There is no emergence

Idealism and materialism are two monist worlds view.

Materialism claims that either matter is mind (some sort of contradiction since they have different definitions) or mind is the result of matter activities. In later case, mind also experiences and effect reality (some sort of strange thing: something which is the result of matter activity experiences and affects something else which is the result of matter activity too, so matter does two things).

Idealism claims that only mind exist and matter is either mental or illusion, Qualia.

The difference between them, materialism and idealism, is that mind in one case is the product of activity of matter or is matter and in another case mind simply exists.

I have two strong arguments one in favor of idealism and one against materialism.

Yes. That is true. Materilism also suggests that mind is generated by matter or it is matter.

I believe that what we call matter is conscious things. I have an argument for that too. I however don’t know what they/things experience. A machine with an AI experience something different from simple machine. We know this through their inputs, decisions and outputs.

We’re talking about an experience that we have that we NAME. We don’t get to “define” what it is or isn’t…
We’re merely observing and attempting to understand its nature.

Thoughts, feelings, colors… these are experiences or sensations.

Call it consciousness or “mind” or qualia or what have you…

To say “Mind is not matter” is either a definition or it’s an assertion.
If it’s a definition, then it remains to be shown that what we experience qualifies by that definition.
If it’s an assertion it can and should be ignored unless sufficient reason is provided.

I have given you a method by which we can generate a sensation, an experience that is interpreted and “displayed” as something other than what it is.
This COULD account for our experience of the world as something other than chemical reactions in our brains. It’s merely a matter of abstraction… no different to turning electrical signals into images.

This experience this “image” that our “mind’s eye” is observing could be unique to us and all inclusive… it could contain feelings, sounds, thoughts, even the sensation of “observing” itself…
There is no limit to how we could abstract, categorize and display electrical signals… the only constraint would be utility.

And just to tie this back to the subject of the OP, this is all well within the realm of possibility because of the compounding effects of generating novel functionality from systematising interactions…
What I would call emergent properties.

In the example you provided, machine which plays chess, the behavior of the system can be explained in term of properties of parts otherwise one cannot design and build it.

If you’re talking about modeling a machine capable of playing chess, having an understanding of how each of the parts work would be insufficient.
You would also need to understand how the parts work and fit together as a whole…that configuration cannot be said to be a “property” of any of the parts.

Modeling a system is more than only knowing the properties of the parts. You need to know that who the system functions.

I said that the property of the system is a function of the properties of parts. Of course we know how the sum of parts work together. I didn’t said the bold part.

A ‘glider’ is an object within Conway’s Game of Life in the same way that a ‘computer’ is an object within the world: we know computers to be made up of smaller parts (whether that be chips or transistors or atoms or quarks, the point is the same), but we talk about ‘the computer’ as an object. So too, we talk about ‘the glider’, and not about the changes in a matrix of cells.

These objects and their properties are best understood without reference to their component parts.

It seems that this disagreement maps to a known division in theories of emergence, that between epistemological emergence and ontological emergence. I would say that emergence is an epistemological question, that it’s about what we can know or predict and not about what actually exists. I agree with you that “There is no [ontological] emergence”. I do think emergent properties supervene on the properties of their parts, but I don’t think there’s downward causation.

Mad Man P, I like the chess camera example for explaining qualia.

The glider is not a good example since it objectively doesn’t exist. The instrument is objective, where there might be a sort life (experience, decision and causation).

The object that we observe is the result of change in state of matter. Well if what you say is true then that is a sign of life in matter. Such a thing obviously cannot be designed.

Well, I am talking about emergence which describes a property of a system which is not describable in term of the properties of the parts. There exists a function if there is a description. So there could not be emergence if there is a always a way to describe reality. The question is how emergence is possible when you consider the fact that there should be a reason why a system should have a specific property rather than any other property.

What Machine experiences is different than what we experience. An electron inside the machine does not experience what we visually experience.

Interesting. But the computer does “objectively exist”, despite that we all agree it’s made up of atoms? What’s the difference?

For my purposes, it’s sufficient that the glider is identifiable in a way that I can point to it as a cohesive whole, and talk about its actions rather than the actions of its parts. i.e., if we’re looking at a grid space in Conway’s Game of Life (“CGoL”), we can see the glider moving across the grid, I can point to it and talk about how it’s moving, how it will eventually run into some other cluster in its path, or how it will continue indefinitely into the empty expanse of the grid. If we aren’t being pedants, we’ll understand each other when we say these kind of things. And if we can use concepts and language that way, we’re treating the glider as an object, and not as a bunch of parts, in the same way we treat the computer as a computer and not as a pile of quarks. And this distinction matters because in fact the cells don’t ‘move’, there’s no movement other than on and off for the cells; there’s no ‘path’, no ‘collision’, those are things the object does that the parts don’t do. The thing that’s moving is the higher-order object, the glider.

I call that an object, because that’s what we call the higher-order clumps of atoms around us, e.g. computers. And to the extent the cells in CGoL are objectively existing parts, the glider is an objectively existing object. If you want to specify that it’s a virtual object made of virtual parts, I have no objection, but it doesn’t change the analysis.

I don’t see how this follows. I’m not arguing that a brick is alive, but I do think bricks are best understood without reference to quarks.

Let’s take the system of ‘a $1 bill’, and think about the quark-level basis for the property of being worth $1. It’s not that we can’t (in principle) describe a dollar bill in terms of quarks or what have you. But that description doesn’t really tell us what we want to know. We would reduce the physical object to its constituent quarks, but also the concept of ‘value’ and ‘economic exchange’ and ‘money’ and ‘worth’ etc. in terms of quarks. What we end up with is a list of all the quark-quark interactions in causal chains that pass through any of those things.

Such a description may be true and precise, but it’s totally useless and can only exist in principle (the amount of information necessary to describe that many quarks and all their interactions is colossal). By contrast, we have higher-order laws that describe the dollar and its value with less precision but in a way that is efficient and practical.

When there are two descriptions, one of which is more precise but functionally unrealizable, and the other of which is true for practical purposes and easily instantiated, the second is rightfully called emergent. And while I use the word in its epistemological sense, I think the distinction starts to break down here. In principle, we believe it’s possible to describe the dollar in these terms, but even in theory we must conclude that it’s impossible given the inherent limitation on how much information we can pack into our universe. So the epistemologically emergent property ends up being functionally ontologically emergent, because the lower-level cause and effect description is forever unavailable.

I can see making a case that the functions of the system are an example of the functions of the parts, when those parts get together in some specific kind of whole. But it’s clear that these functions go beyond the functions of the parts NOT in that system. IOW we can, perhaps, black box ‘who’ actually owns the new functions that emerge when the parts are in this or that specific larger configuration. Fine. But the systems do things the parts do not.

The term is useful In fact it helps see the problem with reductionism. and gives that problem a label.

Atoms cannot write posts, unless they are in very specific, incredibly complicated configurations. None of the atoms in my body can write a post. None of the molecules can. No single nerve can. No organ can. It takes a person.

And heck, why are the parts more real than the wholes?

We only cannot realize the behavior of the object is the result of behavior of parts because of the complexity of the behavior in system but that does not mean that the function, which relates the behavior of objects to behavior of parts, does not exist. It is simply a failure of our visual perception (we cannot see the depth) that we could not realize the patterns in the behavior objects. An intelligent agent can be trained to see more depth, as an example Kasparov is one of the greatest person who can see deep patterns in each position in chess.

The truth is that there is only one description, reductionism, for any phenomenon and this description is functionally realizable. It is just difficult to find a description for all phenomena though. To accept that emergence is true is equal to accepting that reductionism is false. The existence of a reason for any behavior however enforces the reductionism. The very fact that for example we agree that a painting is beautiful indicates that the painting has a specific property which is functionally realizable in term of properties of parts. The beauty however is in mind of observer. What is beauty? A property (a form of Qualia, Qualia being whatever mind can experience). Beauty is aligned with the information we perceive . The alignment is the result of how our brain is structured.

Life is the game we play with different forms of Qualia. It is the result of experiencing Qualia, deciding when there is a conflict, and cause/affecte Qualia.

There is no emergence when there is a function.

What do you mean? Could you please expand this?

Each parts, from small to large to system, does something especial. We can imagine all parts.

Or it is useful to say there is. We don’t have this function at the parts level, then we have this particular function when a specific configuration is there at the level of hte whole. I can’t see a reason not to label the function or property emergent. The word emerge nicely spreads the responsibility around, since it implies that, in a certain sense it was there as a potential, but needed the whole to be realized.

When we reduce everything to the parts and shift the parts around and think we know what will happen or what the larger system is like, we make mistakes. The people making gm products made mistakes like this. They assumed that genes were randomly placed. You replace one, you simply change one trait or production of this protein. But the genes work as wholes, so they created all sorts of unintended effects. You can’t always understand what wholes will be like based on what the parts are like. emergence as a concept functions nicely as a quick way to say this. Hey, you know all about those parts when they are parts, but that doesn’t mean you know what happens when they are in wholes. New stuff happens. It seems like a very useful way to speak and describe. I see no reason to give this up. I also think there is no reason to think of the world in ways that prioritize parts - at least all the time. We find ourselves in a world with wholes. Of course one can learn by taking things apart and learning about parts on their own. But reductionism prioritizes this. At other times it is useful to think of the functions and properties of wholes as the thing, and the properties of the traits as secondary or not important for our thinking at those times. To say there is no emergence is to say it is just parts. But that is not the world we find ourselves in.

Yes, they all do something special or different. Is an electron really quarks or whatever they ‘are made of’ or are quarks just what happens when you destroy an electron for a time. Perhaps the quarks are not really there anymore when the electron is a whole. I think there is a metaphysical confusion that should be black boxed also, at least sometimes.

When we say there is no emergence or that wholes are really just parts, this may very well be illusory. Wholes may not even have parts, though if you destroy them, then you find pieces. It might be a confusion to say ‘But really a person is a bunch of chemical machines.’ A fundamental metaphysical error. There are no chemical machines but this very particular monad. If you destroy an arm or take away a part of the circulatory system - a blood sample, say - you can create pieces that are then, and only then, chemical machines, but before that they were integral pieces, not parts, of the whole person.

There is a particular personality type that wants to think of things as merely parts. It is a useful heuristic, but a limited one. Just as htinking only in terms of wholes doesn’t allow us to gain so much control, as science via technology has allowed us.

We can also think in terms of holons, things that are both parts and wholes, a la Ken Wilbur.

It seems that we need to agree on definition first. In here I am arguing against strong emergence which claim that the system is other the sum of parts. Strong emergence is a claim that if you have parts and know that how parts work together, laws of nature, then you are not able to explain the system (meaning that there is no function which describes the system). Here you are talking about weak emergence.

People make mistake about genes because they don’t know that genes are interacting objects.

This the part that I have issue with it, strong emergence. The heart of my argument is that there should exist a reason that the system has specific property rather than any other properties therefore there is a function which describes the property of the system in term of the properties of the parts. Therefore emergence (read it strong emergence) does not exist.

It seems like one is either a panspychist or a pantheist if one does not believe in strong emergence.

Otherwise you are simply saying you know X (about particles) is true, but have no way to demonstrate it. Deduction is always dependent on what is correct and incorrect in our limited knowledge. We have made seemingly obvious metaphysical deductions before in human history and been proven quite wrong.

Right, it’s unbelievable that the don’t get this, and I mean, lots of geneticists, at least those who work for Monsanto.

I think this is a coming-from-parts perspective. If you come from wholes downward, it is no surprise that breaking a pattern/structure might reduce the number of functions and qualities.

Sure. Here I provided an argument against strong emergence.

No. This is not coming from parts perspective. It is about a fact that there is a reason why system has very specific property rather than any other property.

It would be the same kind of reason that some quarks have this or that spin. If one does not come from a parts upward perspective, then there is no reason to assume the parts are the reason the system has that property. If the systems are primary, they have qualities that are or may be just given. Just as the parts have qualities that are merely given. Somewhere in the universe there are ‘things’ that just have qualities. They just have them. Not because something smaller is like X. Unless it is elephants all the way down. Which again is a property. Why time? Why space? Because of parts? Why are there parts? Because of the qualities of parts?

Well, the question is then whether there is a worldview that can exhaustively explain everything? Apparently quarks has specific property too therefore it could not be the fundamental bases of reality.

GUYS
guys.
A property is a function by which, or simply a way in which a thing interacts with an environment.

Yes?
Handy, to define what you’re discussing. Yes?

Okay.

Therefore, a property can never emerge purely “from within”.

What is going on in both particle- AND property-emergence is what we call “calibration”.
Between inside and outside.

OK continue.
Master will return in a month.

We/minds either follow a chain of causality or decide. The chain of causality is the result of all our past experiences. Atoms seems to just behave in a deterministic way which this is assigned to having specific set of properties.

I already give a summery of my position (previous comment).

Yes, emergence, emergence property being a property which is not a function of the properties of the parts, is impossible.

Great.

I haven’t seen it yet. Until then I will work with what is useful.

Wouldn’t surprise me. And how do we decide what is more fundamental. Time vs. Quarks. That there is something, that that is possible - is that a property, a rule, a fact, a ‘thing’ or a thing. Is it more fundamental? IOW sure, their may be parts of quarks, but it might also be that what is fundamental isn’t quite pieces, but mathematical, or a property. Perhaps the pieces are properties and the distinction is problematic. I mean the subatomic level doesn’t always act or seem like pieces, it seems like processes, sometimes mere potentials (things in superposition, precollapsed waves). Sometimes it seems like whatever is fundamental is not even real, yet.