The origin of the universe is not known. Since it is not known it is illogical to believe any possibility is true. It’s an assumption.
So what is not an assumption? Examples?
“Surely something created all of this” becomes a fairly true axiom, when you realise that creation is a myth, merely it is entities falling into order and restructuring themselves.
The religious supposition, is that the entities restructuring themselves, are God, the atheist supposition is that they are mere matter.
Really, the two are no different, IF, the religious supposition subconsciously believes God is not a sentient entity [size=85](most subconsciously do not believe God is sentient but only through humans are sentient because of God and God is sentient through humans.)[/size]
1+1=2, we have eyes, etc
Knowledge is not an assumption.
So if you see it, it is knowledge?
Well, yes. WW3Angry knows that he has eyes or at least what is according to his definition, eyes.
But, he cannot know that if others have eyes in their own reality, but he believes beyond a reasonable doubt they do.
The Big Bang is currently as far back as physics can go but it does not mean it cannot go back even further
Scientific knowledge is always increasing over time and so there is never a point when it becomes absolute
It is knowledge in the sense of they imagined the big bang happening in their minds, therefore, some apparition of the big bang exists, in their minds.
They way they interpret the data and equations, makes them see images of big bangs in their minds, and so they believe and have faith in the big bang outside of their minds.
No. I already laid that out in a previous post there. Maybe you want to reread it before logic testing me? It seems like a waste of time to go back to things I already covered
No I do not believe such things
Believe what things?
Please be more clear.
I don’t believe <definition of what I don’t believe>. Please don’t use ambiguous terms, like “such things”.
Well, we’ve known since Gettier at least that Knowledge is not justified true belief, there is an additional something needed to make the jump. Beliefs can be justified or not, true or not.
These aren’t mutually exclusive alternatives. In fact, it’s going to be more or less impossible for you to define ‘understanding’ in a way that doesn’t entail/include what epistemologists mean when they say ‘belief’. There is no understanding without a belief, in other words.
On the subject of what epistemologists mean when they say ‘belief’, it’s worth while to point out that it has little to do with the faith/religious overtones you give the term by citing the definitions you cite (and omitting the definitions you omit). Belief in the ‘justified true belief’ sense, the epistemologist sense, is not that thing atheists make fun of. It means nothing more or less than ‘thinking a proposition is true’.
You answer your own question here. Understanding things and accepting things both entail thinking one or more propositions are true- which is what a belief is.
For a layman who thinks that belief is somehow contrasted with knowledge, yes. For an epistemology, the correct answer would be ‘both’.
believe =/ merely believe.
Because you were asked by somebody who wants to claim that knowledge isn’t a type of belief, and so want to correct them by giving the most accurate answer you can.
Moreno answered correctly when he said knowledge was a subset of belief. I don’t see where you credibly refuted him.
Well, I have a standard for certainty of knowledge. I was just curious if yours was compatible.
I don’t believe what you state I believe in the sentence below:
“But, he cannot know that if others have eyes in their own reality, but he believes beyond a reasonable doubt they do.”
I am curious, why don’t you believe others have eyes? There are two options here.
Do you believe that their eyes don’t exist, and you are hallucinating them (this is a false notion. If you hallucinate something, it still exists.)
So the second option is, you see that others have eyes, but you believe there is no sentience behind the eyes?
Or do you not see other people having eyes?
I think Gettier used a very lax “justification” for his criticism of JTB theory, correct me if I’m wrong. Essentially, almost anything was justified, but when it turns out… what one considers justifiable to be believed and what one considers justifiable for knowledge, are two different things. Based on the definition of knowledge provided, I am ascribing justification that knowledge is understood, reasonable, logical. Belief’s in Gettiers theory - allowed for weaker justification to past through his test. Knowledge needs to be understood to be true, they need not have sound reason. Do you have any insight on this?
“I contest that belief is never justified. I contest that belief is not a step towards knowledge. I contest that understanding, logic and reason is the prerequisite for knowledge”.
- I contend that they are mutually exclusive. If belief is merely something that is thinking a proposition is true, then I agree. However, I don’t think a requirement for knowledge is “thinking a proposition to be true”. My point being that knowledge is not merely thinking something to be true, that knowledge is understanding something to be true. That being it is reasoned, understood, familiar in a manner that constitutes it being knowledge. This differnce, albeit subtle, leads to a separation of exclusivity. I think the generalization of the"attitude" of both belief and knowledge being true isn’t necessarily the same within the mind, if pressed. Therefore, I think it is an over generalization to consider knowledge to be believed. I think this key difference leads to a deeper understanding of knowledge and belief as a whole, and in turn, separately.
“However, why does that mean that knowledge is also belief? Knowledge is accepted as true, for good reason. Knowledge is not merely accepted it as true, it is understood.”
I disagree that I answer my own question here. It’s easy to say understanding and accepting things both entail thinking one or more propositions are true, which is what belief is, but knowledge is not about accepting. I think you’re missing the difference I am making between belief and knowledge in this manner - and that is easy to do so. It is very easy to attempt to just lump them together as acceptance, but I do not think I am splitting hairs either. There may be benefit to our minds to separate these as I have proposed, in that we solidify our epistemic frame of reference in a more coherent, although subtly different - that can essentially lead to much greater understanding when realized.
" If someone asked, “Do you know, or do you believe that 1+1=2”, the answer for most should be know."
I understand that, but that may very well be to not examining belief and knowledge as I laid out.
“If someone merely believes that 1+1=2, then they imply that they don’t have understanding of how 1+=1=2.”
I contend that it does, when compared to knowledge. Keep in mind the totality of my argument. I contend that I have a higher standard, and would need to then go into a theory of justification for how a “truth idea” becomes knowledge, or how knowledge is knowledge as well, but this is just a start here.
Based on my response here, does that change anything for you - as to your understanding of my thesis?
Yeah, he gave examples of beliefs that were justified, and also true, but did not constitute as knowledge.
Beliefs need to be understood to be beliefs. It doesn’t make any sense to me that a person would have a belief that they didn’t understand. They might not understand the full implications, or they might not understand why a thing is true, but they know what it is that they believe in all cases. A person doesn’t need to have sound reasoning to believe something, whether that something is true or not. A person does need to have sound reasoning to know something, that’s what the ‘justification’ is in the 'Justified True Belief" equation.
“Being a requirement for” and “being merely” are two different things. We agree that knowledge it not merely thinking something to be true. But that is a part of it. In order to know something, one of the criteria is that you think it is true. You cannot know 1+1=2 if you don’t think that 1+1=2. The ‘thinking that’ referred to is what is meant to ‘have a belief that’.
And also it has to be true. You can reason yourself to a position that is well understood and familiar to you, and also false. That’s not knowledge either.
Of course it isn’t. Just as the attitude of ‘seeing a fish’ and ‘seeing a shark’ isn’t necessarily the same within the mind. Imagine if you’re swimming in the ocean with a friend, and they point behind you and say “Oh look, a fish”. If it turns out that the fish in question was a great white shark, you may find yourself wishing that they said “Oh look, a shark!” instead. You might even think that they were being misleading, in a sense, for saying what they did. Nevertheless, sharks are fish. Yes, when you add justification and truth and warrant to get knowledge, you wind up with something that may be experientialy quite different from a ‘mere’ belief. This is acknowledged through the usage of the word ‘mere’; it doesn’t mean that knowledge isn’t a sort of belief.
Not just about accepting. You began this by talking about the idea of justified true belief being knowledge. There it is- the acknowledgement that in addition to belief there are at least two more criteria for something to be knowledge. You keep saying that knowledge is more than belief as if this is a revelation, when the mere statement ‘knowledge is justified true belief’ already acknowledges this.
I am interested in good arguments, not merely saying things because they will have a positive impact on society or whatever.
I am quite sure that epistemology as a field is not guilty of failing to examine belief and knowledge.
“Truth idea” in the above seems like a transparently desperate way to not say ‘belief’ in a place where everybody else would say it, despite you meaning the same thing. And yes, knowledge has a higher standard than mere belief or even true belief, that is what “Justified true belief” is alluding to.
Gettier gave examples of beliefs that were “justified” but justified how? To what criteria is this justification? Was it the same as knowledge? I think that epistemology is lacking in this arena - justification for what is belief and justification for what is knowledge. It is certainly ambiguous and I know of no real theory that sets forth to parse these. I mean, anybody can consider anything to be justified if they have low standards. So what are the standards and why?
Beliefs need to be understood to be beliefs, but that is rather redundant. They need not understand however, what they are believing. That is what separates knowledge from belief. You can believe 1+1=2, and have no idea why it is the case, but to know why, you must understand what 1+1=2, make sense?
Now being a requirement for and being merely are two different things, however, I contend that belief is mere… compared to knowledge. Again, keep in mind I am separating attitude from belief not only in justification, but also in attitude. Thinking 1+1=2 is rather ambiguous, is it believed or is it known? Thinking doesn’t imply either, it is just a general term in this case that really has no bearing on the matter at hand.
I contend that knowledge dose not have to be true. No part of the description of knowledge lays out a requirement for truth, as shown in my OP. Knowledge does not equal truth, truth is at times beyond knowledge. Do we know we live on earth? Yes. But do we know that is the truth? Perhaps not, there is a logical possibility that we are in the matrix. Not reasonable, however, but we are justified in stating we know we live on earth, in regards to the standard of what constitutes knowledge. We can contest it is true that we live on earth, regardless of that… however, we lack an objective all knowing eye and can only go off of the best probability based on the information we have. However, truth might be another thing to theorize on; Aristotle claims that knowledge must also be truth. However according to the SEP “Another possible avenue of resistance to the truth condition on knowledge derives from our apparent knowledge of false empirical theories. For example, it is intuitively plausible that Newtonian Physics is part of our overall scientific knowledge. But Newtonian Physics is false. So is it possible to know something false after all?” I contest that as we do not have an objective all knowing state of mind we cannot necessarily grasp truth even with knowledge, although most oft we probably can and do.
Knowledge as previously described being
“a familiarity, awareness or understanding of someone or something, such as facts, information, descriptions, or skills, which is acquired through experience or education by perceiving, discovering, or learning.
Knowledge can refer to a theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. It can be implicit (as with practical skill or expertise) or explicit (as with the theoretical understanding of a subject); it can be more or less formal or systematic.[1] In philosophy, the study of knowledge is called epistemology; the philosopher Plato famously defined knowledge as “justified true belief”, though “well-justified true belief” is more complete as it accounts for the Gettier problems. However, several definitions of knowledge and theories to explain it exist.”
Knowledge acquisition involves complex cognitive processes: perception, communication, and reasoning; while knowledge is also said to be related to the capacity of acknowledgment in human beings"
Please note that this shows no indication here that truth is of a matter to knowledge. I do not wish this to be a linguistic matter strictly either, as there is good reason we should not constitute truth with knowledge, I think. Epistemology has classically considered truth to be a necessary condition, but the more we learn and correct our past experiences of “knowledge”, the less likely that seems viable. In fact, it may have never been viable and need not be a condition for knowledge, I attest.
We don’t lack an all knowing eye, We are the Eye (I) who is the Knower of the All.
We know it is the truth we live on Earth, because we defined Earth as the planet which we live on. Even if the Matrix was real, we would still be on the Planet Earth, just it would be a videogame Planet Earth. Planet Earth would exist, and be true. See the parable of the evil genius.
If our consciousness exited the Matrix, and the rendering of Planet Earth ceased, then we would no longer be living on planet Earth, but at one time, we would have been living on planet earth, which is true, and knowledge.
Your part seems to lie on…“How can we verify if other avatars are experiencing the same earth we are?” But the consensus of the sentience behind avatars, is not needed for truth, simply if one sentience sees it is true.
This deepens the topic into the question of spiritual memory - How can we know our memories actually did occur outside of our minds? Perhaps we are in the matrix and they are implanted memories - So there seems to be an essence of spiritual memory, the awareness that memories did infact happen. It doesnt matter if it is a videogame or not, the key thing is, can the memories predict future outcomes, inside that videogame?
If we lived in a reality with no constance of structure, or memory, the designation Planet Earth would not refer to a static globe, but perhaps a globe of changing colors and texture. If it was formless, Planet Earth would refer to chaos itself. And, if it was pure chaos, there would not be a word for Planet Earth, but only some sense of a feeling.
So, we must judge the validity of a memory experience by whether or not it can predict the future outcome inside that videogame. If planet Earth refers to an orange, and inside that reality, oranges don’t exist, then planet Earth is a false concept. For example, free will is a false concept, because it has no consistent definition only an illusion. So, if Newton Equations says it roughly predicts behavoirs of large piles of atoms, it is true. If Netwon is a vague definition that implies it predicts behavoirs of small or single atom units, it is false.
Knowledge serves us well and is always subjective, dynamic, flowing. It often points to the truth, it is very easily considered truth - but when knowledge is not, does that knowledge stop being knowledge, or does truth simply become elusive to knowledge? Who is the arbiter of that and why? Truth is said to be elusive in the physical, not necessarily the axiomatic logical or conceptual. If all of this is but the matrix, is our knowledge truth? No, it is not. But is it logically possible to be in the matrix? Yes, it is. Is it probable? I would say, no, but how do we know if we don’t have the full objective all knowing standpoint?
So why should knowledge suffer from truth, when it doesn’t necessarily matter. The more we learn about the world, the more elusive truth becomes to knowledge. So why consider knowledge as always truth? Perhaps we shouldn’t and perhaps it is good to separate belief, opinion, knowledge and truth in very justifiable, reasonable ways that allow for a better parsing of our thoughts, instead of muddying up everything as JTB does and most commonly contemporary epistemology philosophy. There we have no justification, no standards for belief or knowledge, no standard for truth. It’s time we lay down some viable framework that helps us all comprehend how we think and how we can think better. Justifiably, reasonably, better.