A recent essay I did with the title:
Asses Hume’s criticisms of Miracles
It might be sensible to first summarize David Hume's Critique on miracles before we analyse it. In his section "Of Miracles" from Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), he starts with the proposition that:
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A miracle may be accurately defined as a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent.
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Then Hume divides his argument into two parts, the first being that of inductive probability. At route, this says that we can see a repetitive pattern in the way things work (A followed by B, A followed by B etc.) and that we can deduce it is likely to be A followed by B again. So if someone claims that they were suddenly and miraculously healed of cancer, we will probably not believe it. Thus, Hume sates that “a wise man propositions his belief to the evidence,” and “balance the opposite experiments in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.” He does not claim that miracles don’t or cannot happen, but rather that we cannot find reasonable grounds to believe the evidence.
The second part of the argument tries to reinforce this point, using four practical arguments which, according to Hume, point to the insufficiency of the evidence for miracles. First, that "any miracle must be attested by a sufficient number of men of good education and learning." Second, that we should be wary of evidence because "the passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles" is an "agreeable notion" (i.e. that people love miraculous signs). Third, that reports about miracles generally come out of "ignorant and barbarous nations" who cannot be reliable witnesses to an event. Finally that it is impossible for all world religions "to be established on any solid foundations," and that therefore contradictorily reports of miracles across the sectarian divide almost cancel each other out.
Let us now look closer at the claims that Hume makes here. To commence, his definition of a miracle itself has brought criticism from many a source. A prime example is R. F. Holland in his contingency defence of miracles, who seeks instead to define them as exceptional events which are only seen to be miraculous from a religious perspective. This may be true but, as Anthony Flew suggests, Holland's argument appears to be more a "get out" clause that a real challenge to Hume's critic.
Flew's suggestion, however, seems to be that Hume's argument still stands strong. In reality, there are a number of other criticisms we may make of it. Richard Swinburne attacks Hume's practical arguments and concludes that they are far too vague and indistinct. In the first instance, what can be seen as a "sufficient number of men"? Furthermore, just because people love the miraculous, we cannot infer that they are not suitable witnesses to give us accounts of miracles. And in response to Hume's quasi-outrageous view that miracles come out of "ignorant and barbarous nations," Swinburne has a counter-argument that, in the Middle Ages for example, there was access to in depth knowledge, the clergy were highly educated, and yet they believed in miracles. It is a good defence, but our critic is unable to get over the argument that most miracle stories have indeed come from pre-critical, pre-enlightenment (e.g. Kantian) times. Perhaps more convincing is that Swinburne believes that we can have some relevant evidence testifying to miracles. In the form of physical evidence, witness accounts, memories and contemporary understanding, we do have a certain base on which to rely. However, it has always been difficult to propose damming critiques of Hume's propositions (as his belief in empiricism is an undoubtedly convincing one), and Swinburne is unable to break this mould.
There is one other name which I feel must be mentioned. John Hick, renowned philosopher of religion, although not explicitly directed at Hume, lists some very valid points. In particular, we must come back to the issue of definition. Hume has "A Deity" (or God) as part of his, which seems at odds with his atheistic position. We might conclude that Hume sets up a definition of miracles to suit his own purposes, one which he will then criticise to show how we shouldn't believe in stories of miracles. Hick, by means of contrast, sets down clearly and succinctly that:
It is possible to define the term in either purely physical and nonreligious terms, as a breach or suspension of natural law, or in religious terms, as an unusual and striking event that evokes and mediates a vivid awareness of God.
Unlike Hume, therefore, Hick makes a clear distinction between atheistic and Christian means of definition. He also points out that since it is impossible to breach a law of nature, and so if any miracle is defined as such "one can declare a priori that there are no miracles." Now why could Hume not have just said this? He also addresses the argument against miracles within religion on the basis that "it does not follow that there are no miracles in the religious sense of the word." Finally, Hick takes a shot at Hume's argument on "ignorant and barbarous nations" by pointing to "the present time" and our own "very limited state of human knowledge."
I conclude that these criticisms go some way to damage Hume's critique, but its relevance to us has been by no means completely diminished.
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