I kind of felt You will modify a general descriptive construction, into which we have been dropped, and out of which we will try to navigate out of.
The aesthetic ground, serves as guidelines to do both: deconstruct and reconstruct in terms of satisfactory acceptance
The modus operandi of moral judgements (Kant) and the utalitarianism of Mill, can be handled in terms of the former,(in terms of duty and obligation to certain. Innate ideas/ideals, having predictable consequences , based on PLEASURE of varying kinds, moast notably of the kind Kant had in mind: of the spirit: of the Good, the Kind. the symmetrical and the proportional, those which result in equilibrium. They do not beg specific moral problems per application, they merely guide lines along critical and reasonable judgements.
There is foreseeability with Kant , but only drawn with broad brushstrokes.
I don’t think Kant would venture into absolute categorization as it strays away from a reasonable standard, or be unaware of the naturalistic fallacy.
Mills, on the other hand would need to seek relative pleasure as the motive of action, where the value of (good/evil) may not be exactly defined as an outcome. Some would consider abortion to be good if the nervous system and temporality of the mother would not be outweighed by the feeling of pain and temporality of the fetus.
I feel a little of both are needed to overcome this conflict even if they are of varied opinions , or they lean to disagree on definitions of Good, as an absolute or, the value of maximum number of people are to be considered. This is the ground here, because an aesthetic judgement is primary here.
No a problem particular: Take a man, wealthy, successful, healthy , physically in good shape , and an asset to society. Then take the lowdown immigrant , having nothing, in ill health, no job, etc. Absolute ethical standards would dictate that one of the former would be seen more worth more then scores of the latter.
Neither utilitarianism nor transcendental idealism serves its reasonable practical solution individually, or socially.
If some medic were to come out and say humanity would not survive if everyone over 30 would be left unelimimated, based on the theory that medical science, by extending life by better health care - did humanity a dis service, because it raised population to unmanageable levels , thereby lowering the quality of life- would that not be a reasonable basis for the argument? Would either such ethically absolute serve mankind better then a social morality based on a reasonable prediction as to what constitutes most pleasure to the most people?
Would either, both, or none could serve best, as being the maximal
ethical guideline or the most applicable moral tool?
I think better, the utilization of existing social programs are not less worthy then pragmatic consideration, for with a pragmatism puts all things may be taken into consideration , irrespective of any particular factor. What’s good does not necessarily value quantitative nor qualificational criteria one in front of the other, but neither does conditional or inherent values place unnecessary burdens of judgement on people or personages ,. It can, if the criteria change in an existentially reduced context.
So its a case by case situational ethics, which links to individually perceived morality. The link is there, potentially raised if it became necessary.
Lets say the mother rather risk her life then weigh in to the possibility that her fetus may not come out normal, based on religious notions. Could a medical expert come in with a judgement? He should when others are not willing or come in with their own opinion.
I think mind games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma are much more down to earth, if You want to get a more objective judgement, and still hold such objectivity in suspense, while one’s own predicament becomes linked to such a dilemma.For instance , lets say some one weren’t walk down a riverbank and notice a child struggling to stay afloat. Such a person has no legal duty to preform the action of saving that child, but what if that child should be closely related, does the ethical duty change? No, but the failure to save your own child would be mostly considered highly immoral, while to save the life of another child not, particularly if, such action would not include knowledge. of special circumstances unknown - such as the proximity of the real parent, or other such unknowns.
On ground of pragmatic ethical theory, most moral problems would be solved case by case, with the aid of immediate intuition coupled with reasonable assessment of the situation.
There may be certain deontological unalterable and sensibly rational methods by which most conflicting values can be solved.or.at least.mitigated to a desirably satisfactory definitive level, and such even come to become of universal applicability.
If one cannot come to terms , in near term , AI may help, or even constrain to come to such . The less freedom is afforded, the more such functions are taken over by artificially induced short cuts.
I fear the pleasures of authentic nihilism are going the way of romanticism a century ago, except the interval is becoming shorter.