Freewill exists

There seems to be a range of usages of the word “free”. I fully acknowledge that some are using free in the way you’re describing, but my contention is that whichever way you want to use “free” you can’t ignore the premise of it having to be “from causes” in order to be fully consistent.
Yes, if you ignore causes, you can use “free” like being free from the compulsion to follow impulses, and attributing this to a strong will. You can contrast this with not being free from the compulsion to follow impulses, and attribute this to a lack of will, or a weak will.
But you can’t ignore causes. You are never free from them regardless of how impulsive or rational you are, and since you can’t ignore causes, it’s not really you and you alone to whom you can attribute a strong/weak/lack of will. A “will” is just another thing that’s caused to be either way → not “free” from cause. So no Free Will. But yes, you can ignore the unavoidable premise of freedom needing to be from cause in order to be fully consistent, and then you can comment about wills all you like, it’s true.

My “motive” for going after identity is because it’s so problematic. I have no agenda here, other than to get to truth as best as possible - I don’t care what form it happens to take as long as it’s the best possible. If it could be Free Will, then sure, I have no emotional horse in the race, but it can’t be Free Will for the many reasons I pointed out.

I guess problems with identity does spoil your consent thing, I hadn’t thought about that until you mentioned it - but yeah, I guess that gives you an emotional stake in defending identity. Maybe that’s the core of why you can’t accept my arguments?

And no, problems with the concept of identity is just one thing that gets in the way of Free Will. I listed my main 3 arguments against Free Will on multiple occassions, which haven’t even been attempted by anyone yet, but I’m fine just sticking with the identity thing because that’s enough on its own. But the thing is, even if identity wasn’t a problem - there’d still be my main 3 arguments - so I’m in no corner :slight_smile: I’m out in the fresh air here, and it smells good.

I explained this, more than once I’m pretty sure: the truth and the lying aren’t referring to the same thing - it would only be a contradiction if they were referring to the same thing. A∧¬B, not A∧¬A.

Can you explain the problem you’re laying out here a bit more? Not really sure what the issue is that you’re highlighting.

You said something about 2 former posts that you want me to respond to - do you mean your response to promethean or is there a different one I’ve missed?

Silhouette,

I’m sorry to labor you this way, but I don’t remember an itemized list of your three problems with freewill.

I’d really appreciate this before moving forward.

Freedom is “The Cause” of will…

Therefore, Free-Will

The fewer variables there are the more likely randomness in all its possible variations can be observed - that is where all possible variations can be observed
The simplest example of this is tossing a coin where there are only two variables - heads and tails - so randomness is not impossible to observe like you claim
Binary or even non binary variables - throwing a dice for example - are both possible to observe and entirely random as well

Even where the number of variables is either infinite or unknown randomness can still be observed - just not every single variable
The only time randomness can be falsified is where the same variable keeps repeating itself where there are at least two of them
Although if logically there are at least two of them then it will already be known in advance that randomness is actually possible

It is possible for example to toss a coin an infinite number of times and for it to always land on heads even though there is a binary choice between heads and tails
And also from a random perspective this is no more unusual than any of the other number of infinite possibilities from tossing that coin an infinite number of times

Statistics is decidedly non random.

For example: even with coin tosses, the “randomness” over an infinity of tosses is 50/50, not just 30/70 sometimes, and 65/35 other times for example … it’s a contradiction to define random as non random. These are complex systems, but not random.

Sure dood, they’ve popped up a few times in this thread, mostly in responses to you - I think this was the must succinct formulation of them in a response to you back on page 8:

  1. Possibility is not actuality: the feeling that you could have chosen differently doesn’t make it an actual choice. Only actually choosing makes something actually possible.
  2. The mind-body problem. Not a problem in the sense that it could have a solution, but a problem in the sense that it’s an unavoidable obstacle to any degree of Free Will at all.
  3. How can you be influenced by circumstance, in order to have something to make a decision about, without being influenced by circumstance, in order for your decision to be free from said influence? Free or Will? Not both.

Excellent. Id not have quite braved this rhetorical leap but I was about to say that “free will” is tautological, that “of ones own free will” means the same as “freely” and “of ones own will”. But I have to agree with your ranking order.

Free means unobstructed, unhindered.
Will can be tied down by the affects and obstructed by greater powers.
Freedom both of ones affective self as well as from unsurmountable obstacles, - rather, of the thought of such obstacles (Spinoza) would make for a fully free will, a pure will, pure freedom.

Allegorically, “god” “made” the universe out of such freedom. That is to say its existence is an act of freedom. But that hardly means that this freedom is thence richly distributed inside of it.

philosophy.lander.edu/intro/spinoza.shtml

Until now, this thread has been a no-spinz zone.

What is the difference between possible and actual other than one happened and the other did not happen
If something is physically possible - as opposed to just being theoretically possible - then whether or not it is chosen is academic
Free will is the choice between all possible variables - regardless of whether they are chosen or not - and so all are equally valid

Your decision is not free from said influence because it is restricted by the possibility of choices available
But within that restriction however you are entirely free to exercise your choice any way that you want to

Silhouette wrote:

  1. Possibility is not actuality: the feeling that you could have chosen differently doesn’t make it an actual choice. Only actually choosing makes something actually possible.

Ecmandu replies: This swirls around with the concept called: modal realism

In short, the concept of modal realism is the concept that we cannot conceive of anything, unless it is already actually happening in this or another reality.

In the structure of modal realism, people argue the point I made above, and people also argue against, that imagination is a different value than actuality, a different dimension of sorts.

We can prove modal realism false by simply stating “Everyone ever born is in hell forever”, which is demonstrably (self evidentially) not true.

That’'s a hypothetical reality.

What we can discern from this, is that we have imaginations that aren’t real; they are simply imaginations, that don’t manifest as our objective truths.

I’ll go further with this, with the post I made to peacegirl:

The existence of identity is not about us not being able to travel to the past and change the future, it’s the opposite, we can’t be ourselves if the past is ever changed. Compatabilists except this, just like compatabilists except that you cannot smoke a cigarette if at least one cigarette exists in existence (determinism). Yes, there are aways restrictions… does that invalidate choice? Choice requires restrictions. The argument of restrictions, does not invalidate choice in and of itself. This is not a disproof.

Silhouette wrote:

  1. The mind-body problem. Not a problem in the sense that it could have a solution, but a problem in the sense that it’s an unavoidable obstacle to any degree of Free Will at all.

Ecmandu replies:

Just like I can’t smoke a cigarette unless a cigarette exists, I cannot have a thought unless neurons exist. Again, this is a not a disproof of freewill in terms of compatabilism, it is simply a disproof of absolute freewill. Mind always has some form of body, even if it is supernatural, like the fable of jesus after the resurrection… who could walk through walls and walk on water, and not have to eat food or drink water to survive. We can’t conceive of disembodied sentience, just like we can’t fathom a person smoking a cigarette when existence has no cigarettes to smoke. This in and of itself, is not a disproof of freedom to choose between options.

Silhouette wrote:

  1. How can you be influenced by circumstance, in order to have something to make a decision about, without being influenced by circumstance, in order for your decision to be free from said influence? Free or Will? Not both.

Ecmandu replies:

I already discussed this. If everything is determined, we can prove everything being determined is not falsifiable… since this statement is falsifiable, we can determine that everything is not determined.

What I mean by this is:

If everything is influenced by circumstance outside our control, then we can prove that we have no capacity to prove that what we think is correct or false, regardless or whether it is correct or false. We just think that true is whatever the universe determines us to think is true.

The act of us being able to take a birds eye view and even formulate a disproof in the sense that determinism is not falsifiable, proves that the identity, the will, is falsified by such a simple proof that determinism allows for no falsification (that is a falsification) thus, determinism is false.

It is more accurate to say that absolute determinism is false rather than determinism in general which is not false
As some scenarios are deterministic because there is only one possible outcome but this is not true of all scenarios

One happening and the other not happening makes all the difference, is my point.

Determinism describes the reasons why you chose the actual choice and not the other possible “choices”, so since you were only determined to consider the possible choices and not to actually choose them, and you were only determined to choose the choice you actually choose, only the actual choice is the real choice - the other choices were just possible choices. If you follow the chain of causation, however potentially actual the possible choices may have seemed, they were never actual if they weren’t chosen at that given point. They can be chosen later, but that doesn’t make them “the actual and only real choice” on that previous occasion, it just makes them the actual and only real choice that is determined to be chosen on this new occasion.

Basically, I’m saying that the possible is only illusion until it is realised - shouldn’t be that contraversial, right?
Determinism describes the ways in which the illusions come to mind, and the ways in which you choose the one real choice you were determined to choose in actuality.

You feel entirely free to exercise your choice and choose any of the possible illusions you are not determined to choose, but you’re actually only “free” to exercise your choice to choose the one real choice that you end up choosing in actuality.

Ok so now all we have to do is prove modal realism.

Now here we have a genuinely unfalsifiable philosophy! Not only is the word “possible” highly problematic, but how do you access these other worlds without the circular reasoning that they are accessed by our imagination (i.e. “how do we know possibilities that we imagine are real? Because we can access them in our imagination of course…”)?

You yourself seem to be admitting that you can state some scenario that is evidently not true, and that disproves Modal Realism. I agree with the conclusion, but am not sure “Everyone ever born is in hell forever” qualifies as a possible world - hence my mention of “possible” being highly problematic. How do you really know if something is possible? You test it in reality, it has to become a real determined choice first - which puts its status of “possible” into question. Modal Realism would put our actual world in the same category as any other possible world, but I would dispute that. The actual world is the necessary world, seeing as it is all determined in the one way that it is, at any given point. But even if possible is downgraded to “seems like it could be actual as far as we can imagine”, it’s still merely possible and not actual - the possible and the necessary are not the same thing in Modal Logic. You might argue that some things imagined seem more possible than others, and that different people might judge these boundaries differently, but not even this makes even the agreed “most possible” choice actual, unless it is actualised. Any consensus on possibility doesn’t traverse the abyss between possible and necessary until then.

Free Will needs something like Modal Realism to be plausible in order to justify “you could have chosen otherwise”. Since it is not, I don’t think you’ve challenged my first argument.

The intention of this argument was to highlight the fact that you need substance Dualism in order to try to believe in Free Will to any extent. Free Will requires some “mind” (or other substance) that is both “free” from “matter” (or some other substance, which follows causation, that is different from the first substance), and also able to interact with it - as though that were not a contradiction. There needs to be some realm of disconnect between the decision maker and the world he or she decides about: Dualism, in order for Free Will to try to make sense. And yet it can’t make sense - if you accept some kind of Dualism where one substance is free from another, but also bound to it, that is a contradiction: the decision-making substance has to be influenced by the world substance, and be able to interact with the world in both input and output, in order to both make an informed and relevant decision and enact it, and yet it also has to be free from this world in order to not be determined by it. But this lack of sense is my 3rd argument. My 2nd is that you have to get past the mind-body problem in order to justify Dualism in the first place, even before you can try to justify the mess of causation that is “Free Will”. Because Free Will requires Dualism in the way I just described.

This is an argument against Determinism. My three arguments are against any degree of Free Will. “One or the other only” is a False Dichotomy.

For the sake of argument, and I don’t believe this to be true, let’s grant that Determinism is 100% unjustified. My 3 arguments still stand that prevent, beyond any doubt, any degree of Free Will from being able to exist. If you need to accept the problematic concept of identity, and you want to deny Determinism to any extent, even all the way to denying it exists at all because you don’t think it’s Falsifiable, then you still can’t fill the void with any degree of Free Will, because of my 3 arguments.

But you do believe in some degree of Determinism - as do I: there must be some way that is causing e.g. us to so reliably be able to have this conversation at all: causation. For every person here, they believe in some degree of Determinism or they wouldn’t be using the internet - even our resident freedom-zealot toddler - it’s only its application to “the self” and “choice” where they raise their cherry-picked objection. I’m reminded of comedians like Bill Burr and Jim Jefferies who trash audience members when they laugh for the whole show of offensive jokes only to get offended by one of them. To all those people, object all you like to Determinism acting in your special place, but Free Will still can’t exist there instead because of my three arguments (and maybe more besides if necessary).

But as for Determinism acting even in your safe space, the experiments have been done - you can be influenced by precise deterministic stimulation to choose the way you can be controlled to choose, and all the while think you were perfectly free to choose, and that it was 100% your choice that you chose. They match the theory just fine, and as complex as neuroscience may be, there’s Determinism going on even “up there”. You can accept it or not, but that’ll be Determinism just doin’ its thang.

There was a reason why I brought up Falsificationism itself not being falsifiable, and yet still being essential to knowledge. Even if Determinism wasn’t falsifiable - would that be more of a problem than it is for Falsificationism? Existence isn’t falsifiable - does existence therefore not exist? In light of what promethean said at the top of this page, these general set names for methods/descriptions seem only to be falsifiable if you can guarantee disproof of every possible specific instance empirically (problematic) and/or through logical necessity (perfectly possible - like you can do with Free Will) - Falsification is essential for these specific instances at the very least. I’ve already fully acknowledged “the problem of induction” at the top of page 11 on this thread as well as on other threads, and it’s still potentially possible to falsify instances of supposedly deterministic causation from occurring in specific situations. But for the falsification of Determinism, as I covered, if might be revealed in future to be a misunderstanding once it becomes apparent that it can be completely replaced by a superior model, if it can’t be disproven by logical necessity before that - so we know it is falsifiable at least to that degree - but we know for sure that no superior model will ever have anything to do with Free Will because of my three arguments et al. But my stance has always been Determinism 100% insofar as we are able to model Continuous Experience by means of Discrete Experience, to the extent that such relative attempts can ever be absolute and perfect, and yet they can be better than alternatives (such as “Free Will to any extent” - and in this case the degree to which Determinism is superior is completely).

This is just a bunch of bullshit…

Let’s say you have 1,000 people and 10 doors. Everybody picks a door to go through. So everybody makes their choices and starts going through the doors. But one door, door #4 is locked, and people were not made aware of that before making their choices. Those that choose door #4 are held back. Everybody else walks through.

They could have chosen otherwise, but they didn’t.

It’s as simple as that. Before everybody chose their door, they all did have free-will to choose any of those doors.

You’re implying that “everybody decided before they decided”. No, they didn’t. You’re wrong again, Silhouette, face the music.

Silhouette,

This is going to be funny!

What if someone builds a machine to change their neurons the exact way that they want their neurons to be and exactly how they want them to fire?

What if they can figure out how to abstract that machine within their own neurons, instead of an external tool, it’s built into biology through greater technology?

Yeah man, this could be our future… seems weird, but also appears likely.

The obvious question here being…

What does that say about determinism?

It’s a zero point argument, the determiner and the determined are the same exact thing: compatibalism!

you’ve got more patience for the po-jama people than i ever had, sil, and i don’t know how you do it.

some people’s hot
some people’s cold
some people’s not very swift to behold
some people do it
some see right through it
some wear po-jamas
if only they knew it

It’s Determinism-ception.

Being determined to want to determine what you want etc.

More like an infinite points argument for Determinism with zero points argument for any degree of Free Will.

If I quit, they’ll just declare victory. I’m stuck, halp mee.