Morality is a product of intelligence and experience

[Frankenstein]

Much of cognitive science is related, if not directly, to Kant, I believe. Am I wrong? The German Gestaltists have deep underpinnings into cognitive psychology. Furthermore, what is cognitive science but the search for the mechanisms of thought? Kant just wouldn't label it a "science", because it is in the noumena branch. This is how I understand it, however I may be wrong.

[Ierrellus]

I could be wrong about Kant. It's just that I don't trust anyone who takes more than one page to complete a sentence. Noumena, to me, appears to be a logical abstraction, not an ontological description. I do not see any resolving of the Cartesian duality in Kant--just more mentalese. He claimed Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber. IMHO, he never quite woke up. Aristotelian catagorizing doesn't quite explain how metaphysics must be an extension of physics or how gut emotions so often undermine the best of moral intentions.

[Frankenstein]

I could be wrong about Kant. It's just that I don't trust anyone who takes more than one page to complete a sentence. Noumena, to me, appears to be a logical abstraction, not an ontological description. I do not see any resolving of the Cartesian duality in Kant--just more mentalese. He claimed Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber. IMHO, he never quite woke up. Aristotelian catagorizing doesn't quite explain how metaphysics must be an extension of physics or how gut emotions so often undermine the best of moral intentions.

Kant agrees with much of Hume. In fact, Kant actually grounds much of Hume's work; so for Hume to be right, Kant must be right. Kant doesn't say he disagrees about passion ruling over reason in certain circumstances, like if a tiger is chasing you, what do you do? One wouldn't ponder, they run! However, he is making an argument that, for there to be morality, there needs to be autonomy. For there to be autonomy, there needs to be conscious mental life. The problem arises when we attempt to try to explain freewill with science. Science and freewill seem to be at odds, like a oil and water,they just aren't very compatible. How weird would it be to describe freewill with scientific laws and theories? How peculiar would it be for one to understand poetry by looking at the viscera? Thus, we have the great divide we see that continually rears its head. There are many positions to take in order to try to "resolve" this divide, you take the physicalist, while others will take the idealist, or a dual-aspect stance.

Kant never states his dualism, as far as I know. However, It does seem as though it is lurking in the midst. Notice your assertion though, you believe that dualism ought to be "resolved". Your already taking a position that will determine your method, that will determine your answer to your first assumption--and round and round we go! If we are to make any claims, we must stand on axioms that can't be defended. I'm not saying you are wrong in your basic assumptions, I don't know.

[Ierrellus]

You are probably right about what Kant learned from Hume. I guess my basic problem with Kant is that, not wanting to offend the Church, he adhered to the Platonic dualism of body and soul (Spirit).

[Ierrellus]

I have known persons of low intelligence who were capable of empathy and compassion.

[WW_III_ANGRY]

I could be wrong about Kant. It's just that I don't trust anyone who takes more than one page to complete a sentence. Noumena, to me, appears to be a logical abstraction, not an ontological description. I do not see any resolving of the Cartesian duality in Kant--just more mentalese. He claimed Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber. IMHO, he never quite woke up. Aristotelian catagorizing doesn't quite explain how metaphysics must be an extension of physics or how gut emotions so often undermine the best of moral intentions.

Kant agrees with much of Hume. In fact, Kant actually grounds much of Hume's work; so for Hume to be right, Kant must be right. Kant doesn't say he disagrees about passion ruling over reason in certain circumstances, like if a tiger is chasing you, what do you do? One wouldn't ponder, they run! However, he is making an argument that, for there to be morality, there needs to be autonomy. For there to be autonomy, there needs to be conscious mental life. The problem arises when we attempt to try to explain freewill with science. Science and freewill seem to be at odds, like a oil and water,they just aren't very compatible. How weird would it be to describe freewill with scientific laws and theories? How peculiar would it be for one to understand poetry by looking at the viscera? Thus, we have the great divide we see that continually rears its head. There are many positions to take in order to try to "resolve" this divide, you take the physicalist, while others will take the idealist, or a dual-aspect stance.

Kant never states his dualism, as far as I know. However, It does seem as though it is lurking in the midst. Notice your assertion though, you believe that dualism ought to be "resolved". Your already taking a position that will determine your method, that will determine your answer to your first assumption--and round and round we go! If we are to make any claims, we must stand on axioms that can't be defended. I'm not saying you are wrong in your basic assumptions, I don't know.

And what does that have to do with our judgement of right and wrong, do you have any inkling?

[Frankenstein]

I have known persons of low intelligence who were capable of empathy and compassion.

They've done studies with mice, or was it rats? Let me look this up. Here is one study:http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/12/111208141933.htm
This is one where the mouse is repeatedly freeing his companion from restraints. There is an older one that I believe is better. The one i know of is where two mice are living together in a cage, after awhile one is induced with pains and after awhile the other, if he has lived with the mouse long enough, responds similarly.

This would suggest that there might be a different in degrees to how different we are, rather than different in kinds, when it comes to other animals-- by and large;for the most part; in general.

[Frankenstein]

Hello Good Sir,

I could be wrong about Kant. It's just that I don't trust anyone who takes more than one page to complete a sentence. Noumena, to me, appears to be a logical abstraction, not an ontological description. I do not see any resolving of the Cartesian duality in Kant--just more mentalese. He claimed Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber. IMHO, he never quite woke up. Aristotelian catagorizing doesn't quite explain how metaphysics must be an extension of physics or how gut emotions so often undermine the best of moral intentions.

Kant agrees with much of Hume. In fact, Kant actually grounds much of Hume's work; so for Hume to be right, Kant must be right. Kant doesn't say he disagrees about passion ruling over reason in certain circumstances, like if a tiger is chasing you, what do you do? One wouldn't ponder, they run! However, he is making an argument that, for there to be morality, there needs to be autonomy. For there to be autonomy, there needs to be conscious mental life. The problem arises when we attempt to try to explain freewill with science. Science and freewill seem to be at odds, like a oil and water,they just aren't very compatible. How weird would it be to describe freewill with scientific laws and theories? How peculiar would it be for one to understand poetry by looking at the viscera? Thus, we have the great divide we see that continually rears its head. There are many positions to take in order to try to "resolve" this divide, you take the physicalist, while others will take the idealist, or a dual-aspect stance.

Kant never states his dualism, as far as I know. However, It does seem as though it is lurking in the midst. Notice your assertion though, you believe that dualism ought to be "resolved". Your already taking a position that will determine your method, that will determine your answer to your first assumption--and round and round we go! If we are to make any claims, we must stand on axioms that can't be defended. I'm not saying you are wrong in your basic assumptions, I don't know.

And what does that have to do with our judgement of right and wrong, do you have any inkling?

I guess I didn't really clarify that point, but I'll try my best to attempt an explanation.
Kant's categorical imperative is one that is logical, it isn't emotion based as I've stated, nor is it based on the utilitarian calculus-- where measurement is key. Imagine yourself chained, chained down in a dungeon, essentially you are to be auctioned off to the highest bidder. Think of all the reasons involved here that could explain why you ought to be sold off: first, think of all the happiness you will bring after you slave day to day. All that work you do will pay to feed a large family of bright kids and prospering parents. Surely the balance of pain and pleasure is in pleasures favor here. Secondly, imagine the same scenario, but instead of a butcher's scale, weighing a people's mental states, now imagine "a might make right" maxim, like in Gyges ring, or in Machiavelli. Surely, the slave buyer is right because he has the might, he is willing to pay the price. You, being in an unfortunate situation is the way of the cosmos, but so worse for you and better for me. Finally, take emotion out of the situation, then what is right? To even ask the question is to begin to already assume that there is "rightness", whether objective, subjective, or some type of sociological rightness. Kant takes this out of the sphere of the emotions and passion, and instead brings it into a intelligible realm: "Act in such a way that the maxim of your action would be instituted as a universal law". Another version of the Categorical Imperative is , "Man is never merely a means to an end, but always an end unto himself". These are contained in themselves, and the rational person would obey them because they are good in themselves, unlike those that act in accordance to their own caprice. The slave would be set free, for the slaver, if he was confined to this principle, would then have to give up his slaves, and render universal what is universal-- freedom.

This moral command reminds me of Aristotle's thoughts on law. Law to him was unpassioned reason, which had a princely rule over us. On one hand, we have that nasty Hobbesian worldview of the "war of all against all", where we are in a state of nature, not trusting each other, and the only thing separating us from the rest of the animal kingdom is our ability to build societies so that we aren't murdering each other. This seems like the emotivists, and passion driven people may feel comfortable with. However, on the other hand we have Aristotle, forming laws and rules in order so that we may become better friends. I think Kant would be at home with this notion, and aside from the logical aspect, isn't it good to be friends?

Is that not good? I'm sure you have a response ready so I'll pay attention to this thread.

[Ierrellus]

Is there any basic difference between Kant's moral imperative and the Golden Rule? Perhaps I'm wrong, but I still see the former as purely mental.