On the other hand, suppose my not knowing how to live prompts me to choose behaviors based solely on what I perceive to be in my own best interest. And, in doing so, I make life a living hell for you and many other members of a particular community.
When then do my behaviors actually become a philosophical problem?
Or does a philosophical problem revolve only around an analysis of the language used to describe human behavior?
Does a philosophical problem revolve around academic philosophers devising the most rational âgeneral descriptionâ of them? Or is any particular individual then allowed to take these scholastic descriptions out into the world and ponder the extent to which they are applicable to his or her own values? Or the values of others?
âWhen then do my behaviors actually become a philosophical problem?â
I think you mean,
âWhen then do my behaviors actually become a moral problem?â
This, I believe, is what truly underlies iambiguous. The key to his defeat. Because all that other shit he says, itâs unassailable because itâs true. Itâs proper good philosophy. But he sneaks morality in there and yâall donât even notice.
I see you. I see you Wally. I see you Carmen fucking San Diego.
Which would be a practical problem for certain people, not a philosophical problem. Itâs also an argument based on morality: what if he starts doing immoral things because he doesnât know the way to objectively determine the good. Implicitly understood: Iambiguous right now is avoiding doing immoral things, unlike others. IOW he unlike Faust is trying to do good, help the world, rather than just play language games. Which is an odd, hence primarily implicit, claim for an existentialist. Odder still, he does, in fact, precisely what he seems to be almost threatening to doâŚhe interacts here - in what I think is his only community - in the manner of someone choosing behaviors based on what he perceives to be his own best interests. How otherwise can he get out of his hole, he repeatedly asks rhetorically. His impetous is to get out of the hole. And yet, at the same time, he takes the higher moral ground. There were so many ironies in his previous post it boggles the mind.
We all choose particular behaviors. These behaviors involve biological interactions, chemical interasctions, neurological interactions. And then others â anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists etc. â weigh in on them.
So, how is it then determined when and where philosophers should weigh in on them in turn?
Now, in the field of philosophy, there are âbranchesâ. The main ones beingâŚ
âMetaphysics, which deals with the fundamental questions of reality.
Epistemology, which deals with our concept of knowledge, how we learn and what we can know.
Logic, which studies the rules of valid reasoning and argumentation
Ethics, or moral philosophy, which is concerned with human values and how individuals should act.
Aesthetics or esthetics, which deals with the notion of beauty and the philosophy of art.â
My âthingâ here at ILP is to explore the manner in which those who are technically proficient in one or in some or in all of these branches, are able to approach the question âhow ought one to live?â by taking their technical knowledge out into the world that we live in and situating their intellectual conclusions in a context in which folks actually have conflicting assessments regarding how one ought to live. In order to be thought of as a rational human being.
How on earth does one âsneakâ morality into a discussion that explores the philosophical parameters of human interaction? Given that ethics is one of the main branches of philosophy?
Right. Like in discussing President Trumpâs immigration policy there are clearly distinct lines to be drawn between political theory and political practice.
Culminating in actual [and hopelessly conflicting] moral narratives embodied by folks up and down the political spectrum.
How then is it determined when serious philosophers have a role to play in, say, discussing immigration policy re the upcoming presidential election in the US?
Imagine, for example, a professional philosopher coming upon this site: immigration.procon.org/
Where would she draw the line between, ârelevant to philosophy, irrelevant to philosophy?â
Immoral things? And, with respect to immigration policy, what might they be? How is it determined [using the tools of philosophy] what the âgoodâ is here?
How does the pragmatist determine that other than by taking a particular subjective leap to a particular set of political prejudices that are rooted in the life that he has lived?
And what does he do when he recognizes that the arguments of those opposed to his own âhere and nowâ point of view donât go away as a result of the arguments that he makes?
This is simply preposterous. My whole argument rests on the assumption that in a No God world, I am unable to determine what it means to choose good or bad behaviorsâŚin any particular context understood by any one particular point of view. The part where I have thought myself into being drawn and quarteredâŚinto a hole [in the is/ought world] I am not able to extricate myself from.
Only I acknolwedge in turn that my own thinking here is no less problematic. There may well be a way in which to determine this.
And then of course âresolvingâ these conflicting narratives by making me issue:
Again, choose a context, a set of behaviors.
Iâll note the manner in which I approach them given my far more problematic understanding of pragmatism, and you can note how your own pragmatism of choice has allowed for a considerably less turbulent reaction to conflicting goods.
iam, what you donât seem to be getting is that you have posted tens, hundreds of thousands of words, mostly about yourself and no one else. And anything more general than that, you consider âon the skyhooks.â You are the only person on the planet that knows what an existential contraption really is. Where have you ever really defined this?
An advantage of a Rawlsian approach is that he takes out the metaphysics, the epistemology and really only focuses on matters of interest to political scientists, economists, government types. Deep staters. Stuff like that. He does not include your fractured âIâ because thatâs not a concern of any of those people. Thatâs for a psychologist to examine.
Except for that shattered ego, Rawls is right up your alley. Heâs also a brilliant writer. I am a fan of his method, if not all of his conclusions.
You quote authors who have a readership in the dozens (if they have large families) so I know you must read a lot. Try Rawls, instead of asking me oblique questions that reading Rawls could answer for you. Or David Gauthier. Or even some David Hume, who actually had more influence on Rawls than Kant did.
"My âthingâ here at ILP is to explore the manner in which those who are technically proficient in one or in some or in all of these branches, are able to approach the question âhow ought one to live?â by taking their technical knowledge out into the world that we live in and situating their intellectual conclusions in a context in which folks actually have conflicting assessments regarding how one ought to live. In order to be thought of as a rational human being. "
As you know, I do realize this is so, which is why Iâm your greatest fan.
Rock on iambiguous.
Forgive me if I find you too smart not to take a crack at it myself now and then. You are doing Godâs work.
Ah, taking KTâs approach: making me the issue. Unfortunately, I recognize myself even less here than in his own psych jabs.
Since we presume that we exist, not much about us isnât embedded in all of the contraptions that nature has included in the evolution of life on earth. And then the ever evolving, shifting, changing memetic contraptions derived from history and culture and our own personal experiences.
But: What here are we able to establish as in fact true for all of us? Those existential variables that appear to cling tenaciously to the either/or world century after century after century?
And then, on the other hand, what do we seem able to establish only as in fact something that we believe is true in our head? Something that others do not believe is true at all.
What role does philosophy play here? For some that is considerably more limited than for others. So all we can do here is to exchange narratives embedded in particular contexts.
Yet another general description of Rawlsâs general description of human interactions. And to the extent that you see my fractured âIâ as basically irrelevant to the concerns of philosophy is the extent to which we construe its purview in very different ways.
Until and unless those who champion Rawlsâs take on âfairnessâ bring that out into the world of conflicting goods embraced by individuals who have come to very, very different conclusions about âfair behaviorâ, all the definitions in the world wonât make those newspaper headlines go away.
One way or another, ones âmethodsâ and ones âconclusionsâ [as philosophers, scientists, politicians, sociologists, psychologists etc.] have to get around to the nitty gritty that revolves around either prescribing or proscribing particular sets of behaviors.
Ah, the clever retort. I do get that a lot here.
Iâll tell you what. You bring Rawlsâs methods regarding fairness down to earth by situating his philosophically relevant points in a particular context in which what some construe to be fair behaviors others construe to be anything but.
Moral thinking is useless, and probably impossible, without a world of conflicting goods. This is exactly the condition that moral theory addresses. If anyone does this, itâs Rawls. You clearly donât want to learn anything.
When you ask, âWhat role does [moral] philosophy play here?â you are asking what is among themost general questions you can possibly ask about morality. Itâs a meta-ethical question. You cannot get more general, more abstract than that. To expect the answer to be the solution to the problem of Joey and Suzy arguing about the rightness of abortion is unrealistic to say it kindly.
That they simply disagree is not a question for moral theory. Moral theory applies when we know why they disagree. That they have had different life experiences is not enough. That is a given. We need information that is not self-evident. Specific information. Your examples are vapid (because they are so general that they convey no information that we donât already have).
Why do Joey and Suzy disagree? Again, moral theory assumes that there is disagreement. All moral theory does that. We need to get your example off of the skyhooks.
You assert this as though asserting it itself demonstrates that it is true.
And what I would be interested in in regards to Rawlsâs âmethodsâ is the extent to which they might be effective in yanking me up out of thisâŚ
If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values âIâ can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other directionâŚor that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then âIâ begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.
Consequently, those who champion his methods are either willing to explore them in regards to a particular set of conflicting goods in a particular context, or they arenât.
Perhaps. But you clearly donât want to teach me how âfor all practical purposesâ Rawlsâs âmoral theoryâ has both a use value and an exchange value out in the world of actual human interactions that in fact do revolve around conflicting goods.
Right, like out in the real world here in America, the United States Supreme Court may not soon be sending women to the back alleys again for abortions. And if that comes to pass, folks like Rawls and his âmoral theoryâ are either relevant here or theyâre not.
Imagine for example a philosophy professor who champions Rawls âmethodsâ becoming pregnant. Say she was raped. How does she actually apply the arguments that Rawls makes when she is on trial for the premeditated murder of her unborn baby?
Again, either these âintellectual constructsâ make contact with âthe agony of choice in the face of uncertaintyâ out in the real world or they are passed back and forth didactically in places like this.
Why they disagree? Well the state in our post-Roe America argues that abortion is murder. The unborn fetus is human life and abortion shreds it. The Lawyer for the philosophy professor who aborted her fetus argues that the fetus is not yet an actual human being; and that women have the political right to abortion. Otherwise gender equality is long gone in a world where men cannot become pregnant.
Cue John Rawls here.
Letâs use this example as the one taken off the skyhooks.
It is self-evident. If everyone played by the same set of rules, there would be no purpose to moral prescriptions. How can this be controversial? If there is no deviation from the rules, the rules are superfluous. This is just common sense.
So read him. Thatâs also common sense.
Rawls does not propose objective values.
Iâll address this in the context of your next response.
You can find out for yourself if they are relevant.
Firstly, thatâs factually incorrect. Secondly, You are not giving her reasons - you are giving general, societal reasons. Get this off the skyhooks. I asked for his reasons and her reasons for their respective positions.
But my point is precisely that the moral objectivists insist that conflicting goods revolve solely around the assumption that their own moral/political agenda is necessarily the default in any discussion.
The âgoodsâ are seen as âconflictedâ only by those who donât grasp that all truly rational and virtuous men and women are categorically and imperatively obligated to become âone of usâ.
Yeah, but thatâs what folks will say about Plato or Aristotle or Descartes or Hume or Kant or Hegel or any other philosopher of note who has delved into moral and political philosophy.
I simply want to be apprised as to how their theoretical assumptions might be relevant in yanking me up out of my hole. With respect to an actual context in which values comes into conflict.
In this regard, why should I read him?
Okay, but his methods are such that he either felt more or less âfractured and fragmentedâ with regard to his own particular âIâ when confronting those who did not share his own value judgments.
This is always what I wish to explore with folks like KT. He, like me, rejects objective morality and has chosen to become a pragmatist. But my own pragmatism is a far more profoundly problematic existential contraption than his appears to be. It is rickety as hell. My âIâ allows me to construe my values as rooted precariously in dasein and conflicting goods and political economy. As, in other words, always and ever subject to change given new experiences, new relationships and access to new knowledge, information and ideas.
I am never able [psychologically] to feel any comfort and consolation when confronting the question âhow ought I to live?â And thatâs before the part about oblivion.