by Ingenium » Wed Jan 16, 2008 7:56 am
1. THE EXPERIENCE OF READING CLASSIC WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AS A FEMALE
While reading the commentary of modern female philosophers or scholars who have surveyed the development of ideas by the classic Western male philosophers, I’ve discovered that I have something in common with them. What happens is that, over time, we experience an unusual (and unexpected) outcome from our readings. One can read along, considering and evaluating the bases for the many illustrious and overarching ideas about humanity that she encounters and, almost invariably, two things will happen. First, the reader will come across -- sometimes either as snippets inserted somewhat incongruously into the middle of a major work or as commentary that continues for pages -- some surprising negativity leveled at women. Second, as she reads on down through the centuries (or, indeed, travels backward from the recent past), she begins to discover that theories she might read that appear to be presented as applicable to “humanity†often end up reflecting the experience of particular men during particular times and, furthermore, serving as justifications and rationalizations for both the inferiority of women and their exploitation and control by men.
It’s akin to an out-of-body experience: I’m in the situation of reading ideas which purport to represent something essential about either humanity generally or women specifically -- both groups which include me and therefore the ideas about which are of great interest to me -- yet the sense is of being a muzzled observer of a group of men with a particular worldview talking with each other about ideas presumed globally valid, and they’re oblivious or indifferent that I’m there in the room watching myself be excluded or disparaged by them.
It’s pretty disconcerting when one comes to realize after a time that it’s in fact not uncommon for the eminent male philosophers of Western civilization to wax misogynistic when their attention is directed to the ‘nature of woman.’ One of the things I’ve discovered when reading the commentary of modern women philosophers about this experience is that they note how, prior to the advent of feminism, these pejorative commentaries regarding the female were consigned to near-absolute silence in contemporary scholarly analyses of the classics. But not addressing the misogyny can be extremely problematic for women, because the works of these philosophers form the basis for both philosophical debate and further exploration of ideas in a modern context. As it turns out, this very nature of philosophy to be an ongoing, contextual narrative of the human condition is what both confronts women with significant dilemmas and offers the potential for addressing them. But not without a lot of work…excruciating work sometimes, as it turns out.
By no means am I suggesting that all of the major Western philosophical works are blatantly misogynistic. In fact, there are relatively few in which the misogyny is as openly expressed in negative language as when we’re described as “the devil’s gateway†(Tertullian), or as “big children their whole life long†(Schopenhauer). In fact, if this sort of obvious commentary occurred more often, it would perhaps make the dilemma a little easier to dismiss. But the essential problem goes much deeper than this. When the subject is handled more subtly, females may be described in apparently positive terms, but with an assertion that their roles are different from the roles of men, albeit equally important. However, further inquiry will usually reveal the existence of an implicit hierarchy lurking behind this language of “differenceâ€, in that values equated with the ‘masculine’ are assigned a higher status than values equated with the ‘feminine’. Once this has been established, the common path taken is to assert a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between men and women. Even more fundamentally, it’s theorized that man is the ‘norm’ that defines the human, and woman is thus defined only in relation to man (and often found deficient). So what we find is that philosophers of this sort characterize their efforts as exploring and theorizing about the ‘human’ condition and yet they offer up ideas and assumptions about women that must certainly have impinged upon their understanding of ‘humanity’ in the first place.
2. ABOUT PERSPECTIVE
Women who read philosophy (I’m not referring here to women who are professional philosophers, as they’re in an altogether different category of expertise) will fall under one of perhaps three (but really two) relevant political categories: feminists, ‘not-a-feminist-buts’, and the rest. The difference between first two is mostly a matter of identifying or not with the label, but essentially maintaining similar viewpoints about women and social equality. The third is a mindset probably best labeled ‘traditional’ rather than neutral, as the existing pre-feminist cultural standard was of fairly rigid sex-based roles. In some cases, it would even be considered to represent females holding the view that men are their superiors. Certainly these readers would be expected to find the most agreement with the views of many classic philosophers.
However, the expression of philosophical concepts isn’t merely an intellectual undertaking, it’s also tied into a particular moralistic and ethical (and ultimately socio-political) explanation of the world. So what those who read classic philosophy from the feminist perspective end up trying to resolve is how to separate that which is true about the philosophers’ ideas from their misogyny, or that which is false, with the hopes that the two aren’t so inseparable that this ends up being impossible, essentially forcing one to search for some alternative basis for exploring these sorts of ideas.
Feminists assert that a great deal of male theorizing about women’s experience has tended to disregard or invalidate that experience. The issue isn’t that there’s an independent female perspective per se, that there’s any particular characteristic(s) that women have in common that places them all under the generic brand “womanâ€, or that there’s a female exclusivity to truth, but rather it’s asserted that men can’t claim any of this either. It’s quite likely that philosophy would have evolved differently if female experience had all along had the same entry into the field as male experience, since philosophical theories emanating exclusively from men reflect only men’s experience (including their experience of women). As it is, the symbolic division by gender appears to be an essential and enduring way of articulating people’s experience. And the experiences of women would be expected to vary over time and by circumstance from the experiences of men and, to take it a step further, experiences will vary among differing groups of women. So there’s a category and degree of the proposition and/or analysis of beliefs and assumptions that are fundamentally missing from the philosophical canon, because women’s inquiries haven’t, for various identifiable reasons, made the cut.
3. SO WHAT’S THE PROBLEM SPECIFICALLY?
Considering that the historical body of theories we have available in the West about human nature was pretty much dominated by a select and relatively homogenous group of men expounding on ‘humanity’ as a whole, its utility in interpreting female experience is subject to debate. Bias is reflected in the way these men’s theories are developed according to fundamental norms, like reason and objectivity being gendered male. And, beyond that, their theories are cast a priori as normative in respect to everyone. That members of this group would err in theorizing about the situation of all people isn’t an unknown problem in philosophy. In fact, most scholars accept that there are parts (sometimes large parts) of any given philosopher’s ideas that don’t hold true when applied beyond particular limited circumstances. But prior to the women’s movement, virtually no dissenting voices were heard concerning the problems resulting from male bias in addressing women in philosophical terms. It was as though there was this collective lack of insight that a good deal of what was written about “man’s nature†was not really what men were about, but instead constructions of themselves in contrast with their views of women. Perhaps the form that these constructions took dating back as far as Aristotle, which essentially justified the irrelevancy of females in the loftier (public) world of philosophical ideas, effectively prevented women from finding a forum to
persuasively challenge those ideas.
There’s bias in the traditional exclusion of woman as a representative model of human nature, which reflects the assumption that the complete story of humanity can be explained by representing only half of its experiential element. There’s bias in the emphasis on the mind and reason as characterizing human nature, along with these traits supposed to be associated with masculinity, and the corresponding downplaying or reduction in status of the bodily and the emotions, which are supposed associated with femininity. Going back as far as Plato and Aristotle, reason has been deemed to be the defining characteristic that makes the being ‘human’, that which separates “man†from animals. What women find troubling about this is that it turns out he really meant “man†as separate and at the pinnacle of the sentient hierarchy. (Although I suppose that’s still a step up from Hegel’s likening of women to plants.)
Aristotle distinguishes clearly between males and females by asserting that women don’t share the rational capabilities of men. He attempted to support what was already his belief through his systematic (in that he conducted and documented his ‘factual observations’), but nonsensical biological accounting of the physiological differences between women and men (most of which revolved around the differing degrees of ‘heat’ that he believed they emanate), which he attributed to creating the deficiencies in women and, in fact, prevented them from taking the “proper form†of a human (e.g., male). And Aristotle’s interesting rendition of reproductive mechanisms supported his ideas, as he found women deficient due to the fact that they can’t produce semen, which is what he determined to contain the full human being. Thus, in procreation it was the man who supplies the substance of a human being (the form), while the woman supplied only the nourishment (the matter). Despite the fact that it produced some pretty far-flung conclusions, Aristotle’s system of scientific methodology and analysis remained influential for many centuries. His corresponding finding that women were basically “misbegotten men“ carried on, as well.
Theologians over the next few centuries built upon this Artistotlean theme of innate (and natural) female inferiority, relying upon the ‘man created in the image of God’ framework. Tertullian was able to offer up Eve’s story as examplar of weakness in women. His admonitions to women were to dress and behave with modesty and humility as a reflection of their enduring need to remember that sin was introduced into the world through the female: “And do you not know that you are each an Eve? The sentence of God on this sex of yours lives in this age: the guilt must of necessity live, too.†Augustine and Thomas Aquinas diverged from the idea that women inherited the shame of Eve and allowed that both men and women were made in the image of God. But they believed that even if Eve hadn’t partaken of the forbidden fruit, she still would’ve been subjected to Adam’s authority, as this was a natural hierarchy included in God’s plan of creation and that, as Aquinas writes, “the power of rational discernment is by nature stronger in manâ€, making him the natural ruler of woman.
Later, Schopenhauer went so far as to claim that a woman’s inferior ability to reason limited her ability to be moral. (Schopenhauer is widely regarded as the most vitriolic in his diatribes regarding females, with much speculation over the how this was influenced by his complicated relationship with his socialite mother. Nevertheless, his theories have served as foundational for other philosophers and therefore can’t be summarily discounted.) Essentially, to the degree women are feminine (as opposed to ‘human’), they aren’t rational due to their undeveloped and emotionally unstable natures. As his forbears do, Schopenhauer places women on the philosophical periphery, because his paradigm of the ‘thinker’ is modeled on a concept of male nature.
In such conceptualization can be seen an infamous heritage of characterizing women as moral lightweights that found its way down through the centuries from Plato’s Timaeus, which describes woman as perhaps the reincarnation of ignoble men:
“It is only males who are created directly by the gods and are given souls. Those who live rightly return to the stars, but those who are ‘cowards or [lead unrighteous lives] may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation’. This downward progress may continue through successive reincarnations unless reversed. In this situation, obviously it is only men who are complete human beings and can hope for ultimate fulfillment; the best a woman can hope for is to become a man.â€
Kant’s approach was similar, but perhaps subtler in that he stressed the need for both masculine and feminine qualities. However, when it comes to morality, he deemed those qualities necessary for living a higher moral life to be those that he identified with the masculine, such as the ability to learn, deliberate in depth and develop well-reasoned principles. Women naturally embodied beauty, delicacy, modesty, sympathy. On the one hand, he characterizes these two sets of qualities as complementary, giving them a surface luster of egalitarianism. But when he elevates moral actions that arise from the dictates of duty (which is in line with the masculine qualities) over morality that arises from sympathy or compassion (which is the feminine), it becomes apparent that acts of virtue are accorded higher and lower status in this respect.
The dichotomies of mind/body, reason/emotion, form/matter, nature/culture are used by certain philosophers to support their views on sexual difference. What organizes the dualisms and gives them their distinctively sexual character is how they’re distinguished according to the ‘sphere’ in which they manifest, denoted as either ‘public’ or ‘private’. The private, or domestic, sphere is where the philosophers are concerned with natural interactions; that is, relations between women and men and relations within families. This sphere is primarily concerned with physical bodies in terms of reproduction and care, and is the realm of the domestic and of consumption. The private sphere is also the realm of the passions, including sexual passion and human emotional needs. The public sphere is regulated by relations of exchange between individuals who are defined by their relation to the ‘state’ or the market; e.g., administrators of justice, buyers and sellers of labor, owners of property and products, etc. These relations are conceived to be artificial or cultural and involving rational decisions and interactions which override any elemental (and prepolitical) relations that one may have had with nature.
Because at their core, these conceptual constructions of human life are ordered according to the association of private/public dichotomy with the sexual specification of the two spheres of activity, gender can’t really be separated out without fundamentally changing the structure. Likewise, any attempt to revise or reconstruct conceptually the private and the public spheres is hindered by the interconnectedness of the gendered associations. That is to say, the difficulty of separating women’s assignment to the private sphere is the result of the extensive linking of that private sphere with the body, emotions and nature, which are designated feminine. It’s supposed that the private, domestic realm is merely for ‘reproduction’ and servicing the natural needs of humans for food and shelter. What is thought to be distinctively human, transcendent and related to human progress occurs outside of the household, in the public realm, which has been taken a priori as the realm where men transcend animal nature and create, through the higher virtues, human morality and the progressive record of humanity. So it becomes impossible to reconsider women’s social role and status without also rethinking these dichotomies and the gendering of our spheres of activity. (Politically, it’s been the ‘civil rights’ movements’ as vehicles for changing ‘civil society’ that reflect the attempts of various groups to create bridges for crossing the public/private divide, an example being bringing rape and domestic violence into the legislative arena.)
There’s also bias in that women’s voices hadn’t been widely heard in the Western philosophical world until the last century or so. According to philosopher/historian Eileen O’Neill (University of Massachusetts), there’s an entire body of work from women of the 17th and 18th century in England, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Switzerland and Russia that was accepted during their times, but has been virtually unknown historically. This was work that â€addressed a wide range of issues in topics and questions contemporary to the philosophical circles of their time, including metaphysics, epistemology, moral theory, social and political philosophy, philosophical theology, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of education.†O’Neill notes the problem of “disappearing ink†and explains that despite the “acknowledgment of their contributions is evidenced by the representation of their work in the scholarly journals of the period and by the numerous editions and translations of their texts that continued to appear into the nineteenth centuryâ€, these bodies of work were not passed on. She attributes this to a number of reasons, including “the standard (socially encouraged) practice of anonymous authorship for women…the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ‘purification’ of philosophy†from topics that were addressed, such as women’s nature and societal roles…and “taking Kantianism as the culmination of early modern philosophy and as providing the project for future philosophical inquiry, [German historians] viewed treatment of 'the woman question' as precritical work, of purely anthropological interest. In sum, by the nineteenth century, much of the published material by women, once deemed philosophical, no longer seemed so.†She considers this as a matter of the women’s “views or underlying episteme were ones that simply did not ‘win out,’†although she notes that on “odd feature of ‘philosophical views that did not win out†was â€that they have been frequently characterized as ‘feminine’.â€
It’s important to recognize that this body of work was not passed along with the male-authored works, not because there were some clearly established criteria of selection that ultimately excluded them from the historical record, but because of the growing acceptance at the same time of what O’Neill characterizes as the early modern view that “a woman philosopher is something barely possible and always unnatural,†and, perhaps more significantly, the potential threat of the female “exercise of reason, and thus her rightful role as citizen…and right to education†in the “newly democratized public sphere†in the aftermath of the French Revolution. It’s also worth noting that the excluded works from prior centuries referenced above are by no means consistent in content, attitude or tone with modern works that would fall under the category “feminist theory†or “feminist philosophyâ€. In fact, the range of theories and opinions in them varies widely, as would be expected. What makes them perhaps most noteworthy to feminists is that women wrote them and that they were categorically excluded from the historical canon.
4. INHERENT TENSIONS OF MISOGYNISTIC THEMES IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY
Plato, opining as the great dualist that he was, regarded the body and soul as separate entities, and believed that the basis for morality resided within the rational part of the soul, which should always exercise control and guidance over the non-rational part, where the human desires and appetites of the body were centered. His view was that the soul continued on after death in the realm of pure forms, reincarnating in a human body again somewhere down the road. Yet his presumed ‘purity’ was still subject to a hierarchy, since superior souls necessarily would go into male bodies. This, then, is an inherent contradiction (and indicative of his misogyny), since he deemed that the quality of souls WAS, in fact, determined by the nature of the physical bodies in which they were housed. The presumed separation between souls and bodies doesn’t apply because, if it did, then there would be no distinction made between the type of bodies, either male or female, into which souls reincarnated. So while Plato may have theorized that both men and women had the capacity for virtues of the same degree of quality (albeit not the same virtues themselves), his misogyny is reflected in his assertion that souls can be ‘ranked’, with the superior souls being housed in male bodies and the inferior ones in female bodies, thus being rendered incapable of realizing their greater intellectual and moral potential. This same idea is demonstrated in his Phaedrus, where it’s the vision of a male body that evokes in the soul a recollection of absolute beauty. (Of course this evocation could perhaps be more reasonably attributed to Plato’s homosexual inclinations than to generic ideals of beauty.)
In a manner fairly typical of other philosophers, Rousseau urges that for “right guidance, always follow the leadings of nature. Everything that characterizes sex should be respected as established by nature.†Underlying this genre of prescriptions regarding the need for humans to adhere to ‘the laws of nature’ is the concession that it’s possible, even if not desirable, to alter or circumvent those laws. As feminist philosopher Louise M. Antony asks: “…if nature is straightforwardly deterministic, and if the social status quo is simply a neutral unfolding of the laws of nature, then why do we need prescriptions and warnings in order not to disrupt it? Or if, on the other hand, we accept that maintenance of the status quo depends partly upon our contingent human choices, then an epistemological question arises: How do we know that the qualities we see displayed by men and women are due to differences in NATURES, rather than to the differences in their circumstances that are socially constructed?â€
Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant, among others, asserted reason to be fundamental to humanity, but also realized this presented a problem, in that women weren’t devoid of rationality. So their challenge was to theorize how men and women generally shared a ‘human’ nature, but how to distinguish women from men when it came to what they determined to be the capacity for achieving a higher level of morality and virtue. The problem they faced was that there still had to be some specifically male realization of that nature that was identified as a matter of kind rather than of degree; otherwise the distinctions would still apply to measurable differences between men. Their solution to this problem was to first affirm that women and men shared ’humanness’ of a generic sort, but to then add the qualification that women were, by the prescriptions of nature, unable to fully realize this humanness. This was accomplished by defining women primarily through their reproductive capacities. According to philosophy professor (Penn State) Nancy Tuana:
“Woman’s arrested development, woman as a natural mutation, her weaker cognitive abilities, her inferior moral sense, her greater propensity for sin—all these are intimately related, in complex ways, to the conclusion that the reproductive process takes a greater toll on woman than on man. This premise has been largely responsible for the idea that woman’s reproductive organs play a more significant role in her physical and mental health than do those of man.â€
“Classical medical theory defined ’hysteria’ as a disorder of woman caused by disturbances of the womb. This view is reflected in the etymology of the term, since its root is the Greek word hystera, which means uterus… Since the condition of the womb was considered central to a woman’s general health…physicians frequently prescribed intercourse and pregnancy as cures for women’s ills.â€
“Male seminal fluids were seen as necessary for the health of the uterus, since they provided the needed moisture. Hippocrites claimed that the womb, deprived of such fluids, would dry upâ€â€¦and go in search of moisture elsewhere, thus detaching and roaming the body, perhaps even suffocating the woman. Aristotle’s dubious biological reports went further, to offer that too much sex could lead to the same result, prolapsion of the womb until intercourse was moderated and the womb could migrate back to its proper place. Medical ‘procedures’ from the ridiculous to the horrendous were used to help this migration occur.
One can look back through time to better understand the historical context of social and cultural assumptions about women’s nature and how this influenced “scientific†understanding of the female (and vice versa). Women as ‘natural’ mutations with inferior intellect, ruled by bodily impulses and emotions; these views are essentially based on conclusions that the reproductive process not only affects women to a greater degree than men, but also that it disables them and renders them permanently deficient in comparison with men. It was once a philosopher adopted this “biology as destiny†viewpoint as justification for his ideas regarding the natural inferiority of women that he could then open the door to a determination that men were by natural dictate quintessentially human. Femininity could still be analyzed according to the higher moral and intellectual standards, but any assessment would necessarily reflect the inability of women to achieve such standards due to their “natural†inferiority. Ultimately, women could be moral, but only to a degree and only insofar as morality could be applied to women. Measured by the human standard (aka ‘male’), they were necessarily morally deficient. From that point, it took little more effort to conclude that just as reason serves men in conquering the natural world, so it will serve them in constructing and controlling women.
This theme of controlling woman as a necessary way to control the societal impact of her “destructive†emotions arises repeatedly, and is the basis of feminists’ contention of a deeply ingrained male fear of women and the resulting compulsion to contain them within the private domain in order to maintain the order of the public one. (It’s also asserted to be a thinly disguised attempt at controlling social norms regarding paternity or property rights). Rousseau noted that if women were given free rein to their desires, “men would be tyrannized by women. For, given the ease with which women arouse men’s sense and reawaken in the depths of their hearts the remains of ardors which are almost extinguished, men would finally be their victims and would see themselves dragged to death without ever being able to defend themselves.†Some feminists ponder whether passages such as this betray a deeper male fear, which is that without economic, social or even reproductive dependence on men, heterosexuality becomes a less obvious choice for women.
5. THE FEMINIST CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
The missing half of the human story can't simply be added on, or woven in as a sub-plot, because to do so doesn’t address the dilemma of the conceptualized public/private spheres and that association of them with particular qualities as masculine and others as feminine. As well, attempts to simply include or incorporate women into whatever norms are suggested by certain theories, or that ‘the feminine’ should somehow be assigned arbitrarily the status of “equal†to ‘the masculine’ doesn’t work for theories based on gendered virtue.
If the goal of philosophy is to advance human understanding of ourselves in a very general way or, more practically, to serve as a tool by which we can live more intelligent and virtuous lives, then such goals should equally apply to the lives of women. But when it comes to the Western classics, they don’t. And while feminist analysis and critique of philosophy has made this more apparent, Western culture still reflects this misogynistic inheritance. The result of this is that girls and boys are still raised in our society to see women as predominantly creatures of the private sphere and, when they venture into the public realm, as less capable and less valuable than men, intellectually, physically, and sometimes even morally. (I saw a great modern example of the public/private sphere issue raised recently in a blog discussion about how women who post even the most mundane of pictures on photo sites like 'Flikr' are subject to suggestive or obscene comments from men. If they complain about this, they’re often told that if they don’t want to get harassed, then don’t post the pictures in the first place. This emphasizes how women will enter into a public realm and just because of the fact that they're out there, it’s considered acceptable both to harass them and to hold them responsible for motivating that harrassment.) Women have to deal with the continuing barrage of messages of inferiority and combat them, in ourselves as well as in those who patronize and belittle us, and worse, physically and sexually abuse us.
As previously noted, classical Western philosophical tradition generally either ignores female experience or perpetuates concepts of female inferiority. The theories of male philosophers have taught successive generations that reason and emotional discipline define human excellence (or even human nature itself) and that women lack these capacities. As a result, women have been left to see ourselves and our activities as being of lesser moral and intellectual value. This view extends to other areas of philosophical inquiry, including ethics, epistemology, sociology, political theory, aesthetics, etc. So, necessarily, any approach to expand or improve philosophical inquiry faces ideas so deeply entrenched that they’re easily overlooked or taken as aphoristic rather than justifiably subject to scrutiny or questioning.
So along came the feminists of the 19th and 20th centuries, re-examining and reinterpreting the history of philosophy. Since philosophical exploration is a progressive and dynamic enterprise that relies upon the assumptions and theories of past philosophers, and as the misogynistic views of those philosophers have come to light, modern scholars find themselves in the position of making the ‘baby and bathwater’ sort of decision. One can attempt to discard what a particular philosopher had said about women and keep the rest, but this is often difficult to do if the work contains deeply entrenched conceptions of human nature that recognize the male as normative and build complex and lengthy discourses on this opinion. The strategy to deal with this requires trying to develop some counter theories very specifically tailored to the particular work being analyzed in order to prove women to be as completely human as men. An alternative methodology has been to contend that the philosopher’s foundational theorizing about women is inseparable from the work in toto and to then bring forward fundamental questions about the limits and utility of the philosophical enterprise itself, because of these developmental limitations.
Early feminist philosophers of note such as de Beauvoir and Firestone tried to reconcile feminist insights with already existing systems of thought, trusting that there was somewhere to be found a universal neutrality and adhering to the orthodoxy of philosophical dualisms like mind/body and nature/culture as givens rather than value-laden constructions that diminish women and their experience. As a result, their theorizing tacitly accepted both the superiority of ‘masculine’ values and women’s inferiority as a consequence of her reproductive capacity, leading them to conclude that freedom for women was achieved by transcending the limitations of their bodies, that childbirth and motherhood were inherently constricting or worse, ‘barbaric’ and that the domestic sphere was to be recognized as disadvantageous to women wishing to explore life in the public sphere of ideas and the creation of values. So this period of feminist theorizing was a mixed bag: on one hand, there was the much-needed identification and accounting of female oppression as categorical in Western thought and, on the other, a continuing predisposition to locating the source of women’s inferior status in female biology, leading to the renunciation of that biology as a liberative strategy. There is in this line of thinking an implied need for female disembodiment in order to transcend the ‘animalistic’ functions intrinsic to female nature. Thus it’s not as much of a leap forward as one might hope. As social and political philosopher (Univ. of Sydney) Moira Gatens notes:
“The necessity to be disembodied begs the question of the implicit maleness of the labourer, the citizen, the ethical person. Males can approach the achievement of these ideals only because of the sexed segregation involved in socio-political life. They are able to be ‘disembodied’ in the public sphere because ‘natural’ functions, childrearing, sensuality, and so on, have become the special province of women and are confined to the private sphere. The conflicts and compromises involved for women who ‘choose’ to be both wives/mothers and (paid) workers in the public sphere have no parallel in men’s lives.â€
Some modern feminist philosophers approach the problem by questioning traditional views of morality, ethics, and issues related to reason, rationality and emotion, and arguing that feminism shouldn’t err as the classical male philosophers did by excessively relying on rationality and empiricism and consequently undervaluing emotion and intuition. This argument is based on the assertion that it’s not just content, but also methodological assumptions and epistemology which reflect male bias.
Others believe that theorizing according to the idea of natural, genetically determined sex difference is inherently problematic, not because there aren’t differences, but because of the tendency of the theorist to distort his views both as to what those differences are and as to what they mean. While it’s possible to philosophize regarding difference without making a qualitative inference (or even to conclude that equality doesn’t necessarily lead to standardization), it’s not something that humans thus far have done very well. And the end result of this line of thinking tends to be the dismissal or disparagement of large groups of people as deficient and even morally inferior. Alternatively, that there are different kinds of goodness is a generally acceptable notion in modern thought; but it doesn’t address questions concerning the origin and nature of differences which, in turn, doesn’t address questions concerning to what degree they’re within the control of individuals. As British philosopher Mary Midgley notes,
“Nobody who brings forward biological causes supposes that they replace social causes. They merely supplement them, as the original qualities of food supplement the effects of cooking in accounting for the properties of the finished dish…people’s upbringing is normally just as far out of their control as their genetic constitution is. What is called ‘biological determinism’ is not more of an attack on freedom than the social determinism (or economic determinism) which is accepted without moral qualms in the social sciences. What is injurious is not determinism, but fatalism – that is, the pretence that bad things which are in fact within our control lie outside of it and are incurable.â€
“On any view of causes, a great deal in the life of each of us is completely out of our power, and our freedom must consist in the way we handle that small but crucial area which actually does come before us as choice… Moralists only able to think of autonomy, of the active imposition of the will on what is round us, miss the essential values of receptivity, of contemplation, of openness to the splendours of what is not oneself. Our inheritance, both social and natural, is not a shocking intrusion on our privacy and freedom, but a realm for us to live in.â€
Ultimately, as it has been since women’s movements first gained ground in the 19th century, this is as much a political struggle as it is a philosophical one. It’s the nature of the beast, and it’s a dualistic, oppositional and negating beast that in significant ways portrays the 21st century woman no differently than it did the woman of the 4th century BCE. Even in the 21st century, ancient ideas about female nature are translated into the ways we talk about and think about science, which often retains notions of ‘passivity’ (egg as passive receptor of the active agent sperm) or ‘lack’ (the gonad lacks the addition of H-Y antigen and thus remains female) when it comes to female-ness in genetics and reproductive mechanisms. Difference is often treated conceptually in the way we view the world; it’s an absence, in that difference is first characterized when something is ‘lesser’ and, even more significantly, when one thing falls short of reaching an ideal attributed to another thing deemed as inherently not ‘lacking’.
It seems from my own survey of the available literature that there’s been an evolution in feminist approaches to philosophy over the last several decades that has taken the discipline far beyond its earlier narrow (and thus limiting) criticism and/or reconstruction approach of the classics that was particularly concerned with promoting ideas of a generic “woman†as a perpetual counter to generic “manâ€. This, in my view, is a good and necessary thing, as it prevents feminist philosophers from 1) repeating the same mistake that the classic male philosophers made in assuming one narrowly-constructed group as the paradigmatic "human ideal†by which all else is measured, and 2) relegating their scholarship as the abiding “Other†that cannot journey beyond that which is deemed to be strictly “women’s issues.†What is broadened by this evolved feminist approach is an exploration of more fundamental changes to the philosophical tradition that also address other “differencesâ€, such as those of race, class, and culture, and offers up a much richer and more complex (and more useful) panorama of ideas and theories regarding the human condition.