I think we need a very clear definition of truth. Since you quote that definition of truth - one amongst a few - I need to repeat that truth is not in reality, but is reality, by that definition.
Everything that exists is a truthbearer: matter, minds, universals, properties, etc.
I don’t know what this means. Some of this is empirical, some is not.
I understand the discord this idea raises in philosophy proper. It proposes that a non-empirical quality is essentially the “glue” that binds all of reality, empirical and non-empirical, together.
Some of it is non-empirical, some is.
I noted in the op the status quo idea that the “serious metaphysician” limits his inquiry to the natural sphere. I’m self taught and unqualified to be a serious metaphysician; hence my hypothesis.
I don’t know what a serious metaphysician is, but since what you describe is just one kind of metaphysics, I don’t see philosophy ruling out what you are saying, whatever it is.
Understood that philosophical orthodoxy keep empirical and non-empirical at arm’s length in separate categories.
If there was a philoosphical orthodoxy, then there would be a consensus. I don’t see this.
This seems based on the idea that matter is the primary reality—many call the material the “actual” world as you noted also. I take the position that abstract information is the primary reality because it occurred to me years ago that thing and attribute had to have some recognizable connection and only thing I could come up with is that both offer information to perception.
Some think attributes are empircal. Soem think things are. So you are not distinguishing your ideas from what philosophers might put forward as true.
So, I start there. From this perspective, “actual” reality and abstract entities are just different modes of information. Factual is “louder” and commands more of our attention, but is essentially the static stage dynamic consciousness plays out on.
On the other hand, a value-endued reality has a lot of interesting (to me anyway) connections. The notion of truth as just a feature of propositions or beliefs rises to a much larger role as a value mechanism for all existence.
I think, but I am not sure, that you are conflating truths with things like universals or laws.
Like with the latter that there are rules for the behavior of stuff we experience and we don’t experience those rules, we deduce them. But the truths would be the assertions of those laws, for example, not the patterns/rules out there in reality. I am not making a metaphysical assertion here and so disagreeing with you. I am making a language based criticism. I htink, but I am not sure, you are using the words poorly.
From the starting point “How would Avicenna’s idea that truth is a component of reality (essence) work? How would that play out?”, the conclusion I came to is that there are a number of interesting logical scenarios just on the secular side of things, probably the most significant of which is that value can be mapped to cognition as the prime mover of human behaviour.
I don’t know his work, but I just read a summary and he seems to view truth as a propositional something. Like a stone is not a truth. Though it is real.
There are even more possibilities on the theological side. I can only imagine where the mechanism of value could go in the mind of an actual philosopher, but suspect no one dare buck the status quo.
I think it’s probably not useful to posit yourself as raining rebellious notions that will feel threatening to the status quo. 1) I don’t think you are correct about the orthodoxy or that there is one in the way you mean and 2) there sure as hell isn’t one here. A read of anyone from Ecmandu, to Unwrong, to myself - when I venture into my own beliefs in metaphysics which I rarely do but have done - to Artimas and more…will show ideas that if there is anything like a set of ideas that are orthodox in philosophy, they do not control the range of ideas presented here. IOW I do not think it is useful to frame the issue as people are resisting your ideas because they threaten their need to back some philosophical consensus.