dfsdf

prudent - 1. capable of exercising sound judgement in practical matters, especially as concerns one’s own interests
(from the Latin ‘prudens’, to fore-see)
moral - 1. relating to, dealing with, or capable of making the distinction between right and wrong in conduct
(from the Latin ‘moralis’, of manners or customs used by Cicero as translation of the Greek ‘ethikos’)

Morality deals with relationships with other people. Prudence exists without these relationships but may be also be applied to relationships.

It may be prudent to cooperate with a psychotic killer although it involves doing something immoral.

Alone on a deserted island, prudence still exists but morality does not. It is prudent to build a shelter, but there is no morality associated with such an action. Same with brushing your teeth.

Hope this helps. :slight_smile:

Or, to paraphrase Lewis Carroll:

“I don’t know what you mean by ‘morality,’ ” Iambiguous said.

 Mo smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell you." 

 “But how do square objectivity here with William Barrett's conjecture that value judgments often revolve around conflicting -- but eminently reasonable -- points of view?" Iambiguous objected.

 “When I use words,” Mo said, in rather a scornful tone, “they mean just what I choose them to mean—neither more nor less.”

 "But what if they mean something different to me?"  Iambiguous protested.

 "Then you are wrong!", trumpeted Mo.

There’s no difference here. ‘Right and wrong in conduct’ = ‘sound judgment in practical matters’.

What? Are you claiming that’s all there is to it? If so, you are dead wrong. What moral theory are you talking about? Is it virtue theory? —because then obviously you’re wrong. Is it consequentialism? —because if so, you’re wrong again. Is it Kantianism? —because there you’d be wrong too. Those are the three main moral theories in the history of philosophy. Which one do you want to be wrong about?

It is not prudent to do something immoral because a psychotic killer said to. What a ridiculous and indefensible example.

Utterly false. You ought to build a shelter. You ought to take care of yourself. You ought to care for your health. That’s all there is to say about it. There’s no sense in applying your non-existent distinction.

On the other hand, Mo’s point here is not unreasonable. You can clearly see the direction in which he is going in melding the meaning of the word moral with the meaning of the word prudential.

Still, it is “out in the world” when you are forced to apply the meaning you assign to these words to particular behaviors that you are only able to garner a greater or a lesser consensus.

Mo merely insist if you are not on his side of the lines being drawn then you are wrong.

By definition, in other words.

His own.

Always.

You know, Mo, I sometimes agree with you. And sometimes I don’t. It’s odd that you accuse me of insulting you, when I’ve tried to simply make a point by asking you a question. But I can’t make points if you don’t engage in conversations.

The good news is I’m so used to your vitriol that I’m not insulted by it like I once was.

If you simply don’t have time to deal with me, and would like to stick to “debating” the usual suspects - then just say so. I don’t have tons of time on my hands either, and would completely understand.

Anyway, my post was about Loki’s Wager.

Here’s the point from your last two posts:

Was that your question? Because if it was, you know where you shove it.

You mean about my head and my neck? Guess what I’m going to say?

I see no reason why these people are distinguishing between prudence and morality. I see no reason to do so in the entire history of philosophy. I see no reason in phyllo’s favorite dictionary. They still want to. So, please, if you think they’re right… EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

Are you then equally contemptuous of those who refuse to engage philosophically in “conversations” here? And do you also believe that, in order to ask the right questions, you must first be privy to the right answers?

That often seems to be Mo’s bent here. Unless, of course, this really is just an exercise in irony.

Machiavelli’s Prince is prudent but not moral.

I don’t know how many examples you need, in order to see a clear distinction between prudence and morality.

Your entire theory of morality seems to hinge on this word ‘ought’ which you continue to misuse.

I tried. I am a Webster’s Dictionary to my people.

To your satisfaction?

“I ought to know better than to post here, even occasionally” is a matter of prudence. Let’s say uncontrolled harsh language is morally wrong. Let’s assume that I have trouble controlling my language when I speak with you. So I wonder whether I can fruitfully take part in a conversation with you, in this thread, without doing something morally wrong. I’m feeling good, and in control, so I post something nice and straightforward. I’ve just done something morally right, but imprudent. Because I’ve misjudged my abilities and the first time you say to me “you know where you can shove it”, I lose control and rage against you.

That is a difference between prudence and morality. And the example is purely hypothetical. :-"

What?

But, again, to me, this depends entirely on what you construe the basis of morality to be.

The Prince might embrace self-gratification as a moral font. And, so, he has to be prudent always in deceiving others in order to, at times, convince them otherwise? Think, say, a few prominent folks from the Showtime series The Borgias.

Once you embrace expediency – rooted often in fortiuity, and always in contingency, chance and change – you acknowledge that value judgments are invariably rooted in dasein. And dasein is situated out in a particular world understood in a particular manner.

Sans God, there is no way for mere mortals to go here except to – existentially, subjunctively – make things up as they go along. Mo, however, lives in his “world of words” instead. In the world of Reason. And words here mean precisely what he says they do. Or, in other words, precisely what he wants and needs them to. Thus, he is ruled by his own psychological bent to embrace certainty here.

In my view.

Unless, of course, I’m wrong.

I surely may have misconstrued your point to Mo, but I suspected you were chagrined that Mo would lump you in with all the rest of us. That, while we may have deserved his rebukes, you surely did not.

If this was not your point at all, I apologize.

No problem. Yes, that wasn’t my point at all.

Posting here is not imprudent, nor is it immoral (whatever you think the distinction is). If you can’t control your language, then posting here is both imprudent and immoral—i.e., something you ought not do. If you get into a conversation knowing you can’t always control your language, then posting here is both imprudent and immoral. You haven’t explained whatever you take the distinction to be. I’ve feigned that there is a distinction in what I just wrote—but there actually is none to be had, at least not one that you’ve made clear.

Your example is a bad one. And if you had spent some time reading past posts, you’d have realized that I’ve already dealt with bad examples. Perhaps you could just say what you think the distinction is…

Let me repeat what I’ve already said, for you:

Being prudent is never immoral, and being immoral is never prudent. They are not just conceptually linked, they are two concepts for the same thing (i.e., what you ‘ought’ to do). Your intelligence has been bewitched and confused by means of an error in language. I can tell you how it happened, if you want. The error, at least, reached prominence when Kant divorced empirical self-interest (‘happiness’) from morality, in order to find a non-contingent, universal ground of morality. He rendered the concept unintelligible when he placed its necessary postulates in the unintelligible realm—the noumenal realm. When he tried to solve the problem of motivation (i.e., “Why be moral?”), that answer, too, was likewise placed in the unanswerable category. This is all fundamentally religious thinking. You can separate prudence from morality if you say “prudence is this-worldly self-interest”, and “morality is other-worldly self-interest” (i.e., getting into heaven, and not hell)… but there is no other-world. I don’t make a fiction and a show of my concepts, and neither should you. You can always uphold a distinction when you render one half of it meaningless—but it’ll be a meaningless distinction.

Thus I’m in the tradition of the philosophical greats… Socrates, Nietzsche, Hobbes, and Dan~

Another thing you’ll surely be tempted to do (as others have), is to say things like, “So brushing your teeth is something moral”? And my answer is clearly yes. You ought to take care of yourself. But don’t mistake degrees of importance (e.g., brushing your teeth vs. saving a life) with a fundamental difference in concepts.

This is the idea that each person ‘creates’ their own morality. Mo has been criticizing you for having this position. I think that morality is set by the group. An individual may act morally or immorally with respect to the group standard. The Prince is not ignorant of morality but merely uses it to attain his own goals. Success is based on prudent action which may be saintly piety or ruthless brutality.

ROFL

But if my post here is morally positive, then how could you say it is morally wrong? You can’t. What is wrong about it? Should I always assume I won’t be able to handle myself appropriately in some particular person’s presence? How do you ever know, if you don’t try? In fact, you may have to be imprudent in order to cultivate moral character. You’ve got to be daring, and do something positive in the world.

If you can’t distinguish different kinds of actions because you insist on their connections to each other, then you can’t talk about anything at all, let alone morality or prudence. You can’t talk about what you ought to do, at all. You can’t talk about necks, and you can’t talk about heads.

Anyway, let’s stick with this concept you just brought up - “degrees of importance”. So there is a spectrum, and prudence is to the left, while morality is to the right. It’s all the same thing, but it’s a matter of degree of “oughtness”. Just like the difference between the neck and the head, in Loki’s case. Where is the line drawn? Inability to draw a clear line doesn’t mean there is no difference between “neck” and “head”. Same with prudence and morality, given your own definitions.

I can, and just did. If you do something that does not seem morally wrong, but you know it’ll lead to something morally wrong (or at least that likelihood), then what you did initially is in fact morally wrong. That’s clear. Buying a gun is not morally wrong, but buying a gun when I know I have an uncontrollable temper makes buying the gun morally wrong. It’s something I ought not do.

Your example simply begs the question of what you think the distinction is. You should just state it. Because your example itself shows no distinction.

Wrong.

There is a spectrum of the force that an ‘ought’ claim has. On one end, you really really ought to do that. On the other end, yea, you sort of ought to do it. Perhaps on one end is brushing your teeth, and on the other end is saving a life. Neither side is prudence or morality, one and not the other. I’ve already told you there is no distinction there. If you think there is, it is incumbent on you to FOR ONCE EXPLAIN THE DISTINCTION.

Otherwise, you should more or less agree with me. Prudence and morality are linked. As with many philosophical puzzles and problems, the problem itself is with language and the way the problem is stated. I’m clarifying it. The distinction above is a relic of old religious thinking, which no longer makes sense… just as it didn’t make sense pre-middle ages, to the Greeks. I am a Greek in spirit. Ironically, Ambigui, Faust and phyllo represent the Kantian priesthood.

My point is this: We only have so much understanding of and control over all the myriad variables that come together – and then evolve over the years – as or into “I”. Likewise the “group” is always situated problematically out in a particular historical and cultural context.

Mo is perturbed mostly by the suggestion that particular behaviors are rooted inextricably and inexplicably in dasein. And, thus, in the enormously complex labyrinths that are contingency, chance and change. He refuses to accept there is no way for philosophers to yank Virtue objectively out of all the many, many, many social, political and economic permutations possible “out in the world” of actual human interaction.

So he does it “in his head” instead. He creates an argument [a world of words] that is true only because he claims the meaning he gives to all the words in the argument are true. Morality and prudence are what he says they are. Basically, the same thing.

And, if you insist on being the sole arbiter regarding what either does or does not contribute “scientifically” to the “well-being” of the human race, I suppose they are just different facets of the same thing.

Is this in fact true though? I don’t think so. But, more to the point, I don’t think we can know for sure because facts pertaining to the behaviors precipitated by conflicting value judgments can distinguish what did from what did not happen but not what should from what should not happen.

And calling yourself “a river” instead of a “philosopher-king” here doesn’t change that.

To paraphrase myself, “A prudent and objective morality isn’t true or false unless you believe it is.”

For, among other things, all practical purposes.