The whole vs. the parts–yes, I understand this dilema very well–and it is very complicated (but doable).
First, let me point out how I see this in syllogisms. For example, this…
All X’s are Y’s.
This is an X.
Therefore, this is a Y.
The logic of this syllogism works because the meaning of the premises collectively leads to the meaning of the conclusion. Yet it can be rephrased as…
All X’s are Y’s, and this is an X.
Therefore, this is a Y.
…which can be further simplied to…
All X’s are Y’s, and this is an X, and therefore this is a Y.
Three thoughts translated to two thoughts translated to one thought.
But the shape changes when we learn new knowledge and insight, right?
What better way to promote one’s self than by a little publicity. Thanks encode for being my publicist!
Well, if you’ve followed my pantheist logic so far, we can begin by saying that wherever a physical action occurs, there is subjective experience. What this means is that whenever we perform an action (even breathing), we have effects on the physical world surrounding us. These physical effects, therefore, must come along with a subjective experience. Not ours, but the universe’s. Thus, we can say that at the very least, the universe “feels” us, at least in our local vicinity. What constitutes a “feel” is, first and foremost, a subjective experience characterized by some quality (this is how I define it). But the quality of this “feel” isn’t necessarily conceivable to us humans. Nonetheless, one could say that the universe experiences a “disturbance” from us. ← This is the least we can say. We can go further and suppose that, based on this feel, the universe can identify its source–that the disturbance is experienced as coming from (or being) some third person entity outside itself (this would require making a distinction between “us” and “the rest of the universe” which isn’t necessarily innate). But in any case, I think we can say that the universe at least “feels” us. As for knowing about us, that’s a bit more complicated. This is why I distinguish between experiential awareness (feeling) and epistemic awareness (knowing). Everything, insofar as it “feels”, is experientially aware, but only those systems that experience knowledge can be said to be epistemically aware. In order to say that the universe is epistemically aware of us–that is, the universe knows about us, or at least knows about the disturbances it feels that come from us–it would have to be established that these disturbances, these “feels”, lead to knowledge. Knowledge is just a special kind of experience (a special kind of feel) defined by a particular kind of quality. The quality of the experience of knowledge is, at least, cognitive. It is the experience of thinking “I am experiencing X” or “X is the case” and to believe it. This doesn’t automatically come with any arbitrary experience. Whatever it is that we or the universe experiences, it must first be translated into knowledge before it can be said to be “known”. If the physical effects we have on our surroundings can be said not only to come along with some subjective experience (some feel), but that this subjective experiences carries the specific qualitative signature of knowledge, then we can say the universe knows about us, or at least the disturbance (and possibly its source) that we cause. If not, then it still might be possible to say that the universe knows about us but only by way of some indirect physical effect that our more immediate effects on our surroundings have on the wider world (i.e. further along the chain of cause-and-effect). If, at some point on this chain of cause-and-effect that we initiate, the signature of the physical action in question qualifies as that which corresponds to knowledge, and if that knowledge is specifically about the original “feel” that we directly caused (the disturbance), then we can say that the universe knows about us. But I don’t take that as a foregone conclusion.
Well, I’ve thought long and hard about this very question for years. Keeping in mind that I’m a pantheist who believes that everything experiences, and that experience is underlied by meaning, I can offer you the following insight: when it comes to experience, and therefore meaning, the entire dynamic of “identity” radically changes. To the nihilistic objectivist, a thing can be broken down into its parts (in the way that the whole meaning can be broken down into component meanings) in such a way that we must still say the parts constitute the whole. IOW, the parts and the whole constitute an identity. The atoms that constitute a rock, for example, are said to be identical to the rock itself. But when it comes to experience and meaning, there is an alternative: one can speak of what I call “equivalence” rather than identity. Equivalence is sort of a complicated concept, but let me give you a few examples: if a pixel on a screen is perceived as orange, this may be said to be equivalent (but not identical) to the red, green, and blue hues that the pixel is made of when seen under a microscope. If the average score on a classroom’s exam is 82%, this can be said to be equivalent, but not identical, to the whole collection of individual scores of each student’s personal mark. If two poems convey the same meaning, each poem can be said to be equivalent, but not identical, insofar as their meanings are concerned. I can say that these are not identical by virtue of the manner in which we experience them: when we see orange on the screen, we do not see red, green, or blue. Focus on the screen as hard as you might, you’re not going to find them. Therefore, as a subjectivist, I say that the red, green, and blue that the orange pixel is made of is not identical to the orange I perceive (it’s not actually there in the perception–and what is a perception if not that which is perceived), even though it may be identical to the pixel as an external physical object, but as a perception, I see no red, green, or blue when I look at the orange on my screen. But I can still say the red, green, and blue are equivalent to the orange I perceive. Or in another example: the atoms which make the rock may be said to be identical to the rock, but as far as perception goes, I see no atoms in my visual apprehension of the rock. The atoms are identical to the rock as a whole, but my concept of the rock is not identical to my concept of the atoms–when I am thinking of the one, I am not thinking of the other. If you grant that my theory of experience is right (that experience constitutes the foundation of being), then it can be said that equivalence is the determining principle that ties together all states of experience in the universe. That’s not to say that identity plays no part, but equivalence, at least for me and my metaphysics, is the more suitable concept for imagining the relation between parts and whole. So, for example, even if we say that the atoms of a rock are identical to the rock as a whole, the experience that the rock is having (a steady buzz I would think) is not identical but equivalent to the experiences that the atoms are collectively having (a flurry of diverse and conflicting experiences). In the end, I define equivalence as the relation between two or more sets of things that are ontologically interchangeable, but not identical, with each other–interchangeable in such a way that there is no fact of the matter which one is real and which one isn’t (similar to how 1 = 1/2 + 1/2–well, which is it? 1 or 1/2 + 1/2? Well, it’s both, but we can interchange which one we focus on, and there is no fact of the matter which is the real expression and which is only on stand-in). They both have equal claim to existence. So bringing this back to the question of the holistic meaning vs. the collection of individual parts, I would say the parts that we experience at the human level, even when we are able to amass the whole conglomeration at this level (as dizzying a feat as that would be), is equivalent, but not identical, to the universal meaning at the level of the whole. Such an apprehension as that of all the meaning in all the experiences that a human being can have is (assuming it can be exhaustive of all meaning in the universe at this level) interchangeable with that of the universe as a whole, and neither the former or the latter have any entitlement on ontology over the other. They are both equally valid.
Now why would I mind that? I’d be thrilled if you quoted each and every one of my posts! (not that I’m asking )