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In my own estimation – and that is all it is, my own opinion – this translates as:

“Give me a single reason that I will agree with to think it’s off the mark. That’s what I’ve been asking you for, and you haven’t given me a single one that I agreed with. Let’s be honest, whatever points you brought up earlier I have already dealth with objectively such that you are now making yourself look to me like the Black Knight blocking the path forward without your arms and legs.”

So then every single context has its own objective reality? And it is just that, regarding some contexts, it is harder to figure out what this is because they are more complex?

Is that your argument?

Sure.

And I have to agree with this or I am wrong?

It is possible to deny reality. If you disagree with that statement, then you disagree with me. Not just in the science case, but in the normative case as well.

Look at the dog, for instance. Ought that culture to invite animal abuse? The answer is discovered by investigating the actual world. You can get your reasons just by looking at the actual dog… from the world itself.

Someone might disagree… and claim to be a dasein and other bullshit. He is denying reality just as if he claimed he was the King of France, or that God made the world in 7 literal days.

Wait, so you can’t think of a way to scientifically measure morality yet claim that it can be done, and the burden of proof is then on me to show you that it’s not possible at all? That’s not how it works. You’re making the claim for objective existence, it’s your burden. Just like the burden of proof is on the theist to prove the existence of God, or on the physicist to prove the existence of new particles.

So, my single reason, as requested, would be that the best criteria you could come up with so far barely took any effort to contradict. What more reason would you like not to believe in the existence of something?

What line? Clearly morality is not context independent, as we both have agreed. Do you now want to give me a reason to think I should have to defend some deontological point?
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You’re… not following this discussion at all, are you? Let’s drop it, then.

It’s a purely emotive expression. It may be sympathy with the family of the baby, for instance. Now your turn: in what way is it possibly normative? What prudential/moral lessons can we learn from something completely out of our control?

I don’t know where this comment comes from. Gauging the consequences of actions is often easy. It’s often obvious. We use second order concepts to characterize it. There’s no complex mathmatical or scientific technique needed. It’s a way of approaching moral problems. I’m not doing a scientific investigation, I’m doing a conceptual one. And if you are denying that sometimes people fare worse, and sometimes people fare better, then you’re insane. If you have a problem with characterizing ‘faring better’ and ‘faring worse’ with pleasure and pain, then propose something it leaves out. That’s the question I asked you. Get it straight.

What are you denying the existence of? Suffering? Pain? What?

It would be better for the baby not to be horribly deformed. It ought not have been that way. No one is to blame. But obviously some ‘oughts’ have nothing to do with blame. And no one is to be praised, but obviously some ‘oughts’ have nothing to do with praise. This is clear.

You can fill in the blanks yourself with the opium drip example, can’t you? It leaves out everything separating people on an opium drip from people living good lives. If you think there’s objective stuff there, feel free to raise it.

Suffering and flourishing as single things. Certainly as measurable things, true for all people everywhere in the way that biology and physics are.

So it’s a non-moral ought, then? Because you seem to have been arguing against Faust when he said that.

I would never deny the reality that “Mary had an abortion” if in fact Mary had an abortion.

But you want to insist that either “Mary’s abortion is moral” or “Mary’s abortion is immoral” is an expression of reality too.

Which one? Well, it’s hard to say for now, you note, because abortion as a “normative issue” is complex.

I don’t necessarily disagree with this. Someday it may well be established “scientifically” that it is in fact one or the other. In reality.

You’ve always got me there and then. Just not here and now.

But each individual dasein lives in a particular world and views it from a particular point of view. And while you can demonstrate that “in reality” John abused Rex, you can’t demonstrate that this abuse is necessarily wrong—no matter how many people insist it is.

All John need do is embrace “self-gratification” as a philosophy of life and then hate dogs.

Instead, you need a transcending point of view in order to include normative values in the mix with things that are “in reality” true for all of us.

Or so it seems to me.

You say:

But this is only bullshit because you tell me it is. Because you believe it is. You haven’t proven it however. Not beyond that. Not scientifically. At least I recognize that others are able to point to my belief that it is not bullshit as “true” only because I believe it is not bullshit.

And someone claiming here and now to be the King of France [the France] is patently absurd. And that is because “in reality” there is no king of France here and now. Is there?

But a God creating the world literally in 7 days takes us to discussions about the existence of existence itself. And who among us has a fucking clue as to how that all began. Here, even science is dealing with things it doesn’t even know it doesn’t even know yet.

In my view, you cannot tolerate living in a world without an objective morality. As Peter Singer suggested of Derek Parfit:

Parfit’s real interest is in combating subjectivism and nihilism. Unless he can show that objectivism is true, he believes, nothing matters.

Well, of course, nihilism or no, things matter to us. But some folks – psychologically – seem compelled to embrace the idea that they must matter. And they include in this a belief that their own moral values must matter because they are true “in reality”. And then they go around and around in a circle.

But in a world that is essentially meaningless and absurd – a world that ends for each of us one by one in oblivion – what does it really mean to speak of things – of anything really – that must matter? Nothing matters to you when “you” are dust.

But, truly: A part of me would love to be convinced otherwise. So, please, by all means, don’t ever stop trying to.

This is a common objection, and in my opinion, not a very thoughtful one. Are you suggesting that there is a drug that can give you pleasure while not numbing yourself to all kinds of ways of getting pleasure, like intellectual pursuits, creative achievements, and so on? Even the pleasure of overcoming obstacles? Ultimately, the question is yours. You are the person denying all kinds of things… why don’t you tell me what’s lost? It’s a simple question. I’m not the one claiming to know what it is: you are. Answer it.

And lastly, what is with you just begging questions and so on? It’s this, and it’s the difference between prudential oughts and moral oughts… you keep making assumptions, and never saying a word about them… even after being asked like 5 times. I’m tired of it.

At what point did I say that suffering and flourishing were true for all people in the way biology and physics are? I’ve explicitly denied the notion that there are universals in ethics. You’ve said before (insultingly) that I don’t seem to follow the thread. Is that hypocrisy again?

A non-moral ought? Listen, every time you imply that something could be a moral ought but not a prudential one, or a prudential one but not a moral one, you are begging the question. And the notion that there’s some emotive ‘ought’ separate from both is utterly nonsensical. The baby ought not have suffered. If you think I should call it either moral or prudential THEN EXPLAIN THE FUCKING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM!!! …So that I know which to call it.

Ahem.

Yes you can. You can demonstrate that it is wrong (in reality) with exactly as much certainty as you can decide that you are not the King of France. There is not the slightest difference. Someone can hate dogs and like kicking them. And likewise, someone can think they are the present King of France.

How is this even the slightest problem for me?

All I can do once again is appeal to others:

Mo seems convinced he has dealt my point of view here a…blow? How so? Is there a way to reconfigure his words so that this might be clearer to me?

Is the key to it all the phrase, “with exactly as much certainty as…”?

I know for certain I am not presently the King of France. Why? Because, among other things, there has not in fact been an actual king of France for over 150 years. Now, can I demonstrate this with an absolute certainty? Well, what does that mean, I suppose. After all, someone other than myself might be genuinely convinced – in his head – that in fact he is the current king of France.

In fact, is he?

It seems that, one way or the other, we have to agree on what constitutes a fact here.

On the other hand, I do not hate dogs and I have never kicked one. But, again, how can I demonstrate this with an absolute certainty?

Instead, I make the distinction between a capacity to demonstrate that John kicked Rex – if in fact he did – and the capacity to demonstrate to another that if he did so then he ought not to have done so because – in fact – kicking Rex is necessarily immoral.

When is it reasonable to broach a point of view regarding what is “in fact” true “out in the world” of behaviors that come into conflict over contradictory value judgments?

Sure, epistemologists might well argue endlessly about what we can really know here; or about what we can really know here.

And, technically, more power to them.

But sooner or later – existentially, subjunctively – our Kierkegaardian leaps must be made.

No you don’t. You could have been brainwashed to think you’re not, and that this is the year 2012.

With exactly as much certainty, I said before.

Exact same way that you would prove someone is not the King of France.

Well, yes, of course, we can always go that far out on the limb. And, while out there, we can even saw it off and go tumbling down to the ground.

And only then to find out that, in fact, it was all just a demonic apparition anyway.

Again: what exactly are “the facts” in a cosmos this astoundingly vast and enigmatic?

Note to others:

I won’t need that help after all. We all know where this is going: to the dream within a dream.

Mo - you have misunderstood something about the English language. “The baby ought not to have suffered” contains neither a moral nor a prudential “ought”.

This is not shocking stuff. For instance, there is a sense in which “ought” simply expresses a probability. “After so many rolls of the dice, snake eyes ought to come up soon.” Or a simple desire “You ought to come to the party”. To say “That ought not to have happened” is like the last example. “Ought” is not restricted to moral or prudential uses. Nor to desires.

Notice though, the difference between “you ought to come” and “it ought to be snake eyes” - in the first, it’s a person who is being asked to do something. This at least puts the question in a potentially moral arena - “You ought to come over… because this will show support for the worthy cause that is being feted that night” - or some possible moral act that we could attach to the basic phrase.

“It ought to be snake eyes” is analogous to “It ought not to have happened” in that no entity is assigned any responsibility. “Ought” can be used outside the moral or prudential arena, and is, all the time.

Again, this is not new ground - it is known to many English-speakers over the age of about seven, I would say. To say that “it ought to be morning soon” is either prudential or moral is not only nonsense, it’s illiterate.

When are you going to get serious, here?

  1. There’s one kind of ‘ought’. (And the probabilitistic phrase, “It ought to roll snake eyes” is a misuse of it, I think)
  2. If you think there’s a difference between prudential and moral oughts, then explain what you think the difference is.

The sense in which we say, “the baby ought not have been born that way”, is perfectly intelligible. What we are saying is that: All things considered, it is worse that the baby was born that way. A maximizing consequentialist would take that to mean: “There is more suffering in the world, now”.

You are free to tell me that I don’t understand English, that anyone over 7 would know what I don’t, and you can accuse me of not being serious… But I am dead serious, and I am dead serious when I say that you haven’t a clue what you’re talking about.

Still, eventually, Mo will get around to, “the baby ought not to have suffered at the hands of someone’s abuse.”

And if it is established that someone abused the baby intentionally then surely this must be an “ought not” beyond which no rational mind could possibly object.

But what if the mind is able to convince itself that, in fact, any behavior deemed self-gratifying is not irrational at all?

Is this “in fact” false?

What if particular behaviors are rooted in labyrinthian motivation – inclinations, provocations, inducements, agencies etc. – that are hopelessly embedded [entangled] in any of a virtual infinite number of ways in which “I” might come to view its own life “out in the world”?

This is the argument I don’t quite know how to unravel. It repulses me that someone would derive actual gratification from abusing a baby…an innocent child. But I know from watching the local news there are people like this that do. And if there is no God how can it be argued objectively that such behaviors are in fact objectively immoral when in fact any particular dasein is able to rationalize them? If only because, “I do what I want.”

It seems to me [though I may well be wrong] Mo needs people he can become a river for. They can come to him and he can assure them that he knows when things are Good and when things are Bad. Not only that, but he knows this for sure, “scientifically”.

In other words, with respect to value judgments, Mo is not an ironist. He gets to say what he means because he really does believe he means what he says. He must because he seems adament that you must come to mean what he says too.

Some people are able to think like this. Some people are not. This is no less rooted in dasein. And parts of me would like to think like this again, but: I’m running out of time to be convinced it isn’t just a psychological defense mechanism invented by minds who [if only subconsciously] recognize what it means to live in a world where, in the absense of God, all things really can be rationalized.

And if you able to rationalize something then “for all practical purposes” it is permitted.

I can’t believe this is still going…

Yet another monument to Mo’s intransigence? Or ours?

“You are the person denying God exists - tell me why”. Burden of proof’s still on you, sir. So how do you measure the pleasure of creative achievements in order to balance it against the pleasure of drug euphoria?

“Then measure pain, not suffering. And measure pleasure. And reduce well-being to pain and pleasure.”

I don’t think it is.

You keep bringing this up. Please follow the thread. Faust said, it’s “neither a moral nor a prudential “ought””. I said, “the statement is not a moral one, you bring in prudence, I say it’s not prudential either.” Any difference between prudence and morality is utterly irrelevant, as no-one’s claiming it’s one and not the other. You should call it neither because it is neither, and your attempt to define it as such is bafflingly ill-advised.

You are the one who claimed that a drugged up society on opium was an objection to me. That needs to be explained. You can’t raise that as an objection to me, and also object that there’s no way to measure pleasure—because your first objection assumes that there is.

Whatever your point here is supposed to be, it’s not clear.

You can’t explain the sort of ‘ought’ you’re referring to by saying it’s not this, and not that. Tell me what it is, for the 10th time. Until then, I’m fully justified in telling you that, just like Faust, you have no idea what you’re talking about.

If you think that it was me who brought up prudence, then quote me doing it first. You are dead wrong about that. And why would I have done that? --I’m the only one not distinguishing between prudence and morality.

The sense in which the child ought not have been born that way is very clear—the world is a worse place because of it. Are you claiming that that is unintelligible to you?