You can be “in large part materialist” if 95% of your actions are those of a materialist, and it is only in low-stakes situations when you are anti-materialist.
Let me try to explain why the fault does not lie with materialism. As I said before, you’re just messing with scale, applying the same principle to a ridiculous scale. It’s like me saying “what if a 3000 pound toad that was orbiting the sun had a soul? It would have to be a person! What an absurd conclusion!”, or something similar. See, you’ve set up a pretty bizarre scenario before you apply materialist conclusions: trillions of people standing around raising signs in response to each other is weird, regardless of what it produces.
But we have every reason to believe that Windows, Unix, or any other common operating system could run (albeit slowly) on such uncommon hardware, and that seems just as weird. Does that mean computer science suffers for it? I don’t think so.
Interrelatedness has an effect because the mind is a process, not a state (I’m not sure if Xunzian meant it as a state when he said “The ‘mind’ is nothing more than what we call the network of the brain,” but if it was I diverge with him here). Continue with the computer example: If I take a frozen image of the programs I’m running right now, do I have an instant of a program? If a bunch of people holding up signs randomly hold them up in just such a way that they are the same as those held by people running OSX 10.4 with their signs, is it an instant of 10.4? If it is, what does that mean?
Here’s another example. I have a string of shapes: Cirles(c), Triangles(t) and Squares(s). They form a pattern: c t s c t s c t s c t s c t s c t s. Now, is the circle an instance of the pattern? It doesn’t seem so. It seems strange to say that if the shapes were arranged randomly, each would be an instant of the pattern. In the same way, the mind is the pattern, and a single brain-state is not consciousness without the connection to the preceding and following brain-state.
“Remembering last tuesday” is another case of poor context. If I design a computer that has a word document on it, is it so terrible? No body ‘wrote’ the document, and yet the computer seems to ‘remember’ that a word document was written to it. It might even be dated from last tuesday, but it’s still not a problem from computer theory.
Now, let’s throw the part of the computer that represents that document, written last tuesday, in a ditch. What’s that, there is no one part of your computer that concerns itself with this document? Well, of course, the document is a complex entity, comprising graphics, memory, logic, etc., and drawing from all over the hardware. So there is no problem with the word processing document existing in the ditch, because to throw the document in the ditch, you need most of the computer.
Basically, the folk break-down of the mind is not a one to one match with the material break-down. That’s not to say that there isn’t a material correlate process that maps the folk break down, or that the mind can’t be described materially, but that there aren’t bits of your brain representing certain thoughts or feelings. Thoughts and feelings are processes, a continuity of entire brain-states.