ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, WTP)

What is new about my idea is that it establishes the ground of appearance.
Like truth, appearance is conditional to a reference frame, in the human case the senses and the brain.
Unlike truth, appearance has no requirement of a system of conscious definitions.

The difference between ‘appearing’ and ‘self-valuing / valuing (otherness) in terms of the established self-value’ is that the former is only half a definition ( to whom / what does it appear? What is “it”? ) whereas the latter includes subject, object and a verb including both. It also explains why, how things appear as they do. Nietzsche did not do this. My definition is more technical.

It is an idea including the missing benevolence in Nietzsches thinking. He was the final critic. I am a critical constructor.
My definitions will hold.

Thought is construction, good thought is critical construction. Criticism without construction is entropy. N. arrived at the consequence of his deepest assumptions – disintegration.

I’ve been there, done that, climbed out of it and dived back in… now I know what kind of value I expected to find in that mad sea, why I got there in the first place. I too, believed. I believed that there was still going to be something, if I attempted to judge objectively. Apparently I was strong - or lucky! - enough to attain to what N. could not – the real-life realization that I exist as an entity only to the measure that I am actively discriminating ‘unfairly’!

Well what is the fairest way to judge unfairly? To at least understand the terms of your judgment.
Nietzsche did not arrive there. Not because he was not capable of it perhaps, perhaps he was superior to me intellectually, but because he did not have the real-world context that I have, the means to create and consume value, the reduction of society to an appraisal affair of common denominators – Perhaps he, in his ethical superiority to us (me), still took valuing for granted.

I think that I have been very nihilistic without knowing it, before I was led to this idea by without-music.

No, that can’t be the crux, as I’ve played no language games in this thread.

All this is just nonsense which may fool some into thinking that it’s deep, but not me.

Ridiculous. You are a clown.

No, I’m just trying to bring some logical clarity into this thread.

Let me try to help you. You said:

“[T]ruth is conditional to valuing, and […] the activity valuing is not conditional to the term ‘truth’.”

Did you perhaps mean, “the term ‘truth’ is conditional to the activity valuing, and” etc.? (Valuing can only be an activity, but truth need not be just a term, of course.)

The thoughts behind your expressions (in this thread) may be logically sound, but your expressions themselves are not. Perhaps you feel you needn’t be bothered with that; but I think you do, as you’re trying to communicate your thoughts to others here. For example, the question I just asked you: do you feel like, “of course that’s what I meant”, or “of course that’s not what I meant”? I really wonder. Do you consider yourself a precise writer? I don’t; I don’t think you even aspire to be.

Yes, this “unconditional” or unchecked/unmediated “will to the objective(value)” is only part of the equation, and without its counterpart - what we call “subjective existence” - it is only massive destructivity of the subject it/him/herself. Why is this? The following gives us a clue: “The will of non-living things is stronger than the will of living things”. What does this mean? Objectivity-“as-such” being thus and ONLY a will to non-self. This is (self)destructivity par excellence.

As you say, criticism must include constructivity, at least implicitly so - where it does not, it only lays waste indiscriminately to… itself. As the scope and external power of this critical capacity expands its interior erodes, it becomes increasingly unstable and precarious until, at a critical (no pun intended, but there is a nice double-meaning here) juncture its structure/s collapse.

Will to objectivity-as-such (especially where one wills this in a not fully acknowledged or known manner) is itself grounded in the implicit (and mistaken) need to derive the is, or so it seems to me. This implicit need itself seems to arise from the presence of unacknowledged metaphysical assumptions near the root of one’s (thinking-feeling) being–a disconnectivity or insufficient (self)overlapping of valuation.

Exactly. And this belief can only be sustained to the extent that one never, ever attains what one otherwise (admittingly or not) aspires to with/in this believing. We can see this as literally the will to/of the “non-living” escaping the encompassing context of a will of/to “living things”, to the “living-as-such” or of its only just itself. This “will to/of the living” contra willing objectivity-as-such is the axiom, or posited violence with which we remove all mistaken needs for is-derivation. But the crux is that, for this imposition to be properly violent, potent and complete, it must be intentional, fully conscious. The history of philosophy up until the present, including Nietzsche, has been the history of only semi-conscious positing of the violent axiom of ‘life-as-such’ imposed upon the will of the non-living. It makes perfect sense that this limit can only be seen and overcome by the adoption of a perspective which subordinates the distinction “living” and “non-living” to a higher unity and difference: value, valuing-activity (i.e. both living and non-living things value).

Yes----at least. This is only the barest beginning. Yet the abyssal distance between this initial ‘point’ and all that comes before it and is insufficient to it seems, for many, insurmountable. The inertia of the past world-history of what I will call “self-abdicating valuation” and all that stems, imperfectly, from it—what has thus far been too afraid to stare itself fully in the mirror—still presents a massive barrier, veiling this understanding from all save the most radically open and totally honest thinkers, who are fully capable of re-evaluating EVERYTHING they previously held cherished and true. Lacking such a prerequisite of un-hindered intellectual honesty, I have strong doubts that this higher perspective of value-ontology could ever penetrate the massively closed inertial structures everywhere faithfully obedient to the dictums of the past.

I think this is it, yes. As Heidegger said, truth is what is closest and thus what is furthest away- the most indistinguishable. It takes a severe nihilistic will to insert degrees of separation even here. Nietzsche was far too optimistic to consciously possess such a nihilism (but we see the fruits of his (and others, sauwelios here being one example) inability to separate himself from such a standard of a willing in the more non-conscious realm).

Absolutely, yes.

Additionally, I think no one here has taken the more careful time to really understand what Nietzsche is saying where you quote him in this OP… readers here would be wise to revisit these passages with more authentic and un-closed desire, as opposed to a feeling of obligation or duty.

The real problem is that these thinkings (of Nietzsche, among others) still make use of an understanding of truth as the objective-as-such. Even where this objectivity is flatly denied to exist, or it is acknowledged that even if it did exist it would be entirely impossible to know anyway - even here (indeed even most here) this objective still operates as the implicit standard of truth, of what constitutes the highest truth status or the “most true”.

Metaphysics everywhere still rules, not the least where it is most vehemently denounced. Yet we now have in our hands, perhaps for the first time, the tool with which to dispose of this spectre entirely: that tool is the system of value-ontology.

Maybe you guys—aletheia and Fixed Cross—should invite Three Times Great to this discussion: then you can really have a party…

Do you want to contribute something here, or are you just a troll?

We have developed a new perspective here, offered something significantly new. If you dislike what is presented, explain why, or pass by. Honest debate of these ideas is always welcome, especially if you disagree.

Attack the idea, show its weaknesses. Do your worst! I have confidence it can be defended against whatever you are able to bring to bear.

So now it’s already “we”, eh… “We Übernietzsches”.

The first thing I dislike about what is presented is how it is presented—rambling. I would like to see you present it in a rigorous manner: begin with the basics and, if those prove solid, build on them. Please begin with the first principle(s) of your new perspective/idea. Formulate them as precisely as possible. Only then can we see whether it can be defended.

Nietzsche was too deep to give wankers a peek into his ideas.

He said there is more wisdom in the poems of the pre-socratic artists than in Plato and Aristotle.

For most of us it is probably impossible to realize what this means as we have probably never studied the classical philology.

“In order to understand the Greek tragedy one must be Sophocles”, and if you are Sophocles then you are also probably a man of incredible depth.

I am not Sophocles at this point. So let us not pretend to be Sophocles, my dear strong-all-too-strong “friends”.

(I suppose fixed cross is Jacob and that what he climbs on from time to time is his ladder)

Cezar, you have not much to contribute here it seems. Please, offer criticism of what is presented or leave.
It seems to me that you are unable to bear that something has made a step to surpass your “God”.

Sauwelios, much of what goes for Cezar goes for you, but obviously you are worth more than he is. I will formulate this idea in a more disciplined way , even though I consider your interpretation of what I’ve written here ‘rambling’ to be as much the result of lazy or unwilling reading as of the quality of my responses to you, which was indeed suboptimal.

I will offer a very brief summary here, in the context of the will to power.
The idea is extremely simple and, I think, necessary. For an entity, be it conscious and living or not, can only exert power over another entity if both exist on the same terms. These terms are determined by the overpowering entity. It interprets the entity it overpowers on its own terms.

These “own terms” is what I call self-value.
Since all is flux, self-value can only be interpreted as the result of an activity. I call this self-valuing.

Before I move on, please offer your criticism. Tell me what is not clear. I would like to make use of your rigor to polish my formulations.

Either that, or the content-less criticism is already a result of a disentanglement of the entity from itself. It may be that the “critical caste” is a class of consciousnesses having lost their rooting. They seek objectivity to find it back, to find a sense of being-entity, but on the path to objectivity, they will only be able to erode themselves.

It seems to me that Nietzsche embodied a conflict between rootedness and uprootedness, that he was able to write from both, but as he progressed in years and declined in strength, perhaps after he had passed the peak (Zarathustra, BGE), the impetus of establishing self value was lessened and his critical faculty was unchained from his personal being.

Of course this is pure speculation. It should be seen to stand in service of the development of the idea, not to aim at a psychological profile of Nietzsche.

Exactly.

To really find out where this error is rooted seems very difficult and to require a full model of consciousness based on value-ontology, it may well have several causes. I may also simply be the hereditary superstition of The One God, the objective standard.

In very simple terms, entropy has been the scientific mans God. It is believed that the most fundamental rule of structure/matter is its necessary disintegration. The results of this belief are predictable.

I support your notion of violence, but must specify it to mean that where before there has been a raging fire, moving from a premise but without clarity of that premise so without a precise aim, we now try to fucus this violence, after having specified, explained the premise of it.

Apparently, or so goes my conclusion, intellectual honesty is a plant which grows only on a certain soil. We may call this a naturally affirmative morality, a sort of ‘follow up’ to Nietzsches forged affirmative morality.

Most thinking, and it seems like even this is an understatement, is deeply rooted in the belief that the self is unworthy of dictating truth. It lacks the self-value to relate to the predicate “true”. “The grammar of the soul” is perhaps a useful term here. The noun in the soul is not an integer, but a question, and can therefore not carry, give structural integrity to, ‘the sentence’, the operation of being.

Such people are a rambling.

Probably not. Nietzsche, as respected as he is, is most often taken for granted. I doubt that many of his admirers have understood what he was aiming at. Of course I have reason to doubt it – I am convinced that what he was aiming at is this, an ontology based on interpreting as fundamental and comprehensive the act of valuing. It seems to me that everything Nietzsche wrote/unearthed is confirmed and explained by this idea, all except his notions of finalities and ultimates.

Fixed Cross…

You fail to adhere completely to your new idea in that you demand too much objectivity. If you allow some subjectivity, you will see that yes, perhaps Cezar is unwilling to move past Nietzsche, but he has contributed something to this thread. The Jacob’s ladder reference was moving, and honestly a big compliment (if you ever had the privilege of reading Human, All Too Human Vol. 1). In Nietzschean terms, which are terms you obviously respect, he is far superior to this guy who is only playing at grammar, but to whom you give credit anyway.

Why do you give him credit? Because if the part of Nietzche’s zietgeist that was his weakness was morality, for you it is objectivity.

Remember (if I understand you correctly) that all, including objectivity/subjectivity, including the very idea of a dichotomy, is subordinate to the act of valueing/self-valueing.

Nay?

Will to power is a psychological concept. Almost a buddhist concept in that it is an answer to buddhism.

“Ah, yes”, says Nietzsche “as you say, Buddha, man is nothing and the concept of individuality is only an appearance. But it is the will to power that keeps man acting (valueing?) anyway!”.

Buddha is outraged: “What do you mean? where do you get the balls for such assertions?”

Nietzsche blushes: “Evolution…”

Health is the magic word.

“What values are for your health?”

“How much truth a spirit(health) can bear?”

I think this health is the ability or disability to experience things.

Health is the ability to resist suffering, just like courage. When my name is translated into the Aristotelian terms it means 3 things under which also courage.

If you are healthy, or very healthy, then you will have the chance to experience many things, and if you do this, then you can learn from your experiences. And what is known to us, as Nietzsche clearly says, that corresponds to health!

That is why Aristotle says that we can not learn truthfulness, we are only born with it.

When I was a child I have heard adult people saying that I am “too honest”. Today all people say to me “who cares about truth?”

The book I have written I have named “Nitimur in vetitum”. It is about values and nihilism and the Eternal return.

In my opinion my homeland is among the truest people. Nietzsche being my natural ally.

One must be able to challenge to a duel those who oppose you.

Only so one keeps his name clean and identity known. Otherwise one awakes speculations.

And then he is no more a master of himself.

Sawelios:

Put a shirt on, man.

The only self-flattering in this thread has been your intellectual acrobatics.

Yes, that is precisely what I’ve been doing in this thread. And this differs from what Nietzsche says how?

Your (original) argument seems to me to basically run thus:

Premise 1: “Nietzsche (was)(did) that and that.”
Premise 2: “I (Fixed Cross) (am)(do) this and this.”
Conclusion: “I (Fixed Cross) am greater than Nietzsche.”

(I will give you the benefit of the doubt and not suppose that the order of these three statements was really the reverse, i.e., that the conclusion was foregone.)

Now what you said Nietzsche was and/or did was this:

“He still believed in, at least worked from, the duality of truth and appearance. In this way it could not become apparent to him that the value is not what derives from the truth/appearance of the world/a thing, he was not (morally) strong enough to reverse this conception […] – to arrive at the far more useful idea that value (more precisely the act of valuing) gives rise to both appearance and truth.”

Let’s see if this is true. You essentially imply that Nietzsche thought that “the value […] derives from the truth/appearance of the world/a thing.” The only statement found in your opening quote that comes anywhere near this, however, is this:

“The worst thing is that with the old antithesis ‘apparent’ and ‘true’ the correlative value judgment ‘lacking in value’ and ‘absolutely valuable’ has developed.”

Note that it says “with”, not “from”. So this statement cannot be cited in support of your claim. Please provide other statements of his which can be so cited.

Now your opening quote is from the Kaufmann edition of The Will to Power. And on the page opposite to the first part of that passage, we find section 580, which is from Spring-Fall 1887 and begins thus:

“To what extent the basic epistemological positions (materialism, idealism) are consequences of evaluations [Wertschätzungen]: the source of the supreme feelings of pleasure (‘feelings of value’) as decisive also for the problem of reality!”

As you can see, I’ve consulted the German text. I looked up your opening quote both in the 1996 German edition of The Will to Power and in the Nachlass (it’s Frühjahr 1888 14 [103]). I checked both because sometimes the Kaufmann edition is closer to the Nachlass than the German edition, and the Nachlass is the penultimate authority, the ultimate authority being of course the manuscripts. I found an interesting thing. Kaufmann’s translation contains (at least) two flaws. The first is in this passage:

“That a world accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, that we understand a world as being subjectively conditioned, is not to say that an objective world is at all possible. Who compels us to think that subjectivity is real, essential?”

Both the German edition and the Nachlass say rather, “Who compels us to not think that subjectivity is real, essential?” For the word translated as “compels” is wehrt, “prevents”. So what Nietzsche is suggesting is that subjectivity is real, essential. (Indeed, note that he writes, “Who prevents us”, not “What prevents us from thinking that subjectivity is real, essential?”…)

The second flaw is in this passage:

“We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world. (There might only be an apparent world, but not our apparent world.)” (emphasis found in all editions)

Kaufmann left out the little word nur. It should read: “There might only be an apparent world, but not just our apparent world.”

These two flaws are interesting, because when corrected they point strongly to section 569 (which is also from Spring-Fall 1887), where Nietzsche says:

“[T]he antithesis of this phenomenal world is not ‘the true world,’ but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations—another kind of phenomenal world, a kind ‘unknowable’ for us;”

And:

“[Q]uestions, what things ‘in-themselves’ may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? ‘Thingness’ was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an apparent world—and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed reality; in short, whether that which ‘posits things’ is not the sole reality; and whether the ‘effect of the external world upon us’ is not also only the result of such active subjects [wollenden Subjekte, “subjects that will”]— The other ‘entities’ act upon us; our adapted apparent world is an adaptation and overpowering of their actions; a kind of defensive measure. The subject alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that only subjects exist—that ‘object’ is only a kind of effect produced by a subject upon a subject—a modus of the subject.” (Cf. section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil.)

I will finish with a passage from Leo Strauss:

“What he [Nietzsche] seems to aim at [with aphorism 36] is the abolition of th[e] fundamental distinction [between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)]: the world as will to power is both the world of any concern to us and the world in itself. Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any ‘categories’.” (Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”.)

How about this:

What exactly is the difference between the will to power and self valuation?

Or perhaps my real question is: Is it fair to say that the will to power is the valuing of a human consciousness when it decides to take action?