the psychology of objectivism - one possible narrative

His view is that John wants the child to be born and Mary wants to abort it (the Dasein Dilemma). Then he asks, “Which is the moral solution?” Then answers it with;
“THERE SHALL BE NO MORAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM AND ANYONE SAYING OTHERWISE IS A DAMN, MALICIOUS, TRICKSTER, DICTATOR, OBJECTIVIST, LIAR!!!”

Thanks for, uh, clearing that up. Though I suspect our understanding of “dasein” may somewhat different.

Here is where I start:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529

What’s your take on it?

And how do you relate it to morality? Morality and the “objective truth”. Abortion for example. Or choose your own moral conflagration.

James, please!!!

The last thing ILP needs is yet ANOTHER seemingly futile exchange between us about objective morality. Take this over to “our” thread okay? :wink:

The question is, “Why did you bring it over here?

Your OP is merely you inventing a single case of bad reasoning, having almost nothing to do with objective morality or psychology. And let me remind you, you are an objectivist yourself. Soon, you might realize that along with the others who have.

And on top of that, even you couldn’t deny the reality that your own definitions led to concerning the existence of “objective morality”. In a way, you are seriously hating yourself, hating what is You.

My understanding of Dasein is that shared by scholars of Heidegger.
How does it relate to specific morality - it does not.
If you think it does then you’ve missed the whole point.

What kind of thing is “objective truth”, you are pulling my leg aren’t you?

Subject/object is not relevant. One of the key points, i think.

Be careful, Bigus only allows the definitions that HE dictates.

But to Bigus, it means, “conflicting beliefs in good”.

And to me, it appears to mean, “Being in the state of having no fucking idea of what I am thinking or doing”.

No, I am not interested in exploring dasein as it relates to a scholastic pursuit of philosophy.

I am interested only in exploring how you and I have come to understand what it means “here and now”…and in how we would situate that understanding out in the world of human interactions that come into conflict over moral and political value judgments.

Moral objectivists have insisted there is but one truly rational manner in which to understand these things. The way they do. By and large. Then there are those objectivists who insist that the way they understand it is applicable universally. Others, like James, insist that it is applicable only to each particular context.

This thread was an attempt on my part to link either “frame of mind” to human psychology.

In particular, the discussion revolved around abortion. But I am more than willing to explore these relationships regarding any other moral conflict we might all be familiar with.

You mean moral objectivists like yourself who believe that your understanding that there is no objective morality is the only rational way to understand morality?

Can’t even you see the parallel between the atheist who firmly believes in the lack of God attacking people for having a firm belief concerning God and your firm objective belief in the lack of objective morality attacking people for having an objective belief concerning morality? You are a moral-atheist.

In effect, you are saying that there is this objective truth, “…”

Your objective truth is that there is no objective morality.
Other people say there is an objective morality.
Both make claims of objective truth.

So you disagree with their stance on morality. But both are espousing objective truths concerning it. Both have an opinion of objective/universal truth/reality. Theirs is “yea”. Yours is “nay”. But both are declarations of objective truth.

Your real argument seems to be merely one of fixed/blind morality, not “objective”.

And the psychological question (which I could easily guess) is “Why do you hate moralists so much as to not even listen to what they might have to say before preemptively attacking them?

Seriously, perhaps Lev will take up my offer to discuss dasein [as it relates to conflicting value judgments as it relates to the psychology of objectivism] “down here”. Re abortion or some other issue.

Perhaps someday you will too.

In the interim, I am not interested in exploring [on yet another thread!] the circular nature of your own “definitional logic”.

Please bring it over to “our” thread, okay?

That’s pretty objective.

[quote=“Lev Muishkin”]
Dasein dilemma is a contradiction in terms, anyway.

The whole point about Dasein is that it was Heidegger’s solution to the Sartrean angst. Dasein is a Germanic solution to a Gallic problem.
There is no Dasein Dilemma, and if it is presented as such the presenter is still stuck in an existential Nausea.[/quote

Heidegger could not possibly have attempted this, in good faith, since he knew the boundary issues between Germany and France. He may have tried to show a politically expedient good faith. His signature was much more grounded in people like Husserl and Holderline.

Translation: Iambiguous does not know what he is talking about.

Dasein IS a concept as developed by philosophy, reaching its apogee with Heidegger.
If you don’t know what he was talking about then I suggest you read Being and Time.

If al you got is your own uninformed idea, then you are actually talking about something else, so I suggest you stop using a term that does not apply.

It’s not about what he intended to “attempt” ; its about what he achieved with Dasein.

There are no boundary issues to ideas; so what do you think you are talking about?

Don’t you mean objectionable?

Fine, then I don’t know what I am talking about.

But anytime you are inclined to bring the manner in which you define and understand the meaning of the word down to earth, I’ll be more than happy to accommodate you.

Hell, I would liked to have discussed and debated dasein with Heidegger himself. Sans all the abstruse jargon of course. :wink:

 There are even boundaries between issues and ideas.  As for example in cases where issues are framed in terms of ideas.  The political post war climate between Germany and France can not be discounted in basically ideological garb, although a case can be made for that view.  Even the distinction between idealism and the existential reduction can be interpreted, as the effect of political backlash, on part;of former underground french patriots,Sartre having been one of them, to reduce the traces of an ideal buildup by a reduction of politically loaded ideas.

Granted the genesis of existentialism did not begin with Sartre, Nietzsche, too, reacted against that, however, Nietzche did not end idealism, he merely closed it with the circle. The metaphor of the ring cycle, culminating with Brunhilda’s immolation, leads to the view that Sartre, par excellance, started the politico-ontological deconstruction of the ideal, Liebnitzean world. He proved too metaphorically obscure, and propped it up with the system anti system of the pure Heglelian dialectic, that of Marx. That failing, meaning analysis was reduced to the meaning of meaning, and preoccupation with text and context. Unfortunately for Russel, he was caught in a semantic ,irresolute semantic trap.

What remains? Hermeneutics and relational meaning between subject and object, ad hoc creation of temporal meaning.

You are right, that there is no subject/object referentiality in all this, and it is because the language of reference and meaning, has been buried within in solution of irreversibility. But vestiges remain, and these are archetypical foundations of what Polanyi calls ‘tacit knowledge’

The only reason to bring up this absence in presence, as Stirner calls it, is because, it is too tempting to bring in old notions of subjective/objective differentiation, of what it has become basically a text-context issue.

Whether it is or is not what he intended to effect, or if what he has achieved would be the primary focus , in defining the contradictory nature of dasein, is trumped by the antithetical Sartrean position on Heidegger’s intentionality, vis. presence can be imbued in absense.(ibid)

Sartre’s existenze is not absolute,it persists in a nausating duration, containing within it, the possibility of what is absent. The nothingness is contained in being, but from a so called objective position, being may well turn out as empty as nothingness. For Russell, these terms are probably co-dependent to a point where definitionally it may prove totally reductive to build any real framework upon them.

It’s a matter of choice. Accept the Hedeggerian Dasein, or wallow in the Sartrean Angst. The choice is yours.
Nothing you write here establishes any “boundaries”, and nothing you write here necessitates a position where all we have left is some sort of half digested Hermaneutic Circle.
If you accept H’s Dasein then you are free from the worry of the Gallic navel gazing, but that is as open to a Frenchman as it is to a Anglo-Saxon.
With H you are the centre of your experience and when asked what you think about your girlfriend’s abortion, inevitably all questions have to be filtered through the Dasein.
The point is that in H there are no objective moral considerations. Ultimately your choice is about how you feel about and for your girlfriend, not about some societal injunction gained through moral law. The Dasein might want to have adopted such views, and might “do the decent thing” in terms of society or his girlfriend. But the dilemma is a mirage. Ultimately all personal decisions are made by , and taken responsibility for the Self. This is true whether or not you accept H’s concept of the moral self or not.
The difference comes, that when you accept the truth of the Dasein, you are enlightened in a super-Kantian sense of Aufklarung, far in excess of Kant’s rather servile version of enlightenment. There is now no need to obey; that is nothing more the “obey” that your true self.

Dasein clutches to the heart, and embraces the truth of the human experience; that all we do is on our own heads. Whilst Sartre beats himself like a true Catholic wallowing in self loathing, and at odds with his relationship with the world; H puts himself first.

While giving you the benefit of doubt the only weakness in the above argument lies in the idea of free will, grounded in total freedom. The aufklarung it seems has nothing objective about it, it is based on a realization of synthetic unity, where reductive or regressive and progressive issues define the way we live. The boundaries are limits where such realizations can bear fruition. We may think we are totally free, or, absolutely hampered by a lack of clarity or the presence of responsibility. The aufklarung is a state of mind, with no connextion to issues as above?

The special relationship which exists between being and knowledge, present boundaries, which are matters of interpretation. Certainly our knowledge has to do with the clarity of mind, as well as the heart, and the it is not as if either one can act individually. To put it in another way, would place too much of an emphasis away from it dynamics of it, reducing it as it were from the framing of it, toward the pure object. It would deny the ontological intuition, which is behind it, and put it on the level of emotion.

I see where you are going with this, but emotional solutions lead away from the underlying structure, which, here on this forum, may be leading the truth of being through various routes, none of which are set in stone, and the authoritarian focus may be abandoned by inapplicable particulars. The connection between knowledge and it.s object Being present overlapping boundaries, as the need to know sometimes dictates it’s content, which includes it’s ultimate objective: Being.

My particular need, the knowledge and place of intuition within the erklarung? (framed by an commonly sensed objective)

Here is a direct quote from Kant:

Enlightenment is not merely the process by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of thought guaranteed. There is Enlightenment, where the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another.

The boundaries here are implied by the text, that of the ideas of the universal are bounded by the free and public uses of reason. The guarantee of personal reason is an idea bounded and overlapping by the free and the public use of that reason.

This throws light on the meaning of the idea of ‘a process of seeing their personal freedom’ as basically an idea, whereas public use is an extension of that into the realm of basing that supposed freedom of thought, toward functioning as such. The difference implies what Kant may means by superimposition. At the least, there is vagueness in maintaining wherefrom the process and the idea are differentiable.