ILP thread on value-ontology (starting with Nietzsche, WTP)

That is indeed a most humble opinion.

“[T]he genious [sic] of this ontology [is] that it incorporates human perception into existance [sic] itself without requiring humans to be the only existing things.”

That is exactly what Nietzsche does in, e.g., section 36 of his Beyond Good and Evil.

Wow… I had not read that passage before. (In all honesty, I have been kind of stuck on “The Antichrist” with Nietzsche after having read “Human, all too Human” because I am afraid that it might be impossible to write something even better than those two. Obviously I have been very mistaken.)

So, Nietzsche did propose a… kind of ontology. But inasmuch as it still requires a sort of metaphysical “will”, the will to power doctrine differs from value ontology. The latter attempts at an objective description, while Nietzsche’s is ultimately subjective.

(I am still too humble as regards Nietzsche to talk of one being superior to the other. I am not convinced that objectivity has any inherent superiority to subjectivity, whereas I am increasingly convinced that subjectivity is the only legitimate angle, and that the more objectivity it incorporates, the more powerful it becomes.)

I hope this explains how, while I refrain from calling it superior, I certainly find value ontology to be… Valuable!

But also without denying the (human)will. In fact there is nothing, no “thing in itself”, no “matter”, no “energy”, but only will. There is no “thing”, and consequently there is no “thing in itself”!!! - All is subjective!
Nietzsche incorporates will and perspective! You deny the will! You are slaves of the “perspective” which is not even yours - moral Christian or Buddhist fanatics! - Opportunists! In ancient Greece morals were not an imperative until the end of the 4th BCE religion has become an instrument of manipulation in the hands of the masses and powerful men were persecuted as “heretics” out of hate. Modern philosophy with its “ontology” is nothing but a hunt against “witches”, “heretics” and the likes…
Nietzsche never said in BGE36 anything about a “metaphysical will”! There is no “meta” because there is no PHYSICAL!

So, there is no will-matter relationship, because there is no matter.

Hmm…

The way you keep a simplistic view of a concept that is very complex is illumintaing in many ways. I have come to resent your ability for it, but I am greedy enough to learn from what you say anyway.

But I will, now, begin to question you.

There IS a physical… or at least a real. A something. A something that applies itself. Not just human, but something that the human is a complex developpment of.

This second part is still refered to by what I wrote above, but I quoted it seperately because… well, don’t you see it?

FC, tell 'em.

Nothing applies itself.

The will is discovered only out of interaction with other wills.

Of course you resent, you are a slave.

Ah, don’t be cranky.

Your use of willing is looking mighty similar to FC’s use of valuing…

That is so shallow, almost American. If not stupidly English.

I am making a list of secondary drives. If you want to know what will is then work on it and you will see the drives and the perspective (value) are different.

The thing with you, Cezar, is that you play in a depth that you are not deep enough for. The result is statements that sound deep, but the percieved depth is only an echo of the place you are in. Get out of there! You do not belong.

The trick is in not speaking before you are sure what you are saying.

If you have that, then you don’t need to hear the sound of the room, you can look into the dark of the depth.

One day there will maybe be no chance to speak at all. People will kill each other for a wrong word.

Therefore you can see this as a training for more serious undertakings.

Train yourself for war.

Instead of “subjective” and “objective”, I propose that we use the words “perspectival” and “non-perspectival”, respectively—so as not to reify subjects and objects all too explicitly (though the word “per-spective” still implies a subject and an object).

Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism is perspectival and non-perspectival at the same time:

“Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any ‘categories’.” (Leo Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”.)

They seem to work well, and are agreeable to me. But they do lack a certain action that implicit in “subjective”/“objective”. The object is seen, is arrived at. The subject sees, arrives. I think the grammatical structure fits the circumstance quite nicely. Either way, I don’t think the difference is important enough. If you think “subjective”/“objective” muddy things up too much, I’ll stop using them.

I think this captures very well a thing we already seem to agree on: That the will to power both describes and incorporates human perspective.

Now this depth, this depth you fill very well.

I will.

Sauwelios – The idea that value-ontology rests the idea of self-valuing erupting from nothingess is an error. It rests only on the observation that this is in fact that a self-valuing must exist, if there is any valuing going on at all.

Regarding origin, I have simply observed, facing the notion of no-thingness, is that this grants its possibility, by virtue of chaos’ incapacity of enforcing its impossibility.

I have let myself be foolishly drawn into discussing nothing, whereas I clearly posited chaos / no-thingness. i.e., theoretic potential for somethingness, as the limit. So discussing with you has not only been doing the job of clarifying for me, but also of misleading, when we began treating the notion of chaos (being different from flux, as I made logically clear), which stands at the limit of my theory, as nothing.

The idea that value-ontology is essentially the same as the will to power is wrong. The will to power treats the subjects capability to engage otherness as a given. This has been the main problem I have had with the theory. On which terms does it do so? Nietzsche has explained nothing in this respect. He simply observes that the subject of will to power has this ability.

Where N. treats this capacity as a given, I ask: how can anything value? The answer: by being/holding a standard-value. And how can it be a standard? I have posited as the answer: its full being must be engaged in positing itself as a standard. Its being can be nothing besides positing itself as a standard, as this is the only certainty we have of what it is.

This is the root on which the entire theory rests - that being a standard is the activity granting the possibility of the secondary modus of this activity of valuing otherness in order to dominate/incorporate/reject. What has been misunderstood/miscommunicated, and this happens at the same level as trying to implant a crude causality-temporality thinking to this theory, is that this positing itself as a stands happens logically prior to valuing otherness, but can only be physically observable when it values another thing, when it starts to accumulate, when it begins willing to power.

So here we are back again, thankfully, at the real theory.
The notion of nothing must be entirely dismissed as nonsensical, and the notion of chaos, which means flat time-space, as the ground/limit.

The mentioned passage from BGE:

The problem here is that in terms of defining this working, “will” is an entirely empty term.
How could will work on will? On which terms ? I.e. what is this will?

Will must be somethingness engaging somethingness. What is somethingness? A standard. Waht is a standard? A value. How can a value be a subject? By it being a valuing in terms of itself. How can it do this (not just be this) Only by positing itself as a value.

I.e. self-valuing.

As I said before, value theory is a specification, a refining of the will to power theory. Why is it superior? Because it is more powerful, more useful. It explains further the terms by which an entity may be maximize its the capacity to will to power.

Will to power focusses on otherness, on the “to —>”, i.e. not on the subjects activity itself. The ‘will’ is secondary, because unexplained, mystical.

Unrefined, that is to say up until now, it could only lead to entropy. Now that I have demystified the will to power, philosophy/philosophers may actually begin acquire power.

Do I sound arrogant?

With people with only modest ability, modesty is mere honesty; but with those who possess great talent it is hypocrisy. - Schopenhauer

If I would not present this theory as a victory, a great advance, I would be misleading, lying. Value-ontology should be judged and analyzed according to its use, what it makes possible, which is an entirely new power-architecture.

Trying to logically reduce it to that from which it sprang forth, as you are, Sauwelios, is as trying to reduce man to ape, as some schools of behavioralist psychiatry are doing, instead of trying to elevate him, to overcome man, to forge out of him a higher species.

Unit is the center of energy. Each unit has it’s own will and perspective. They all together form a chaos.
You claim that it is not possible and also units are chaos?

But that which has a center is a unit.

Concluding:
How can anything will to power?
By positing itself to itself as a ground value.

And you, Nietzscheans, are excellent examples of this. Nothing will be incorporated by you unless you have defined it in your own terms – in the terms made possibly by your self-positing.

This is a prologue to the next phase of the theories development. The question: can one posit oneself in different ways? Self-valuing is the primary activity, absolute to being-subject, but the particular self-value that is posited may very well be more arbitrary, especially as larger entities are concerned, more resource is involved, different contexts are available.

“What matters is the quantum of power that one is” means: what matters is the scope/size/amount of context in which one is able to posit oneself as primary.

As power is context-bound, and a context is a value-system, the essence of power is the capacity to posit oneself as a ground-value. “Fundamental am I to myself, and to what/who else?” This is the question that we self-conscious entities face. We are driven to find the context in which we, as ground-value, determine the greatest good, the highest value.

How can anything want power? How can anything not want power?

Even you with your “thing in itself” want Nothing and can simply not stop wanting.

And even your nothing is a will to power, because every decadent is losing power against his own will and the Nothingness means wanting to stop the loss of power! Nothing = 0 loss of power. - It is still a will to power.

And knowledge is power.
And decadent is hedonist.
And hedonists are forgetful.

How can Value Ontology apply itself? Where is it better than science?

I will probably make a case for science as soon as you answer, be ready.

If the attempt to understand “self-valuing” necessarily leads to its genealogy, then it rests on that.

So Pezer is wrong, and self-valuing is not subordinate to valuing, but the other way 'round?

But it amounts to nothing. Nothing is literally no thing, so nothingness—the reification of nothing—is literally no-thingness.

As I said, pure flux would be nothing. But your flux is no pure flux, it’s only relatively fluxious.

Where is there “otherness” in will acting on will?

There is no subject of will to power. The will to power is encroaching subjects, or force moving outward from centers. The phrase “encroaching units” is not an answer to the question “who wants power?” or “who feels pleasure?”

And how can anything posit itself? I’ve asked this question, in different forms, multiple times already, but this suggestion of absurdity has been conveniently ignored.

“Itself” already refers to its being, so this is circular, absurd.

Well, I don’t care whether it’s logically prior or only logically more fundamental; all I care about is whether it’s logical.

I would agree if you said that valuing presupposes a value-standard. What I disagree with is the notion of “positing itself as a value-standard”, or “self-valuing”—as that is circular, absurd.

And what is “flat time-space”?