I agree with the first paragraph, but my statement was meant to be one having more to do with usefulness than anything. The tree is certainly the tree in any language or no language at all, my point is that what we decide to call the, “Tree,” is subjective, and to give the linguistics any meaning we have to be in agreement about language. A Japanese individual can talk about the tree until he/she is blue in the face, but it will mean absolutely nothing to me (though it means something to them and they are referring to an object) because I speak absolutely no Japanese.
In that sense, that we use language is an objective fact. We hear ourselves making sounds, and there are sound waves that physically exist that we produce. We can see writing and recognize the writing as language whether or not we understand it. It is what the sounds (or words) being produced mean that is subjective, because the same word can certainly mean two different things to two different people.
The thing about that is it both does and doesn’t. A speaker can make a statement that nobody else understands, but provided the speaker understands it, the inability of others to understand it will do nothing to negate the speaker’s opinion of the validity of his own statement. The manner in which the statement is made, however, will have an affect on whether or not another person considers the statement valid, or even can consider the statement valid.
If the language and usage is not, at a minimum, similar, we could not make an accurate judgment concerning the validity of the speaker’s words for ourselves.
And, of course, we can assume this particular engineering manual has in fact accounted for all of the variables because…you wrote it?
Yes, theoretically, every single possible variable could be factored into the pages of the engineering manual but, then, if that were possible “out in the world” of actual race cars going around and around the track, the optimal car would be winning every race.
Really, regarding the science of race cars, how do you gauge if it is “correct” if you don’t take the car off the pages, out of the garage and down to the track? Is there a car that would be fastest on all tracks and in all weather conditions or would there only be one fastest car per each juncture of variables?
And what of the variables factored into value judgments that reflect conflicting goods?
For example, “is it ethical to risk your life [and the lives of others] racing cars for a living?”
Try to digest the following: Some things are not subjective. Math, scientific facts are not subjective. Reasons, likewise, are not subjective.
It’s quite simple. So, why do you think a human has a right to life? I.e., why is your opinion correct? Because as you know, your opinion here could be wrong. Why do you think the Golden Rule is a good rule? Are you saying that the negative emotional impact on the family who’s member you killed is just a matter of your opinion, or do you think they actually feel that way?
Welcome to philosophy. Huge question…
That’s just wrong. Please keep in mind these important distinctions that… I honestly don’t even know how long I’ve been harping on them… intersubjectivity is not objectivity.
Exactly right. And that is what happens every single fucking time.
How many times should I have to repeat myself for you? Scientists do tests to see if they’ve gotten the science right… the tests don’t make the science right, they just verify it. The car with rain tires will be faster and more controlable in rainy conditions—no doubt. And just as with morality, we’re not arguing for a universal principle.
It’s quite obvious that consequentialists have a method that applies to all situations. What makes a situation tough is knowing what the consequences are… not whether consequences are important.
You’re just begging the question again. The consequentialist is going to understand the virtues, the rules, and the just war by teh consequences. If you think they miss something, then please, say what it is.
As I said before, that’s just simply false. Consequentialits demand that your intention is to maximize utility (for example), and that your character inculcate the virtues that are virtues just because they maximize utility. There isn’t a consequentialist alive who has ever said, “Just guess”… or “be cowardly and hope it works out for the better”. Again, if you think there’s something left out, then explain what it is.
Your reasons to like cherries are subjective… unless you’re trying to tell me why I should like cherries.
I agree with this. Morality is mind-dependent, in the way that any perceptual experience (of a tree, or whatever) is mind-dependent. You don’t see a tree without eyes, etc. That doesn’t mean we just make it up ex nihilo. That’s why I think the distinction between subject-dependent and subjective is important. So this may be our common ground, at last.
That’s not an argument. Let’s accept premise 1 - math and scientific facts are not subjective. (I do not actually accept that, but we have to start somewhere.)
That reasons are not subjective just does not follow. Just interjecting “likewise” does not make a logical connection. What is your argument for this?
You are the only one here who thinks morality is being made up out of nothing. We have all said that it is based on real world experiences. Who are you arguing with?
Read the OP again.
But here’s another separate reason to think reasons are objective. Some of your reasons for thinking what you do are bad ones.
Just as some of your answers to a math problem are bad ones.
Well, that’s another criticism of consequentialism But I don’t think the importance is so easy in all cases. How important is an embryo? At what point does it become important? How many rats are as important as a dog?
I don’t think they miss anything. I think they judge on different criteria: consequentialists want to minimise the net suffering, overall. The others want to uphold moral concepts, even if it requires more net suffering than pacifism would.
Consequentialists demand nothing, morally. The good of intention is purely instrumental - it works better than random guesswork or happenstance. Not that it’s not important instrumentally, of course - it just has nothing to do with whether an individual act is the right or wrong act. Because it’s judged on consequences. At least, that’s where Bentham, Mill, Singer and Rawls seem to agree; I don’t know if there are any intention-consequentialists, but I’ve never heard of them.
You should like cherries too, because they’re objectively soft and sweet and juicy.
The difference is that we discover trees, insects, planets. We create games, theories, models.
If we gradually discovered more morals, it might make sense to assume the former. But that doesn’t seem to happen; morals fall in and out of focus with culture and history, so the latter seems more reasonable to me.
I think much of the difference is in objective/subjective terminology. I don’t think anyone thinks we make it up ex nihilo.
But are the reasons true only when they correspond with your own? Can it really be as simple as that? Or is it simpler to suggest they are true only when they correspond with mine? Or with someone else?
Is it for the same reason another might give for taking it away? Is a reason all that is needed if you believe the reason you give accomplishes the task you set out for it?
They probably feel the same as the family of the man who is executed because we didn’t like the reason he gave for doing it. Reasons conflicting don’t make them any less reasons if we can’t think up a reason to prefer one over the other. Or, if we insist that our reason is preferable, does that make it so?
So, if someone writes an engineering manual for every conceivable context in which folks might race cars, it’ll just take longer for science to confirm that each is in fact the world’s fastest race car.
Just not so…universally.
Oh, and don’t forget to assign teams of scientists to prioritize all the reasons here:
“…is it ethical to risk your life [and the lives of others] racing cars for a living?”
And how about just for the sport of it?
Fortunately, if the universe is infinitely long, we will have an infinite amount of time in which to establish it.
No, it’s not a criticism of consequentialism. Are you unimpressed with the scientific method because scientific problems are hard and complex?
Yes, how many rats are as important as a dog… good question. It’s hard. Morality is complex. What is your beef?
This is the last time I’ll say this. What makes a character trait good are its consequences. What makes an intention good are the consequences it aims at. This is a consequentialist analysis of virtues and intentions. If you think this analysis misses something, then say what you think it misses. Otherwise, you are free to be a consequentialist. Here’s what you can’t do: Criticize consequentialism because it doesn’t incorporate the virtues, etc. Because as you can see, that’s just false.
And of “soft sweet and juicy” was the criteria of “tasting good” then I would be forced by reason to agree with you. As it happens, I think your definition misses something, namely “hard salty and dry”.
We create conceptual frameworks to capture and make sense of data, which becomes ‘trees’, ‘insects’, and ‘planets’. We create conceptual frameworks (theories/models) to capture normative data as well. What is the difference?
Faust,
My evidence was on the dog. You recognized it immediately. You said that the dog ought not have been treated that way. You read that off of the world itself. The dog, to be exact. Recognize, now, that it doesn’t matter whether anyone actually did that to the dog or not—what happened to the dog still ought not have happened, whether it was nature or man. I told you about this case before. A child with inner ear cancer. Nobody did that to him. He had to be strapped to a bed in such a way that he couldn’t move his head… because the fluid movement would cause pain. This is not an interpersonal conflict between people. The medications caused him to halucinate. And that’s how he died. Strapped to the bed, seeing monsters, and 5 years old. It is perfectly intelligible to say “that ought not have been the case”. The normative conclusions are pulled from facts about the world. You can fail to see them, sure. The present King of France fails to see the tree in the yard. You can defend the present King of France, sure. Ambigui is hatching an escape plan as we speak. None of that matters to me. I write the King off as a fanatic. I do the same in the moral case. What’s wrong with that?
If they hatch up a moral framework divorced from reality, then that’s where they belong. On the other hand, if they get it from reality, they’re likely an objectivist. Clear enough, right?
When reasons conflict you have a moral problem. There are lots of moral problems. Not all of them are solvable right now. Just as in science with competing explanations. That’s why we do philosophy—we look deeper into the reasons.
It has been shown that it’s possible to get several valid subjective results purely from objective data. Remember the wet farmers. Or are you now suggesting that their interpretation of the rain is not at all subjective? That they are each making an objective judgement? It is relativistic, right?
Do you remember my response to the wet farmer case? Go back and read it, and try to keep it in your memory long enough to last through your next post.
The rain is objectively good for crops X, and objectively bad for crops Y. No declaration such as “this rainstorm is universally good” is possible. Just as in morality, no principle such as “killing is universally wrong” is possible. Context matters. That’s not relativism or subjectivism. Relativism is the idea that the justification of morality is cultural crap, just as subjectivism is the idea that morality is justified by shit inside your head. It’s not, in either case. In a particular case, an entire culture can be wrong about whether the rain is good for crops X, and they can be wrong about whether they should have done that to the dog. This is old news my friend.
That you give a reason is a fact. That the reason you give is in accordance with, say, the laws of physics is often considerably more problematic.
If Mary is pregnant and chooses an abortion she either gives you a reason why or she does not. But if the reason she gives is, “it’s immoral to bring more life into this wicked world”, is that a fact about the world?
Is this, in fact, true?
Or, if she says, “a flying elephant from another planet told me to abort it”, is this something she can reasonably demonstrate to be a fact about the world we live in?
You say:
In other words, you avail yourself of the escape hatch. And there is no way on earth I can unequivocally discredit you. In other words, not objectively.
If the reason is a good one, then there will be a fact about the world that makes it true. As it is, it’s not well specified. We need to ask her more questions. I would ask why she thinks “it is immoral”. I’d keep asking why, until she specified a fact about the world. If she ended up just saying what Faust usually does, something like, “well I don’t fucking know, it just is”—then Mary is irrational.
The context is inside your head and it’s influenced by culture. There is no objective context which is accessible to humans - that would require God’s point of view.
But I don’t think the importance is so easy in all cases. How important is an embryo? At what point does it become important? How many rats are as important as a dog?