In faust’s Logic 101 thread, I wrote the following:
“If the law of non-contradiction did not apply, it could at the same time apply too. This means that if it applies, that does not mean it does not not apply.”
This was completely ignored there. Does it deserve no attention? What I mean is, what I wonder is: Do I fail to see something obvious? Please throw your light on this matter – your perspective, please.
Maybe the catch is in the very first clause:
“If the law of non-contradiction did not apply, …”
If it did not apply, as opposed to applied, this would already mean that it did apply, as otherwise there would be no such opposition.
Because the law of non-contradiction is, as far as “we” know, nothing apart from the perception of it, there is no reason to think existence is logical. Thus Nietzsche’s conclusion, for instance, that there must be a “Being” (ein Sein), even if its character be untrammeled flux, may be false, as it is still based on logic (an inference made from his perceptions). Thus the question that enthralled Heidegger so, “Why is there something at all and not rather nothing”, implies an empty assertion: that there need be such an opposition at all! That there is “something”, be it only Nietzsche’s “imagining Being”, does not mean that there is not nothing! The character of “existence” need not be conceivable for us!
Of course, the latter is also what Nietzsche said about his “imagining Being”. Untrammeled flux is literally “no thing”. Because we can only conceive of “things”, untrammeled flux is literally “nothing” for us!
“Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases [that is, things: for only a “thing” can be identical – with itself or anything else. And even the quantum is a form of the “thing”]. In fact, to make possible logical thinking and inferences, this condition must first be treated fictitiously as fulfilled.”
[Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 512.]
Sauwelios - I resonded to that in that thread. Maybe I don’t count, but I didn’t ignore it.
You’re probably referring to this post:
viewtopic.php?p=1985992#p1985992
But in that post, you did not respond to the second paragraph of my post (which I’ve reproduced in the OP of this thread).
Oh, that. That’s just a word game. If it didn’t apply, all bets are off. But again, it only applies to statements. Not to the real world. Statements are supposed, by us, to have truth values. It appies to the truth values. If there are no truth values, there is no possibility of contradiction. Again, truth and falsity are prelogical - logic dwells within that paradigm. The paradigm sets the limits.
“Statements are supposed, by us, to have truth values.” Isn’t that to say they are supposed, by us, to pertain to the real world?
Yes, they are supposed to apply to the real word, but that is extralogical. When applying logic itself, no such supposition is warranted.
Truth values of statements (premises) are assigned before logic is applied - logic deals directly only with the truth value of the relations between the statements. The truth value of the conclusion (as a conclusion, but not necessarily as a statement) is dependent upon not only the validity of the argument (which is the province of logic) but the truth value of the premises (which is not the province of logic).
The law of noncontradiction does not establish the truth value of a statement per se, but only with the value of relation of the statement to itself.
Thank you. I think I see now what’s wrong with my “word game”.
Argument I.
Premise A: The law of non-contradiction does not apply to the real world.
Conclusion: The law of non-contradiction may at the same time apply and not apply to the real world.
A premise is missing from this argument, to wit premise B: “Logic [which includes the law of non-contradiction!] applies to the real world.” This argument then is logically unsound, as it defies the law of non-contradiction, making it illogical.
Right?
I don’t think the primary issue is the validity of the argument, but the veracity of the missing premise.
Rationalism nothstanding.
I think you’re right, but that veracity cannot be tested by Reason, methinks; one must resort to Revelation for that.