Hi Bob!
Glad you’re back; hope you’re refreshed!
Before I give any studied response to your reply I want to tackle you about what appears to me to be your misapprehension of Stoic ‘apathy.’
I have taken the liberty of posting you the following excerpt from, Self-sufficiency and Power: Divine and Human Agency in Epictetus and Paul Troels Engberg-Pedersen, dealing with the matter.
Another formulation that comes back again and again is that of â€willing things exactly as they occur†(e.g. 1.12.15: hekasta houtô thelein hôs ginetai). Quite often the relationship with God is sounded too, e.g. in the passage just quoted where Epictetus continues: â€And how do they occur? As He that ordains them has ordained (hôs dietaxen auta ho diatassôn)â€. Thus another synonymous formulation is this (2.17.22): â€Do not will anything but what God wills†(mêden allo thele ê ha ho theos thelei).
This is of course the famous Stoic doctrine of apatheia. It has the usual radical consequence of a stark disengagement in relation to the world.
size=75 Do you not rather render thanks (eucharisteis) to the gods that they have allowed you to be superior (epanô) to all the things that they did not put under your control (epi soi), and have rendered you accountable (hypeuthynos) only for what is under your control? (33) As for parents, the gods have released you from accountability; as for brothers, they have released you; as for body, they have released you; and for property, death, life. (34) Well, for what have they made you accountable? For the only thing that is under your control – the proper use of impressions.[/size]
Note here the list of â€externalsâ€: parents, brothers, body, property, death, life. Clearly, Epictetus has chosen the things that are most highly valued in the ordinary valuation of things to make his point that none of these things is of ultimate concern to the person he is talking about, the truly human being. It is very important not to be misled here. The point is certainly not that the truly human being will not care about those things. On the contrary, they are precisely the things he does care about. Only, his ultimate concern is that he cares about them in the proper way. Thus in an interesting passage that would deserve more extended analysis, Epictetus discusses how, within his scheme of things, a person may be â€affectionate†(philostorgos), that is, love other human beings. That is possible, he claims (3.24.58 ), without giving up the principle of not depending (kremasthai) on anything other than oneself (ex allou). Take Socrates, Epictetus’ revered hero.
size=75 Did not Socrates love his own children? Yes, but as a free person (eleutheros), as one who remembers that it was his first duty to be a friend to the gods (theois einai philon).[/size]
The same is true of another of Epictetus’ heroes, Diogenes.
size=75 Come, was there anybody that Diogenes did not love, a man who was so gentle (hêmeros) and human-loving (philanthrôpos) that he gladly undertook all those troubles and physical hardships for the sake of the common weal (hyper tou koinou tôn anthrôpôn)? But what was the manner of his loving (ephilei pôs; )? (65) As became a servant of Zeus (hôs tou Dios diakonon edei), caring for men indeed (kêdomenos), but at the same time subject unto God (tôi theôi hypotetagménos).[/size]
I do hope you will take note and revise your apparent misapprehension of Stoic apathy. I again at the risk of angering you, emphasise Engberg-Pedersen’s very just and accurate appraisal/understanding of the concept:
“[size=100]It is very important not to be misled here. The point is certainly not that the truly human being will not care about those things. On the contrary, they are precisely the things he does care about. Only, his ultimate concern is that he cares about them in the proper way[/size].â€
Peter