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The context is inside your head and it’s influenced by culture. There is no objective context which is accessible to humans - that would require God’s point of view.

I do not recognize that at all. Your implication was that the dog had been mistreated. If the fact is that the dog has not been mistreated, then I do not claim that it ought not to have happened. i did not read it off the world, i read it off what i took to be your implied claim - that the dog had been mistreated. If you were just trying to be cute, and that was a picture of a dog that had not been mistreated, then that is a problem not with my claim, but with your subterfuge. You can’t ask for my view and then demand that I take your view, by simply “recognizing” that it doesn’t matter if the dog was mistreated or not. here, you are, once again, not making an argument, but simply demanding that we “recognize” what you “recognize”. I am asking you to do some philosophy - to make an argument, which you evidently cannot do.

It’s also not a moral question to begin with. The kid had cancer. that’s not the result of anyone’s behavior towards their fellow man.

In common parlance, sure. But my assumption is that we’re generally here to engage in philosophy.

There are no normative conclusions in this case, because moral, normative conclusions are about the behavior of people. No one did this to the kid.

It’s not a moral case. Once again, you are not even attempting to respond to my points. I really had, up until now, given you much more credit than this. I had no idea how weak your case really was.

It’s a question about what’s better or worse. It’s a question about human flourishing. —That’s morality.
Your problem is that you define morality as “a bunch of bullshit”, and then argue that morality is a bunch of bullshit. (I’m paraphrasing obviously). And all I’m suggesting is that you haven’t captured everything with your definition. I thought that I showed you what you weren’t capturing with your definition… in the picture. Perhaps you don’t see it. If that’s the case, long live the King!

So is the debate over Brady v. Manning. That’s not enough to make it a moral question.

No, it is not. Morality is also about behavior. Many other factors are involved in human flourishing, including, but not limited to, luck, weather, and genetics.

Not at all. I think morality is one of the most useful of all human constructs. I neither make that claim nor do i argue for it.

All I’m suggesting is that you have found about a hundred ways, over thousands of words, to restate a single claim.

Yup, if you thought being a good football player had anything to do with human excellence, then it would be a moral question. As it happens, that’s about a craft—and unrelated.

No shit. Don’t you get it? If a baby is born (to use your genetics example), that is horribly deformed, whose organs aren’t connected properly, and who lives a short painful live, dying before it can open its eyes… guess what I’m going to say… I’m going to say, “that ought not have been the case”. And guess what? I’m fucking right about that.

What about the dog is constructed?

Here’s my beef: You think you’d be the actual King, if only the hospital maid wasn’t so treasonous.

You mean, a human being excellent at his craft has nothing to do with human excellence? Either way, you have missed my point, or dodged it.

No, you’re just using the word “ought” in a way that doesn’t apply to morality. Now, that just is a matter of literacy. I can intelligibly say “hey, we had a great time at the party, you ought to have been there” but that’s just a different usage than we employ in morality. I have said this many times, but you can’t do philosophy until you understand the language you are using.

Really? Seriously? Are you seriously asking that question?

Yes, this is basic Socratic stuff. Being an excellent cobbler doesn’t make you an excellent person. And being an excellent football player doesn’t make you an excellent person. That’s just fucking obvious, isn’t it?

No, it’s not. It’s the exact same usage. Here’s why you (wrongly) think it’s different: You think the person is either (1) wrong, or (2) it didn’t really matter either way—so it’s a flippant use of an important word. That’s all.

You can’t do philosophy until you understand basic language.

Yes.

  1. Science is very good at measuring and defining things, however hard it may be. Consequentialists generally wave their hands and talk about indefinable quantities like pleasure and well-being and back down when asked for specific objective measurables.
  2. So where do you start? How do you objectively come to a conclusion that it’s fifteen, or thirty-five, or whatever, such that anyone who disagrees is ignoring the tree in the yard? Don’t back down with “oh, it’s hard”, because I think it’s impossible. Because such a calculus doesn’t exist.

I think you misunderstand me. I’m not saying one is better than the other, here, or that you’re missing anything from your explanation of consequentialism. I’m saying that they are different, and will reach different conclusions on what is moral in specific cases, for different reasons. And I’ve given you examples of such things, as you asked me to.

And of “soft sweet and juicy” was the criteria of “tasting good” then I would be forced by reason to agree with you. As it happens, I think your definition misses something, namely “hard salty and dry”.
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How can this be? We’re referencing objective criteria, one of us must be wrong.

I’ve just said. Within the frameworks, we discover new trees and planets. If a thousand years ago in Europe we’d discovered trees, and no-one believed in them any more, we’d have a situation like that of morality.

That’s not a moral ought though; no-one is to blame. No normative power.

Mo -

It’s obvious when you say what you mean. But you still haven’t told us what makes an excellent person. You seem to be claiming that a morally excellent person is an excellent person, and when we ask you about actual moral cases, you claim that you don’t know, that morality is “difficult”. Just what good is your claim, then? You tell us it’s easy to see a tree, but impossible to see right and wrong in the examples that have been given you. Moral theory is useful when it tells us which acts are right and which are wrong. You give extreme examples that most would agree with, on pain of being called insane, but you expect us to be insane enough to accept your claim that morality is just as easily seen - except that it’s not, for when it’s an example that’s not settled by your claim, you simply shrug your shoulders and say - “Well, tough luck. I don’t know the answer”.

Again, with all this verbiage, all you have done is to make a single claim, that morality is “objective”, and then use extreme examples that most would agree with, and when someone disputes not the moral choice itself, but the basis for that choice, you scream “Reductio! Reductio!” It’s an insult.

The biggest problem with all this is that newbies might think that this is all actual philosophy, which it is not.

What? Why wouldn’t a consequentialist just use the scientist to measure things like pain? Why reinvent the wheel? Is that what you want?

Talk to a scientist. I am not a scientist.

Begging the question again. You have not explained how they are different, and if they are, you cannot point to the difference by saying that “they fight the good fight”----because that’s obviously begging the question about what ‘good’ means here.

I’ve just said. Within the frameworks, we discover new actions and principles, because new problems arise—like abortion. There are clearly people here who are prepared not to believe in trees, if only they were prepared to be consistent.

This is nothing but begging the question again. I’m tired of responding to it. Just look backwards if you need to.

Plato beat me to it.

I gave you an easy case. You’re free to give me a hard case. You can do that to a scientist too. Just ask them if quarks exist. There’s no difference, and neither hard case is a problem for a scientist, nor an objectivist about morality.

This is the insult.

I really hope they do. Because philosophy is practical—at least it can be, and was for the people who knew how to do it best.

And this brings up a more general point about ILP. There are, right now, any number of topics that I think are more interesting than this. But it’s like talking to your neighbour and knowing in advance that he has a dead body in his closet. Some things need to be cleared up first…

Awhile ago, I wanted to figure out what makes something beautiful. And a bunch of …people started going off about how beauty doesn’t exist! it’s all just made up shit! blah blah blah! So I was like, whoa…

You want to know what’s not philosophy? That’s NOT philosophy. If your answer to any of the deepest most interesting questions is: “It doesn’t exist! You just make it up for yourselves! Every man for himself!” …that’s the style of answer people here give, including you… and it’s not philosophy. I hope the newbs recognize that.

Because pain is not suffering, as I’ve explained. And scientists don’t measure pleasure. And no moralist has yet told a scientist how to measure well-being.

What a disappointing cop-out. You haven’t a clue what to measure, yet you insist it’s there?

Yes I did, back up the thread. Twice, I believe. Deontologists see the rational rule as good regardless of contexts, because the rule-keeping itself is what leads to the aggregate best world. Act consequentialists ignore a rule that brings a suboptimal result. I’m not going to keep repeating myself.

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I’m not sure that “begging the question” means what you think it means. Or if it does, how pointing out that not all oughts (nor this particular one) are moral statements does so.

I don’t think that you’re wrong that the baby ought have had a better life, nor that it doesn’t matter. But it’s simply not normative, no-one has the slightest capacity to change things. Unless you have a God you wish to blame. Ought can refer to many things besides moral injunction: you ought to try balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream, it’s delicious - I’m not attempting to bring you in line, just offering a suggestion. Of course, if it is moral in that case, then “delicious” is an objective description, by your views. :slight_smile:

Then measure pain, not suffering. And measure pleasure. And reduce well-being to pain and pleasure.

Oh for godssakes. You see how this is begging the question, right? To say that “Good is good regardless of context” doesn’t tell you a freaking thing about what “good” is. And I seriously doubt you want to put the phrase “Aggregate best world” into the mouth of a deontologist. I seriously doubt that…

Everytime you say something that implies a distinction between a prudential ought, and a moral ought, you are begging the question… because I asked you pages ago to explain the difference that I don’t seem to see.

Unless the ought just refers to “trying new things” or “seeing if you like what I like”—or is just plainly false in this example! In any case, I see no difference.

Get as many people on an opium drip as society can sustain, then. Good luck with selling that as the definitive answer to human morality.

Morality is context-independent to the deontologist.

“That baby ought not have been born so” isn’t a prudential ought. How can one be prudent about such things?

I don’t believe you do. Ah well.

Though seriously, minor quibbles like morality aside, good balsamic vinegar on vanilla ice cream is good.

But she already thinks that, in fact, it is wicked; and for any number of reasons.

So, sure, that she has reasons is an objective fact. That they are good reasons is a matter of opinion. She may be a socialist convinced that capitalism has turned the world into a moral cesspool.

That’s a reason. Is it a fact about the world? Some say yes and others say no. And they can all give you reasons. Lots of them. How then does science or philosophy determine if they are good reasons. At best you can go down the escape hatch: “someday we will know this for sure but it’s hard to be certain now because these things are complex.”

All I’m looking for is an argument able to convince me that “capitalism = a wicked world” or “capitalism = a virtuous world” is an argument that might possibly be made objectively. I am not suggesting that it can’t be, only that you have not convinced me that it can. This is my escape hatch: that, in a world sans God, these things [i.e. value judgments] can’t be known. Not wholly. Not objectively.

But, as an ironist, I accept that my own point of view here is just that: a personal prejudice.

Like yours is.

Yes, so again, maybe something’s left out—I’d be glad to hear what you think it is.

That’s wonderful for a deontologist.

Begging the question again. I haven’t made the distinction, so to say it’s prudent but not moral, or moral but not prudent, is to beg the question of what you mean by the distinction.

What are her reasons? Why are those her reasons? What are her reasons?

You do that, you do philosophy. Period.

Logic and empirical fact.

I’ve already explained why Math is subjective, because it is language, but how it refers to the objective, often. That Math exists or is used is an objective fact, mathematical equations can be Empirically experienced. I’ve also determined that the goal of scientific inquiry is to determine what is objectively true, so you’re just repeating what I said there.

The subjectivity, or lack thereof, of Math and Science have nothing to do with reasons.

I’m not going to answer all of those questions in the second paragraph as they should really be reserved for different threads. Besides, I would just be answering with reasons which would lead to more questions. I agree that my reasons are certainly refutable, but I’m not sure that a morally based reason can strictly be, “Wrong,” certainly some are more unusual than others…

I will answer to the negative emotional impact. It is a matter of my opinion, unless I know that an individual has a decent enough relationship with his family. He may have no family alive. His family may hate him. Unless I know him, then I don’t really know.

beg the question - to use an argument that assumes as proved the very thing one is trying to prove

Thank you. If Only_Humean was wondering, that should show him.

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