Nietzsche's Early Metaphysics.

The fundamental concept of Nietzsche’s early metaphysics is the Primordial One. “One” is here a nominalised adjective and is neuter. It may be relevant to note that originally, the word “god”, too, was neuter. The Primordial One is the ‘God’ of Nietzsche’s early metaphysics. One should remember at all times though that It is immanent, not transcendent.

The Primordial One has Being (as opposed to “Becoming”) and suffers from it. This suffering is a suffering from over-fulness, over-joyedness: the Primordial One aches for lack and woe. It therefore imagines a world of Becoming, lack, and woe. This imagined world, this vision, is not outside It, but It is immanent to it: it is the world as we know it—the world we are a part of. The world as we know it is an imaginary self-fragmentation of the Primordial One; we are really only imaginary fragments, and only have reality in being one with the Primordial One.

This world of Becoming, lack, and woe, which Nietzsche usually calls “Nature” (and which he personifies, hence the capital N), itself also aches for something. Contrary to the Primordial One, Whose ache’s alleviation it is, it aches for Being, fulness, and joy. And this ache is again alleviated by imagination: by Apollinian illusion. This illusion is not only the alleviation of Nature, but also the complete redemption of the Primordial One. For the Primordial One delights in seeing Its ‘creatures’ (most notably human beings) at ease in the illusion of Being. This happiness of Nature/Becoming in the illusion of Being transfigures the Primordial One’s own Being: Being now seems something desirable, indeed, the highest good. What delusion! This identication of the good, the beautiful, and the true in Being is the furthest away from the truth and therefore the most desirable. This illusion is truly the highest good and the most beautiful beloved. But only for the Primordial One. For us, it is beautiful and good, but only as a relief from Becoming, not as a transfiguration of Being. In order to partake in the delight of this transfiguration, we must put ourselves in the place of the Primordial One.

The highest form of the illusion of Being in the midst of Becoming is attained by the Apollinian genius. It is for the sake of this genius that the State exists. All human organisations larger than the family ultimately exist solely for this purpose, and even the family ultimately derives its worth solely from compensating for any deficiencies the State may have (hence in Plato’s perfect State, the family was to cease: for it would no longer have been of any use).

But there is also another kind of genius, and this has in itself nothing to do with the State. It is the Dionysian genius. The genius of the Dionysian genius consists in his being able to put himself in the place of the Primordial One. The supreme achievement of the exclusively Dionysian genius is experiencing the world as we know it as the Primordial One experiences it: as an alleviation of the torment of Being, overfulness, and overjoyedness in the illusion of Becoming, lack, and woe. But this achievement is not the supreme human achievement. The supreme human achievement is the supreme achievement of the both Dionysian and Apolllinian genius. This genius can at the same time put himself in the place of the Primordial One and create Apollinian images.

[size=95][N]ow Apollo approaches him and touches him with his laurel. The sleeper’s enchantment through Dionysian music now begins to emit sparks of imagery, poems which, at their point of highest evolution, will bear the name of tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs.
[Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 5.]

[O]nly in the work of art that is the tragedy do we hear that highest twin art which, in its union of the Apollinian and the Dionysian, is the image [Abbild] of that primordial enjoyment of the eye of the world.
[Nietzsche, fragment of an advanced form of The Birth of Tragedy.][/size]

That is impossible. How can one that has everything suffer? Suffering exists because one lacks something. If one lacks something or suffers, then one is still becoming. Being does not do anything; if it did, it would be becoming.

Good point. The difficulty is that this Being is also a Becoming: as I said, the Primordial One is immanent to Nature. It is simply the whole of Nature, Nature as a whole. Becoming is, i.e., has Being.—

I still don’t buy this part. Being, by definition cannot be Becoming because it cannot move. If Primordial One is immanent to Nature, then the Primordial One is not Being to begin with, it is and always has been Becoming.

Has Becoming itself become? Has it not always been Becoming?—You can compare this to ‘Block Time’: time (Becoming) forms a block in a higher dimension (just as a plane may form a sphere in a higher dimension). The comparison is apt, as Nietzsche has this to say about the Primordial One:

[size=95]Mankind, with all of Nature as its to be presupposed womb, may in this broadest sense be characterised as the continuous birth of the genius: seen from that monstrous omnipresent perspective of the Primordial One, the genius is attained at every moment, the whole pyramid of appearance is perfect up to its apex. We, in the narrowness of our view and within the perception-mechanism [Vorstellungsmechanismus] of time, space, and causality, have to take a back seat when we recognise the genius as one among many and after many human beings; yea, we may be glad when we have recognised him at all, which can at bottom only happen by coincidence and has in many cases certainly never happened.
[fragment of an advanced form of The Birth of Tragedy.][/size]

This implies that the Primordial One is not bound to said ‘perception-mechanism’—i.e., to time, space, or causality.

Anyway, you don’t have to buy anything, as Nietzsche later said this about his early metaphysics:

[size=95][Y]ou can call this whole artists’ metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the moral interpretation and significance of existence.
[Attempt at a Self-Criticism, 5.][/size]

Are we supposed to believe it simply because someone said so? This above claim is nonsensical. There is no such thing, and even if there was, we, as temporal beings, are never to know it.

I would call it symmetrical, with the exception of Being, which, in this context, is a contradictory concept to me.

Where did I say anyone is supposed to believe any of the above? All I have done is attempted to summarise Nietzsche’s early metaphysics. As I’ve shown (see below), it seems he later came to reject all of it except its amorality.

Well, to me it isn’t, as I’ve tried to explain to you. The only real problem I have with it is in the idea (which I haven’t yet mentioned in this thread) that representations which are “all Outside” (all surface) are superior, from the perspective of the Primordial One at least, to representations of things which actually exist (for instance the light I saw in my last mushroom trip superior to my perception of actual light). This does ring true to my heart, but not to my head, so to say: for I think there is no absolute difference: all our fantasies and hallucinations are based on our memory, that is to say on our perception of reality; more precisely, our entire consciousness is the result of reactions in our brain.

I am just saying - I don’t believe it.

And I thank you, Sauwelios. If you do not wish the others to step in and criticise it just make a disclaimer on top of the summary next time.

You gave this quote to illustrate this point:

This sounds to me more of a self-compliment than self-criticism.

I do not even like to go this far. To claim to know what this is like is to already step into an illusion; not unlike sketching a picture of an existence made up of parallel universes.

No offense taken!

You may of course criticise my summary. You can also criticise what has been summarised (which I think is what you’ve been doing), but I think it’s an assumption on your part that I should feel attacked by the latter.

Do the words “arbitrary”, “idle”, and “fantastic” (which latter is meant in the literal sense, as “fanciful”) sound complimentary to you?

Okay, let me rephrase it (i.e., say explicitly what was only implied before):

The only real problem I have with it is in the fact (which I haven’t yet mentioned in this thread) that, according to the early Nietzsche, representations which are “all Outside” (all surface) are superior, from the perspective of the Primordial One at least, to representations of things which actually exist (for instance the light I saw in my last mushroom trip superior to my perception of actual light). This does ring true to my heart, but not to my head, so to say: for I think there is no absolute difference: all our fantasies and hallucinations are based on our memory, that is to say on our perception of reality; more precisely, our entire consciousness is the result of reactions in our brain.

And as I’ve shown, the later Nietzsche criticised the artists’ metaphysics of the early Nietzsche as deserving of being called “fantastic”, among other things.

Disclaimer: I’m not saying that any of Nietzsche’s early metaphysics is true or even probable; only that, in my view, all of it is possible—except for representations which are “all Outside”.

No, it sounds critical. He anticipates criticism of what he refers to as “this whole…” but immediately dismisses it by saying “what matters is…” as if to imply that the beforementioned criticism is not really important here (that is, he is basically dismissing criticism).
He is somewhat vague in this quote and I think I need more context of that quote because I may actually be reading it differently. First of all, who is he referring to in this quote, himself or somebody else when he says “artists’ metaphysics”? Is he pre-emptively addressing his own view from a critic’s point of view? Or is he referring to the other people of like mind (his followers?), as addressed by the critics? I feel like there is a third-party present here.

Who are the artists here? His followers? Himself? Someone else? Who is he criticising?
You said

And in quote that follows Nietzsche is addressing criticism of someone else. (i.e. “the artists”)
I thought it was about self-criticism. If it’s self-criticism, then, first of all, why do so through a third party and why dismiss it by implying that the criticism does not really matter?

I think it’s best to look at this “primordial one” as something immanent in a mind that conceptualizes nature
(or the universe or whatever vague abstraction that we can only agree to based off agreed associations to concrete nouns… the universe as an unimaginable extension of the night sky, for example),
rather than something supposedly immanent and inseparably with a material universe we believe objectively exists in some absolute way (whether or not we can comprehend, understand it).

The way being and becoming has been defined does make it seem contradictory, and that is what makes it a kind of artistic/poetic metaphysics; however, it can accurately express the subjective experiences–the perceptual aspects–of Being and Becoming, as to distinguishable states, even though the communicable concepts themselves only have meaning in light of the other. Basically, they are always together, the only difference is whether or not the subjective experience differentiates perceptual forms or sees them all as one.

It’s not important to him (it is an attempt at a self-criticism after all) at that point. It was important to him when he wrote it.

He is criticising, or trying to criticise, himself. But there are no ‘artists’ involved. The word translated as “artists’ metaphysics” above, Artisten-Metaphysik, could also be translated as “artist’s metaphysics”. For the context, see http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_the_birth_of_tragedy/the_birth_of_tragedy.htm.

It’s a bit unusual that he addresses himself in third person, and plural. Threw me off a bit. But I guess he does have a somewhat ambigous style.
I wonder if he he was name-called as “artist” in his time.

Thanks. I’ll give it a read.

I would say our consciousness is even more primarily the result of the existence of the brain itself. That makes it possible to conceive of general fantasies, inherent to the brain. Perhaps life after death is returning to the latent primordial fantasy of the structure of the brain.

The way I have read Nietzsche’s early metaphysics is somewhat similar. Suffering and joy are associated with both the Dionysian (Primal One) and the Apollonian (illusion of Being, principle of individuation), and so do not solely belong to one or the other (this is what you’re saying in a round about way, aren’t you?). We experience joy in the Primal One because we feel at one with our fellow men and nature, but we also can experience joy in the illusion of Being by contemplating “beautiful forms”. Similarly with suffering, the Primal One is the “primal contradiction and primal pain” from which the world speaks, but suffering can also occur in the illusion of Being through our feelings of isolation and alienation from our fellow men; we long for the collapse of the principle of individuation and a return to the Primal One.

Dionysian intoxication is an excess and this is why the world in-itself Becomes. Apollo attempts to halt the flux by creating forms; but all forms are fleeting; the Heraclitian flux disolves all forms.

I think you’re essentially saying the same thing, but in a different way. Or maybe not?

It took me a while before I could put my finger on it, but I think this is where we differ:

I distinguish three different things:

1. the Primordial One, oneness, actual Being;
2. Nature, the illusion of fragmentation/individuation and of Becoming—this is a dream or vision by the Primordial One;
3. dreams or visions by imaginary individuals (like ourselves), illusions or hallucinations of Being.

The joy of 2 is experienced by the Primordial One. The joy of 3 is experienced by That and Nature (including the imaginary individuals mentioned under 3). The joy of 1 is experienced only by the imaginary individuals mentioned under 3.

The suffering from 1 is experienced by the Primordial One. The suffering from 2 is experienced by Nature. The suffering from 3 is experienced by said individuals (if not by all of Nature) when they have been “traumatically wounded” by the ‘truth’ (the ‘fact’ of 2), so deeply that they cannot plaster over it with 3. 1 then becomes their redemption (but only because it makes possible the alleviation by 2 and the redemption in 3).

In my words, this intoxation is an excess on the part of the Primordial One (Which one could personify as the cosmic Dionysus), and this excess, this superabundance, drives It to imagine Nature (fragmentation/individuation and Becoming). Is that what you meant?

Kind of. I agree that intoxication and excess is personified as the cosmic Dionysus. But I interpreted this to be the embodiment of Becoming. The Apollonian impulse tries to halt the excess (Becoming); kind of like pressing the pause button of a vcr and freeze framing one section of a film - hence “appearance” and “individuation” (Being) occurs. So, it isn’t the excess that drives it to “imagine Nature”, instead the excess is what ruptures Nature as “appearance/individuation”.

What’s the difference between Nature (from 2) and Primordial Oneness (from 1)? Nature is the Apollonian impulse?
Also, if Primordial Oneness is a suffering and woe, is redemption to be really found in it? I would agree if, as I stated in my previous post, that the Primordial Oneness can be associated with joy as well as suffering.

They’re the same ‘thing’, but Nature is the Primordial One veiled by the illusions of fragmentation/individuation and Becoming.

Yes, but as I said, only because it makes possible the alleviation by 2 and the redemption in 3.

It can, as I’ve shown. It suffers from Itself (Its own fullness), but enjoys Nature and the dreams or visions that arise in Nature.

No. It is the embodiment of Causing-to-become. I will now quote a long but important passage from the Nachlass:

[size=95]Fundamental psychological experiences: with the name “Apollinian” is designated the ravished Pausing before a poetically-invented and dreamed-up world, before the world of beautiful appearance as a redemption from Becoming: with the name Dionysos, on the other hand, Becoming is conceived actively, empathised-with subjectively, as raging voluptuousness of the creating one, who at the same time knows the anger of the destroying one.
Antagonism of these two experiences and the underlying desires. The former wants appearance to be eternal: before it, man becomes still [or: silent], wishless, waveless [like a sea], healed, reconciled with oneself and all existence; the second desire urges toward Becoming, toward the voluptuousness of Causing-to-become [Werden-machen], i.e., of Creating and Destroying. Becoming, experienced and interpreted from the inside, would be the continuous Creating on the part of an unsatisfied one, an over-rich one, an infinitely tense and urged one, a God Who overcomes the torment of Being only through constant Transforming and Changing:—appearance as His temporary, at-every-moment-attained redemption; the world as the succession of divine visions and redemptions-in-appearance.
[source unknown, I suspect from 1886; my translation.][/size]

Compare the phrase I made bold to the following:

[size=95]The will to appearance, to illusion, to delusion, to Becoming and Changing (to objective delusion) here [in The Birth of Tragedy] counts as deeper, more original, more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to Being:—the latter is itself only a form of the will to illusion.
[WP 853, my trans.][/size]

The former will is aroused in the Primordial One by the torment of Its Being. This Being is Its truth, Its reality; It cannot really escape from it. So It escapes from it in Its imagination: It imagines Becoming. This is a delusion not on the part of a subject, but on the part of the only object, the only objective existent there is—hence “objective delusion”. And the latter will, the will to imaginary/Apollinian truth, reality, and Being, only arises within that objective delusion, within ‘Nature’: thus it is less deep, less original, less ‘metaphysical’.

Becoming is not the excess; Becoming is the lack. ‘Nature’ is need. Apollinian beauty is in the illusion of the absence of want.

I disagree. I say that excess only exists in the ‘rupturedness’ of Nature—behind Nature, behind the veil of illusion that is Nature—in that veil’s ‘shreddenness’. The Becoming that is Nature is the Arising and Perishing of individual beings (both living and lifeless). There can be no notion of Becoming without the notion of such beings. What the Apollinian does, is, it seeks to eternalise such beings. The excess and joy of the Dionysian, however, does not lie in the ‘Transientising’ of such beings, not in Becoming as such, but in the Being of Becoming, the eternity of Becoming, the true Being behind yet immanent in that Becoming:

[size=95]The metaphysical consolation—with which, I wish to say at once, all true tragedy sends us away—that, despite every phenomenal change [Wechsel der Erscheinungen, “change of appearances”] life is at bottom indestructibly powerful and joyful, appears in corporeal manifestness in the satyr-chorus, a chorus of nature-beings who so to say dwell ineradicably behind all civilisation and remain eternally the same despite all change of generations and historical movement.
[BT 7, my trans.][/size]

For such a consolation in eternity from much later in Nietzsche’s career, cf. WP 1065.

nietzscheforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=631