On the Is-Ought Relationship

[thinkdr]

“I'm skeptical about the initial Humean claim because I'm skeptical about how much of our assertoric discourse is really "purely descriptive." Hume and others are perfectly correct to say that one cannot validly derive something in a conclusion that wasn't in the premises, but there is a lot of covert value-judgment intertwined in our ordinary "factual" claims about the world, so much so that the logicians' ideal of totally distilling denotation from connotation frequently won't work, because by the time we've removed all axiological connotations from an assertion, we've changed its meaning.” ------------ Andrew Jeffery

In conventional Philosophy courses we are taught that one cannot get from “ought” to “is” or vice versa. Why? Well, because Hume said so. If he said it, it must be so. We have all heard “We can't derive normative statements from descriptive statements.”

Even though it is “impossible,” Robert S. Hartman - following in the footsteps of Plato and of G. E. Moore - did it. It may well be that what we learn in old textbooks is not always the last word on a subject; it gets dated over time.

Since "ought" is a value copula, it is appropriate to invoke some value- theory, as preliminary to arriving at a sound and reasonable definition of the term "ought."

At this point it would be appropriate to review the material in Chapters 2 and 4 (of the document from which this post is excerpted, namely, from my paper):
http://wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/Ethics_A_College_Course.pdf
so as to recall the axiom of value and be very clear about what fulfillment of an intension really means. Comparisons of two values must be comparisons of two entities which fall under the same concept. If the concept shifts, one is in danger of comparing oranges to toy elephants. [This can be done legitimately if the concept is “things” or maybe “commodities.” Then one may say, perhaps, “the former is better than the latter (as a commodity.”] The name sets the norm. One wristwatch is better than another if it has more wristwatch features than the other, all else being equal (and if the concept doesn’t shift.)

That is how we employ the term “better” in formal axiology. In the same way, the relation “better for” can be carefully defined .

The "ought" now based on the "is"

Better means: more valuable. To say '"x" is better for y than z is' means: x more fulfills the meaning of y than z does.

For example, Heifetz more fulfills the meaning "violinist" than Henny Youngman does. Therefore, Heifetz is a better violinist than Youngman. And it follows that a Jascha Heifetz violin concert is better for an audience of music lovers than a Henny Youngman violin concert is. We shall now employ the definition of "better for" as we examine the "ought"- judgment.

Saying: "x ought to R y" -- a paradigm for ought-judgments -- is, by Hartman's definition, an abbreviated way of judging that:

"it is better for x to R y than to S y or to R z (at time T)."

In this way, each definition is built upon a previous one -- a rigorous procedure. Given what x, y, z, R, and S are, an ought-judgment may be true, false or indeterminate.

An empirical inquiry is called for with respect to each such judgment. Thus the ought is in effect reduced to a series of is judgments.

If, as an illustration, I judge: Heifetz ought to play the drums all day," Heifetz here is x, drums is y, and play all day is R. Now this would be a false judgment which when expanded would perhaps read: It is better for Heifetz to play the drums all day than either for him to listen to drums being played or to play the violin all day.

Or, to say it yet another way: "It is the case that the meaning of playing the drums all day overlaps more with the meaning of Heifetz's life than listening to drums does or than playing violin all day does. . ." possibly a false is-judgment (most of the time.)
Heifetz himself decided on the meaning of his life, to be a concert violinist. We all ought to decide our own meaning.

If you thought the term “ought” functions as an imperative, as in : “You ought to go clean your room, kid!” you might reasonably ask at this point, How do you get from an indicative to an imperative, or vice versa? [Here is one way this can be done]:

“You ought to go clean your room!” =df. = “(Given who you are, and given what cleaning your room means) It is better for you to clean your room than not to -- or than to play some other game right now. And that is a fact.” And here are the reasons why it is better for you: 1) it would please your mother; 2)you will continue to get an allowance 3)you will enjoy more -- once you get used to it -- I predict, living in a clean, neat atmosphere 4) etc., 5) etc. [The latter points are illustrative and not part of the definition. Substitute reasons appropriate to the facts of the situation and the circumstances rather than taking these points literally.]
The former phrase [before the equals-by-definition sign] is shorthand for the longer phrase.
The former is in imperative form -- the latter is a set of descriptions of what is. Of course, the ought-judgment may be false; the facts have to be investigated to determine this.

In this example, the x is 'you'; the R is 'go clean' and the y is 'your room.' (The example was merely an illustration, not a comment on the nature of the universe.)

Sometimes the y is the null class.
In "Brian ought to relax" the X is Brian; the R is 'to relax.' That means: It is better that Brian relaxes than if he doesn't (or that he do something else), Whether that is more valuable, all around, is for a consensus of impartial observers to decide -- just as any other objective matter.
Public confirmation is the criterion.....remembering what Bertrand Russell said in a moment of sarcastic humor: "Objectivity is a delusion shared by several lunatics at once."

The above explication is only one of several possible ways to base the "ought" on the "is." If I say "Brian ought to relax" it is like an Euler (or Venn) diagram: I am saying there is an overlap between who Brian is, and what relaxing is. It may be that only Brian -- or those who "know him better than he knows himself" -- can tell us if this proposition is true. Sound value judgments are based upon a knowledge of the facts. in the Algebra of Value, the ought was represented by a minus sign, indicating a gap between two states, the supposed ideal and the actual.

Comments? Questions? Discussion? Your views are most welcome.

[Flannel Jesus]

I've always kept in mind, when talking about "ought" and "should" which are pretty much perfect synonyms that there are 3 meanings for them.

1) the probability should. "If you go to the store at 5 pm tomorrow, you should be able to find George there, that's usually when he works." The should there is basically saying that it's probably going to be the case.
2) the practical should. "Oh, you like comedy movies? You should see Pineapple Express." "You should find out what time it starts, you don't wanna be late." Etc. The should here is saying it's practical, either for your enjoyment or for other practical reasons, to do the thing in question.
3) the moral should. "You shouldn't murder someone. That's wrong." In this case, the should is often at least slightly divorced from practical considerations, though usually not completely.

2 and 3 are easily mistakable. A lot of peoples' conceptions of what's moral is at least partially based on practical considerations. However, I think there is a major distinction between the two. You can imagine someone using the second meaning to say "You should murder your husband for the life insurance," but it's a bit harder to imagine someone suggesting the same action with the third meaning. "You should murder your husband, that would be the moral thing to do."

When people say "You can't get an ought from an is," they're talking about the moral ought. It's quite easy to get a practical ought from an is, as your post shows. But notice all the examples in your posts aren't moral considerations. What watch to buy, cleaning your room, whether someone should relax, playing the drums. You haven't refuted Hume, you've just used a different meaning of ought.

[Uccisore]

It seems like you aren't so much bridging the 'is-ought' gap as merely sidestepping it by denying the existence of the 'is'.

If all objective truth is determined by consensus, then of course there is no problem, because that's how value is generally determined anyway.

If that thing is only a tree because we all agree it is, then I suppose that tree might as well be evil because we all agree it is.

I think the problem was only a problem for those who believe the 'is' exists independent of consensus.

A further confusion is that you've equated 'ought' statements with value statements...and while that might be true to a point, there certainly ARE types of value that aren't 'oughts' which fit in with 'is' statements quite well. You cite them with your violinist comparisons- it's possible that 'being a good violinist' could be expressed as a series of numerical values- you can play this fast, for this long, without missing more than this many notes, for example. Then of course we have a way to value some violinists as better than others. But that kind of value was never in question- everybody knows that value-as-quantity is compatible with 'is' statements, in fact most 'is' statements contain an implication of such value if through no more than the usage of the word 'a' or 'the'. You get a similar problem if you define a great violinist as a violinist that sells many concert tickets- again, a reliance on numeric value that was always besides the point.

To really resolve the issue, we'd have to both see what your definition of the meaning of 'violinist' is, and see some purely objective is-defined reason why that meaning is the correct one.

[thinkdr]

...If all objective truth is determined by consensus, then of course there is no problem.

Well, I'm glad we agree. Yes, even the circumference of the Earth, or similar facts of nature, is a matter of agreement among scientists in that specific relevant field.

Thanks for your thoughtful response, Uccisore

Actually, if one takes the time to read the first few brief chapters of the reference offered in the original post, one would get a better understanding of why this approach is systematic. It is based upon an axiom - an axiom which defines "value". (It is a definist approach.) Then "a good x" is defined; then "good for"; then "better". Furthermore it gives the premiss underlying the axiom, namely, the structure of a concept ...any concept, in general. In this way, a frame of reference is constructed that seeks to explain the data.

What the definition of "ought" amounts to is this: what you ought to do or have overlaps with who you are, with "what is good for you." The 'ought' is the overlap. ...the intersection.

My sequel work - easier reading than the textbook - applies this value theory to ethics, as seen in this four-part document entitled "A Unified Theory of Ethics." Here is a link to the first part: http://tinyurl.com/27pzhbf It is a PDF file, safe to open.

It employs the literary device of a dialog form, a conversation, or series of presentations, by a group of educators and ethicists working to build a coherent system of Ethics. Their aim - once the theory is tested and applied - is to add to the useful information in this world. It is a fictional account, but its topic, Ethics, is very real.

Many of the Ethical fallacies (errors in reasoning) are summed up by the one word "rankism." You may want to learn more about rankism by cliking on this link and studying the text of the column: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-fuller/what-is-rankism-and-why-d_b_465940.html?view=print
The author, Dr. Fuller, also has given a TED talk to students at Berkeley University on this topic. You may prefer to listen to the video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djM6cZb8kak

Comments on any of the ideas covered?

[thinkdr]

I
If that thing is only a tree because we all agree it is, then I suppose that tree might as well be evil because we all agree it is.

Yes, a tree is "a tree" because we learn the meaning associated with that designator (that name) by growing up in a culture that uses that word. For purposes of valuation, the meaning (taken as a set of predicates or attributes, descriptors) serves as the measure. The size of the set measures the degree of value. When something is more meaningful, it is more valuable.

As to the issue of how "evil" is defined (and employed in everyday life), that is a separate thread. To treat that subject properly at a minimum a knowledge of the Dimensions of Value, as spelled out by Robert Hartman here: http://hartmaninstitute.org/Portals/0/html-files/AxiologyAsAScience.html

They are named Systemic Value (SV), Extrinsic Value (EV), and Intrinsic Value (IV)., or S, E, and I. By using the Axiom of Value, they can be judged - as values - and it turns out that IV is the most valuable; EV next; and SV the least. They are defined in terms of their cardinality (size), that is, by the number of elements in their respective set.) When an IV - one application of it is: an individual person - is violated, or downgraded, harmed, abused in any way, an evil is present.

[Uccisore]

Well, I'm glad we agree. Yes, even the circumference of the Earth, or similar facts of nature, is a matter of agreement among scientists in that specific relevant field.

Taking it as axiomatic that truth is determined by consensus when said axiom does not enjoy such consensus is probably the best example of philosophical humor I've had in a while. Are you putting me on?

[thinkdr]

I never said truth is determined by consensus.

Setting up an axiomatic system, interpreting its symbols by means of bridge laws, testing it by experiences, and using it to order and explain data -- and sometimes, when appropriate, introducing a time factor, and even making a prediction -- all this can result in what some are willing to label as "truth." If I were writing an Epistemology/Metaphysics blog, instead of one concerned with Ethics, I would offer my a(technical, and somewhat detailed) analysis of the concept "truth." I would employ for that project the tools of formal value science. I would place Coherence Theory, Correspondence Theory, and Existential Truth on a spectrum from least valuable to most. I would justify the project with logic, a logic of meanings (intensions.) [Truth tables alone do not a truth make...]

I fell into the trap of discussing "objectivity vs. subjectivity" when that was not the topic of this thread. I have a section on that in the ETHICS: A College Course booklet. I have long since lost interest in that particular topic.

How do we know anything as "fact" about this universe, about nature? It is usually because we choose to believe what some, who we defer to as an authority on the subject, tell us. As a former close-up and stage magician I know well how easy it is to deceive the senses. Eyesight itself is a piecing together of visual cues and forming a gestalt out of them, a hypothesis as to what we are seeing. ...
This is all a digression, however, from the fact that an ought-judgment can consist of a series of is-judgments, for which we are willing to settle as sufficient for the purpose at hand. When we judge,(we prize, we evaluate) we rapidly and intuitively build a case, in some sense like a trial lawyer would do. There was a classic book in philosophy of science by Vahinger, entitled THE PHILOSOPHY OF AS IF. It argued well that science is very "iffy" Many scientists are humble enough to admit this.

I'm very glad that you had a good laugh, because I careabout people and that laugh is good for your health. You ought to have a smile more often.

p.s. That axiom may likely gain a consensus as to its reasonableness, its fertility, and its utility when enough people are familiar with it. It is safe to say that at present a majority of scholars outside of axiological (value theory) l circles are ignorant with regard to it.

Often, as well, the introduction of a new paradigm is accompanied by "future shock" on the part of many. [Was it Schopenhauer who said that profound new ideas go through three stages? First they're ridiculed; then they gradually become the conventional wisdom; and then everyone claims that they thought of it first.] I predict this will be the course of history for Hartman's definition of "good."

[thinkdr]

...3) the moral should. "You shouldn't murder someone. That's wrong." In this case, the should is often at least slightly divorced from practical considerations, though usually not completely.

2 and 3 are easily mistakable. A lot of peoples' conceptions of what's moral is at least partially based on practical considerations. However, I think there is a major distinction between the two. You can imagine someone using the second meaning to say "You should murder your husband for the life insurance," but it's a bit harder to imagine someone suggesting the same action with the third meaning. "You should murder your husband, that would be the moral thing to do."

When people say "You can't get an ought from an is," they're talking about the moral ought. It's quite easy to get a practical ought from an is, as your post shows. But notice all the examples in your posts aren't moral considerations. What watch to buy, cleaning your room, whether someone should relax, playing the drums. You haven't refuted Hume, you've just used a different meaning of ought.

Within my system of Ethics I argue that the moral life IS the practical route to take, for it is the way to maximize the value in your life. Morality, as defined in the theory, requires a consideration of the long-term implications, not merely the short-term benefits. Your illustration in re murder to collect insurance money is short-term thinking, and thus does not meet the test. The Ethical perspective arises when individuals are regarded as of uncountably-high value. {This is how Intrinsic valuation is defined.] When you value a person Intrinsically, you are most unlikely to dream of murdering him/her. So that someone using the second meaning you give to "should," counseling the wife to hurt her husband, is violating ethics. If we are thinking clearly, and ethically, we do not defile a treasure.

As I explain in the treatise, ethics is about adding value, about maximizing the value for all concerned, which eventually is everyone in the world. Hence, it is about making the world work for every individual, via superior design, and new technologies, both social and physical, empowering people from the bottom up, optimizing opportunity for creativity, depriving no one of a life of high quality and sustainability.

[Flannel Jesus]

you said the moral life is the practical route, but that doesn't necessarily mean all practical things are moral, and that's really the crux of it. whether being moral is practical or not is beside the point, my point was the examples you gave were NOT moral issues, which tells me that your should is not a moral should. even if all moral shoulds are practical shoulds, not all practical shoulds are moral shoulds. you're still not dealing in morality.

[anon]

Any ought has its origins in what is. But at some point you have to step up and take responsibility for the moral choices you make. In other words, there is a difference between a child and an adult. "18 years old" does not describe the boundary between childhood and adulthood from a moral perspective. A person murders another person. The murderer has a history. He came from a "bad family", his father was abusive, etc. The history goes way back. We evolved from chimpanzees. We are animals. Only the fittest animals survive, it's a dog eat dog world. All animals try to get what they want, but we all have different strategies for getting what we want. Some people are kind and that helps them get what they want (say, cooperation from others). Some people are nasty and that helps them get what they want (say, dinner). Big picture though, I think we all want satisfaction. So if we're smart it's necessary to ask, does cooperation from others provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does not going hungry provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does cooperation without dinner make me happy? Does dinner without cooperation make me happy? Or maybe it's that everything always centers around my own personal happiness that, frustratingly, keeps satisfaction at bay? Maybe there's a fundamental error involved.

There is a leap at some point. A moral choice stands apart from circumstance, even while it is rooted in circumstance. Leaps are natural, but not inevitable - just as butterflies really do (if not always) emerge from their cocoons. Nobody can say, "I'm a determinist; therefore, butterflies are imposssible".

[thinkdr]

you said the moral life is the practical route, but that doesn't necessarily mean all practical things are moral, and that's really the crux of it. whether being moral is practical or not is beside the point, my point was the examples you gave were NOT moral issues, which tells me that your should is not a moral should. even if all moral shoulds are practical shoulds, not all practical shoulds are moral shoulds. you're still not dealing in morality.

Greetings, Flannel Jesus

I could argue that Heifetz being true to himself is a moral matter, and thus my illustration was a 'moral should.' Also a case can be made that being surrounded by cleanliness and knowing enough to relax occasionally are ways to show self-respect and hence have some intimate connection to personal morality. You seem to have an interest in ethics, so I commend to your attention the three sequels (much shorter than Part I) of the Unified Theory of Ethics. Here are links to them. Check them out, and let me know your impressions, okay?

http://wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/PDFs/ETHICAL%20ADVENTURES.pdf

For the essay, ETHICAL EXPLORATIONS, click on: http://tinyurl.com/22ohd2x

For the paper ASPECTS OF ETHICS - http://tinyurl.com/36u6gpo

Happy reading

All constructive suggestions are welcome.

[thinkdr]

Any ought has its origins in what is. But at some point you have to step up and take responsibility for the moral choices you make. In other words, there is a difference between a child and an adult. ... A person murders another person. The murderer has a history. He came from a "bad family", his father was abusive, etc. The history goes way back. We evolved from chimpanzees. We are animals. ... we all have different strategies for getting what we want. ... we all want satisfaction. So if we're smart it's necessary to ask, does cooperation from others provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does not going hungry provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does cooperation without dinner make me happy? Does dinner without cooperation make me happy? Or maybe it's that everything always centers around my own personal happiness that, frustratingly, keeps satisfaction at bay? Maybe there's a fundamental error involved.....

Hi, Anon

You are very wise. You show great ethical insight. I appreciate highly your contribution to the discussion.

There is, one could detect, a conflation between "satisfaction" and "Happiness." They are two distinct concepts. I would define satisfaction as: systemic emotion. On a scale, I would rank it low. Here is how the spectrum of positive emotions (displaying the degree of value entailed) would look:

S: Satisfaction. E: Pleasure. I: Joy.

A person with a high degree of morality would aim for joy and serenity in life. S/he would ask those questions you list and imply, in other words, would give serious consideration to avoiding any conduct that might be offensive and hurtful to others, or to herself. Yes, I'm all in favor of considered judgments, yet the individual of good character has formed habits that enable him or her to act intuitively and manage to do the right thing. We are not all scheming all the time as to how to get our own way. Some have finally learned that life is more about giving than receiving - and taking.

I believe you have hit upon it. I'd like to hear more about how you would help build a sound, coherent, useful theory of ethics, some of the hypotheses of which could be carefully tested, and the results confidently reported.

[anon]

Any ought has its origins in what is. But at some point you have to step up and take responsibility for the moral choices you make. In other words, there is a difference between a child and an adult. ... A person murders another person. The murderer has a history. He came from a "bad family", his father was abusive, etc. The history goes way back. We evolved from chimpanzees. We are animals. ... we all have different strategies for getting what we want. ... we all want satisfaction. So if we're smart it's necessary to ask, does cooperation from others provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does not going hungry provide the satisfaction I'm looking for? Does cooperation without dinner make me happy? Does dinner without cooperation make me happy? Or maybe it's that everything always centers around my own personal happiness that, frustratingly, keeps satisfaction at bay? Maybe there's a fundamental error involved.....

Hi, Anon

You are very wise. You show great ethical insight. I appreciate highly your contribution to the discussion.

There is, one could detect, a conflation between "satisfaction" and "Happiness." They are two distinct concepts. I would define satisfaction as: systemic emotion. On a scale, I would rank it low. Here is how the spectrum of positive emotions (displaying the degree of value entailed) would look:

S: Satisfaction. E: Pleasure. I: Joy.

A person with a high degree of morality would aim for joy and serenity in life. S/he would ask those questions you list and imply, in other words, would give serious consideration to avoiding any conduct that might be offensive and hurtful to others, or to herself. Yes, I'm all in favor of considered judgments, yet the individual of good character has formed habits that enable him or her to act intuitively and manage to do the right thing. We are not all scheming all the time as to how to get our own way. Some have finally learned that life is more about giving than receiving - and taking.

I believe you have hit upon it. I'd like to hear more about how you would help build a sound, coherent, useful theory of ethics, some of the hypotheses of which could be carefully tested, and the results confidently reported.

Thanks for the compliments, thinkdr, but I'm afraid I don't have a sound, coherent, useful theory of ethics. Or if I do, I'm not aware of it in its totality. I can say though that I think joy is a rarefied form of satisfaction. I've heard it said that the pleasure humans get from making love through sexual intercourse can't match the pleasure that gods get from holding hands, or a loving glance. But it's still pleasure that is acquired, and based on undependable circumstances that are beyond our ability to control. I think maybe the culprit in all this lack of perfection is the delusion that there is a fundamentally separate self that needs to be "fed". So maybe the most useful thing I have to offer is that it might be more fruitful to just relax and take a bigger view than it is to beat your head against the wall over and over trying to be a better person. Assuming a person wants to be "moral", that is.

The noble, yet very fragile ideals of "goodness" and "morality" are high-maintenance endeavors (which have several weak spots which can be exploited), and require constant supervision and upkeep.

Of course leaning to relax, in the sense that I mean it, ironically seems to require much discipline and practice.

[Uccisore]

Often, as well, the introduction of a new paradigm is accompanied by "future shock" on the part of many. [Was it Schopenhauer who said that profound new ideas go through three stages? First they're ridiculed; then they gradually become the conventional wisdom; and then everyone claims that they thought of it first.] I predict this will be the course of history for Hartman's definition of "good."

Naturally any theory that, when proposed, results in gales of laughter and ridicule has thereby gained something by which to recommend itself.

You agreed with me twice that truth is a matter of consensus, then disagreed with me when I showed that it doesn't work as an axiom. I'm afraid I don't know what you mean by anything anymore. You say subjectivity and epistemology is besides the point, but if you're trying to say there is no is-ought problem, it seems they are the point.

Anyway, positions that revolve around taking everything a single philosopher said as gospel and proclaiming that the world is not yet ready for the one man's wisdom tend to make me leery. What also makes me leery are arguments that look like philosophy, but always have to close with a comment about the moral character of the individuals/cultures/times that are skeptical. Good luck with your proselytization.

[Ichthus]

thinkdr I'd appreciate your feedback on my is-ought thread.

[ZenKitty]

Here is the thing about what you brought up, you brought up "better than", but "better than" is a value judgement. But what is the judgement based on? It is based on something that the individual values. You value the taste of vanilla the best, so vanilla is "better than" chocolate. But this is definitely subjective. And this axiology is also a value, defining it as you value or want it. Not defining it based on some fact, besides the fact that you prefer that definition or value.

One of the points that we would have to keep in mind is that Hume did not say we cannot derive an "is" from an "ought", categorically across the board, but that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" based on reason. Hume held to a sort of emotionalism, and this is based on the "is". Even Hume once pointed out that reason can lead us to different positions, but it is the emotions, or passions, that make the choices among these many options that reason points out.

[thinkdr]

You agreed with me twice that truth is a matter of consensus, then disagreed with me when I showed that it doesn't work as an axiom. ...

Anyway, positions that revolve around taking everything a single philosopher said as gospel ... Good luck with your proselytization.

I never said any such thing as is attributed to me in the first sentence quoted above. I did not in my original post allude to the concept "truth" at all. I believe many would concur that it is not a constructive comment to put words into someone's mouth. {I did allude to how "facticity" is established in practice. When some idea or piece of information gets enough media attention it acquires an air of facticity about it. People often accept it unquestioningly. [I include even the Standard Model for Physical Chemistry taught in many, if not most, Chemistry classrooms.] My position is that human nature is part of nature also, and just as gravity is a law of physical nature, the capacity to generate value is a part of human nature ...and thus a law of nature as well.

There are facts of nature such as what happens if you step off the edge of the roof of a high building; or what happens if you leave your bare arm touching a hot stove. And there are facts of human nature such as our propensity to generate values, and to make value judgments. Many businesses are today concerned with "added value." My system of Ethics generalizes this to personal and social life too. See Demerest & Schoof, ANSWERING THE CENTRAL QUESTION, a recent book that combines Brain Neurology with formal Value Logic.}

Now you made me laugh when you infer that I take Dr. Hartman as gospel. My doctoral dissertation, "Trends Toward Synthesis" tears into his moral philosophy and finds many, many defects and shortcomings in it. You possibly may be speaking from ignorance ..but that's okay. We all do sometimes.

As to the accusation that I proselytize ...it is a total misunderstanding as to what I'm doing. I define, analyze and clarify concepts, (such as "ethics," "morality," "hypocrisy, " "integrity," etc.) sharpening them up and getting them ready to be handled scientifically. Science is not dogmatic; it is held very tentatively, ready to be abandoned if better evidence comes along. This is my attitude: show me a better analysis of goodness, a better theory of ethics, and I will leap to that (or incorporate into my system.) If you had bothered to even glance at my writings, you would immediately gather how I'm striving to synthesize and integrate into it the good ideas of every philosopher or scholar who ever said anything of import in ethics. {And so too did R. S. Hartman, which is one reason I was impressed by his work. That was the purpose of my dissertation: to show that he was not merely a Platonist, a Kantian, an Aristotelian, a follower of George Edward Moore, or of the Stoics, or of Royce, etc., etc.}

I notice that you don't seem to grasp what an axiom is, nor how it functions in axiomatic systems. Axioms are assumed; they are not claimed as "truths." Their test is their fertility to generate a theory, which (if it's a theory of ethics) at some point can produce a conclusion that can be tested by real-world experience. There are other good tests of a theory also. Interested readers may want to see my next post for further details.

[thinkdr]

...this axiology is also a value, defining it as you value or want it. Not defining it based on some fact, besides the fact that you prefer that definition or value.

... Hume held to a sort of emotionalism....passions... make the choices among these many options that reason points out.

Yes, ZenKitty, it is true that every proposed theory of value is a value (which can be analyzed by value theory, just as roses are studied by Botany. Botany does not smell; roses do.) We philosophers ought to apply good criteria to critique a system. In Ethical Explorations, a final chapter is devoted to offering tests of a good theory. One such test is that it employs variables and/or logical symbols. This enables it to cover a wider range of territory than if it was all expressed in words only, for specific instances can then be plugged in as values of the variable. It may pay readers to check out the list presented in this document and see if it can gain your agreement on the criteria there enumerated. See pp. 39-42 here: http://tinyurl.com/22ohd2x


And, yes, you are correct: Hume was an early emotivist, or precursor of Stevenson and the others.

Dr. David Mefford, in a book soon to be released, of which I've seen a review copy, with the title VALUES FOR LIVING, argues vigorously that virtually every value judgment, or act of valuation, has an emotional component along with a (hopefully) rational one. He maintains that we don't make an evaluation, a choice, or a decision without the force of an emotion or sentiment behind it. Mefford is a Formal Axiologist doing research in values in Knoxville, Tennessee. He has made major contributions extending the scope and potency of value science. [The 'rational' component may be an incoherence - a combination of two or more incompatible values - but it is open to rational analysis, given the right analytical tools.]

[thinkdr]

I've always kept in mind, when talking about "ought" and "should" which are pretty much perfect synonyms that there are 3 meanings for them.

1) the probability should. "If you go to the store at 5 pm tomorrow, you should be able to find George there, that's usually when he works." The should there is basically saying that it's probably going to be the case.
2) the practical should. "Oh, you like comedy movies? You should see Pineapple Express." "You should find out what time it starts, you don't wanna be late." Etc. The should here is saying it's practical, either for your enjoyment or for other practical reasons, to do the thing in question.
3) the moral should. "You shouldn't murder someone. That's wrong." In this case, the should is often at least slightly divorced from practical considerations, though usually not completely.

I hold that examples 2 and 3 are actually instances of 1, and that 1 is a hypothetical. (It starts out with the word "If".) I love your examples, by the way ! They show you have put some thought into this topic.

Here is why I said that the moral should is hypothetical: If you want to maximize the value in your life, you will comply with the insights of Ethics, the discipline, the field of study, the "science" in the original sense of the term as a body of knowledge. [See the roots of the word, science from the Latin.] If you (anyone) want the quality of life in the world to be optimized, you will live a moral life, and educate, inspire by your own example, and encourage others to do so as well. You won't tell people how to live so much as you will be a model and a mentor; or a coach (whose services they seek out.)

If you don't care, if you don't aim for the highest forms of justice, if you are apathetic or indifferent to life, you likely won't aim to be good, you will not lead an ethical life, except by some accident, inadvertently. Sociopaths make up about 3% of the world's population; they have a type of brain damage. They might behave ethically much of the time, but may easily transgress since they lack empathy, and can't identify with anothers' pain. {They grabbed your toy away from you in kindergarten and were indifferent to your sobbing tears.}

[0belafekete0]

“I'm skeptical about the initial Humean claim because I'm skeptical about how much of our assertoric discourse is really "purely descriptive." Hume and others are perfectly correct to say that one cannot validly derive something in a conclusion that wasn't in the premises, but there is a lot of covert value-judgment intertwined in our ordinary "factual" claims about the world, so much so that the logicians' ideal of totally distilling denotation from connotation frequently won't work, because by the time we've removed all axiological connotations from an assertion, we've changed its meaning.” ------------ Andrew Jeffery

In conventional Philosophy courses we are taught that one cannot get from “ought” to “is” or vice versa. Why? Well, because Hume said so. If he said it, it must be so. We have all heard “We can't derive normative statements from descriptive statements.”

Even though it is “impossible,” Robert S. Hartman - following in the footsteps of Plato and of G. E. Moore - did it. It may well be that what we learn in old textbooks is not always the last word on a subject; it gets dated over time.

Since "ought" is a value copula, it is appropriate to invoke some value- theory, as preliminary to arriving at a sound and reasonable definition of the term "ought."

At this point it would be appropriate to review the material in Chapters 2 and 4 (of the document from which this post is excerpted, namely, from my paper):
http://wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/Ethics_A_College_Course.pdf
so as to recall the axiom of value and be very clear about what fulfillment of an intension really means. Comparisons of two values must be comparisons of two entities which fall under the same concept. If the concept shifts, one is in danger of comparing oranges to toy elephants. [This can be done legitimately if the concept is “things” or maybe “commodities.” Then one may say, perhaps, “the former is better than the latter (as a commodity.”] The name sets the norm. One wristwatch is better than another if it has more wristwatch features than the other, all else being equal (and if the concept doesn’t shift.)

That is how we employ the term “better” in formal axiology. In the same way, the relation “better for” can be carefully defined .

The "ought" now based on the "is"

Better means: more valuable. To say '"x" is better for y than z is' means: x more fulfills the meaning of y than z does.

For example, Heifetz more fulfills the meaning "violinist" than Henny YoungmanTherefore, Heifetz is a better violinist than Youngman. And it follows that a Jascha Heifetz violin concert is better for an audience of music lovers than a Henny Youngman violin concert is. We shall now employ the definition of "better for" as we examine the "ought"- judgment.

Saying: "x ought to R y" -- a paradigm for ought-judgments -- is, by Hartman's definition, an abbreviated way of judging that:

"it is better for x to R y than to S y or to R z (at time T)."

In this way, each definition is built upon a previous one -- a rigorous procedure. Given what x, y, z, R, and S are, an ought-judgment may be true, false or indeterminate.

An empirical inquiry is called for with respect to each such judgment. Thus the ought is in effect reduced to a series of is judgments.

If, as an illustration, I judge: Heifetz ought to play the drums all day," Heifetz here is x, drums is y, and play all day is R. Now this would be a false judgment which when expanded would perhaps read: It is better for Heifetz to play the drums all day than either for him to listen to drums being played or to play the violin all day.

Or, to say it yet another way: "It is the case that the meaning of playing the drums all day overlaps more with the meaning of Heifetz's life than listening to drums does or than playing violin all day does. . ." possibly a false is-judgment (most of the time.)
Heifetz himself decided on the meaning of his life, to be a concert violinist. We all ought to decide our own meaning.

If you thought the term “ought” functions as an imperative, as in : “You ought to go clean your room, kid!” you might reasonably ask at this point, How do you get from an indicative to an imperative, or vice versa? [Here is one way this can be done]:

“You ought to go clean your room!” =df. = “(Given who you are, and given what cleaning your room means) It is better for you to clean your room than not to -- or than to play some other game right now. And that is a fact.” And here are the reasons why it is better for you: 1) it would please your mother; 2)you will continue to get an allowance 3)you will enjoy more -- once you get used to it -- I predict, living in a clean, neat atmosphere 4) etc., 5) etc. [The latter points are illustrative and not part of the definition. Substitute reasons appropriate to the facts of the situation and the circumstances rather than taking these points literally.]
The former phrase [before the equals-by-definition sign] is shorthand for the longer phrase.
The former is in imperative form -- the latter is a set of descriptions of what is. Of course, the ought-judgment may be false; the facts have to be investigated to determine this.

In this example, the x is 'you'; the R is 'go clean' and the y is 'your room.' (The example was merely an illustration, not a comment on the nature of the universe.)

Sometimes the y is the null class.
In "Brian ought to relax" the X is Brian; the R is 'to relax.' That means: It is better that Brian relaxes than if he doesn't (or that he do something else), Whether that is more valuable, all around, is for a consensus of impartial observers to decide -- just as any other objective matter.
Public confirmation is the criterion.....remembering what Bertrand Russell said in a moment of sarcastic humor: "Objectivity is a delusion shared by several lunatics at once."

The above explication is only one of several possible ways to base the "ought" on the "is." If I say "Brian ought to relax" it is like an Euler (or Venn) diagram: I am saying there is an overlap between who Brian is, and what relaxing is. It may be that only Brian -- or those who "know him better than he knows himself" -- can tell us if this proposition is true. Sound value judgments are based upon a knowledge of the facts. in the Algebra of Value, the ought was represented by a minus sign, indicating a gap between two states, the supposed ideal and the actual.

Comments? Questions? Discussion? Your views are most welcome.

the test for logical necessity was not sustained nor absolutely negated by the now famous formula "are synthetic -apriori propositions possible? , since validity of logical certainty itself has variable value. Strict tautologies such as "a rose is a rose is a rose". Shows meaning of factual propositions are intentionally dissected for variability of value. Consequently, If we say, "God exists" and then say therefore "priests should be celibate" we can detect variability in the cohesive use of pro logically necessary progression between "God exists" and "priests should be celibate" Why? Because by focusing all energies on God, then the Cupola of value requires it. Changes in usage, context, and perception enable a new look at the way how logical connections evolve .The horizon between the perceptual field, understanding, and intentionality is critical whether a proposition has sufficient validation to be logically consistent. Tests for validity that fail, usually end up in an infinite regression, as in Russell's connection between sense, sense and sense data.

[0belafekete0]

“I'm skeptical about the initial Humean claim because I'm skeptical about how much of our assertoric discourse is really "purely descriptive." Hume and others are perfectly correct to say that one cannot validly derive something in a conclusion that wasn't in the premises, but there is a lot of covert value-judgment intertwined in our ordinary "factual" claims about the world, so much so that the logicians' ideal of totally distilling denotation from connotation frequently won't work, because by the time we've removed all axiological connotations from an assertion, we've changed its meaning.” ------------ Andrew Jeffery

In conventional Philosophy courses we are taught that one cannot get from “ought” to “is” or vice versa. Why? Well, because Hume said so. If he said it, it must be so. We have all heard “We can't derive normative statements from descriptive statements.”

Even though it is “impossible,” Robert S. Hartman - following in the footsteps of Plato and of G. E. Moore - did it. It may well be that what we learn in old textbooks is not always the last word on a subject; it gets dated over time.

Since "ought" is a value copula, it is appropriate to invoke some value- theory, as preliminary to arriving at a sound and reasonable definition of the term "ought."

At this point it would be appropriate to review the material in Chapters 2 and 4 (of the document from which this post is excerpted, namely, from my paper):
http://wadeharvey.myqol.com/wadeharvey/Ethics_A_College_Course.pdf
so as to recall the axiom of value and be very clear about what fulfillment of an intension really means. Comparisons of two values must be comparisons of two entities which fall under the same concept. If the concept shifts, one is in danger of comparing oranges to toy elephants. [This can be done legitimately if the concept is “things” or maybe “commodities.” Then one may say, perhaps, “the former is better than the latter (as a commodity.”] The name sets the norm. One wristwatch is better than another if it has more wristwatch features than the other, all else being equal (and if the concept doesn’t shift.)

That is how we employ the term “better” in formal axiology. In the same way, the relation “better for” can be carefully defined .

The "ought" now based on the "is"

Better means: more valuable. To say '"x" is better for y than z is' means: x more fulfills the meaning of y than z does.

For example, Heifetz more fulfills the meaning "violinist" than Henny YoungmanTherefore, Heifetz is a better violinist than Youngman. And it follows that a Jascha Heifetz violin concert is better for an audience of music lovers than a Henny Youngman violin concert is. We shall now employ the definition of "better for" as we examine the "ought"- judgment.

Saying: "x ought to R y" -- a paradigm for ought-judgments -- is, by Hartman's definition, an abbreviated way of judging that:

"it is better for x to R y than to S y or to R z (at time T)."

In this way, each definition is built upon a previous one -- a rigorous procedure. Given what x, y, z, R, and S are, an ought-judgment may be true, false or indeterminate.

An empirical inquiry is called for with respect to each such judgment. Thus the ought is in effect reduced to a series of is judgments.

If, as an illustration, I judge: Heifetz ought to play the drums all day," Heifetz here is x, drums is y, and play all day is R. Now this would be a false judgment which when expanded would perhaps read: It is better for Heifetz to play the drums all day than either for him to listen to drums being played or to play the violin all day.

Or, to say it yet another way: "It is the case that the meaning of playing the drums all day overlaps more with the meaning of Heifetz's life than listening to drums does or than playing violin all day does. . ." possibly a false is-judgment (most of the time.)
Heifetz himself decided on the meaning of his life, to be a concert violinist. We all ought to decide our own meaning.

If you thought the term “ought” functions as an imperative, as in : “You ought to go clean your room, kid!” you might reasonably ask at this point, How do you get from an indicative to an imperative, or vice versa? [Here is one way this can be done]:

“You ought to go clean your room!” =df. = “(Given who you are, and given what cleaning your room means) It is better for you to clean your room than not to -- or than to play some other game right now. And that is a fact.” And here are the reasons why it is better for you: 1) it would please your mother; 2)you will continue to get an allowance 3)you will enjoy more -- once you get used to it -- I predict, living in a clean, neat atmosphere 4) etc., 5) etc. [The latter points are illustrative and not part of the definition. Substitute reasons appropriate to the facts of the situation and the circumstances rather than taking these points literally.]
The former phrase [before the equals-by-definition sign] is shorthand for the longer phrase.
The former is in imperative form -- the latter is a set of descriptions of what is. Of course, the ought-judgment may be false; the facts have to be investigated to determine this.

In this example, the x is 'you'; the R is 'go clean' and the y is 'your room.' (The example was merely an illustration, not a comment on the nature of the universe.)

Sometimes the y is the null class.
In "Brian ought to relax" the X is Brian; the R is 'to relax.' That means: It is better that Brian relaxes than if he doesn't (or that he do something else), Whether that is more valuable, all around, is for a consensus of impartial observers to decide -- just as any other objective matter.
Public confirmation is the criterion.....remembering what Bertrand Russell said in a moment of sarcastic humor: "Objectivity is a delusion shared by several lunatics at once."

The above explication is only one of several possible ways to base the "ought" on the "is." If I say "Brian ought to relax" it is like an Euler (or Venn) diagram: I am saying there is an overlap between who Brian is, and what relaxing is. It may be that only Brian -- or those who "know him better than he knows himself" -- can tell us if this proposition is true. Sound value judgments are based upon a knowledge of the facts. in the Algebra of Value, the ought was represented by a minus sign, indicating a gap between two states, the supposed ideal and the actual.

Comments? Questions? Discussion? Your views are most welcome.

the test for logical necessity was not sustained nor absolutely negated by the now famous formula "are synthetic -apriori propositions possible? , since validity of logical certainty itself has variable value. Strict tautology such as "a rose is a rose is a rose". Shows meaning of factual propositions are intentionally dissected for variability of value. Consequently, If we say, "God exists" and then say therefore "priests should be celibate" we can detect variability in the cohesive use of pro logically necessary progression between "God exists" and "priests should be celibate" Why? Because by focusing all energies on God, then the Cupola of value requires it. Changes in usage, context, and perception enable a new look at the way how logical connections evolve .The horizon between the perceptual field, understanding, and intentionality is critical whether a proposition has sufficient validation to be logically consistent. Tests for validity that fail, usually end up in an infinite regression, as in Russell's connection between sense, sense and sense data.

----------Lastly---in the example just, the logical certainty of the premise "if God exists----then celibacy is a consequence----because----devotion to God and marriage are mutually exclusive: the logical certainty of the proposition "God exists" has been "proven by St.Anselmback in the middle ages. It's tautological logic has been pointed out, subsequently, and wittgenstein would later explain that we mistake was in using "God" and "existence" equivocal,since we already knew, that existence was an attribute of "God".The point is then, that denotative and connotative words are used interchangeably, since existence in this instance, connotes and attribute of the denotation of God. God is a denotation because God is God. Anything is said about "god" describes him. "God" is a closed hermenautically complete "anything said about "Him" whether "He" is a fact" or a "Self evidence" is a description. The intentionality behind the concept is to enclose all ideas within it, so as to remain logically self defined. There are no categories under "He" can be subsumed,because "He is what He is" he is a break from paganism in that, paganism entailed. Kinds of gods with natural definable attributes logical reducing of "ought" from "is" leads to Russels'' infinite regress, hence comes the enlightenment and Nietzche and then Wittgenstein. The non definable of "God" does not eliminate he question, in certain propositions, ho does the need to close hermenautically the logical structure of meaning? is are there certainties underlying the physical universe? Like the reducibility of all matter into energy? (Where all matter reduces into energy? I think ,this is what early metaphysicians grappled with, with the earliest problem of the one and the many, and the atomists were a very early attempt to describe it.