On the philosophy board there was a discussion of eastern vs western philosophy. I made some comments as I was writing this essay at the time (for uni). I figured I’d chuck it on here and see what people reckon. Sorry if it seems a bit brief, I was working to a 2500 word limit.
- Prima facie at least, there are differences between the notion of freedom analysed from a first-person’s perspective from that analysed from the third-person’s perspective. But are there really differences between them? If not, why not? If there are, what exactly are the differences?
The prima facie difference between the first-person’s perspective and the third-person’s perspective is the nature of the claims made. The first-person’s perspective makes introspective claims about human freedom. It asks the question; am I free? The third-person perspective makes claims from the outside looking in. It asks the question; is she free? At the same time, they are both analysing the same thing; human freedom. They argue from premises about personal identity to conclusions about freedom. Their knowledge is drawn from the content of human experience, and their reasoning is based on logic. Indeed, the first-person metaphysical model of the Hindus resembles the third-person model of Kant. Similarly, Hume’s model, and his argument, closely resembles Buddhism. This dichotomy is interesting, as Buddha’s model was a response to Hinduism, and, conversely, Kant was responding to Hume. This essay is an examination of the similarities and differences between Hinduism and Kant, and Buddhism and Hume. The purpose of this examination is to see whether the difference in perspective leads to other differences in the analysis of the similar model.
Hindu Analysis of Freedom
The Hindu account of personal identity revolves around an eternal subject, or “self”. The Upanisads use the metaphor of a passenger in a chariot to describe the self . The intellect is the chariot driver, the mind is the reins, the body is the chariot, the horses are the senses and the objects of sense are the lands they travel over. Essentially, this eternal self, or “ātman”, is the passive subject of perception. It is the thing that sees when I see, the thing that feels when I feel and the thing that thinks when I think. Ātman cannot be sensed, or “sought by outward knowledge” . It can never be one of the objects that it perceives, as it is the very thing that is perceiving.
“He who is awake in those that sleep,
The Person who fashions desire after desire-
That indeed is the pure. That is Brahman.
That indeed is called the immortal.
On it all the worlds do rest;
And no one soever goes beyond it.
This, verily, is That!”
Ātman is not merely the grounds of one’s personhood, it is equivalent to Brahman, the grounds of everything, or ultimate reality . The nature and reality of ātman is the fundamental assumption of Hindu Metaphysics.
The Bhagavad-Gitā uses this account of personal identity as a grounds for an analysis of freedom. The vehicle for this analysis is a dialogue between the warrior-prince, Arjuna, and the incarnate deity, Krsna. Arjuna is about to fight a war against his “own people” . He is troubled that it is wrong for him to kill his own teachers and kinsmen to serve the “greed” of his superiors. Eventually, after asking Krsna’s advice, he refuses to fight. Krsna’s response is that Arjuna misunderstands the true nature of ātman. All of the persons that Arjuna is worried about destroying are physical vessels carrying a spark of the ultimate reality. When the body perishes, the self persists, as it is a part of the immortal divine. Bodies are destined to perish, and souls to be reborn, so death should not concern Arjuna. Arjuna should instead be concerned with his own duty, without regard for possible consequences. Desires and concerns for consequences drive the lower states of consciousness. A consciousness that is at one with ātman is freed from these concerns. That sort of consciousness will be motivated by duty, and will be free to focus all of its attention on the performance of duty.
“Do thou become free, Arjuna, from this threefold nature ; be free from the dualities; be firmly fixed in purity, not caring for acquisition and preservation; and be possessed of the Self.”
Freedom, for the Hindu, is elevating consciousness to a level where it is directed by ātman, and motivated by duty. It is a freedom from concern for one’s actions. Arjuna should fight because, as he is a warrior-prince, it is his duty. If he was at one with ātman, then he would not be concerned with anything else.
Kantian Analysis of Freedom
The Hindu account of personal identity analyses the subject-object relationship, from the perspective of the subject . Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is also an analysis of the subject-object relationship, from the perspective of an outsider looking in. The similarity does not end there. For Kant, it is a precondition of human reasoning that there be a subject who is reasoning . As with Hinduism, Kantian personal identity is essentially the thing that thinks when I think. Furthermore, Kant believes that space and time are simply the structure in which appearances are presented to the understanding . Appearances are the result of the subject-object relationship, the subject and object, as they exist alone, cannot appear. The subject in itself is not merely immortal, in the sense that it exists at all times. Instead, it exists outside space and time, outside the structure of appearances. It is the eternal reasoning which understands and interprets temporal appearances. Furthermore, while it cannot appear, it is a presupposition of all appearances. The Kantian model of personal identity is a third person account of ātman. Where The Upanisads make the claim, you are ātman; the first Critique claims that every human is an ātman.
For Kant, freedom is freeing the will from temporal desires, and directing it with reason alone . When the will is directed by a desire, it is part of a temporal causal chain that stretches back to the first instant. When the will is directed by pure reason, action is being caused by the rational subject, or ātman. As this exists outside of time, it acts as a first cause when it motivates an action within time. This power to be a first cause leads to a comparison with a possible first cause of the temporal universe. Kant believes that this comparison necessarily arises from the first-person perspective . This comparison is reminiscent of the relationship between Brahman and ātman. However, he makes the point that we cannot know whether there is a God, or Brahman, from the third person perspective. This is because we cannot know the universe as it exists independently of subject-object relationships.
Kant analyses the fundamental practical implications of his account of freedom in The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Here he outlines two categories of possible imperatives; hypothetical and categorical . Hypothetical imperatives are when an agent should act in a certain way, if they desire a certain outcome. Categorical imperatives are when an agent should act in a certain way, irrespective of what they may desire. An agent who is directed by reason alone is acting according to a categorical imperative. For the Kantian, as well as the Hindu, freedom is putting ātman in charge, and acting in accordance with duty, “for the sake of duty” . However, Kant goes further than this. From the first person perspective, identifying duty is simply harmonising with the same ātman as everyone else. However, when you view the subject-object relationship from an external perspective, humans appear as qualitatively identical, numerically discrete, interacting ātmans. From this perspective, harmonizing with ātman necessarily involves respecting others as ātmans. For Kant, it is not enough for Arjuna to identify his duty as a warrior-prince. He must also take into account the duties of his enemies. Kant employs the same basic model of personal identity and freedom as Krsna. However, he would argue, from a third person perspective, that Arjuna’s doubts are justified in accordance with his duty not to treat others as a means to his own ends .
Buddhist Analysis of Freedom
The Buddha had tried to gain spiritual enlightenment through Hinduism . He rejected that religion, meditated himself to enlightenment, and founded a new religion. Part of his rejection of Hinduism is a rejection of their account of personal identity. He rejects the notion that there is an entity that is separate from our thoughts and perceptions, such as ātman. The Buddhist account of personal identity is analysed in a dialogue between a Buddhist monk, Nāgasena, and a foreign king, Milinda . Like the Upanisads, Nāgasena uses the metaphor of a chariot to explain to Milinda why there is no person addressing him. He asks if any of the individual parts of the chariot is the “chariot”. Then he asks if the all of the parts are the “chariot”. Finally he asks if there is a chariot apart from all the parts. Milinda admits that none of these are the “chariot” itself, and there is no chariot apart from them. This is analogous to Milinda’s earlier line of questioning about the parts of Nāgasena’s body and mind. There is no Nāgasena apart from his body and mind, yet the parts of his body and mind do not capture the meaning of “Nāgasena”.
“Just as when the parts are rightly set
The word ‘chariot’ is spoken,
So when there are the khandā
It is the convention to say 'being” "
For the Buddhist, the “I” in “I think” is merely a sound that denotes the body containing its particular bundle of thoughts and perceptions. There is no discrete entity, “I”, that is separate from the body, thoughts and perceptions.
The Buddhist notion of freedom is about being free from the illusion that you are a person. When Buddha completed his enlightening meditation, he began teaching a doctrine based on the Four Noble Truths;
- "The truth of duhkha.
- The truth of cause of duhkha.
- The truth of cessation of duhkha.
- The truth of the path leading to the cessation of duhkha."
Duhkha is usually translated as suffering, however, it is probably best understood as the antonym of Aristotle’s “eudaimonia” . Duhkha represents a lack of fulfilment, and it is the defining characteristic of normal human existence. This lack of fulfilment is caused by “clinging” desires. These desires are ultimately caused by the idea that you own your mind and body. This idea is based on the illusion that the self is something separate from the mind and body. When you stop believing that you own your experiences, you are freed from desires. When you are free from desires, you are free from duhkha. Finally, the way to stop believing that you own your experiences is the eightfold path. For the Buddhist, ordinary human existence is driven by wanting things for yourself. Freedom is realising that there is no self to want things for, and, consequently, not wanting things.
Humean Analysis of Freedom
The Humean argument for personal identity is remarkably similar to the Buddhist argument. Essentially, it is a first-person argument supporting a third-person conclusion. Hume introspectively analyses his own personal identity to support third-person claims about human identity. He does this by sarcastically allowing that others may have different experiences, and can perceive some distinct persistent entity called the self . While the core of his argument is first-person, the perspective from which he approaches the whole issue is classical western empiricism.
“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other - I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.”
This is reminiscent of Nāgasena’s argument that there was no part of a body or mind that could be identified as a self. As a consequence, they have a similar account of personal identity. For Hume, as for Nāgasena, the self is a body containing a bundle of thoughts and perceptions.
Hume is a determinist, in that he believes every human action is ultimately caused by a desire. He sees freedom as an illusion based on the idea that reason can cause action, independently of desire . Hume’s view of ordinary human existence is similar to the Buddhist view. Humans are bodies, filled with perceptions and thoughts, and driven by desires. Buddha looked inward from a tradition of first-person introspection, and found nothing. He concluded that this freed him from the shackles of ordinary human existence. Hume looked inward from a tradition of third-person reflection, and found nothing. He concluded that all that exists is the shackles of ordinary human existence. What intrinsic value could meditation have from a third person perspective? From the outside looking in, meditation is the ultimate in doing nothing. Meditation can only have an instrumental value from the third-person perspective, such as improving health or mental well-being. However, meditation is a way of life for the Buddhist. It is a way of losing the illusion of personhood, and becoming free from the whole process of valuing.
Conclusion
There are many similarities between the analyses of Hinduism and Kant, or Buddhism and Hume. They argue from similar premises about personal identity to similar conclusions about human action. Their metaphysical models are similar, as are their rules of logic. They make their claims from different perspectives, but there is little difference in the content of their claims, analysed from either perspective. Indeed, the greater difference is between the philosophies of Kant and Hume, or Krsna and Buddha. Having said that, a difference in perspective is not simply a difference in the nature of the claims made. It is also a difference in the possible implications of those claims. The third-person perspective enabled Kant to provide content to the notion of duty. The first-person perspective showed Buddha a way to be free from desire. The difference between the third- and first-person perspective is like thinking outside the square. Changing perspective is analogous to struggling with an algebraic equation, and solving it geometrically. It is approaching the same model from a different angle, resulting in a slightly different set of possible implications. A difference in perspective is more than just a difference in the nature of the claims made. It is also a difference between the implications arising from those claims.