Well, first: the term is not mine, it’s Elizabeth Potter’s. Second: the methodology is derived from, and grounds itself in, the ontology.
But rejecting a particular ontological view from participation in the scientific enterprise is itself tyrranical, no? Science depends on verifiable results. Fundamentalist Christians can be (and are!) scientists. Their values are presumably part and parcel of how they do science, but the science they produce remains independent of their (idiosyncratic) values - it is common property, which transcends particular belief systems. What they produce does not remain dependent on how they got there.
I completely disagree. Refer to my tabbed post, here, for what is more or less my understanding of the scientific practice.
well we are down to base rock…i agree with anon and disagree with music…i now know what the music position is…there is objective truth(99.9%) that can be handled neutrally…
It’s a desirable ideal.
A karate master practices his entire life fully aware that perfection of form is impossible.
We work to gain knowledge more even though we can never know everything.
There are certain aspects of science on which we have agreement. The topics listed in an elementary physics book are not changing. Currently active fields of research are changing. The results may overturn theories which are decades or centuries old but they won’t overturn everything. There is a solid foundation of knowledge on which we are building.
Philosophically speaking we do need to be correct. If we are only interested in making calculations and predictions, then any theory which produces good results is useful. That is an engineering approach - the application of science to solve a problem. Science, itself, is seeking the really real.
The bias cannot be eliminated but it can be reduced. Reducing the bias produces better results - better science.
Encouraging a value-laden bias will distort the results in the direction of those values. If you hold those values, then you may consider it beneficial. In reality, it is not beneficial. Your agricultural studies example showed an initially male bias study being ‘overturned’ by a female bias study. I would say that if both studies attempted to take a neutral position, the results would have been closer to the truth.
Considering how sympathetic I am to your views here, I’m surprised you “completely disagree”.
In attacking “objectivity”, be careful not to throw out intersubjectivity with it. True or not, theories that work are theories that work. They work whether or not I want them to, and whether or not they conflict with my religious beliefs. Feminist values, alternative methodologies… these are not problems (and might be quite beneficial) assuming they produce results that are relevant to the scientific community.
I was as careful to include the word “idiosyncratic” as Nelson was to use the word “necessarily” (both words bolded in this post).
Scientists study the “real”. I’m not sure what the “really real” even is, other than a metaphysical belief of some kind. But a scientist who believes in the “really real” is just as capable of studying the “real” as an instrumentalist is. The validity of a scientific theory does not rest on methodology or belief. Science is a discipline. As such, there are scientific values, scientific rules. Those rules are what make science science, and not something else.
Determining whether plants are conscious sounds interesting. Why can’t science investigate it?
I can think of some reasons for ‘the helplessly lethargic retardation of our world’ but I don’t think that applying a neutral scientific approach is one of them.
I’d be interested in hearing your reasoning for such a conclusion.
anon: I think my main problem lies with your statement that “what [scientists] produce does not remain dependent on how they got there.” I think knowledge is always contextual, for reasons enumerated throughout the thread.
The scientific discourse works under its own rules of legitimation. These rules are grounded in the tyranny of ontology, and so science done outside of such an ontology, subject to the rules of the discourse, isn’t permitted entry, isn’t qualified as science. These rules can change, and they must change as far as I’m concerned. Insofar as these rules are derived from the tyranny of ontology, the validity of a scientific theory does rest on methodology, and insofar as such an ontology is a belief, validity does rest on belief.
I think the issue is that philosophers of science aren’t aware that objectivity is impossible. This is the meaning of the tyranny. We can still admit values into science while striving for neutrality, for those values are going to worm their way in regardless. My intention is not for science to embrace as much value-ladenness as it can manage, my intention is that science accepts its inevitable bias, and embraces that bias that is ineradicable.
I disagree. That we have agreement does not mean that we have reached certainty. We have previously agreed on knowledge that has since undergone serious revision and reconsideration. Further, I believe that the topics listed in an elementary physics book are changing, and will continue to change in the foreseeable future.
They did attempt neutrality: the traditionalists believed they were being objective. The feminists, contrarily, sought neutrality while embracing the values that they couldn’t leave at the door.
This is where you lose me on the subtle distinctions.
How do you ‘embrace that bias that is ineradicable’? What does it mean in the context of gathering data and analyzing the data? How does ‘the embrace’ change the theory?
How did the feminists seek neutrality? Presumably they went into the study trying to show the influence of women. Didn’t they pick data that substantiated this theory? Did they reject data just as the male traditionalists had done? How do we know which data they rejected?
How neutral was the study?
Do you admit that neutrality is desirable? Nelson doesn’t think so.
I think knowledge is always contextual as well. But the context of scientific knowledge is bigger than you might be suggesting it is. Is scientific knowledge limited to anglo-saxon culture, for example? No, it applies more universally than that. And we can’t just choose, even collectively, what kind of knowledge scientific research will provide. You can’t just say, “The scientific discourse works under its own rules of legitimation” and leave it at that. Scientific knowledge is as much about discovery as it is about construction.
Sure. But which rules are essential to scientific inquiry? It’s not a rule that you must have (or not) a particular religious outlook. It’s not a rule that you can’t have personal prejudices.
Some scientific rules are essential. When you break them, you aren’t doing science any more. Other scientific rules come and go. I think you have to be very specific - if you have an issue with a certain “rule” (whether canonical or unspoken assumption), then that “rule” should be discussed on its own. The fact is, however, not everything is science.
Which rules should change? All of them? Are you suggesting that science doesn’t investigate (even if in a limited way) our common reality?
actually this so-called “ontological tyranny” and “really real” are cofusing a discussion about reality and objective truth…music cant you write more clearly about reality…this is almost like playing word games…
That’s a really exacting question; I’ll be sure to look over my notes before giving you a response.
The feminists went into the study trying to develop a theory that did a better job in accounting for observed phenomena. If we can agree that their resultant conclusion was the better of the two, then we needn’t occupy ourselves with the last three of your questions.
I think neutrality is unattainable. Nelson goes slightly further than I, though I believe we’re “on the same page”, so to speak.
Duly noted.
I agree in that we can’t just “choose”; the issue is far subtler: the scientific discourse operates within certain boundaries, and under certain restrictions. These restrictions work to legitimate that kind of knowledge scientific research produces, while negating or “refusing entry” to the rest. These restrictions are intrinsic to the discourse: they consist of the “rules” of science, as you’ve said: who can produce knowledge, under what conditions, through what process, after how much verification, in what context, for what purpose, etc.
I think, generally speaking, rules rooted in the ontological tyranny are currently considered essential to proper inquiry. These can be changed, and I think they must be changed, as I’ve said. In short: the discourse needs to be allowed to grow and change.
I know I’m being vague, but that’s not what I’m suggesting: this is a topic that currently interests me, one that I’m currently working through an understanding and conceptualization of. My stance isn’t concrete. However, I am suggesting that science understands itself, and so allows itself to be reproduced, in a certain way: this understanding seems to me to be rooted in the tyranny of ontology. It is this understanding of itself that provides a framework for the scientific discourse as well as, in turn, the restrictions that constitute such a discourse. To overcome this understanding is to alter the discourse and so change the rules of legitimation: it is to change the way science is allowed to be done, the way knowledge is allowed to be produced.
Without-Music, have you read Paul Feyerabend? Nancy Cartwright? Seems like they would interest you.
I have not. Can you suggest a particular work to begin with? I appreciate the recommendation, though.
I haven’t read Cartwright at all - I’ve only had some online contact with her ideas (not personally - just, you know, Wikipedia etc.) I’ve read some Feyerabend, but not much. I had a book called Farewell to Reason for a while, and read an essay or two from it. I think he’s most famous for Against Method though.
Wiki on Feyerabend’s philosophy of science
I’m sure I’ve read some stuff of Cartwright’s (I think from How The Laws of Physics Lie) but I don’t know where. If you try, you might dig something up online.
EDIT: Here’s an online version of How The Laws of Physics Lie
The handling of data is critical to any experiment. We have assumed that the data is collected and processed in a neutral manner. That implies that data which supports or contradicts a theory is accepted and rejected on a fair and equal basis. That is or should be the goal of the ontological tyranny. If a value-laden method is embraced, does it not become legitimate to include more supporting data and exclude more contradictory data? Once the paper is written no one has access to the raw data. How can we decide if the resultant conclusion was better? We decide based on our own values - we side with the sexist male study or the feminist study. I don’t think science like that should be encouraged. We need to move as far away from that as possible.
This is a question that passionates philosophers, most scientists would tend to dismiss it as irrelevant.
Ultimately Realism rests on the principle of economy in science, I guess that many scientists don’t really believe in the (divine) Really Real - as Only_Humean said.
Working on competing metaphysics (because that is what it is) could be valued by scientists only in terms of how much power that could wield to new theories - although they might have more personal leanings for one metaphysics or the other.
Anyway I guess I am with you on this, philosophically ontological tyranny is over. But with one remark: it is rejected for the same platonic reasons and/or for the same principle of economy that led to it. There are over-assumptions in Realism, and they might be not “true” (and not necessary). And this is the same attitude discussed in GS 344 - that I guess you know very well.
Just wanted to highlight what I bolded above - all we ever have is what is scientifically verified NOW. The set of knowledge/beliefs 1) may be modified, in fact is very likely to be modified, even with some things being later dismissed 2) is what we have achieved SO FAR. A lot of people, even sadly scientists, act as if we have some rather large % of what can possibly be known already known. So ideas that do not seem to fit with the known, even if they do not contradict current research, are often dismissed out of hand. Present scientific knowledge - this set - is limited by technology, intereste, funding, biases - paradignmatic or other - and no doubt other factors. But when ideas are raised outside accepted science but not contradicting accepted scientific knowledge there is a strong knne jerk reaction - often backed up by ‘rationality’ for why these ideas are incredibly unlikely at best. This is not supported by scientific methodology or epistemology yet is endemic.
I think it also needs to be pointed out that all of us use non-scientific methodologies to navigate the world, including obviously the most concrete decision-making. In out social lives, political life, work lives and so on. Even, as I pointed out earlier, it is taken for granted in scientific inquiry itself that there are other modes of coming at knowledge - though there is a in practice distrust of these despite their consistent use.
Anyone who would not believe something unless science verified it would not survive very long.
I have assumed no such thing. I think values enter into all parts of the scientific process. I will enumerate when I have time, later.
What is problematical is not only that our theories of the universe, of space and time, of causation, or of evolution are merely our interpretations of reality, but also that the self of the scientist, from the scientist’s point of view, is itself a product of the putting together, in the mind of the scientist, of various sensations or memories through his thought. In that sense, the self or the subject who does the scientific study, and who is normally taken for granted, is himself an `interpretation’.