All these terms need to be re-thought, re-valuated: fair, will, power, valuing, human, consciousness, decides, and action.
This is precisely what is at stake here, and it is indeed the highest: can we build something new, can we transgress the old for the sake of something new, perhaps more powerful, more useful and less deliberately self-constrained? I think we can - indeed I think this is precisely what is demanded of us. Demanded by the responsibility for philosophy, and by the responsibility for the/a future.
The difference between the will to power and self-valuation, this is a tricky issue, because this debate is implicitly framed already within the context of the will to power only. Self-value theory is new and has yet to significantly impose itself upon the common terms. We already think in terms of willings to power. Philosophy has yet to rise above Nietzsche, philosophy and all modernity and post-modernity still live in Nietzsche’s titanic shadow.
As Fixed Cross said already here, " It is believed that the most fundamental rule of structure/matter is its necessary disintegration. The results of this belief are predictable." An essential component of value-ontology is that is posits the prior existence of self-valuation, structure, whereas all deterritorializing, expansion, outreach, power shiftings, disintegration, these are always secondary - these suppose self-valuation to begin with. Rather, the self may only value the other/s to the extent that it does so with respect to its already existent self-value/s. To do so is to consolidate value, to produce meaning; to do otherwise is to decay and to lose meaning, precisely to abdicate one’s terms to another – and yet even here this is done still and only in terms of oneself, of one’s way of valuing.
The valuable may only present a such to the extent that there is a valuer which values, which means: to the extent that the potentially valuable is actually related to the valuing-self. All value contains a root of self-value. So what is the difference between the Will to Power and value-ontology? There are many differences, there are many overlaps. These are not two different terrains as much as they are two trajectories criss-crossing each other, but it appears that value-ontology, through positing the HOW (a mechanism) and the WHAT (a context) of the otherwise willings to power, gains the “upper hand” in that value-ontology is the frame for grasping will to power itself. Will to power is a very good start, a necessary beginning. But we need to keep going, because Nietzsche does not posit the subject, that which wills and why (the context of willing/s). We might start by reducing the difference to the orientation either toward or away from the subjective core within all objectivity and all willing to the objective. Will to Power theory attempts to repudiate objectivist metaphysics but it attempts to do so without positing the valuational opposite of this metaphysical objectivism and so is only a partial success. We need also to posit the opposite value to this metaphysics: the absolute existence of a subject/s. We need the other part of the equation.