Yes, that is precisely what I’ve been doing in this thread. And this differs from what Nietzsche says how?
Your (original) argument seems to me to basically run thus:
Premise 1: “Nietzsche (was)(did) that and that.”
Premise 2: “I (Fixed Cross) (am)(do) this and this.”
Conclusion: “I (Fixed Cross) am greater than Nietzsche.”
(I will give you the benefit of the doubt and not suppose that the order of these three statements was really the reverse, i.e., that the conclusion was foregone.)
Now what you said Nietzsche was and/or did was this:
“He still believed in, at least worked from, the duality of truth and appearance. In this way it could not become apparent to him that the value is not what derives from the truth/appearance of the world/a thing, he was not (morally) strong enough to reverse this conception […] – to arrive at the far more useful idea that value (more precisely the act of valuing) gives rise to both appearance and truth.”
Let’s see if this is true. You essentially imply that Nietzsche thought that “the value […] derives from the truth/appearance of the world/a thing.” The only statement found in your opening quote that comes anywhere near this, however, is this:
“The worst thing is that with the old antithesis ‘apparent’ and ‘true’ the correlative value judgment ‘lacking in value’ and ‘absolutely valuable’ has developed.”
Note that it says “with”, not “from”. So this statement cannot be cited in support of your claim. Please provide other statements of his which can be so cited.
Now your opening quote is from the Kaufmann edition of The Will to Power. And on the page opposite to the first part of that passage, we find section 580, which is from Spring-Fall 1887 and begins thus:
“To what extent the basic epistemological positions (materialism, idealism) are consequences of evaluations [Wertschätzungen]: the source of the supreme feelings of pleasure (‘feelings of value’) as decisive also for the problem of reality!”
As you can see, I’ve consulted the German text. I looked up your opening quote both in the 1996 German edition of The Will to Power and in the Nachlass (it’s Frühjahr 1888 14 [103]). I checked both because sometimes the Kaufmann edition is closer to the Nachlass than the German edition, and the Nachlass is the penultimate authority, the ultimate authority being of course the manuscripts. I found an interesting thing. Kaufmann’s translation contains (at least) two flaws. The first is in this passage:
“That a world accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, that we understand a world as being subjectively conditioned, is not to say that an objective world is at all possible. Who compels us to think that subjectivity is real, essential?”
Both the German edition and the Nachlass say rather, “Who compels us to not think that subjectivity is real, essential?” For the word translated as “compels” is wehrt, “prevents”. So what Nietzsche is suggesting is that subjectivity is real, essential. (Indeed, note that he writes, “Who prevents us”, not “What prevents us from thinking that subjectivity is real, essential?”…)
The second flaw is in this passage:
“We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world. (There might only be an apparent world, but not our apparent world.)” (emphasis found in all editions)
Kaufmann left out the little word nur. It should read: “There might only be an apparent world, but not just our apparent world.”
These two flaws are interesting, because when corrected they point strongly to section 569 (which is also from Spring-Fall 1887), where Nietzsche says:
“[T]he antithesis of this phenomenal world is not ‘the true world,’ but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations—another kind of phenomenal world, a kind ‘unknowable’ for us;”
And:
“[Q]uestions, what things ‘in-themselves’ may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? ‘Thingness’ was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an apparent world—and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed reality; in short, whether that which ‘posits things’ is not the sole reality; and whether the ‘effect of the external world upon us’ is not also only the result of such active subjects [wollenden Subjekte, “subjects that will”]— The other ‘entities’ act upon us; our adapted apparent world is an adaptation and overpowering of their actions; a kind of defensive measure. The subject alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that only subjects exist—that ‘object’ is only a kind of effect produced by a subject upon a subject—a modus of the subject.” (Cf. section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil.)
I will finish with a passage from Leo Strauss:
“What he [Nietzsche] seems to aim at [with aphorism 36] is the abolition of th[e] fundamental distinction [between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)]: the world as will to power is both the world of any concern to us and the world in itself. Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any ‘categories’.” (Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”.)