the simple objection against the fine-tuning argument

One can say: there are two possibilities concerning weather: either sunny or rainy. Therefore, the likelihood of a sunny day is 1/2.

But we know that it is FALSE: the likelihood of a sunny days is de facto higher in a sunny country. We calculate the likelihood of a sunny day not a priori, but a posteriori, by collecting data. And the likelihood we find expresses the laws followed by nature.

The defenders of the fine-tuning arguments are wrong because they calculate the likelihood of some cosmic phenomena in an a priori way, but they should instead collect data and check whether there are natural laws which make some events likely.

They could object: we concede that the a posteriori way of calculating the likelihood of phenomena is better than the a priori way, but since we can’t use the a posteriori way, we can only rely on the worse method and determine what is reasonable this way.

I am reminded of a piece from a satire of children’s science boooks called “Science Made Stupid” It had a section about making a rain gauge where you were supposed to get some “statistician’s ink” to put in the cylinder that collected rainfall. You could then compare the “probable rain” to the rain that actually fell.

Usually philosophical arguments don’t involve anything I would call ‘fine tuning’ when they invoke probabilities. I see phrases like “Somewhat more than .5” or “fairly low” or “reasonably high” way more often than specifics, unless those specifics are 1, .5, or 0.