provided my body and the external world remains the same at a certain order of magnitude. When I cut myself and feel pain I cause the cut but I do not cause the sensation of pain, something else causes it.
123 Mind can actualize belief x means mind moves matter y which becomes z and x refers to z. All actions are the objects of actualization which means mind actualizes x is the same as x is an action.
124 All desires must be any belief which must refer to mind actualizing some belief in the future. All value must be the objects of any desire. Avoid is the opposite of desire. V - (xDEy = xDEva)
125 All abilities are aspects of mind which must allow mind to cause something. [EOR - power = ability]
126 Consciousness must be any ability which must allow mind to actualize some beliefs, experience some sensations, perceive some matter. [V - xHAcs-y = xCSy EOR - awareness = consciousness]
127 x coordinates with y means x and y actualize z
128 Design must be a property of the motion of any two natural beings which coordinate with each other.
129 Random must be a property of the motion of any two natural beings which do not coordinate with each other.
130 x helps mind actualize y means if mind did not have x then it is possible that mind could not actualize y.
131 Mind uses x means x helps mind actualize y.
132 Mind coordinates x and y means mind uses x and y to actualize z. Design is the object of coordinate and also the synonym of coordinate. [V - xCOOy = xCOOdg = xDGy]
133 Lawlike must be a property of the motion of a group of natural beings at an order of magnitude of space greater than 10@@-15m which do not coordinate with each other and lawlike must be a property of a situation x which must become situation y. [Note - Many physicists use the word initial condition but condition has too many diverse meanings.]
134 Alive must be a property of any natural being composed of parts, most of which coordinate with the whole and have the property of designed motion.
135 Dead must be a property of any natural being composed of parts, few of which coordinate with the whole and have the property of lawlike motion.
136 Dangerous must be a property of any natural being which can cause death to some other natural being.
137 All persistence must be a property of any natural being which exists in the present and will exist in the future. [V - xHAps = xPS]
138 Sustenance must be a property of any natural being which can cause some other natural being to persist.
139 All feeling must be any sensation which must cause some mind to have some belief which can refer to some danger or some sustenance. Emotion is the object of feeling. [V - miEPfe = miFEem]
140 All enjoyment must be any feeling which, if experienced by any mind, must cause some mind to desire it in the future and most enjoyments can be interdependent with some beliefs which can refer to some sustenance. All pleasures must be the object of any enjoyment. [V - miHAej-pl = miEJpl]
141 All pain must be any feeling which, if experienced by mind, must cause mind to avoid it in the future and most pains are interdependent with some beliefs which refer to danger.
142 Mind receives x means y causes mind to have x.
143 All perception must be any sensation which must cause some mind to receive some data from the external world. [Note - In English it is correct to say that my perception of the 2000 election is that Gore should have won. Here we use perception more strictly.]

Ethics

144 x prevents y means if x exists then y likely must not exist.
Note - the only necessity is verbal necessity. For this reason actions are only likely to prevent other actions or unlikely. To symbolize this we use the same @ operator to distinguish between likely and unlikely. So @* means likely and ~@* means unlikely.
145 An action x morally contradicts another action y means mind actualizes x, desires y more than x and x prevents y in reality.
146 Good must be a property of any action x which must not morally contradict a more valuable action y. Bad is the opposite of good and evil is worse than bad.
147 All right must be a property of any good action which must cause some minds pain. [EOR - just = right Note: right and good are often synonymous in the popular language but here we make a distinction between the two]
148 Duty must be a property of any right action which causes you pain and you believe the action is right.
[Note - duty in the popular language is not necessarily painful, for instance, “it is the duty of the duke to produce an heir” but here we are using pain to differentiate it from good. We also associate duty with pain so as to differentiate it from acts that you enjoy doing and are right anyway.]
148a x should actualize y means if mind knows y is right and can actualize y then mind actualizes y.
Note - We use the modal operator for necessity to symbolize should even though should does not have the exact same meaning as must. The square in conjunction with AC means should.
Nothing must be more valuable than existence itself.
[Note - A common mistake is that people automatically think I’m saying: “Nothing is more valuable than your existence” when I’m clearly not saying that. For that reason “itself” was put in there. This moral theory is highly similar to Kant’s but without the clunky prose. Also the previous fact is the one time when I allow a non-basic fact into my ontology. It’s a deduction from other obvious facts but I include it so that people know that I’m not a moral relativist]

Epistemology

149 All knowledge must be a property of any true belief. [V - miHA.bex/tr = miKNx Note - It is almost orthodoxy that knowledge is true justified belief but only certain types of knowledge need justification.]
150 A natural being gets x means a natural being does not have x in the past and the natural being actualizes y which allows the natural being to have x. [Note - get is different from receive here in that you have to do something in order to get something which is not the case with receiving]
151 Any tool must be any dead whole which helps some natural beings get things and tools must be used with intuition.
152 x contradicts y means mind believes x and does not believe x
153 Obvious must be any knowledge which is not got with a tool used by few minds and which does not contradict other obvious beliefs. [Note - some might think this is the coherence theory of truth but many things about reality are obvious for reasons which will be justified later. EOR - analytic, a priori, axiomatic]
154 Intuition must be any ability which allows any mind to get obvious knowledge. Intuitive must also be a property of knowledge. [knOB = iuKN]
155 Logical must be any knowledge which must not be very obvious but some other obvious knowledge implies it. [EOR - reasonable, justified, rational, synthetic = logical]
156 Intelligent must be a property of any action which must actualize some desires which few minds can actualize and which must not morally contradict any other desires. [Note - In popular English intelligent can also be a property of belief but here we’re going to make a distinction between logical and intelligent]
157 Cunning must be a property of any action which actualizes some desires which few minds can actualize and must morally contradict other desires.
158 Mind observes x means mind gets data with their eyes. Observation is the object of observe. OB - eye
159 Observational must be any knowledge which must be got by some mind with some observation that few minds actualize.
160 Experimental must be any knowledge which must be got by some mind with some tool used by few minds which also means if many minds get knowledge with the same tool then it is not experiment. EOR - evidence = experimental
161 Scientific must be any aspect of knowledge which was got by mind with some experiment or some observation.
[EOR - a posteriori Note - Science has three different meanings. On the one hand, it is the opposite of pseudoscience, on the other hand it is the opposite of philosophy, it is also distinguished from art in the sense that it is a body of knowledge of obvious facts that anyone can learn whereas an art cannot be taught.]
162 Pseudoscience is the opposite of science which means it is a group of illogical statements got with tools which few minds have.
163 Philosophic must be any aspect of knowledge which was got by mind using logic, does not refer to numbers and refers to basic facts.
164 Mathematic must be any aspect of knowledge which was got by mind using logic and refers to numbers. [Note - I am told group theory does not have much to do with numbers so I might be wrong about this]

Why? Are “snow is white” and “la neige est blanche” two separate facts, using different words? I think Tractatus-era Wittgenstein would argue not; the words paint a picture of the same fact. A fact is simply “what is the case” - for example, even before humans were around to talk of it, it was a fact that the world was round.

I only got this far before stopping, but:

  • There seems to be a worrying circularity that if facts depend on words, any “basic fact” in itself is composed of words whose meanings are themselves facts… and there’s the regress.

  • 24 is a direct contradiction to 3 and 5, which poses considerable problems for the chain of reasoning.

  • There’s an unwarranted leap from “at least one word is basic” (25) to “the most basic word/fact” (27/28). There’s no argument to support that “at least one” means “only one”.

  • 23 is unsupported; words could be a self-referential, self-supporting network of meanings.

  • 26 should be “at least two relatees”, but I don’t think that’s true. There are certainly non-relational facts. “The sun’s surface is 5,500K hotter than London” is relational, “the sun’s surface is 5,800K” isn’t.

  • In any case, “all facts relate two things” doesn’t entail “all relations between two things are facts”, as would be necessary for 27.

  • 4 says that a word’s meaning is a basic fact. Surely a basic word’s meaning would be a more basic fact than the relation of the basic word to another word?

  • why in 11 is a basic fact one that has many dependent facts? Shouldn’t “basic” refer to antecedents?

Wittgenstein is aphoristic like Nietzche, and although all the terms are very confusing in themselves, his intrinsic formal substance , and his purely relational (logical) concepts are the key, as I see it, to his metaphysics. (Where these relations were represented by logical rules of language~syntax)

You bring the word actuality into your op many times, proves that the thrust of the tenet is this movement of qualification on basis of spatial properties toward quantification on basis of temporal properties. This actualization which props up over and over again, is nothing but the movement of dis semblance toward semblance. (Recognition)

The point I am trying to bring up, is that Wittgenstein has already assumed this swing toward pure understanding as a prerequisite , he is really looking at an ontology with the notion of having actuality: i.e. Identified the terms as intrinsic objective properties. So Wittgenstein’s propositions can give the impression of basing it on the presumption of what you point out as almost a Kantian categorical inherent formal object as inherently self defined. It’s potentiality(the objects) is an inherent formal(logical) proposition of it’s possible existence in all states.(Spatially)

Move toward a quantified paradigm of limited temporal actuality, where states, propositions, cases, of existence become co dependent on the various degrees of substantiation(logical generalisation). That is all he is saying.

Would You agree? Do you think that the circularity of the regression of the data of sense is “cured” in this way? (Russell’s problem)?

In the quantified, actual world of reality, the recogniion (within the state of semblance as approaching that limit where such recognition becomes possible) solves Russell’s problem of identifying the possible (which entails all possible worlds) from the probable?

I think where metaphysiscs is concerned, it is important to unassume the presumptions which underly the notion that merely seeing the validation of the existance of non substantial objects, purely based on a logical assumtions based on positive propositions which is it’s negation, may be inadequate?

Thanks for bringing up the question whether Wittgenstein has indeed, solved the metaphysical problem.

In fact, having looked up the above, and I hope I do no disservice to the strictly logical analysis of languagein the OP, Lebnitz-Frege, did in fact tried to quantify language, and so did Witggenstein in the Tractatus, but he gave it up, and went against his own Tractatus in favor of the later Philosophical Investigations. As a consequence the metaphysical theory, as envisioned as complete at first, has been largely abandoned by Wittgenstein.

If the OP implies an inferencence (which according to Frege has no truth value)that in fact the superpositioning of Philosophical Investigations disallowing the earlier view in the Tractatus may not be conclusive, then I think it’s worth another look.

Could someone please define “complete metaphysical theory”?
… just in case I want to vote.

Do you know how to read? It says in the first paragraph:

“This is a complete metaphysical theory in the sense that all 165 terms in here are defined, 15 I leave undefined and 20 are defined circularly.”

I suppose that could be phrased better: some terms must be left undefined and some terms must be defined circularly. Therefore, a complete metaphysical theory is where all terms are define or marked as undefined or circular. A term is defined when it is indicated that it has a certain relation to a certain property and the term is not found in the relation or the property.

Presumption is the seed of ALL sin/error. :confused:

I have no doubt of that. My question is whether it can be defined correctly.

So that leaves the ones that can be defined unambiguously and relevantly (ie “correctly”)?

I’ve never found a term in a “relation or property”. But…

I think the issue is more related to the concept of “complete”…?

I would think that “comprehensive” would be a more applicable word, but again…

I’m not seeing signs of either.

James, relational terms are not really a reliable measure . The compete metaphysical theory would include all those types of logical facts, hence for a totality or completeness to occur, it need be related.
According to Ayer, relational values have no truth value. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein takes up where Liebnitz leaves off, hence is seeking for a totality. The OP’s point is, that this complete metaphysical theory is supported by Wittgenstein’s list of these logical-factual propositions.

I think Wittgenstein should have stuck to his guns, and not reverse his position, to one where language games played became the modus operandi of his theory. But that’s only my way of looking at it. I think a lot of accommodation was done by him to come to toe the line of the empiricists in London. His Tractatus reflected earlier views of the Vienna Circle. Hope this helps.

Ah, I was just curious if any part of it was comparable to my own ontology.
…it doesn’t seem so.

 Granted.  You're point of view is in the majority opinion.

I wrote in my introduction in the essay I put on Google for you to download that there are 4 things we want in a metaphysical system:

completeness: all terms defined
justified: none of the terms lead to a contradiction or contradict how language is used popularly
comprehensive: confronts most of the philosophical problems of its day

Right now, we’re just aiming for condition one.

Well the three standard are;
1) Coherency (“consistency”)
2) Comprehensiveness
3) Relevance.

My Rational Metaphysics: Affectance Ontology Intro starts of like this;

Look, James, I appreciate you posting on my thread but continuous prose just doesn’t work for philosophy. You have to be more logical. Try to define 200 words in your ontology with the form X a Y which has the Z relation to A.

Really???
“more logical”…
“X a Y which has the Z relation to A”
“…200”
of them?

And not being my thread topic, I didn’t post the entire intro (since you didn’t seem to notice). But I am pretty sure it never had an “X a Y which has the Z relation to A” in it anywhere.

That would be any theory, or?
What makes this definition one of a metaphysical theory?

I tend to agree. A definitional theory does not
Make the metaphysical theory, but the OP makes no such claim. It just posits a possibility towards which such a theory could correspond to. Completeness is not the OP’s state. It is it’s intention. The completeness the OP considers, only meets the logical completeness of definitions. As such, the OP’s implication uses two meanings of completeness: one definitional toward an intended metaphysical probability

Only because the logical/nominal requirement of completeness is met, such completeness can not be used to further argue for a complete metaphysical probability. It can only show a movement toward such a completeness.

Sorry to hear that. There are allot of tard houses on the internet.

Yeah, but are they metaphysically complete?

Why would reality itself be a “complete” “system”?
We can say it is complete, and is a system, but is saying that or seeing that enough, is it real also?

Dan: Perceived boundary situations from a supposed “within” points of view, can be said to represent a reality, as an approximation of completeness, as the number of those varied realities approach total curveture emboundedness.(Embededness)

In such a way, reality can not be desribed as differentiable from it’s negation, as in the moebius strip, where the outside and inside are unperceptible. Mathematical logic and reality approach an idenitical non differentiable complete description of reality.

In case of the Moebius strip, who can say which surface is outside and which is inside? So I agree, linguistically it’s non descriptive.

 If you are talking common sense, reality in this way is desribed literally, and metaphysical theory is alway desribed as reality of a  figure of speech rather then as  correspondence with literal meaning. There can be no colloqual methapihysics, un- bound by tradition, and the hermenautic closure, does not help to regain it's meaning.

Metaphysics refers to the reasoning or logic that is beyond/above the physical reality. It addresses the “why’s” rather than the what’s.

What is required is;

  1. consistency/coherency
  2. comprehensiveness
  3. relevance

Without all of those three, no ontology can be said to be “complete”.
As far as I can tell after years of searching, RM:AO is the only one offered to the public that can make such a claim.